A presente pesquisa analisa as práticas de governança corporativa indicadas aos seguintes mecanismos de monitoramento: (a) o conselho fiscal; (b) a auditoria externa e (c) a auditoria interna. Buscou-se verificar quão próximas as cooperativas agropecuárias estão do que é indicado pelos códigos de melhores práticas de governança. Utiliza-se como fundamentação teórica a perspectiva da firma como um conjunto de contratos em um contexto no qual pode existir delegação de parte do poder de controle e decisão dos ativos. Assim, analisa-se teoricamente as motivações para a adoção de estruturas de governança corporativa que desempenhem funções de monitoramento da gestão. Para tanto, considera-se a condição de incompletude dos contratos, os pressupostos comportamentais da racionalidade limitada e oportunismo dos agentes econômicos e o processo decisório em um contexto de propriedade coletiva. Nas análises, utilizou-se primeiramente as cooperativas agropecuárias constantes no banco de dados da FIPECAFI Melhores e Maiores entre os anos de 2005 e 2009. A amostra foi composta por 72 cooperativas para o período de cinco anos. Verifica-se que as empresas de auditoria externa que compõem o grupo das maiores apresentam menor representatividade no mercado de auditoria independente para cooperativas comparadas às menores empresas de auditoria constantes no banco de dados. Ainda, aplicou-se um questionário fundamentado nos Códigos de Melhores Práticas de Governança Corporativa do IBGC (Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Cooperativa) e da OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), sendo que o instrumento apresenta Alfa de Cronbach de 0,77. Verifica-se que as práticas e mecanismos de governança indicados em códigos de governança corporativa, apresentam níveis de adoção consideravelmente menores comparados àqueles presentes em lei, não sendo possível verificar tendência para adoção de práticas que não são regulamentadas na maior parte das cooperativas agropecuárias estudadas. Apesar de constatada maior adoção de práticas regulamentadas, os estudos de caso realizados em duas cooperativas comuns à amostra do banco de dados da FIPECAFI e do questionário apontam a tendência de cooperativas maiores implementarem práticas de governança corporativa não regulamentadas. / This research examines the corporate governance practices related to the following monitoring mechanisms: (a) the fiscal board, (b) the external audit and (c) the internal audit. The aim is to determine how close the agricultural cooperatives are from the recommended by codes of best corporate governance practices. It is used as the theoretical perspective that the firm is a set of contracts in a context where it is possible the delegation of part of power to the control of assets. Its analyzed theoretically the reasons to adopt corporate governance practices that perform monitoring functions of management. For that, was considered the condition of incompleteness of contracts, the behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism of economic agents and the decision-making in the context of collective proprietorship. In the analysis was primarily used the agricultural cooperatives contained in the database of FIPECAFI Better and Bigger in the years 2005 to 2009. The sample was composed of 72 cooperatives for the period of five years. It appears that the external audit firms of Bigger group are less representative in the independent auditors for cooperatives market if compared to smaller audit firms listed in the database. A questionnaire, based on Codes of Best Practice for Corporate Governance IBGC (Brazilian Institute of Cooperative) and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), was applied and the instrument has Cronbachs Alpha of 0, 77. It is verified that corporate governance practices and mechanisms that are indicated in codes, have lower level of adoption compared to those regulated by law. It was not possible to verify the tendency to adopt corporate governance practices indicated in codes in most agricultural cooperatives studied. Despite most part of corporate governance practices verified by the questionnaires application are regulated by law, case studies realized in two cooperatives that make part of questionnaire and FIPECAFI database, point to the tendency of large cooperatives implement not regulated corporate governance practices.

A presente pesquisa analisa as práticas de governança corporativa indicadas aos seguintes mecanismos de monitoramento: (a) o conselho fiscal; (b) a auditoria externa e (c) a auditoria interna. Buscou-se verificar quão próximas as cooperativas agropecuárias estão do que é indicado pelos códigos de melhores práticas de governança. Utiliza-se como fundamentação teórica a perspectiva da firma como um conjunto de contratos em um contexto no qual pode existir delegação de parte do poder de controle e decisão dos ativos. Assim, analisa-se teoricamente as motivações para a adoção de estruturas de governança corporativa que desempenhem funções de monitoramento da gestão. Para tanto, considera-se a condição de incompletude dos contratos, os pressupostos comportamentais da racionalidade limitada e oportunismo dos agentes econômicos e o processo decisório em um contexto de propriedade coletiva. Nas análises, utilizou-se primeiramente as cooperativas agropecuárias constantes no banco de dados da FIPECAFI Melhores e Maiores entre os anos de 2005 e 2009. A amostra foi composta por 72 cooperativas para o período de cinco anos. Verifica-se que as empresas de auditoria externa que compõem o grupo das maiores apresentam menor representatividade no mercado de auditoria independente para cooperativas comparadas às menores empresas de auditoria constantes no banco de dados. Ainda, aplicou-se um questionário fundamentado nos Códigos de Melhores Práticas de Governança Corporativa do IBGC (Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Cooperativa) e da OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), sendo que o instrumento apresenta Alfa de Cronbach de 0,77. Verifica-se que as práticas e mecanismos de governança indicados em códigos de governança corporativa, apresentam níveis de adoção consideravelmente menores comparados àqueles presentes em lei, não sendo possível verificar tendência para adoção de práticas que não são regulamentadas na maior parte das cooperativas agropecuárias estudadas. Apesar de constatada maior adoção de práticas regulamentadas, os estudos de caso realizados em duas cooperativas comuns à amostra do banco de dados da FIPECAFI e do questionário apontam a tendência de cooperativas maiores implementarem práticas de governança corporativa não regulamentadas. / This research examines the corporate governance practices related to the following monitoring mechanisms: (a) the fiscal board, (b) the external audit and (c) the internal audit. The aim is to determine how close the agricultural cooperatives are from the recommended by codes of best corporate governance practices. It is used as the theoretical perspective that the firm is a set of contracts in a context where it is possible the delegation of part of power to the control of assets. Its analyzed theoretically the reasons to adopt corporate governance practices that perform monitoring functions of management. For that, was considered the condition of incompleteness of contracts, the behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism of economic agents and the decision-making in the context of collective proprietorship. In the analysis was primarily used the agricultural cooperatives contained in the database of FIPECAFI Better and Bigger in the years 2005 to 2009. The sample was composed of 72 cooperatives for the period of five years. It appears that the external audit firms of Bigger group are less representative in the independent auditors for cooperatives market if compared to smaller audit firms listed in the database. A questionnaire, based on Codes of Best Practice for Corporate Governance IBGC (Brazilian Institute of Cooperative) and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), was applied and the instrument has Cronbachs Alpha of 0, 77. It is verified that corporate governance practices and mechanisms that are indicated in codes, have lower level of adoption compared to those regulated by law. It was not possible to verify the tendency to adopt corporate governance practices indicated in codes in most agricultural cooperatives studied. Despite most part of corporate governance practices verified by the questionnaires application are regulated by law, case studies realized in two cooperatives that make part of questionnaire and FIPECAFI database, point to the tendency of large cooperatives implement not regulated corporate governance practices.

Les pays du Maghreb (Tunisie, Algérie, Maroc) ont engagé de profondes réformes structurelles sur les plans politique et économique. Leurs équilibres macroéconomiques sont à peu près maîtrisés et ils bénéficient d’une multiplication de partenariats avec l'UE et de programmes d'aides internationales. Pour autant, ces pays n'arrivent pas à atteindre un niveau soutenu de croissance leur permettant de se développer. En se basant sur un cadre théorique centré sur l’interrelation entre les mécanismes de gouvernance publique et privée, cette recherche doctorale se propose de comprendre les raisons du blocage de développement dans les pays du Maghreb.A partir d’une définition stricte de la gouvernance et au moyen de la base de données « Profils Institutionnels » du MINEFI, pour les années 2001 et 2009, nous construisons 31 variables institutionnelles de gouvernance publique et privée pour 51 pays développés et en développement. Nous examinons ainsi la dynamique des Systèmes Nationaux de Gouvernance des pays du Maghreb comparée à celle d’autres pays, notamment à celle des Pays de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale (PECO).L’exploitation des données, moyennant des ACP et des régressions linéaires, souligne l’importance des institutions de gouvernance qui se rapportent aux niveaux de formalisation des règles et qui expliquent le développement ou le blocage des pays. Nos résultats démontrent également, en comparaison avec les PECO, que le blocage de la transition des pays du Maghreb est expliqué, dans une large mesure, par leur faible niveau de formalisation des règles souligné par la quasi-stagnation de l’évolution de cette formalisation entre 2001 et 2009. Les niveaux des libertés accordées aux citoyens permettent aussi d’expliquer les différences de développement entre les pays. / Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) have undertaken substantial structural reforms on the political and economical level. Their macro-economical equilibrium is almost under control and they benefit from increased E.U. partnerships coupled with international aid programs. However, these countries have failed to reach a sustained growth level that would allow them to develop. Based on a theoretical framework centered on the interrelationship between mechanisms of public and private governance, this doctoral research aims at understanding the reasons behind the Maghreb countries’ development block.From a strict definition of governance and using the MINEFI "Institutional Profiles" database, for the years 2001 and 2009, we built 31 variables of institutional, public and private, governance for 51 developed and developing countries. Dynamics of the National Systems of Governance of the Maghreb countries were examined and compared to that of other countries, particularly to that of Central and Eastern Europe countries.The use of data factor analysis and linear regressions has highlighted the importance of governance institutions that are related to the levels of formalization of rules, and that explain the development or its hiatus in these countries. Our results also showed, in comparison with the Central and Eastern Europe countries, that the transition of the Maghreb countries is explained largely by their low level of formalization of rules and by their almost stagnation between 2001 and 2009. The different levels of freedoms granted to citizens also helped explaining the differences in development between countries.

Audit committees (ACs) can enhance corporate governance in the public sector, particularly in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). This study adopted a qualitative research approach to identify factors contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. The empirical data was collected primarily through semi-structured interviews with participants as well as from field notes and company documents. The study highlighted certain AC characteristics and practices contributing to the effectiveness of ACs in selected Namibian SOEs to provide sound corporate governance. The mandate, composition, managing the activities of the AC, performance assessment of the members of the AC and reporting of the AC if applied correctly can enhance effectiveness of ACs. The study also highlighted weaknesses, suggesting that some of the ACs needed improvement in order to enhance corporate governance at SOEs. / College of Accounting Sciences / M. Phil. (Accounting Sciences)