The concept of "corporate governance", which has appeared in the United States, is however recently subject to vivid discussions across the world. The notion is understood differently in distinct jurisdictions. Nevertheless, corporate governance widely refers to the way corporations are managed. The present study firstly concentrates on the United States since the latter has been the first country to host debates on the topic. Different governance models basically distinguish the North-American and European (Continental Europe) governance systems. However, debates in the United States and Canada concentrate on distinct issues. The third studied country, France has also its own characteristics. International organisations' initiatives on the topic such as the OECD, illustrate the importance given to "corporate governance". Although the uniformity of distinct national governance systems is not likely to be reached in the near future, certain similarities might be pointed at, especially through the recent activism of institutional shareholders.

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Chu Kwok Hei Derek. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-103). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / Table of Content --- p.iv / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2. --- Some Conceptual Issues --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1. --- PPE holding and shareholders' return --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2. --- Mis-management of Corporate Real Estate --- p.7 / Chapter Chapter 3. --- Determinants of Real Estate Holdings --- p.12 / Chapter 3.1. --- Growth opportunities --- p.12 / Chapter 3.2. --- Size --- p.13 / Chapter 3.3. --- Firm focus and real estate holding --- p.14 / Chapter 3.4. --- Level of Debt --- p.15 / Chapter 3.5 --- industrial effect --- p.15 / Chapter 3.6. --- Imperfect capital market and Real Estate decision --- p.16 / Chapter 3.6.1. --- Dividend payout --- p.17 / Chapter 3.6.2. --- Cash flow --- p.17 / Chapter Chapter 4. --- Measuring Corporate Governance --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2. --- Management ownership --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3. --- Outside Blockholder ownership --- p.22 / Chapter 4.4. --- Executive compensation structure --- p.24 / Chapter 4.5. --- Board composition --- p.26 / Chapter 4.6 --- DUALITY --- p.28 / Chapter Chapter 5. --- "Data, Sample and Empirical Analysis" --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1. --- Data and Sample --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2. --- Empirical Analysis --- p.31 / Chapter Chapter 6. --- Summary Statistics and Regression Results --- p.33 / Chapter 6.1. --- Summary Statistics --- p.33 / Chapter 6.2. --- Regression result --- p.35 / Chapter Chapter 7. --- Robustness check --- p.40 / Chapter 7.1. --- Full Sample Splitting --- p.40 / Chapter 7.2. --- Regression result --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 8. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.44 / Appendices --- p.46 / Appendix 1 --- p.46 / Split full sample into single industry that sample size is larger than 30 --- p.46 / Appendix 2 --- p.52 / "Results after excluding firms in sector of Transportation, communication and Utility" --- p.52 / Appendix 3 --- p.53 / Non-monotonic relation between managerial ownership and agency cost --- p.53 / Appendix 4 --- p.55 / Comparison of previous literatures-1 --- p.55 / Appendix 5 --- p.56 / Comparison of previous literatures-2 --- p.56 / Appendix 6 --- p.61 / List of Tables --- p.61 / Appendix 7 --- p.95 / Variables description: --- p.95 / References --- p.97

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M.Com. (Computer Auditing) / In the wake of the economic catastrophes and corporate disgraces such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and other corporations at the turn of the 21st Century, the United States Senate adopted the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act, which became known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter the SOX Act). The concluding bill, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, was accepted and approved by the United States Senate on July 25, 2002. The primary motive of the SOX Act is to safeguard shareholders of public corporations by improving, cultivating and ultimately ensuring the reliability and accuracy of corporate disclosure of financial and non-financial information. More than a decade later, many corporations have enhanced their compliance capabilities and competencies, having learned from prior experience and/or earlier SOX fiascos. The envisioned benefits of the SOX Act were to provide the charter and contextual information needed to implement, monitor and review operational and financial processes, reinforce internal controls, and enhance corporate financial reporting. Since the SOX Act forces corporations to conform and comply, the question is; whether SOX compliance can essentially benefit the company’s everyday business as it affects virtually every line of work with the unequivocal purpose of reinstating public confidence in the disclosures included in annual financial statements. The study focuses on how to approach the rudimentary SOX compliance checklist and possibly transform it into an actual value added service for stakeholders and furthermore, how to leverage off the knowledge garnered through complying with the SOX Act – ultimately creating a more effective and resourceful corporation in all financial spheres. By aligning the SOX compliance process with the actual improvement of internal controls, financial processes and ultimately financial reporting, an unprejudiced ambition to identify and manage “real world” risks can be achieved. Ultimately, to comply with the SOX Act might not be an option for public corporations; however, being SOX compliant doesn’t have to be without substantial benefit to a corporation, Senior Executive Management and eventually and ultimately the shareholders.

I examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated with levels and valuations of cash holdings. Prior research also shows that strong corporate governance mitigates opportunistic earnings management behavior and enhances the valuation of cash holdings. Using empirical models from prior research, I document that REM is positively associated with cash holdings, investors discount cash holdings of high REM firms, and, among high REM firms, valuations of cash holdings of weak corporate governance firms are discounted significantly lower relative to those of strong corporate governance firms. My study unites two lines of research by incorporating agency problems concerning REM with levels and valuations of cash holdings. / by Adam J. Greiner. / Vita. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.

This study analyzes corporate governance practices of foreign (non-U.S.) issuers listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq. Specifically, I examine the extent to which these foreign issuers voluntarily comply with U.S. stock exchange corporate governance requirements applicable to domestic issuers. My sample consists of 201 foreign companies primarily domiciled in Brazil, China, Israel, and the United Kingdom. I find that 151 (75 per cent) of the sample firms do not elect to comply with any of the U.S. corporate governance requirements. Logistic regression analysis generally supports the hypotheses that conformance with U.S. GAAP and percentage of managerial ownership are positively associated, and that percentage ownership by major shareholders is negatively associated with foreign firms electing to comply with U.S. corporate governance rules. This evidence is relevant for regulators and investors.