This study investigates the effect of preferred stock on the credit ratings assessed by professional credit analysts. Preferred stock inherently contains both features of debt and equity financing. Hence, the nature of preferred stock has presented a puzzle to the efforts of accounting regulators such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board to consistently classify within the existing framework established by financial reporting standards. I find evidence that the association of preferred stock with credit analysts' assessments of credit risk depends on two factors. First, the association of preferred stock with credit ratings varies by the type of preferred stock. Preferred stock that is redeemable is negatively associated with credit ratings, while nonredeemable preferred stock bears no consistent association with credit ratings. Second, the negative association of redeemable preferred stock with credit ratings is sensitive to the firm's financial condition. For those firms in poor financial health, the negative association dissipates. This is in line with preferred stock's inability to drive an insolvent firm into bankruptcy.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-177).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of South Carolina, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-67).

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Economics, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 262-277). Also available in print.

Thesis advisor: Fabio Schiantarelli / Thesis advisor: Thomas J. Chemmanur / After the 2007 financial crisis, a big attention has been dedicated to credit ratings. Whether ratings are capable to provide the most precise and timely information is a question that has been tackled from different angles. The possibility to discipline credit ratings via a regulatory mechanism, the influence that ratings may play on corporate governance decisions and the information they deliver in comparison to other financial intermediaries are the main points that this dissertation aims to address. The first paper compares the behavior of standard or issuer-paid rating agencies, represented by Standard & Poors (S&P) to alternative or investor-paid rating agencies, represented by the Egan-Jones Ratings Company (EJR) after the Dodd- Frank Act regulation is approved. Results show that both S&P and EJR ratings are more conservative, stable and, on average, lower after the Dodd-Frank implementation. However, EJR ratings are higher for firms that may generate high revenue for the rater. Additionally, I find that, after the regulation, S&P cares more about its reputation. Exploiting a measure that captures the bond marketís ability to anticipate rating downgrades, I show that, after Dodd-Frank, bond market anticipation decreases for S&P but increases for EJR, suggesting that S&P ratings are timelier. Finally, I study how the bond market responds to rating changes and how firms perceive ratings in their decision to issue debt in the post-Dodd-Frank period. Results suggest that both S&P downgrades and upgrades generate a greater bond market re- sponse. On the contrary, only EJR upgrades have a magnified effect on bond market returns. The greater informativeness of S&P ratings after Dodd-Frank is confirmed by the meaningful impact of these ratings on firm debt issuance. The second paper (coauthored with Annamaria C. Menichini) studies the relationship between credit rating changes and CEO turnover beyond firm performance. Using an adverse selection model that explicitly incorporates rating change related turnover, our model predicts that a downgrade triggers turnover, more so the lower the managerial entrenchment, but that this relation is weaker when the report provided by the rating agency is more reliable. Our empirical results support these predictions. We show that downgrades explain forced turnover risk, with the new CEO chosen outside the firm that has received the negative credit rating change. In addition, we find that the relation between rating changes and management turnover is stronger when the degree of managerial entrenchment is low, for firms characterized by a high level of investment and for firms less exposed to rating fees. Finally, we show that this relation has weakened in the post-2007 crisis period, in coincidence with the increased reputational concerns of the rating agencies. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns. The third paper (coauthored with Thomas J. Chemmanur and Igor Karagodsky) focuses on equity analysts, issuer-paid and investor-paid ratings. Equity analysts' forecasts and ratings assigned by issuer-paid credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poorís (S&P) and by investor-paid rating agencies such as Egan and Jones (EJR) all involve information production about the same underlying set of firms, even though equity analysts focus on cash flows to equity and bond ratings focus on cash flows to bonds. Further, the two types of credit rating agencies differ in their incentives to produce and report accurate information signals. Given this setting, we empirically analyze the timeliness and accuracy of the information signals provided by each of the above three types of financial intermediary to their investor clienteles and the information flows between these intermediaries. We find that the information signals produced by EJR are the most timely (on average), and seem to anticipate the information signals produced by equity analysts as well as by S&P. We find that changes in leverage are associated with lower EJR ratings but higher equity analysts' recommendations; further, credit rating changes by EJR have the largest impact on firms' investment levels. We also document an investor attention effect (in the sense of Merton, 1987) among stock and bond market investors in the sense that changes in equity analyst recommendations have a higher impact than either EJR or S&P ratings changes on the excess returns on firm equity, while EJR rating changes have a higher impact on bond yield spreads than either S&P ratings changes or changes in equity analyst recommendations. Finally, we analyze differences in bond ratings assigned to a given firm by EJR and S&P, and find that these differences are positively related to the standard proxies for disagreement among stock market investors.

The credit rating industry is a global industry with only three major actors, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. The “big three” control the majority of the credit rating market and have powers, in the form of credit rating issuances, which they use to influence financial markets worldwide. Ever since their involvement in the fall of corporate giants in early 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008, the power and influence of the credit rating agencies, as well as questions regarding conflict of interest and transparency, have been a hot topic of debate.   The impact of credit ratings can be seen across multiple markets; however the focus of this study is on the stock market where every day investors can be affected. As Moody’s is one of the three largest CRAs in the world and is present worldwide, we apply their credit ratings when investigating the impact. Due to different characteristics of large and small markets, and since the US market is well studied; this study is conducted on the Swedish market. Thus, the aim of our study is to investigate the impact credit ratings from Moody’s have on the Swedish stock market and also, give a perspective on how the financial crisis of 2008 influences the potential impact.   We apply an event study method to isolate the events and measure the abnormal returns. To estimate the expected market return we use the market model on estimation periods of 60 to 120 days. The sample contains 71 individual credit rating changes from 17 firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and considers all uncontaminated credit rating changes issued by Moody’s on the Swedish market during the time period of 1990 to 2012.   Empirical evidence showed that the Swedish stock market is susceptible to Moody’s negative credit ratings but almost unaffected by the positive credit ratings. These findings are in line with previous research of Holthausen & Leftwich (1986) amongst others. Still, the effects discovered were not prolonged and no clear difference in impact was found after 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-132). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2003. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-132). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Ohio University, November, 1994. / Title from PDF t.p.