So, King Pui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-52). / Abstracts in English and Chinese; appendix II, III also in Chinese. / Cover Page --- p.1 / Abstract --- p.2 / Chinese Version --- p.3 / Acknowledgements --- p.4 / Contents --- p.5 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 2. --- Definition and basic idea of Cumulative Voting --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Literature Review --- p.11 / Chapter 4. --- History and Development --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1. --- Around the world --- p.12 / Chapter 4.2. --- Cumulative voting in listed companies in China --- p.13 / Chapter 5. --- Hypothesis --- p.15 / Chapter 5.1. --- Nature of cumulative voting --- p.15 / Chapter 5.2 --- Relationship of corporate governance mechanism and tunneling in signaling the effect of cumulative voting --- p.18 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Ownership characteristics --- p.18 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- Activeness of minority shareholders --- p.20 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- Legal framework --- p.21 / Chapter 5.2.4. --- Ownership nature --- p.22 / Chapter 5.2.5. --- Board of directors and supervisors --- p.22 / Chapter 5.2.6. --- Compensations of top executives --- p.23 / Chapter 6. --- Methodology --- p.24 / Chapter 6.1. --- Cumulative voting in the election of the board of director --- p.24 / Chapter 6.2. --- Ownership concentration and characteristics --- p.24 / Chapter 6.3. --- Legal framework --- p.25 / Chapter 6.4. --- Firm Operation Policy --- p.25 / Chapter 6.5. --- Ownership Nature --- p.25 / Chapter 6.6. --- Board of directors and supervisors --- p.26 / Chapter 6.7. --- Top Executives' compensations --- p.27 / Chapter 6.8. --- Operating performance --- p.27 / Chapter 6.9. --- Industry sectors --- p.28 / Chapter 6.10. --- Market firm value --- p.28 / Chapter 6.11. --- Event study approach --- p.29 / Chapter 6.12. --- Matched Propensity Scores Approach --- p.32 / Chapter 6.13. --- Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities --- p.34 / Chapter 6.14. --- Difference in differences approach --- p.35 / Chapter 7. --- Data --- p.39 / Chapter 7.1. --- Sources of Data --- p.39 / Chapter 7.2. --- Cumulative voting announcements and firm characteristics --- p.39 / Chapter 8. --- Empirical Results --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1. --- Short-term market response --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1.1. --- Event study --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1.2. --- Univariate test --- p.41 / Chapter 8.1.3. --- Multivate OLS regressions --- p.42 / Chapter 8.2. --- Long-term impact --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2.1. --- Matched Propensity Scores --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2.2. --- Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities --- p.44 / Chapter 8.2.3. --- Univariate test --- p.45 / Chapter 8.2.4. --- Difference in Differences regressions --- p.46 / Chapter 9. --- Conclusions --- p.47 / References --- p.49 / Table 1: Descriptive statistics for firms announcing the implementation of cumulative voting in the election of board of directors --- p.53 / Table 2: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics --- p.54 / Table 3: Descriptive statistics for annual shareholders' meetings from 2002-2008 --- p.56 / Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in election of board of directors announcements --- p.56 / Table 5: Abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in election of board of directors announcements --- p.57 / Table 6: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics --- p.57 / "Table 7: Mean comparison between above median/ ´ب´ب 1"" group and below median/ ""0"" group using t-test" --- p.59 / Table 8: OLS regression --- p.60 / Table 9: First stage Logistic Model --- p.62 / Table 10: Top Executives Pay-Performance sensitivities for salary and inside stock ownership --- p.64 / Table 11: Mean comparison between cumulative voting and straight voting group using t-test --- p.65 / Table 12: Difference in differences regressions (Corporate governance) --- p.66 / Table 13: Difference in differences regressions (Operating performance) --- p.67 / Table 14: Difference in differences regressions (Market firm value) --- p.68 / Appendix I --- p.68 / Appendix II --- p.71 / Appendix III --- p.72

Tam Wai-man Grace. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-77). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.ii / 序言 --- p.iii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Dividend Irrelevance Theory --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Bird-in-the-hand Theory --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Clientele Effect Theory --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Signaling Theory --- p.11 / Chapter 2.5 --- Agency Cost Theory / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Theoretical Models --- p.15 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- The Latest Agency Cost Model --- p.19 / Chapter 2.6 --- Residual Theory --- p.24 / Chapter 2.7 --- Other Studies on Dividend Policy / Chapter 2.7.1 --- Low-Regular-Dividend-Plus-Extras Policy --- p.26 / Chapter 2.7.2 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japanese and U.S. Firms --- p.27 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Methodology / Chapter 3.1 --- Model --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2 --- Anti-Signaling Hypothesis --- p.29 / Chapter 3.3 --- Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4 --- Residual Hypothesis --- p.31 / Chapter 3.5 --- Investment Opportunities Hypothesis --- p.32 / Chapter 3.6 --- Industry Control --- p.33 / Chapter 3.7 --- The Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.34 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Sample and Data Description / Chapter 4.1 --- Sample Description --- p.35 / Chapter 4.2 --- Variable Description --- p.36 / Chapter 4.3 --- Limitations --- p.39 / Chapter 4.4 --- Descriptive Statistics --- p.41 / Chapter Chapter 5 / Chapter 5.1 --- Regression Results and Implications --- p.42 / Chapter 5.2 --- Alternative measurement for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3 --- Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Hong Kong and the World --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Tables / Table 1 Summary of the Four-Hypothesis Model --- p.50 / Table 2 Construction of Variables --- p.51 / Table 3 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.52 / Table 4 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996to 1999 --- p.54 / Table 5 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.55 / Table 6 Regression Results for Raw Data --- p.55 / Table 7 Regression Results using Substantial Shareholders Concentration as Proxy for Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.57 / Table 8 Summary of Regression Results --- p.58 / Charts / Chart 1 Dividend Payout Ratios of 83 Hong Kong Listed Firms from1992 to 1999 --- p.59 / Chart 2 Earnings Growth Rate of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Chart 3 Dividend Payout Ratio of 33 Hang Seng Index Constituents from 1996 to 1999 --- p.60 / Appendices / Appendix 1 The Complete Dataset --- p.61 / Appendix 2 Definition of Variables in Different Sectors --- p.63 / Appendix 3 Non-Nested Tests --- p.54 / Table A3.1 Non-Nested Tests Results --- p.65 / Table A3.2 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.66 / Table A3.3 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria - Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.67 / Table A3.4 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Anti-signaling Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.68 / Table A3.5 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Agency Cost Hypothesis --- p.69 / Table A3.6 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.70 / Table A3.7 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Residual Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.71 / Table A3.8 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.72 / Table A3.9 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Residual Hypothesis --- p.73 / Table A3.10 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria ´ؤ Agency Cost Hypothesis vs Investment Opportunity Hypothesis --- p.74 / Table A3.11 Non-Nested Test Statistics and Choice Criteria 一 Technology Industry Phenomenon vs Anti-signaling Hypothesis --- p.75 / Bibliography --- p.76