La littérature sur les investissements directs étrangers a considérablement progressé au cours des deux dernières décennies (Antràs & Yeaple, 2013). Le rapport de la CNUCED sur les investissements de 1998 indique que les firmes multinationales suivent une grande variété de stratégies d’internationalisation. Plusieurs études théoriques ont étudié ces nouvelles stratégies (ex. : colocalisation des activités, agglomération géographique des projets d’une firme, et les stratégies complexes). Néanmoins, les travaux empiriques existants ne traitent pas la séquence d’implantation des multinationales comme un phénomène dynamique dans l’espace et le temps. Notre étude suppose que la localisation des firmes multinationales n’est pas un processus statique. Quand le niveau de la production augmente, l'entreprise prendra de nouvelles décisions organisationnelles afin de maintenir son niveau de productivité et de garantir l'efficacité de son processus de production. / The literature of foreign direct investment has been characterized by a significant progress in the last two decades. According to the World investment report (UNCTAD, 1998), different strategies are set by multinational firms in their internationalization process. Some theoretical studies highlighted the relevance of these new strategies (e.g. co-location of activities, geographic agglomeration within firm boundaries and complex strategies). However, most of the empirical works study the location of the multinationals as if they were to be undertaken once and overlook the dynamic extension of the firms over location and time. Our study assumes that the location decision is not a static process, but when the level of the production increases, the firm will take some new organizational decisions in order to maintain its productivity level and guarantee the efficiency of its production process.

This dissertation is about research and development (R&D) and formation of research joint ventures (RJV). The first chapter analyzes R&D competition and cooperation regimes with coordination costs under full information sharing and no spillovers in a Stackelberg model. The findings show that profits and R&D incentives of RJV members decrease with coordination costs. R&D cooperation of leaders results in higher profits for insiders and also higher welfare compared with R&D competition. Checking the robustness of the results shows that with R&D spillovers and no information sharing no RJV forms. With convex costs, an RJV containing all leaders forms. The second chapter considers a duopoly Cournot model where production may result in environmental damage. Firms can either invest in process or environmental R&D. In the first case, we assume an exogenous emission tax. With high enough emission tax, welfare is always higher under public R&D than cooperation. Under endogenous emission tax, when the regulator acts before firms’ decision on R&D, with high R&D spillovers, public R&D yields higher welfare than R&D cooperation. When the regulator sets the emission tax after firms’ decision on R&D, welfare under R&D cooperation is higher than public R&D. Comparison of commitment and no commitment also shows that commitment increases private R&D. Chapter three investigates the endogenous formation of coalitions under the size announcement game in a Cournot framework and analyzes the effect of coordination costs on equilibrium and optimal coalitions. When there are industry-wide R&D spillovers numerical simulations show that with high enough coordination costs no RJV forms in equilibrium, which also maximizes welfare. When there is intra coalition full information sharing and no inter-coalitions R&D spillovers with high enough coordination costs, the equilibrium coalition structure is more concentrated than when coordination costs are low and the size is higher than when RJVs could not form endogenously. Also, with high enough coordination costs, the welfare maximizing coalition is less concentrated than the equilibrium one while the opposite is true for low coordination costs.

Made available in DSpace on 2010-04-20T20:47:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2003-03-27T00:00:00Z / Como resultado da ênfase na minimização da dependência de fornecedores e na maximização do poder de barganha do contratante, os modelos tradicionais de terceirização têm-se restringido à gestão da estrutura de suprimento da atividade-meio. Esta pesquisa tem por propósito contribuir para a mudança desse paradigma tradicional de decisão de terceirização, descrevendo como os modelos de cooperação no relacionamento contratual podem capitalizar as decisões na atividade dos negócios com eficácia, flexibilidade e adaptabilidade. Esta pesquisa em trinta e sete firmas, engajadas em contratos de terceirização da tecnologia de informação no Brasil, tem por propósito examinar a barreira do relacionamento na transação com ativos específicos e a explicar porque os modelos tradicionais ignoram o processo de relacionamento nas análises de decisão de comprar ou fazer atividades da cadeia de valor. Integrando-se a teoria econômica dos custos de transação com a teoria da organização, a teoria de agência e a teoria jurídica dos contratos, introduziuse nesta pesquisa um modelo de análise e gestão de relacionamento contratual que complementa as abordagens neoclásslcas. / As a result of the increasing emphasis being placed on minimizing dependence on suppliers and maximizing bargaining power of contractors, the traditional framework of outsourcing is bounded to the supplying organization of support activities management. This research paper aims at expanding this traditional paradigm of outsourcing decisions by describing how the cooperation models of contractor- vendor relationship may capitalize business activities decisions with effectiveness, flexibility and adaptability. This research on thirty-seven technology of information outsourcing contracts in Brazil, attempts to examine the barriers of the relationship in specific assets transactions and why traditional models usually ignore the relationship process in their analysis of make-or-buy value channel activities. By integrating criticai issues from the economic transaction cost analysis, the organization theory, the agency theory and contract law; a conceptual framework of relationship contracting analyses has been introduced in this research paper that complements neoclassical approaches. Key words: shifting costs; coordination costs, transaction costs, asset specificity, governance structure, agency problem, commitment, opportunism, economic rents, bargaining power, asymmetric information, implicit tax, opportunity cost, organizational rational open system.