<p>Family businesses are a major part of everyday life and the society of Sweden. The majorityof existing companies and the companies that started are small family business, somethingseen in Gandemos (2000:6) study. Family businesses are defined by Anna Vikström, lecturerat Luleå University of Technology, as: "A company in which one or more members of onefamily owns the company, while one or more members of the family actively participates inmanaging the company's daily operations." The family is important in the company and thecompanies that are joint-stock-companies have statutory requirementes that they must have aboard, and this board is obviously represented by family members. The people who are a partof the family controling a company can according to authors within corporate governencecreate problems and therefore such as Nielsen & Lekvall (2008) demand that boards aretaking an external member to the board to get a better board and corporate governence. But isthere really a difference in how the family business boards of directors work according towhether they include an external member or not? In our observational study, we found thatthere are advantages in having an external person to be a member of a board that is made upof families and individuals who have a previous relationship with each other. The externalmember influences on the social processes that exist within the group and this has an effect onhow the board is working.</p> / <p>Familjeföretag är en stor del av vardagen och samhället i Sverige. Majoriteten av deexisterande företagen och de företag som startas är små familjeföretag, något som sesGandemos (2000:6) undersökning. Familjeföretag definieras av Anna Vikström, adjunkt vidLuleå Tekniska Universitet, som: ”Ett företag där en eller flera medlemmar av en familj ägerföretaget samtidigt som en eller flera medlemmar ur samma familj aktivt deltar i att ledaföretagets dagliga verksamhet.” Familjen är därmed viktig i företaget och de företag som äraktiebolag har krav på att det finns en styrelse, och i denna styrelse finns självklartfamiljemedlemmar representerade. Att personer som är del av en familj även ska styra ettföretag kan enligt författare inom styrelsearbete skapa problem och därför efterfrågarexempelvis Nielsen & Lekvall (2008) att styrelser tar in en extern ledamot för att få ett bättrestyrelsearbete. Men är det verkligen en skillnad i hur aktiva familjeföretagsstyrelser fungerarberoende på om de innehåller en extern ledamot? I vår observationsstudie har vi kommit framtill att det finns fördelar med att ha en extern ledamot i en styrelse som består avfamiljemedlemmar och personer som har en tidigare relation till varandra. Den externeledamoten påverkar de sociala processerna som finns inom gruppen och detta ger effekt påhur styrelsearbetet fungerar.</p>

Abstract This dissertation assesses the potential impacts of corporate governance codes and legislation on Directors and Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance. Corporate failures lead to numerous losses for stakeholders especially shareholders. Worldwide including in South Africa, this has resulted in an increase in legal liability claims against directors and thus insurers. Often these failures are ascribed to corporate governance breaches giving rise initially to corporate governance codes and more recently many countries are legislating certain aspects of corporate governance; this includes a codification of director‟s duties. South Africa, in-line with the United Kingdom, Australia and to an extent the United States has followed suit with the Companies Bill of 2008. This dissertation seeks to assess the possible effects of the codes of practice and new Companies Act on Directors‟ and Officers‟ Liability insurance. This will be done by ascertaining what impact the new Act will have on directors‟ liability using inter alia the Delphi Technique.

Regulation of the nonprofit sector is a subject of significant debate in the academic and professional literature. The debate raises questions about how to regulate the sector in a manner that addresses accountability while preserving the sector’s unique role in society. Central to the debate is the role of self-regulation. The nonprofit sector is recognized and defended as a distinct third sector in society. Cultural norms and values differentiate the purpose of the sector from the governmental and commercial realms. The legal regime secures rights, establishes organizational structures, and provides tax benefits that enable, reinforce, and protect participation in nonprofit activities. Nevertheless, government regulation is thought to be antithetical to sector autonomy, as well as an obstacle to flexibility and innovation. Selfregulation protects the sector’s political independence and its distinctiveness through the cultivation of shared norms, standards, and processes for ethical practices. Although self regulation is considered to be consistent with the autonomous nature of the sector, it is also criticized as a weaker form of regulation. The ability to address regulatory issues expressed in the broader debate is limited by how we frame nonprofit regulation. The problem with advancing our understanding of self-regulation has to do with how we conceptualize nonprofit regulation. Government and self-regulation are conceptualized and studied as distinct options for regulating the sector. Missing in the nonprofit scholarship is a theoretical framework capable of reframing nonprofit regulation as a system of governance that depends on self-regulation. This represents a glaring gap in the research. Neglecting the institutional context that explains the structure and functioning of the nonprofit sector has led to an oversimplification of nonprofit governance. To study the effects of self-regulation on the functioning of the sector, I argue that we must first frame what is relevant about how the nonprofit sector is governed. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework outlines a systematic approach for analyzing institutions that govern collective endeavors. The objective of this dissertation is to introduce the IAD as an approach for examining self-regulation not as an alternative to government regulation but as an important part of nonprofit governance. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection