by Wang Xiao Ling. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-73). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgment --- p.ii / Table of Contents --- p.iii / List of Tables --- p.v / List of Figures --- p.vi / Chapter I --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Objective of the Study --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Outline of the Study --- p.4 / Chapter II --- Background --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- China's Enterprise Reform and the Development of Capital Markets --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board of Directors in China --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Legislation on Board - The Company Law --- p.13 / Composition of the Board of Directors --- p.16 / Functions and Powers --- p.18 / Regulations and Requirements --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Board of Chengdu Brilliant Development Inc --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Difference between Board in China's Company Law and that in Hong Kong Company Ordinance --- p.24 / Chapter 2.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.26 / Chapter III --- Literature Review --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1 --- Theoretical Background --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2 --- Empirical Studies --- p.30 / Takeover Evaluation --- p.30 / Management Buyout --- p.31 / Adoption of Poison Pills --- p.32 / CEO Turnover --- p.32 / Financial Performance --- p.33 / Chapter IV --- Testable Hypotheses --- p.35 / Chapter V --- Research Methodology --- p.37 / Chapter 5.1 --- Variables and Sample --- p.37 / Chapter 5.2 --- Empirical Results --- p.43 / Board Composition and Corporate Performance with Full Sample --- p.43 / Excluding IPO Firms --- p.51 / Insider Dominated Board and Outsider Dominated Board --- p.51 / Alternative Measures for Firm Performance --- p.55 / Cross-sectional Test --- p.58 / Financial Distress --- p.60 / Industry Classification --- p.62 / Chapter 5.3 --- Discussion --- p.64 / Chapter VI --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.1 --- Conclusion and Implications --- p.67 / Chapter 6.2 --- Suggestions for Further Research --- p.69 / Bibliography --- p.70 / Appendix Legislation on the Board (The Company Law in PRC) --- p.74

by Chan, Cheuk-Wah. / Thesis submitted in: August 1997. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- p.1. / Chapter 1.1.-- --- The main theme / Chapter 1.2. -- --- Theoretical background / Chapter 1.2.1. -- --- The proper role of the state in the economy / Chapter 1.2.2. -- --- Conception of the development state / Chapter 1.2.3. -- --- Politics of defining the role of the state / Chapter 1.2.4. -- --- The relative autonomy of the state / Chapter 1.2.5. -- --- "The ISH Model-- Institutions, Strategic actions of agents, Historical contingencies" / Chapter 1.2.6. -- --- The ISH Model and the economic dynamics in Hong Kong / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- p.22. / Chapter 2 -- --- "Historical Background, Contingency and International Hurricane (from the mid of 1940s to the mid 1950s)" / Chapter 2.1. -- --- Introduction / Chapter 2.2. -- --- Historical background / Chapter 2.3. -- --- Conflicts between China and the West (Korean War and Cold War) / Chapter 2.4. -- --- Hong Kong's fluctuating economy and the colonial minimal government / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- p.44. / Chapter 3. --- The Dynamics of the Process of Economic Restructuring and the Strategies of the Industrialists (1950s-60s) / Chapter 3.1. -- --- Introduction / Chapter 3.2. -- --- The path of economic restructuring / Chapter 3.2.1. -- --- Profile of textiles industry / Chapter 3.2.2.-- --- rofile of clothing industry / Chapter 3.2.3. -- --- Profile of toys and plastic industry / Chapter 3.3.-- --- Strategies of the Chinese industrialists / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- p.62. / Chapter 4. --- Hong Kong Government's Role and Selective Interventions in the Economy / Chapter 4.1. -- --- Introduction / Chapter 4.2. -- --- Monetary/fiscal policy with colonial bias / Chapter 4.3. -- --- Housing policy / Chapter 4.4. -- --- Investment and trade promotion / Chapter 4.5. -- --- Land and infrastructure development / Chapter 4.6. -- --- Influences on the prices and supplies of foodstuffs / Chapter 4.7. -- --- Productivity and quality support services / Chapter 4.8. -- --- Inadequate research and development policy / Chapter 4.9. -- --- Absence of industrial bank and few financial incentives for Industries / Chapter 4.10. -- --- Deficiency in manpower training for manufacturing / Chapter CHAPTER FIVE --- p.83. / Chapter 5. --- The Dominance of British Hongs' in Hong Kong / Chapter 5.1. -- --- Introduction / Chapter 5.2. -- --- The historical foundation of the British Hongs in Hong Kong and its political implication / Chapter 5.3. -- --- Dominance of the British hongs in Hong Kong in the period of1950-70 / Chapter 5.4. -- --- "The business activities of the Jardines, Matheson and Co. Ltd. in Hong Kong" / Chapter CHAPTER SIX -- --- CONCLUSION --- p.102.

by Lan Yat Si, Wong Tai Chun, Mark. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-37). / ABSTRACT --- p.iii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.vii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Problem --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Overview --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- Different Perspectives Explanation --- p.2 / Chapter 1.4 --- Earnings Management Explanation --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Big-bath Hypothesis --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Blaming Hypothesis --- p.3 / Chapter 1.5 --- Difference between Big-bath and Blaming Hypotheses --- p.4 / Chapter 1.6 --- Motivation and Potential Contributions of Study --- p.4 / Chapter 1.7 --- Chapter Summary --- p.5 / Chapter II. --- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK / Chapter 2.1 --- Earnings Management --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Definition --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Overview --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Motivations --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Patterns of Earnings Management --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Executive Succession --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Accounting Change --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Definition --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Accounting Policies --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Accounting Bases --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Accounting Estimates --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.5 --- Disclosure Requirements --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.6 --- Discretionary Changes --- p.12 / Chapter 2.4 --- Summary of Related Empirical Research --- p.12 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Copeland and Moore (1972) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Moore (1973) --- p.13 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Strong and Meyer (1987) --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- DeAngelo(1988) --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4.5 --- Elliot and Shaw (1988) --- p.15 / Chapter 2.4.6 --- Lilien et al (1988) --- p.15 / Chapter 2.4.7 --- Chen and Lee (1990) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.8 --- La Salle (1990) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.9 --- Walsh et al (1991) --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.10 --- La Salle et al. (1993) --- p.17 / Chapter 2.5 --- Chapter Summary --- p.17 / Chapter III. --- RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY / Chapter 3.1 --- Development of Hypothesis --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2 --- Sample --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3 --- CEO Change and the Likelihood of Accounting Change --- p.21 / Chapter 3.4 --- CEO Change and the Directional Effect on Earnings --- p.22 / Chapter 3.5 --- Statistical Test and Employed --- p.22 / Chapter 3.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.22 / Chapter IV. --- RESEARCH FINDINGS / Chapter 4.1 --- Officer Titles for CEOs --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2 --- Accounting Changes --- p.24 / Chapter 4.3 --- Income Effect on Accounting Changes --- p.24 / Chapter 4.4 --- CEO Change and Accounting Change --- p.25 / Chapter 4.5 --- CEO Change with Positive and Negative Accounting Changes --- p.27 / Chapter 4.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.28 / Chapter V. --- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION / Chapter 5.1 --- Summary of Key Findings --- p.29 / Chapter 5.2 --- Implications and Discussion --- p.30 / Chapter 5.3 --- Concluding Summary --- p.31 / APPENDIX --- p.32 / BIBIOGRAPHY --- p.35

Xiao, Rui. / "August 2010." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 28-30). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.ii / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.iii / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.2 / Chapter 3. --- Research Hypothesis --- p.5 / Chapter 3.1 --- Institutional Background --- p.5 / Chapter 3.2 --- Hypothesis Development --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Firm Performance and Outside Succession --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Board Composition and Outside Succession --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Predecessor Characteristics and Outside Succession --- p.7 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Successor Characteristics and Outside Succession --- p.7 / Chapter 3 2 --- 5 Performance Consequences and the Source of Successor --- p.9 / Chapter 4. --- Methodology --- p.9 / Chapter 4.1 --- Measurement --- p.9 / Chapter 4.2 --- Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection --- p.11 / Chapter 4.3 --- Event Study --- p.13 / Chapter 5. --- Data --- p.15 / Chapter 5.1 --- Sample Selection and Data Sources --- p.15 / Chapter 5.2 --- Descriptive Statistics --- p.16 / Chapter 6. --- Empirical Results --- p.17 / Chapter 6.1 --- The Determinants of Outside Succession --- p.17 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Firm Performance --- p.17 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Board Composition --- p.18 / Chapter 6.1.3 --- Univariate Tests of Outside Succession and Predecessor Characteristics --- p.18 / Chapter 6.1.4 --- Regression Results --- p.18 / Chapter 6.2 --- Outside Succession and Successor Characteristics --- p.21 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Univariate Tests --- p.21 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Regression Results --- p.21 / Chapter 6.3 --- Market Reaction and CEO Succession --- p.22 / Chapter 6.4 --- Post-turnover Performance and Outside Succession --- p.23 / Chapter 6.5 --- Robustness Tests --- p.26 / Chapter 7. --- Conclusion --- p.26 / Reference --- p.28 / Table 1. The Percentage of CEO Outside Succession during the Sample Period …… --- p.31 / Figure 1. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession in Each Year --- p.32 / Figure 2. Outside Succession Rate in the Turnover Sample --- p.32 / Table 2. Literature Summary of Outside Succession --- p.33 / Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables --- p.34 / Table 4. Outside Succession Rates at Different Performance Levels --- p.36 / Table 5. Relation between Outside Succession Rates and Board Composition --- p.37 / Table 6. Relation between Outside Succession Rates and CEO Predecessor Characteristics --- p.38 / Table 7. Outside Successions Regression Results --- p.39 / Table 8. CEO Successor Characteristics --- p.41 / Table 9. Regression Results of the CEO Successor Characteristics --- p.42 / Table 10. Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Announcement of CEO

This study investigates whether earnings components are correctly priced by the Chinese investors. Under the Chinese GAAP, total earnings can be easily decomposed into core earnings and non-core earnings. Core earnings are more persistent than non-core earnings and cash flows from operations are more persistent than accruals, as expected. However, the market underestimates (overestimates) the value implications of current core (non-core) earnings for future earnings. Furthermore, the market overprices (underprices) accruals (cash flows from operations). Therefore, future returns adjusted for risk factors identified in this study are predictable by the information contained in the components of current earnings. Both the portfolio tests and regression analysis generate economically significant abnormal returns that are robust to sensitivity checks. Further analysis suggests that there is no significant difference in the extent of mispricing across firms with different characteristics such as transaction costs, arbitrage risks, investor sophistication, or firm size. This could be due to the measurement errors in the proxy variables for these characteristics. / Wu Donghui. / "July 2003." / Advisers: In-Mu Haw; James Xie. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-07, Section: A, page: 2551. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 121-130). / Available also through the Internet via Current research @ Chinese University of Hong Kong under title: Mispricings of earnings components empirical evidence from China. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Tam Wai-man Grace. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-77). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 序言 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Dividend Irrelevance Theory --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Bird-in-the-hand Theory --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Clientele Effect Theory --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Signaling Theory --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5 --- Agency Cost Theory / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Theoretical Models --- p.15 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- The Latest Agency Cost Model --- p.19 / Chapter 2.6 --- Residual Theory --- p.24 / Chapter 2.7 --- Other Studies on Dividend Policy / Chapter 2.7.1 --- Low-Regular-Dividend-Plus-Extras Policy --- p.26 / Chapter 2.7.2 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms --- p.27 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Methodology / Chapter 3.1 --- Model --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2 --- Anti-Signaling Hypothesis --- p.29 / Chapter 3.3 --- Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4 --- Residual Hypothesis --- p.31 / Chapter 3.5 --- Investment Opportunities Hypothesis --- p.32 / Chapter 3.6 --- Industry Control --- p.33 / Chapter 3.7 --- The Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.34 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Sample and Data Description / Chapter 4.1 --- Sample Description --- p.35 / Chapter 4.2 --- Variable Description --- p.36 / Chapter 4.3 --- Limitations --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4 --- Descriptive Statistics --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 5 / Chapter 5.1 --- Regression Results and Implications --- p.42 / Chapter 5.2 --- Alternative measurement for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Hong Kong and the World --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Tables / Table 1 Summary of the Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.50 / Table 2 Construction of Variables --- p.51 / Table 3 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.52 / Table 4 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996to 1999 --- p.54 / Table 5 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.55 / Table 6 Regression Results for Raw Data --- p.55 / Table 7 Regression Results using Substantial Shareholders Concentration as Proxy for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.57 / Table 8 Summary of Regression Results --- p.58 / Charts / Chart 1 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.59 / Chart 2 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Chart 3 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Appendices / Appendix 1 The Complete Dataset --- p.61 / Appendix 2 Definition of Variables in Different Sectors --- p.63 / Appendix 3 Non-Nested Tests --- p.54 / Table A3.1 Non-Nested Tests Results --- p.65 / Table A3.2 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.66 / Table A3.3 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.67 / Table A3.4 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.68 / Table A3.5 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.69 / Table A3.6 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.70 / Table A3.7 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.71 / Table A3.8 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.72 / Table A3.9 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.73 / Table A3.10 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.74 / Table A3.11 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Technology Industry Phenomenon vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.75 / Bibliography --- p.76

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Economics and Finance / Master / Master of Philosophy

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, Macquarie Graduate School of Management, 2006. / Bibliography: p. 240-276. / Introduction -- "Greening" phenomena of corporate environmental management and reporting -- China's environmental management and reporting -- Research theoretical methodology -- "Evolutionary epic" of China's environmental management institutions -- Findings and conceptualisation of CEM and CER -- Further discussion and implications -- Conclusion. / What was once the preserve of a 'green' social organisational fringe, Corporate Environmental Management (CEM) and Corporate Environmental Reporting (CER), have increasingly become a core business strategy. Research studies in this arena have been centred on industrialised nations (e.g., Guthrie and Parker, 1990), and until recently, comparatively sparse focus on developing nations (Belal, 2000), particularly in empirical studies on CER in the People's Republic of China (PRC). -- As the most populous nation on earth with one fifth of humanity (1.3 billions), China's astounding economic growth and resource consumption (Economist, 2005), provide 'telescoping' lessons in understanding the embracing of CEM and CER in rapidly developing countries. Motivated by China's unique institutional structure and embryonic stage of environmentalism (Luo and Yuwen, 2001; Chan and Welford, 2005), this field study explored the 'greening' phenomena of CEM and CER as perceived by senior managers in Shanghai. -- Utilising a modified grounded research approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; 1994; Whiteley, 2004), the constructivist ontology was chosen to penetrate the social context of the companies interviewed. Grounded in the data and applying interpretive epistemology, this qualitative research elucidated our awareness about the normative assumptions underpinning CEM and CER in Shanghai. The emergent model illuminated our understanding of how Chinese institutions and senior individuals within enterprises responded to the greening challenges, and how senior managers matched their personal beliefs with perceived CEM and CER. -- The results in this study indicated that CEM and CER were influenced and/or constrained by formal institutional rules (e.g., environmental policies and laws) and informal cultural institutional norms (e.g., Guanxi, trust and secrecy). The findings resonate well with institutional theoretical constraints (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Fogarty, 1992a) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1962). This is attributable to the dilemma of balancing the 'yin and yang' of long term environmental sustainability and short term economic growth. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / viii, 289 p. ill

by Yu Ying Choi Alan Abel. / Bibliography: leaves 72-73 / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985