ABSTRACT This thesis investigates the legal and theoretical basis of continuous disclosure regulation in Australia as it applies to listed companies. An empirical study is undertaken to further investigate the operation of the legislation. As part of the Enhanced Disclosure regime, the continuous disclosure provision was effective from 5 September 1994 as s1001A of the Corporations Law, now the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This statutory provision is replaced by s674, inserted by Schedule 2 to the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), and effective from 11 March 2002. The provision reinforces Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listing rule 3.1. The rule requires a listed disclosing entity to notify ASX immediately of information that would be expected to have a �material effect� on the share price of the company. However, the disclosure requirement is weakened by a number of specific exemptions or �carve-outs� to listing rule 3.1. If a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed, and if the confidentiality of the information is maintained, then disclosure is not mandatory in special circumstances. This study analyses 427 query notices, issued by ASX to listed companies from July 1995 to April 1996. The queries request information concerning unexplained movements in a company�s share price or a failure to comply with the listing rules. An analysis of the companies� replies to these notices provides a profile of the type of company that is likely to be queried. The study also attempts to evaluate the extent to which these companies have relied on the �carve-outs� as an exemption to the regulation.

ABSTRACT This thesis investigates the legal and theoretical basis of continuous disclosure regulation in Australia as it applies to listed companies. An empirical study is undertaken to further investigate the operation of the legislation. As part of the Enhanced Disclosure regime, the continuous disclosure provision was effective from 5 September 1994 as s1001A of the Corporations Law, now the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This statutory provision is replaced by s674, inserted by Schedule 2 to the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth), and effective from 11 March 2002. The provision reinforces Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listing rule 3.1. The rule requires a listed disclosing entity to notify ASX immediately of information that would be expected to have a �material effect� on the share price of the company. However, the disclosure requirement is weakened by a number of specific exemptions or �carve-outs� to listing rule 3.1. If a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed, and if the confidentiality of the information is maintained, then disclosure is not mandatory in special circumstances. This study analyses 427 query notices, issued by ASX to listed companies from July 1995 to April 1996. The queries request information concerning unexplained movements in a company�s share price or a failure to comply with the listing rules. An analysis of the companies� replies to these notices provides a profile of the type of company that is likely to be queried. The study also attempts to evaluate the extent to which these companies have relied on the �carve-outs� as an exemption to the regulation.

Includes bibliographical references.

Company directors, being human, may be tempted to promote their own interests rather than those of the companies on whose boards they serve. Directors are subject to a number of legal duties. A director has a fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. A number of other duties flow from this duty such as the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. The duty of a director not to appropriate a corporate opportunity belonging to the company of which he or she is a director, also flows from the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. The common-law duties of directors which have their origins in English law, have developed over a number of years. Because of the difficulty that directors had in establishing what their duties were, a number of jurisdictions embarked on a process of codifying or partially codifying these duties. South Africa, Australia and England are three countries that have promulgated legislation which has resulted in the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties. The purpose of the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties was firstly to clarify the duties of directors, and secondly to make the duties more accessible to those affected by them – the directors of companies. In South Africa the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has partially codified the duties of directors. Because directors’ duties have only been partially codified there is uncertainty regarding their scope. This dissertation will focus on the possible effect of the 2008 Companies Act on the duty of a director not to take a corporate opportunity falling to the company. In this dissertation I address two issues involving the effect of the 2008 Companies Act on the duty of a director not to appropriate a corporate opportunity belonging to the company. Firstly, I consider whether the partially codified directors’ duties are wide enough to cover issues involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities. Secondly, I consider the appropriate common-law test or tests to be applied in determining whether, in the specific circumstances, an opportunity should be classified as a corporate opportunity. In considering whether the partially codified duties of directors are wide enough to include the corporate-opportunity rule, I compare the approach to corporate opportunities and the corporate-opportunity rule in South Africa, Australia and England. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Corporation Law)

This thesis critically examines the statutory unfair prejudice remedy provided for in section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘the Act’). Section 163 is evaluated against its equivalents in England, Australia and Canada. Section 163 is considered against its predecessors to determine whether problems associated with the formulation and application of its predecessors have now been eradicated. It is argued that although it is important to ensure that company legislation is able to provide protection of an international standard to shareholders to be able to attract capital investment in a competitive market, one has to be cautious of slavishly following legislative trends in foreign jurisdictions. The South African legislature indiscriminately incorporated only parts of the Canadian unfair prejudice remedy in section 163. This approach also resulted, amongst others, in the introduction of foreign concepts. The legislature further failed to take cognisance of the unique historical developments relating to the unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa. This has led to the reintroduction of problems experienced with previous formulations of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in South Africa and left certain problems relating to the interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy unresolved. Consideration is also given to the interrelationship between section 163 and some of the statutory remedies in the Act. Section 163 is also assessed in the context of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. In conclusion, recommendations for possible legislative amendments are made and an interpretational framework for the interpretation and application of the statutory unfair prejudice remedy in section 163 is provided. / Mercantile Law / LL. D. (Mercantile Law)