Creditor committees have been characterized as the “watchdogs” of the bankruptcy reorganization process of large companies. Not only do creditor committees have broad statutory powers to oversee the debtor and its management, but they also play a key role in preventing abuses by professionals and other participants in the often complex corporate bankruptcy process. Furthermore, recent research has provided evidence of abusive fee practices in large corporate bankruptcy cases which point to failures in the oversight mechanisms of the process. This dissertation examines the role of creditor committees in the bankruptcy process and in selected outcomes of this process, with a focus on fees paid to bankruptcy professionals. Based on a unique data set comprised of 1,037 bankruptcy cases over the period 1999-2008, the research first examines committee characteristics along three separate dimensions of analysis: individual characteristics of members serving on committees; changes of committee composition over the life of the committees; and social characteristics of committee interlocks. The Calpine bankruptcy case is used throughout this dissertation to illustrate the research. This research finds a dense network of interlocks that dominates large cases, with financial industry members being significantly more likely to serve on multiple committees than non-financial industry members. Analysis of the data shows that over 50% of creditor committees are never amended and there are no systematic recompositions of the remaining committees. A test of small-world topology in the member creditor committee network fails to show a strong small-world structure in the member social network once it is corrected for imposed network topology. This dissertation then employs econometric models to evaluate whether creditor committee variables help explain professional fees in large bankruptcy cases. It finds a statistically significant and positive relationship between the social centrality measure of the creditor committee case and the professional fees paid. This finding points to potential conflicts of interest among the repeat creditor committee players and their constituents. The research fails to find a significant relationship between the presence of financial firms in creditors’ committees and professional fees paid in the case. The dissertation concludes with policy recommendations and suggestions for further research. / text

L’article L 626-27 du Code de commerce sanctionne l’échec du plan de sauvegarde par la résolution. L’effet destructeur de cette sanction peut, de prime abord, séduire lorsque la solution arrêtée par le tribunal ne répond plus à l’objectif de sauvegarde de l’entreprise. Cependant, ce choix suscite l’étonnement dans la mesure où il s’agit d’une sanction de l’inexécution d’une obligation contractuelle. Or, il apparaît difficile de considérer le plan comme un contrat. Malgré l’effort de contractualisation opéré par la loi du 26 juillet 2005 à travers la participation des comités de créanciers à son élaboration, il demeure un acte juridictionnel. Cette incompatibilité invite à redéfinir la nature de la sanction. Une étude minutieuse de l’échec du plan montre que sa sanction répond à une logique propre à la procédure collective qui s’illustre principalement dans la diversité de ses causes et de ses effets. Contrairement à la résolution, la sanction de l’échec du plan peut être prononcée soit en présence d’une inexécution des engagements qu’il contient soit en raison de la survenance d’une cessation des paiements au cours de son exécution. En outre, elle produit des effets distincts étrangers à toute idée de rétroactivité. Si elle permet, en cas d’inexécution, de revenir à la relation contractuelle initiale, elle assure, en cas de cessation des paiements, la clôture de la sauvegarde et le retour simultané de la procédure collective. Aussi, elle ne saurait être une résolution, mais constitue un instrument de nature procédurale hybride propre à la procédure collective. Une approche cohérente de l’échec du plan de sauvegarde invite, par conséquent, à reformuler l’article L 626-27 du Code de commerce. / Article L 626-27 of the French Commercial Code punishes the failure of a bankruptcy plan by cancellation. The destructive impact of this sanction may, at first, trigger a company's interest when the court's decision does not correspond to the company's bankruptcy goal. Nonetheless this choice is surprising given that it punishes the non-execution of a contractual obligation. However it seems difficult to consider the plan as a contract. The Act of July 26, 2005 looks to formalizing this process by contract namely through the participation of creditor committees in the early stages of the procedure, but it remains a jurisdictional action. This incompatibility encourages one to redefine the nature of this sanction. A careful examination of the plan's failure shows that the sanction fulfills a logic pertaining to a collective procedure, the causes and consequences of which are diverse. Contrary to the cancellation, the sanction punishing the plan's failure may be delivered in case of the non-execution of commitments put forth in the plan or the suspension of payments during its execution. Furthermore its consequences are distinct, with no retro activity. In case of non-execution, the sanction allows for a return to the initial contractual relation, but in case of suspension of payments it guarantees a bankruptcy closure and a return to collective procedure. Thus, it would no longer be a cancellation but a hybrid procedural instrument pertaining to a collective procedure. Therefore a coherent approach to the failure of the bankruptcy plan encourages one to rephrase article L 626-27 of the French Commercial Code.