Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1992. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-113). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, June 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis advisor: Philip Strahan / In my first essay, I study how the rise of non-bank loan investment from CLOs, mutual funds, and hedge funds influenced contracting relationships between firms and their senior lenders. Contrary to common perception that non-bank investors diluted the incentive for banks to monitor firms, I find evidence that bank underwriters embraced tighter contracts to mitigate agency and holdout problems associated with less-informed and dispersed non-bank investors. While recent studies show that non-bank loan investors lowered the cost and expanded the availability of capital ex ante, I conclude that tighter contracts also assigned stronger control rights to lenders and imposed higher renegotiation costs to firms ex post. In my second essay, we examine the drivers of M&A activity in bankruptcy. M&A in bankruptcy is counter-cyclical, and is more likely when the costs of financing a reorganization are greater than financing costs to a potential acquirer. Consistent with a senior creditor liquidation bias, the greater use of secured debt leads to more sales in bankruptcy - but, this result holds only for sales that preserve going concern value. We also show that overall creditor recovery rates are higher, and unsecured creditor recoveries and post-bankruptcy survival rates are not different, when bankrupt firms sell businesses as going concerns. Finally, in my third essay, we examine whether corporate credit rating analysts are rewarded based on ratings accuracy or bias. Overall, accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted. However, analysts who disproportionately downgrade firms compared to the corresponding S&P rating are less likely to be promoted despite being more accurate than analysts who disproportionately upgrade firms. Further, analysts whose rating decisions lead to significantly negative announcement returns are also less likely to be promoted. We conclude that Moody's rewards accurate analysts but punishes analysts for negative bias. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.

Research thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Management in Finance and Investment Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management Wits Business School University of Witwatersrand June 2017 / Sovereign credit ratings provide a summary of the economic conditions of a particular country, and are a representation of the ability and willingness of a country to make its debt payments as they fall due. These ratings provide an indication of the cost of borrowing in that country, so a country would like to obtain the highest possible credit rating. These ratings are provided by independent agencies who use their own systems to provide a rating and an outlook. Credit ratings are important as they provide information to investors on the potential investability and access to financial markets of that particular country. The problem found by some literature is the reliability of ratings in emerging markets as investors perceive these markets to be riskier in nature. In this paper, the aim was to identify what the different factors that the two big agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s use when rating a country. This is done through using a multiple regression model on 5 emerging economies from different continents from 1994 to 2015, based on annual data. The first step was to find out what are the macro-economic variables that have strong correlations with the agencies, and the results show that external balances as a % of GDP and the GDP growth have low correlations with the ratings. The regression analysis also shows that Moody’s takes the inflation rate into consideration when rating a country but Standard and Poor’s does not. The paper also wanted to identify the effects of ratings on markets, and this was done through the effect of ratings on the interest rate spreads. The results show that the rating differential, which was the ratings from Moody’s subtracted from the ratings of Standard and Poor’s, affect the interest rate spreads negatively, therefore a better rating should reduce the spread and have a positive effect on the financial markets. / MT2017

<p>This study aims to investigate the relationship between systematic risk and credit ratings. The systematic risk, frequently measured by beta, is an important consideration for both investors and corporations. Therefore it is interesting to examine if indications about the systematic risk could be gained by looking at credit ratings, especially on the Nordic market, where credit ratings are seemingly growing in importance. Consequently, the following research hypothesis is posed;<em> We intend to establish a relationship between market risk (Beta) and credit ratings for firms in the Nordic countries.</em></p><p><em> </em></p><p>In order to confirm or deny the research hypothesis, theories from peer reviewed databases were collected. These were divided into three sections; background theories, hypotheses about credit ratings and a literature review. The background theories consisted of two classical financial theories, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which are the foundation upon which the research field have progressed. The hypotheses is specifically designed to explain the relationship between credit ratings and either systematic risk or stock price. The literature review contains information about studies which did not contribute to theory building, but produced results interesting in the research area.</p><p> </p><p>The actual sample in the thesis consisted of the 58 credit rated companies on the Nordic stock market. These companies were rated by Moody’s and/or Standard & Poor’s, the two largest credit rating agencies in the world. As a measure of the systematic risk, betas for each of the companies were calculated. To investigate the relationship between these variables a regression analysis was performed, as well as one sample T-test using the software SPSS.</p><p> </p><p>The result revealed a moderate relationship between beta and credit risk, a relationship which was not statistically significant on the five percent level. Our results suggest that credit ratings contain some information about companies’ systematic risk, a finding that might be useful for market participants.</p><p> </p>

This study aims to investigate the relationship between systematic risk and credit ratings. The systematic risk, frequently measured by beta, is an important consideration for both investors and corporations. Therefore it is interesting to examine if indications about the systematic risk could be gained by looking at credit ratings, especially on the Nordic market, where credit ratings are seemingly growing in importance. Consequently, the following research hypothesis is posed; We intend to establish a relationship between market risk (Beta) and credit ratings for firms in the Nordic countries. In order to confirm or deny the research hypothesis, theories from peer reviewed databases were collected. These were divided into three sections; background theories, hypotheses about credit ratings and a literature review. The background theories consisted of two classical financial theories, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which are the foundation upon which the research field have progressed. The hypotheses is specifically designed to explain the relationship between credit ratings and either systematic risk or stock price. The literature review contains information about studies which did not contribute to theory building, but produced results interesting in the research area.   The actual sample in the thesis consisted of the 58 credit rated companies on the Nordic stock market. These companies were rated by Moody’s and/or Standard &amp; Poor’s, the two largest credit rating agencies in the world. As a measure of the systematic risk, betas for each of the companies were calculated. To investigate the relationship between these variables a regression analysis was performed, as well as one sample T-test using the software SPSS.   The result revealed a moderate relationship between beta and credit risk, a relationship which was not statistically significant on the five percent level. Our results suggest that credit ratings contain some information about companies’ systematic risk, a finding that might be useful for market participants.

This dissertation is a collection of three essays that study the market for consumer information. The first chapter studies the role of information intermediaries and their impact on consumer privacy. The second chapter presents an analysis of signaling in credit and insurance markets through default and repayment decisions. The third chapter studies some special topics such the manipulation of credit histories by fake borrowing or deletion of records. It also identifies a learning mechanism through which uninformed consumers can endogenously learn the link between credit market behavior and insurance market outcomes. / text

published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

This paper seeks to investigate the reaction of credit ratings and credit markets in response to accounting restatements. Accounting restatements can often be perceived as a precursor to fraudulent activity, which could lead to a more negative credit rating, or a heightened credit default swap (CDS) price. CDS prove to be a useful measuring tool as they adjust to changes relatively quickly; much more quickly than the assessment of a credit rating agency. My results suggest that restatements do indeed have an effect on credit rating. It does, however take longer for credit ratings to be updated after the restatement, but CDS quotes move faster and are just as, if not more accurate. I also find that credit default swaps do not anticipate restatements, showing that while the credit markets are beating the rating agencies, they do not appear to be beating the accountants.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on April 17, 2008) Includes bibliographical references.