Generally the Courts have a discretion to impose sentence. Violent crime was rampant in South Africa. The response of the legislature in dealing with crime was to enact legislation in 1997 like sections 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 which prescribe severe mandatory sentences for a large number of serious offences like murder, rape and armed robbery. This legislation come into effect on 1 May 1998 and was to have effect for two years. The President could with the concurrence of Parliament by proclamation extend its operation for one year, that was in fact done. The latest extension of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was for a further two years making the minimum sentence provisions valid until 30 April 2005. The Courts did not like these mandatory sentences because of the limitation it places on judicial discretion and dealt with this legislation that limited their judicial discretion restrictively in order to defend their sentencing discretion. Although the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 105 of 1997 was held not to be unconstitutional the Courts stll sought to give it a narrow interpretation. This research paper include an outline of the Criminal Law Amendment Act / the Constitutional challenges that were brought against the Criminal Law Amendment Act / the judicial interpretation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act as well as the applicability of the Criminal Law Amendment Act to District Courts and juvenile ovenders / the procedural requirements that must be complied with in the Criminal Law Amendment Act and its consequences if not complied with. This paper examined how the Courts defined substantial and compelling circumstances, the approaches adopted by the Courts and when deviation from the Criminal Law Amendment Act can take place. It also include the challenges posed by mandatory minimum sentence legislation as well as recommendations for the improved implementation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) --University of Limpopo, 2014 / This research focuses on the application of the double jeopardy principle in labour law, section 188(1)(a (b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, (herein the LRA) which provides that the dismissal is unfair if the employer fails to prove that the reason for the dismissal is fair and was effected in accordance with a fair procedure. The first point which I would explain is the meaning of double jeopardy and whether it is applicable in labour law. The research articulates that the double jeopardy principle applies to labour law and enumerates ways it can be applied. The South African courts, in particular, the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court have delivered several judgements on the double jeopardy principle. These cases will be critically discussed in detail. Comparison will be made with foreign labour law jurisprudence on the double jeopardy principle, particularly in Australia and the United States of America.

Generally the Courts have a discretion to impose sentence. Violent crime was rampant in South Africa. The response of the legislature in dealing with crime was to enact legislation in 1997 like sections 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 which prescribe severe mandatory sentences for a large number of serious offences like murder, rape and armed robbery. This legislation come into effect on 1 May 1998 and was to have effect for two years. The President could with the concurrence of Parliament by proclamation extend its operation for one year, that was in fact done. The latest extension of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was for a further two years making the minimum sentence provisions valid until 30 April 2005. The Courts did not like these mandatory sentences because of the limitation it places on judicial discretion and dealt with this legislation that limited their judicial discretion restrictively in order to defend their sentencing discretion. Although the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 105 of 1997 was held not to be unconstitutional the Courts stll sought to give it a narrow interpretation. This research paper include an outline of the Criminal Law Amendment Act / the Constitutional challenges that were brought against the Criminal Law Amendment Act / the judicial interpretation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act as well as the applicability of the Criminal Law Amendment Act to District Courts and juvenile ovenders / the procedural requirements that must be complied with in the Criminal Law Amendment Act and its consequences if not complied with. This paper examined how the Courts defined substantial and compelling circumstances, the approaches adopted by the Courts and when deviation from the Criminal Law Amendment Act can take place. It also include the challenges posed by mandatory minimum sentence legislation as well as recommendations for the improved implementation of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

Text in Afrikaans / Artikel 217 is van toepassing op Jn bekentenis, synde Jn ondubbelsinnige erkenning van skuld, wat indien dit in Jn hof gemaak sou word, sou neerkom op Jn pleit van skuldig. Om toelaatbaar te wees, moes die verklaarder die bekentenis vrywillig en ongedwonge, by sy volle positiewe sender onbehoorlike beinvloeding afgele het aan Jn landdros of vrederegter. Waar die bekentenis in Jn dokument vervat is, is dit, mits daar aan die toelaatbaarheidsvereistes voldoen is, toelaatbaar teen die verklaarder daarvan. Artikel 209 vind toepassing mits die bekentenis Jn volle bekentenis is en die vereistes van artikel 217 nagekom is. Volgens die beslissing in S V SHEEHAMA 1991 2 SA 860(A) is Jn aanwysing Jn erkenning. As sulks moet dit voldoen aan die vereistes van artikel 219A en moes derhalwe vrywillig en ongedwonge gemaak wees. Jn Gedwonge aanwysing is dus ontoelaatbaar, tensy nuwe feite ontdek word as gevolg daarvan. / Section 217 is applicable to a confession, being an unequivocal acknowledgment of guilt, the equivalent of a plea of guilty before a court of law. To be admissible, the declarant must have made the confession to a magistrate or justice freely and voluntarily in his sound and sober senses without having been unduly influenced thereto. Section 209 is applicable provided that the confession is a full confession and the requirements of section 217 are complied with. According to the judgment in S V SHEEHAMA 1991 2 SA 860(A) a pointing out is an admission. As such it must comply with the requirements of section 219A and must therefore be made voluntarily and freely. An involuntary pointing out is thus inadmissible, except if new facts are discovered because of it. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.M.

M.A. (Social Work) / In the recent past people became more aware of the fact that serious crimes are being committed against children. Statistics show that sexual molestation is one of the most prevalent types of offences committed against children. Society demands that such an offender must be punished in a suitable manner. Recent developments in South Africa in regard to alternative sentences led to correctional supervision. The motivation for this study was to establish differences between people who was sentenced to imprisonment and people who was sentenced to correctional supervision for committing sexual crimes against children by using three different Hudson scales, namely, depression, self-esteem, and sexual discord.

The challenge in the law of defamation lies in finding the appropriate balance between the two competing rights of freedom of expression and an unimpaired reputation. From Roman and Roman-Dutch law into the modern era, criminal and civil defamation have been very closely linked. The elements and defences are substantially alike. There were several calls prior to 1994 for the abrogation of criminal defamation. Now that the right to an unimpaired reputation, as part of the right to human dignity, and the right to freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, quo vadis the crime of criminal defamation? The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently granted a petition for leave to appeal against convictions for criminal defamation on this very point: is the offence constitutional. Due to the paucity of criminal defamation precedent, the copious civil law precedent concerning civil defamation must be analysed to determine what view the Supreme Court of Appeal will adopt. Prior to 1994 the right to an unimpaired reputation has trumped freedom of expression. Since then, the two leading decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court have ameliorated this situation slightly, according freedom of expression more weight. Claiming the previous common law position was incorrect, they claim the present common law position is constitutionally sound. Thus the Constitution has in essence had no effect to date upon the balancing of competing rights in the law of defamation. Both courts have erred in according the right to freedom of expression too little weight. This may be due to three judicial errors. Firstly, they have under-appreciated that the values of dignity, equality and freedom fortify and are fortified by the right to freedom of expression. Aspects of dignity such as self-actualisation, self-governance and an acceptance that humans have intrinsic worth are heavily reliant on freedom of expression, particularly political expression. Secondly, while political expression lies at the core of freedom of expression, reputation lies nearer the periphery of the right to dignity. Rights at the core ought to trump competing but peripheral rights. Thirdly, erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. Unless they too are protected, unacceptable self-censorship occurs. The correct approach is as a matter of policy, particularly regarding political expression, to balance the competing rights with one’s thumb on the free expression side of the scales. This seems the trend of the European Court of Human Rights in recent cases In Canada, an offence punishing libel made intentionally but without knowledge of its falsity was recently ruled unconstitutional. On the other hand, another offence punishing libel made with knowledge it was false, videlicet punishing the intentional publication of defamatory lies, was ruled constitutional. Criminal defamation clearly infringes upon the right to freedom of expression. For this infringement to pass constitutional muster it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. It fails the limitation test due to the lack of proportionality between its objective in protecting the right to an unimpaired reputation and the harm it does to the right to expression. There are three reasons: firstly the “chilling effect” of imprisonment, over and above pecuniary damages, unacceptably stifles free debate. Secondly, it may punish even the truth, yet protect a falsehood, since the truth per se is not a defence. An undeserved reputation is thus more highly valued than the publication of that truth. Finally there is a well-developed civil remedy that adequately protects the right to reputation of aggrieved persons. In the appeal concerning the constitutionality of the common law offence of criminal defamation, the Supreme Court of Appeal ought to find it unconstitutional.

The general principle in criminal law is that a person is liable when committing a criminal offence. This may include an offence a person has facilitated or procured. Vicarious liability, a principle borrowed from civil law, is an exception to the general rule in that it allows for a person to be held liable for the criminal acts of another. Legal persons have no physical existence and do not have hands and brains like natural persons. A legal person acts through its directors, employees, members or representatives. The corporation, being distinct and separate from its agents, is held liable for the acts or omissions of its representatives. This liability exists even though the corporate body never acted. International recognition of corporate criminal liability can be based on vicarious liability, identification or aggregation. All these forms of liability are derived from the human actus and mens rea. The identification theory provides for the liability of the corporate body, when someone who is identified with it, acted during the course of his employment when committing the offence. Those acts are treated as the acts of the corporate body. The identification theory is normally applied where mens rea is a requirement of the offence. The Aggregation theory provides for criminal liability of the corporation based on the conduct of a group of members of the company taken collectively. This theory is applied effectively where it is difficult to prove that a single person within the company is responsible for the commission of the offence. In South Africa corporate criminal liability developed from vicarious liability. It is regulated by section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. This liability is based on the special relationship between the director or servant and the corporate body. Corporations act through its agents. The agent can be a director, servant or a third person instructed by either of them. In terms of section 332(1) it is possible that the corporate body can be held liable even where the agent acted beyond the scope of his employment. The latter can be argued is an extension of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability, can be argued, is too broad, because the intention of the agent is imputed to the corporate body, without the enquiry of fault by the corporate body. This offends the general principles of substantive criminal law. Generally, liability in criminal law accrues to someone who committed the offence with the required state of mind. The constitutionality of section 332(1) Act 51 of 1977 is questioned. The question is asked whether it is desirable to punish a legal person for the behaviour of its representatives or employees. Criminal law purports to control the behaviour of individuals to be in line with the interest and values of society. There is doubt whether the same goal can be achieved with the prosecution of corporate bodies. Prosecution of corporate bodies results in stigma to the corporation, which results in suffering a loss of reputation. Some authors argue that civil remedies can control the activities of corporate bodies more effectively. This argument, however, fails to address the issue that criminal law concerns the harm inflicted by human beings, hence the need to regulate human conduct. Corporate criminal liability attempts to address the harm inflicted by corporate bodies. It regulates pollution, health, safety and business. This liability is firmly established around the world but requires further development and modern refinement in South Africa. / Abstract

Legislation regulating minimum sentences in South Africa was re-introduced by sections 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 which came into operation on 1 May 1998. These provisions were regarded as a temporary measure to be effective for two years, where after they were extended from time to time. After they had been extended for several times, section 51 was rendered permanent on 31 December 2007 by the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007. At the same time sections 52 and 53 were repealed by the same Act. Minimum sentence legislation was the result of a call by the community for heavier penalties and for the offenders to serve more realistic terms of imprisonment. There was also a general dissatisfaction about the perceived leniency of sentences imposed by the courts for serious crimes. During 1996 and in the wake of these concerns the Minister of Justice requested the South African Law Reform Commission to investigate all aspects of sentencing in South Africa. A Project Committee chaired by a judge of the High Court was appointed and it operated from the late 1996 to March 1998. Minimum sentences for certain serious crimes were one of the options to be investigated by the Project Committee. Consequent to this the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was promulgated with effect from 1 May 1998. The legislature intended this Act to defer criminal activity, to avoid disparities in sentencing and to deal harshly with perpetrators of serious offences. The subsequent amendments to the Act included the granting of jurisdiction to the Regional court to pass life imprisonment, an automatic right of appeal against life imprisonment in respect of a juvenile accused and identification of circumstances that do not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances. Judicial discretion and departure from prescribed minimum sentences had initially presented a problem regarding its interpretation in a variety of cases in our courts. Eventually our courts came up with a clear interpretation of the meaning of the phrase substantial and compelling circumstances. This research project will analyze the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 with regard to minimum sentences for certain serious offences. In the process case law and other literature will be discussed regarding the interpretation of minimum sentence provisions in the Act. Recommendations for legislation which will cover the aspect of sentencing on a wider scale are made.

The Criminal Law Amendment Act introduced a scheme where minimum sentences are prescribed for serious offences into the South African Criminal Law. The limitations put on the courts’ sentencing discretion were not received with unanimous approval from all quarters. The Constitutional Court declared the general working of the Act to be constitutional soon after its inception. Specific provisions pertaining to certain offences remained unpopular. The hefty sentence of 15 years imprisonment prescribed for the possession of a semi-automatic firearm is put forward as an example in this regard. High Courts avoid the minimum sentence prescribed for this offence by using different interpretational methods. Despite the sense of animosity towards the unfair contents of this provision, no ruling is made on the constitutionality thereof. An apparent deference towards the legislature could be detected on the part of the judiciary. South African jurisprudence discourages our courts to rule on the constitutionality of a law. It is only done when the defect could not be remedied by any other available means. The reluctance of our courts to make a ruling on the constitutionality of the semi-automatic provision does not promote legal certainty. High Courts attach different interpretations to the “true intention” of the legislature in order to bypass this provision. Logic dictates that inexperienced presiding officers with inferior interpretational skills would continue to hand down the minimum sentence while it remains on the law books. A sentence of fifteen years is also prescribed for robbery with aggravating circumstances. The existing common law on the interpretation of the definition of this offence provides for a wide range of human conduct to be included. Case law could be expected where the courts deviate from the prescribed sentence on a regular basis. This unscientific approach should be discouraged and a rethinking of the boundaries of this offence is suggested. The Act is doing more harm than good to our Criminal Law. The legislature could still provide other visible measures against serious crime without invading the sentencing discretion of the judiciary.

The South African criminal justice process is such that there is an inevitable lapse of time between the arrest of the offender and his or her subsequent trial. The pre-trial incarceration presents a special problem. Between the arrest of the accused and release, the accused is being deprived of his or her liberty in circumstances where no court of law has pronounced him or her guilty. The right to bail is well entrenched in South African criminal justice system both in the Constitution Act and Criminal Procedure Act. Bail is always in the form of contract between the State and the accused, even though at times it may be opposed by the State. In the past the legal position based on the case law was that the presumption of innocence in bail proceedings operated in favour of the applicant even where it was said that there was a strong prima facie case against him or her. This position has slightly changed in that the courts in bail applications are not concerned with guilt, but that of possible guilt only to the extent that it may bear on where the interests of justice lie in regard to bail. The onus of proof in bail applications, other than Schedule 5 and 6 offences is borne by the State. Where Schedule 5 or 6 is applicable the onus is on the applicant. There are different requirements between schedule 5 and 6 that must be met by the applicant before release on bail is granted. In Schedule 5 offences the bail applicant must satisfy the court that the interests of justice permit his or her release. In determining whether the interests of justice permit the release of a particular applicant on bail, the courts are guided by the provisions of section 60(4) to (9) inclusive of section (11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In such determination the courts must also take into account of section 60(60)(a) to (g) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In Schedule 6 offences there are two requirements namely: the exceptional circumstances and the interests of justice. The term “exceptional circumstances” does not have a closed definition. Both requirements must be established by means of written or oral evidence to the satisfaction of the court before bail may be granted. As pointed out above, the State may still oppose the release on bail of the applicant. It is now accepted in bail applications that ordinary circumstances may in particular context be blended with exceptional or unusual elements. In such cases the court is expected to apply its independent evaluation of evidence in order to determine whether the exceptional circumstances in the interests of justice permit the release on bail. Similarly to the South African bail jurisprudence the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognises a right of the arrested person to apply for the interim release. It also recognises the need to establish exceptional circumstances for such release. The South African bail jurisprudence recognises the right to bail, and places reasonable and procedural limitations founded on the constitutional values and interests of justice. There are still practical challenges that need to be addressed as a results of the stringent requirements in section 60(11)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act that relate to Schedule 5 and 6. It is therefore recommended that there is a need for the following: 1. Legislative intervention that will regulate and limit the time spent on investigations where bail has been refused. 2. Legislative intervention that will provide for an automatic review procedures in Schedule 5 or 6 offences where bail is refused on grounds that the interests of justice do not permit the release of the applicant on bail or for failure to prove exceptional circumstances. It is submitted that this may assist in reducing refusals of bail based on mistaken understanding of the law or facts or irregularities that may be prejudicial to the applicant or the administration of justice; or 3. Legislative intervention that will make it mandatory for a court that refuses to grant bail to reconsider its decision after a certain period in future provided that the trial has not been commenced with, in order to determine whether further incarceration is necessary or proportionate to the offence. It is submitted that this may assist the court to enquire into unreasonable delays on investigations or changed circumstances of the applicant in order to enable the court to reconsider its previous decision if necessary. This may further assist in offences where it is foreseeable that the trial court is likely to pass a partly or wholly suspended sentence in case of conviction. For example some cases fall within the scope of Schedule 5 by virtue of a previous conviction on Schedule 1 or release on bail on a Schedule 1 offence. The above recommendations may directly or indirectly contribute in balancing the scales of justice during the bail proceedings and its aftermath. These may contribute to the reduction of high numbers of the in custody awaiting trial prisoners while not compromising the current bail procedures.