In this thesis, we want to establish a theory of "contractual egalitarianism". It depends on the assumption that all people are free and equal. If all people are free and equal and they want to find a principle to govern their society, they would adopt a modified version of Scanlon's contractualism. According to this version of contractualism, a social practice or institution is unjust if it would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of society that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. If we have good reasons not to adopt a certain kind of policies, then it is likely that any principles allowing such policies could be reasonably rejected, hence that they will be unjust. With this contractual framework, we argue that there are four kinds of reason---equal respect, fulfilling basic needs, fair political equality and fair equal opportunity---by which we can reasonably reject inequality. If we accept the contractual framework and adopt the four kinds of reason, then we can justify egalitarianism without appealing to the idea of substantive equality. This kind of egalitarianism is a moderate one. A more radical version of egalitarianism will be reasonably rejected for its conflict with our other important value, such as liberty and personal relationship. / 鄧偉生. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2006. / 參考文獻(p. 181-186). / Adviser: Yuen Kang Shih. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-02, Section: A, page: 0602. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / School code: 1307. / Lun wen (zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2006. / Can kao wen xian (p. 181-186). / Deng Weisheng.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on Nov. 16, 2009). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, [Department of] Philosophy, University of Alberta." Includes bibliographical references.

The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.

This thesis applies T.M. Scanlon's version of contractualism to the problem of future generations. I begin by analyzing Rawls' contractarian account of just savings and find that there is no plausible composition of the original position that can deal with the inclusion of future people. I then examine Scanlon's contractualism and some objections to it before moving on to applying it to future people. I argue that the disanalogies between the intra- and inter-generational contexts do not preclude including future people in the contractualist framework, and that the theory avoids the non-identity problem. Part II of the thesis applies contractualism to three intergenerational topics and develops principles governing them: resource conservation, procreation, and population size. To conclude, I address how to deal with the fact that, in the case of future generations, we often have imperfect knowledge of what they will need, how our actions will affect them, and how many of them there will be.