Abstract Moisture content control is a very effective way of protecting timber. Treatments with environment-friendly, biodegradable tall oil are known to reduce the capillary water uptake of pine sapwood greatly, but despite the good results achieved there have been two problems that limit the use of tall oil for wood protection, the large amount of oil needed and the tendency for the oil to exude from the wood. This work was undertaken in order to obtain an understanding of the mechanism of wood protection by means of crude tall oil (CTO) and to find technical solutions to the main problems limiting its use for industrial wood protection. It is shown that the emulsion technique is one way of solving the first problem, as it provides high water-repellent efficiency at considerably lower oil retention levels. The fact that water is used as a thinner in this technique instead of the commonly used organic solvents is beneficial from environmental, economic and safety points of view. It is also shown that although the drying properties of CTO are inadequate for use as such in wood preservation, its oxidation and polymerization can be accelerated considerably by means of iron catalysts, which prevent the oil from exuding out of the wood. This also increases the water repellent efficiency of CTO treatment. Most impregnation oils do not dry when applied in large quantities, because they hinder the diffusion of air through the wood, which supplies the necessary oxygen. Limiting of the oil uptake by the means of the emulsion technique disturbs the airflow to a lesser extent, and thus enhances the drying process. Hence, both the emulsion technique and the use of an iron catalyst improve both the water-repellent efficiency of tall oil treatment and the rate of drying of the oil, thus solving the two main problems related to wood impregnation with tall oil in one single-stage treatment which can be used in existing wood preservation plants. This is advantageous from both an industrial and an economic point of view.

Until the developments in computer technology, linear test administrations within classical test theory framework is mostly used in testing practices. These tests contain a set of predefined items in a large range of difficulty values for collecting information from students at various ability levels. However, placing very easy and very difficult items in the same test not only cause wasting time and effort but also introduces possible extraneous variables into the measurement process such as possibility of guessing, chance of careless errors induced by boredom or frustration. Instead of administering a linear test there is another option that adapts the difficulty of test according to the ability level of examinees which is named as computerized adaptive test. Computerized adaptive tests use item response theory as a measurement framework and have algorithms responsible for item selection, ability estimation, starting rule and test termination. The present study aims to determine the applicability of computerized adaptive testing (CAT) to Turkish Pupil Monitoring System&rsquo / s (PMS) mathematics assessments. Therefore, live CAT study using only multiple choice items is designed to investigate whether to obtain comparable ability estimations. Afterwards, a Monte Carlo simulation study and a Post-hoc simulation study are designed to determine the optimum CAT algorithm for Turkish PMS mathematics assessments. In the simulation studies, both multiple-choice and open-ended items are used and different scenarios are tested regarding various starting rules, termination criterion, ability estimation methods and existence of exposure/content controls. The results of the study indicate that using Weighted Maximum Likelihood (WML) ability estimation method, easy initial item difficulty as starting rule and a fixed test reliability termination criterion (0.30 standard error as termination rule) gives the optimum CAT algorithm for Turkish PMS mathematics assessment. Additionally, item exposure and content control strategies have a positive impact on providing comparable ability estimations.

On assiste depuis 2020 à une riposte politique concertée et sophistiquée contre les Big Tech et leurs dérives. Plusieurs dirigeants mondiaux, de Bruxelles à Canberra, tentent de rependre contrôle de leur environnement numérique – et par le fait même de leur marché – en assujettissant ces grandes entreprises du numérique à des lois rigoureuses en matière de concurrence, de modération des contenus en ligne et de respect de la vie privée. Après avoir fait preuve pendant longtemps de permissivité et de laisser-aller face à la montée en puissance des Big Tech, les décideurs politiques occidentaux sont aujourd’hui beaucoup plus interventionnistes et incisifs envers ce qu’ils perçoivent être une domination de multinationales – américaines pour la plupart – qui nuisent à la concurrence et à la démocratie. Ce changement de paradigme dans la régulation du numérique soulève des enjeux importants quant à l’origine de cet élan politique contre le pouvoir des Big Tech ainsi qu’à sa diffusion. D’où provient-il? Comment ce cadre réglementaire centré sur le triptyque des contenus (content), des données (data) et du pouvoir de marché (market power) s’est-il façonné et propagé? À partir d’une étude de cas des projets de réformes américains dans le secteur du numérique depuis le début de la présidence de Joe Biden (2021-2023), notre mémoire démontre que ce récent élan transatlantique s’explique en partie par l’activation d’un «effet Bruxelles» de jure – entendu ici comme l’effet de contagion du modèle réglementaire européen avec sa capacité normative à influencer le reste du monde – et de ses réverbérations (Bradford 2020). / Since 2020, there has been a growing political and regulatory push against Big Tech's power. Numerous world leaders, from Brussels to Canberra, are trying to regain control of their digital environments – and their markets – by subjecting these large digital platforms to stringent laws on competition, content moderation and privacy. After having long shown permissiveness and laisser-aller towards Big Tech's rise, Western policymakers have recently adopted a more interventionist and incisive approach towards what they perceive as a domination of foreign (primarily American) tech companies that harm competition and democracy. This surge in policymaking raises important questions regarding the origin of this transatlantic backlash against Big Tech's power. Where does it come from? How has this regulatory framework centered around content, data, and market power been shaped and disseminated? Our thesis, based on a case study of American reform proposals in the digital field since the beginning of Joe Biden's presidency (2021-2023), demonstrates that this recent transatlantic movement is in part a manifestation of the de jure "Brussels effect" – understood as the contagion effect of the European regulatory model with its normative ability to influence the rest of the world – and its reverberations (Bradford 2020).

Wie sollen Rechtssysteme auf Regeln reagieren, die Provider von Netzgemeinschaften wie Facebook oder World of Warcraft Nutzenden auferlegen? Das positive Recht gibt hierauf keine verlässliche Antwort. Erst ein Verständnis der Legitimität der Regeln ermöglicht ein Austarieren des Verhältnisses zwischen den Regelwerken von Netzgemeinschaften und Rechtssystemen. Nach Literaturstimmen sollen die Regeln durch außerrechtliche Mechanismen (z.B. direktdemokratische Verfahren), eine gerichtliche Kontrolle nach verfassungsrechtlichen Kriterien oder Zivilverfassungen legitimiert werden. Es ist aber zweifelhaft, ob Netzgemeinschaften legitime außerrechtliche Mechanismen schaffen können, ob sie wie Staaten behandelt werden sollten und ob Zivilverfassungen entstehen werden. Die Arbeit schlägt ein alternatives Modell vor: Im deutschen Zivilrecht zeichnet sich ein Legitimitätsmodell für private Regeln ab, das auf Regeln von Netzgemeinschaften anwendbar ist und als transnationale Schablone dienen kann. Danach werden die Regeln durch die Zustimmung und das Wohl der Nutzenden legitimiert. Letzteres gewährleistet ein Ausbeutungsschutz der Nutzenden in Form einer gerichtlichen Kontrolle. Die Anwendung des Modells führt zu folgenden Erkenntnissen: 1. Geschriebene Regeln sind schwach durch Zustimmung legitimiert. Eine gerichtliche Kontrolle nach vertragsrechtlichen Kriterien (bei Regelungen des Austauschverhältnisses zwischen Providern und Nutzenden) oder grundrechtlichen Kriterien (bei Verhaltensregeln) verleiht ihnen zusätzliche Legitimität. Die Kontrollintensität hängt von der Höhe des Ausbeutungsrisikos und der Existenz von legitimen außerrechtlichen Mechanismen ab. 2. Code-Regeln (z.B. Newsfeed- Algorithmen) sind auch nur schwach durch Zustimmung legitimiert. Gerichtliche Kontrollmöglichkeiten, die sie gegenüber Nutzenden legitimieren, müssen noch geschaffen werden. 3. Geschriebene und Code-Regeln sind illegitim gegenüber Nichtnutzenden, weil sie nicht auf deren Zustimmung beruhen. / How should legal systems respond to rules that virtual community providers such as Facebook or World of Warcraft impose on users? To answer this question, we must look beyond black letter law. Only an understanding of the legitimacy of these rules allows us to balance out their relationship with legal systems. Current scholarship theorizes their legitimacy as follows: Non-legal mechanisms (e.g. direct voting systems), judicial review according to constitutional principles, or digital civil constitutions may legitimize the rules. Yet, three points remain doubtful: whether virtual communities can develop legitimate self-governance mechanisms, whether they should be treated like states, and whether digital civil constitutions will effectively emerge. This work proposes an alternative legitimacy model: German private law reflects a legitimacy model for private rule-making applicable to rules of virtual communities which can serve as a transnational template. This model suggests that the rules can derive legitimacy from two sources: user consent and the common good of users, the latter ensured by judicial review protecting users against exploitation. This leads to the following key findings: 1. Written rules of virtual communities are weakly legitimized by user consent but derive additional legitimacy from judicial review. Contract law standard applies to rules that govern the bilateral exchange relationship between providers and users. General rules of conduct for users are checked against fundamental rights. The required intensity of review depends on the risk of user exploitation and the presence of legitimate self-governance mechanisms. 2. Rules embedded in computer code (e.g. newsfeed algorithms) are poorly legitimized by user consent. Judicial review procedures legitimizing them towards users still need to be established. 3. Both written rules and rules embedded in computer code are not legitimate towards non-users since non-users have not consented to them.