This thesis seeks to answer the principal question as to whether international criminal justice systems can serve as adequate truth-ascertaining forums. In doing so, it reviews the practice of three international criminal justice systems: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It is not the purpose of this research to review the black letter law adopted and applied by these international tribunals and court, but rather to review the implementation of the legal principles in practice. It is a socio-legal research project which focuses on the practice of the tribunals and court. It discusses socio-legal, institutional and political issues relating to the ascertainment of the truth in international criminal justice. In addition, it examines the gaps between the theory and practice of ascertaining the truth in the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. It does so principally by exploring the roles of the parties, participants and judges in ascertaining the truth. This includes the obstacles they face in doing so and the responses given, if any, to accommodate these difficulties. Challenges include the politicised climate of most post-conflict societies, the remoteness of the crime base areas from the seat of the Court, the lack of enforcement mechanisms and reliance on State cooperation, as well as the unfamiliarities with the cultural and linguistic features of the affected communities. This thesis reveals that these difficulties are not the principal cause of truth-searching impediments. Indeed, it is asserted that the ascertainment of the truth can be fair and effective notwithstanding these difficulties. It also demonstrates that truth-ascertaining impediments are mainly caused by failures to adequately investigate the crimes and relevant evidence. At the ICTY, investigations have been carried out in the most efficient and fair manner possible under the circumstances. By contrast, the ICTR and ICC investigations are far from adequate and should be improved. The Prosecution should make more efforts to obtain the best evidence available. It further concludes that international justice systems have set their goals too highly. Instead of seeking to meet objectives such as reconciliation, peace and security, they should restrict their focus to the question as to whether the guilt of a particular accused has been established in respect of the crimes charged.

This thesis seeks to systematically examine the contributions made by the dispute settlement bodies established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to the development of the law of the sea. The two main research questions to be answered are: (i) what kind of contribution have UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies made to the development of the law of the sea? and (ii) what are the factors that impact the performance of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies in developing the law of the sea? To that end, Chapter 1 provides a working definition for the concept of 'judicial development of international law' in order to establish a framework for an assessment of the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals. Based on this working definition, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine the significance of UNCLOS tribunals' decisions in the development of three main areas of the law of the sea, respectively the law on fisheries, the law on the outer continental shelf and the law on marine environmental protection. Based on the findings of these chapters, Chapter 5 analyses the factors that help explain the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals to the law of the sea as identified in the preceding chapters. These factors include: (i) the jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals, (ii) the institutional design of UNCLOS, (iii) the interpretative method employed by UNCLOS tribunals in deciding their cases and (iv) the perception that UNCLOS tribunals hold regarding their roles. Chapter 6 concludes by taking stock of the contribution of UNCLOS tribunal in these areas and offering some final observations on the role of UNCLOS tribunals in the development of the law of the sea.

At the outset, it has to be noticed that crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and international law will achieve its goals only if those responsible for crimes will be brought to justice. The principle of individual criminal responsibility of Heads’ of State for crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and torture (elaborated in the Nuremberg Charter) is part of customary international law. The principle is embodied in the resolutions of the UN General Assembly – Principles of Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal (1950); international treaties – Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), Geneva Conventions (1949), Convention against Torture and Other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (1984), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); other international instruments – UN Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1993) (also clarified in the proceedings brought before the former Yugoslavian leader S. Milosevic) and Rwanda (1994); decisions of national courts – the UK House of Lords decisions in the Pinochet case (1998 -1999); extradition requests sent and honoured by executive officials – Belgium international arrest warrant for H. Habre (2005) and African Union requests; state proposals for international... [to full text]

The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the Security Council has opened a new avenue for law-making at the international level by adopting resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which create new norms of international law or modify international norms already in force (the normative resolutions). The normative resolutions analyzed in this study pertain to the areas of counterterrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. The new approach of the Security Council has been examined in light of the Third World Approaches in International law (TWAIL), as well as from the viewpoint of mainstream lawyers. Furthermore, 15 years of State practice relating to the implementation of these normative resolutions has been studied with a view to determining whether subsequent State practice confirms the exercise of a law-making function by the Security Council. Despite some incremental success in promoting international standards in the fight against terrorism, this thesis illustrates that the Security Council has not succeeded in introducing a new viable form of law-making. The Security Council’s authority to exercise such a function is now under serious doubt and its legitimacy questioned, as its normative resolutions were improperly initiated and adopted under the influence of a Permanent Member of the Security Council. Furthermore, the Security Council’s intervention in areas that are already highly regulated runs the risk of contributing to the fragmentation of international law—a phenomenon that undermines the coherence of international law. Currently, the Council’s normative resolutions are facing serious challenges at the implementation stage and several proceedings before national and regional courts have either directly challenged the normative resolutions, or questioned their enforceability. The Security Council is under continued pressure to further revise its practice or potentially face additional challenges before national, regional, and even international courts which may annul or quash relevant implementing measures. Thus, in light of relevant State practice, it is almost inconceivable that the Security Council would repeat its use of normative resolutions as a means of law-making in the future. Nevertheless, the increasing powers of the United Nations Security Council also stimulates an increasing demand to hold the United Nations accountable for the possible wrongful acts of its principal organ, particularly when its decisions harm individuals. It is argued that in the absence of a compulsory judicial mechanism at the international level, non-compliance with the Council’s decisions is the only viable way to challenge the Security Council wrongful acts. Yet, non-complying State or group of States should clearly identify their actions as countermeasures vis-a-vis ultra vires acts of Security Council and seek support from other like-minded States to avoid being declared recalcitrant, which may be followed by Security Council sanctions.