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This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of corporate voluntary disclosure of predecision information. The first essay entitled, "Disclosure Choice in a Duopoly", focusses on the phenomenon of partial disclosure, where the manager of the firm discloses selected signals and withholds the rest. The manager may or may not receive private information which is related to both firm-specific and industry-wide common factors. The motivation for disclosure (non-disclosure) is derived from the proprietary nature of the manager's private information. The cost (benefit) of disclosure is modelled in an imperfectly competitive product market, where an uninformed opponent’s reaction to a disclosure affects the manager's expected profit. Our results indicate that the nature of the manager's optimal disclosure policy is crucially dependent on whether the signal is more informative about firm-specific or industry-wide common factors. Unfavourable news is disclosed and favourable news withheld if the signal is more informative about common factors. On the other hand, favourable news is disclosed and unfavourable news is withheld if the signal is more informative about firm-specific factors. Comparative statics show that the sensitivity of the optimal disclosure policy and the probability of disclosure to some key parameters are also dependent on this characteristic of a signal. The empirical implications of our results suggest that when testing hypotheses involving voluntary disclosures, failure to take the above characteristic into account may confound the results. The second essay entitled, "Disclosure and Reputation in Credit Markets", deals with a different aspect of voluntary disclosures. A reputation game is modelled in the absence of credible disclosure. The manager's ability with respect to obtaining predecision information is of interest to the firm's creditors. The manager's future nominal interest charges depend on the creditors' belief about the manager's ability, i.e., on his reputation. Hence, the manager attempts to communicate this ability through sub-optimal production choice and creditors learn about the manager by observing the end of period revenue realization. If credible disclosures are possible the manager may make direct disclosures to communicate his information gathering ability to the creditors. This alternative mechanism avoids the cost of reputation building incurred by selecting a suboptimal project. However, it is shown that if these two mechanisms for reputation acquisition are not "independent", then the possibility of disclosure increases the manager's incentive to select a sub-optimal action. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

The purpose of this study is to survey the theory and practice of corporate liquid assets. A survey of the pertinent literature will be made to determine the theory concerned with the management of corporate liquid assets. The practice of the management of corporate liquid assets is examined at two levels. The first is a historical review of empirical data of Canadian corporations. The data used is aggregate in nature with corporations grouped into eleven industrial classes and ten asset size categories. With the aid of the computer various ratios are calculated. The transactions (sales) and wealth (asset) approach will be used. The second level of practice involves an examination of the policies and practices of liquid asset management in one specific manufacturing company, the Standard Oil Company of British Columbia Limited. The theory considers factors external and internal to the corporation that influence its need for and management of liquid assets. Four main external factors are: (1) the demand for money, (2) the development of the Canadian short-term money market, (3) the competitive environment, and (4) improvements in technology, education, and management skills. The theory suggests a number of internal factors are also influential in determining the need for and management of corporate liquid assets. They are: (1) corporate policy, (2) the ability of management to plan and control, (3) the individual firm's demand for money, (4) the size and nature of corporate organization and activity, (5) the age of a corporation, (6) the firm's cost of capital, and (7) the firm's growth rate. The survey of the practice of corporate liquid assets at the aggregate level suggests that firms of most industrial classes and asset size categories have during the 1951-64 period: (1) increased the use of the cash balances they hold, (2) freed liquid assets to be used in more attractive alternative means, and (3) shifted their portfolio of liquid assets so as to hold a greater proportion of interest earning forms, especially higher yielding nongovernment forms. The review of the policies and practices of liquid asset management at the Standard Oil Company of British Columbia Limited indicates the effective application of much of the theory. However, various characteristics specific to the company clearly indicate that all the theory and the general practices based on aggregate empirical data are not likely to be observed in the management of one company's liquid assets. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

The study views a corporate brand as more than just an outward manifestation of an organisation (its name, logo and visual presentation), or as an organising proposition that helps to shape an organisation’s value and culture and guide the organisation’s processes that generate and support value creation (Bickerton, 2001:43). Corporate brands are adored by stakeholders and organisations alike the world over because they provide enormous value to their organisations by differentiating their organisations from competitors, bestowing added value on products and services and contributing to a firm’s margins. According to Balmer (1995:30) the Catholic Church and ancient universities are regarded as representing “the apotheosis of corporate brand management, because, the two institutions have been astute in knowing what, how and when to change whilst preserving their core identity”. The study focused on these “apotheoses” to use as benchmarks for interrogating the approaches to corporate brand management in South Africa. In so doing, the study examines the nature, characteristics, importance and management practices of corporate brands in the South African market by confirming the meaning of corporate brands, the meaning of corporate brand management and the benefits provided by the adoption of a corporate brand strategy. The study also focused on the relationship between corporate brands and product brands; it identified stakeholder saliency and the process of corporate brand management. There were two reasons for undertaking this study. The first was to add to the body of empirical research in the area of corporate brand management, as empirical studies are few and far in between in thi s area, and the second to examine how organisations in South Africa manage their corporate brands. The study therefore involved a twostage process; the first phase was a detailed review of the literature on corporate brands to establish the current body of knowledge on corporate brand management. The second phase consisted of primary research, used to test the output of the literature review. A total of 41 online questionnaires dealing with the subject matter were completed by individuals responsible for the management of corporate brands in various organisations. The study’s findings cannot be generalised to the population of interest, owing to the size of the sample. Nevertheless, the findings confirmed that corporate brand management consists of a parallel process that requires management of a corporate brand internally while ensuring that it is relevant and meets stakeholders’ expectations, thus creating a positive reputation. Some of the findings contradicted the existing literature, for instance: • Although more respondents confirmed that a corporate brand must consist of a name and logo, the related mean score was relatively low (see Chapter 5 section C). • Secondly, contrary to what the literature suggests, based on the responses a corporate brand is not seen as an explicit formal written agreement between an organisation and its key stakeholders (see Chapter 5 section B). • Furthermore, corporate brands were not seen to offer reduced advertising and marketing costs (see Chapter 5 section B). • There was also a definite response to the responsibi l i t y of a chief executive officer (CEO) in terms of managing a corporate brand. The respondents made it clear that the responsibility of managing a corporate brand does not lie with CEO only (Chapter 5 section C). / Mr. H.B. Kruger

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