From introduction: The study begins with a detailed examination of the origins of the defence in Roman law, and traces the dispute over the role of the veritas convicii through the writings of the Roman-Dutch jurists and the decisions of the pre-Union colonial courts in South Africa. The gradual absorption of the requirement of public benefit into the contemporary law is examined. Subsequent sections attempt to extract from the case law and to systematise the rules relating to the requirements of the defence of truth and public benefit, with a view to setting forth the circumstances in which the truth may lawfully be published. Section 2 deals with problems relating to proof of the truth of the imputation; Section 3 with the problem of when publication can be said to serve the public benefit. The final section seeks to examine the juridical basis of the defence and to relate it to recent developments in the law of defamation as a whole. Brief conclusions are then drawn and recommendations made.

No abstract available. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1998.

With this piece of work an attempt is made to have a objective evaluation of the influence of South Africa's Bill of rights on the common law of Defamation. the following aspects are being highlighted: The general application of the Bill of Rights and its relevant sections; A comparative study of the application of Bill of Rights with special reference to the United States, Canada, India and Germany; The law of Defamation under a new legal order, with specific reference to whether the Bill of Rights does apply to Defamation and if so how will it change the current common law of Defamation. / Text in Afrikaans / Law / LL.M.

With this piece of work an attempt is made to have a objective evaluation of the influence of South Africa's Bill of rights on the common law of Defamation. the following aspects are being highlighted: The general application of the Bill of Rights and its relevant sections; A comparative study of the application of Bill of Rights with special reference to the United States, Canada, India and Germany; The law of Defamation under a new legal order, with specific reference to whether the Bill of Rights does apply to Defamation and if so how will it change the current common law of Defamation. / Text in Afrikaans / Law / LL.M.

The challenge in the law of defamation lies in finding the appropriate balance between the two competing rights of freedom of expression and an unimpaired reputation. From Roman and Roman-Dutch law into the modern era, criminal and civil defamation have been very closely linked. The elements and defences are substantially alike. There were several calls prior to 1994 for the abrogation of criminal defamation. Now that the right to an unimpaired reputation, as part of the right to human dignity, and the right to freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, quo vadis the crime of criminal defamation? The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently granted a petition for leave to appeal against convictions for criminal defamation on this very point: is the offence constitutional. Due to the paucity of criminal defamation precedent, the copious civil law precedent concerning civil defamation must be analysed to determine what view the Supreme Court of Appeal will adopt. Prior to 1994 the right to an unimpaired reputation has trumped freedom of expression. Since then, the two leading decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court have ameliorated this situation slightly, according freedom of expression more weight. Claiming the previous common law position was incorrect, they claim the present common law position is constitutionally sound. Thus the Constitution has in essence had no effect to date upon the balancing of competing rights in the law of defamation. Both courts have erred in according the right to freedom of expression too little weight. This may be due to three judicial errors. Firstly, they have under-appreciated that the values of dignity, equality and freedom fortify and are fortified by the right to freedom of expression. Aspects of dignity such as self-actualisation, self-governance and an acceptance that humans have intrinsic worth are heavily reliant on freedom of expression, particularly political expression. Secondly, while political expression lies at the core of freedom of expression, reputation lies nearer the periphery of the right to dignity. Rights at the core ought to trump competing but peripheral rights. Thirdly, erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate. Unless they too are protected, unacceptable self-censorship occurs. The correct approach is as a matter of policy, particularly regarding political expression, to balance the competing rights with one’s thumb on the free expression side of the scales. This seems the trend of the European Court of Human Rights in recent cases In Canada, an offence punishing libel made intentionally but without knowledge of its falsity was recently ruled unconstitutional. On the other hand, another offence punishing libel made with knowledge it was false, videlicet punishing the intentional publication of defamatory lies, was ruled constitutional. Criminal defamation clearly infringes upon the right to freedom of expression. For this infringement to pass constitutional muster it must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. It fails the limitation test due to the lack of proportionality between its objective in protecting the right to an unimpaired reputation and the harm it does to the right to expression. There are three reasons: firstly the “chilling effect” of imprisonment, over and above pecuniary damages, unacceptably stifles free debate. Secondly, it may punish even the truth, yet protect a falsehood, since the truth per se is not a defence. An undeserved reputation is thus more highly valued than the publication of that truth. Finally there is a well-developed civil remedy that adequately protects the right to reputation of aggrieved persons. In the appeal concerning the constitutionality of the common law offence of criminal defamation, the Supreme Court of Appeal ought to find it unconstitutional.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die siviele lasterreg word gekenmerk deur verdeeldheid aangaande bewyspligtigheid. 'n Unieke situasie doen horn voor: weerlegbare regsvermoedens van onregmatigheid en animus iniuriandi word opgevolg deur verskeie regsverdigingsgronde. Bykomend hiertoe stel die Grondwet die vereiste van konstitusionele regverdiging vir beperkings op fundamentele regte. 'n Oorsig oor die regspraak in sowel die voorgrondwetlike - as na-grondwetlike bedeling, dui op 'n versuim deur die howe om behoorlik aandag te skenk aan die bewyspligtigheidsgevolge van die regverskynsels wat hulself in die lasterreg voordoen. In hierdie verhandeling word bewyspligtigheid in lastersake krities ondersoek om vas te stel of dit die reg korrek weerspieel en om 'n werkbare bewyslasformule vir lasteraksies in 'n konstitusionele litigasie te vind. Daar word voorgestel dat die probleem opgelos word deur 'n tweefase-benadering: Die eiser moet in die eerste fase die omvang van sy reg bewys en dat daarop inbreuk gemaak is. In die tweede fase moet die verweerder sy regverdigingsgronde bewys, asook dat dit konstitusioneel regverdigbaar is. / The civil law of defamation is marked by discord regarding onus of proof. A unique situation evidences itself: rebuttable presumptions of law concerning unlawfulness and animus iniuriandi are followed by various grounds of justification. In addition thereto the Constitution sets the requirement of constitutional justification for limitations on fundamental rights. An overview of case law in the pre-constitutional as well as the post-constitutional dispensation, indicates a failure by the courts to pay proper attention to the evidentiary consequences of the legal phenomena found in the law of defamation. In this dissertation onus of proof in defamation cases is critically examined to ascertain whether it reflects the law correctly and to find a workable "onus of proof" -formula for defamation cases in a constitutional dispensation. It is suggested that the problem be solved by a two stage approach: in the first phase, the plaintiff must prove the extent of his right and the encroachment thereof . In the second phase the defendant must prove his grounds of justification and show that they are constitutionally justifiable. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die siviele lasterreg word gekenmerk deur verdeeldheid aangaande bewyspligtigheid. 'n Unieke situasie doen horn voor: weerlegbare regsvermoedens van onregmatigheid en animus iniuriandi word opgevolg deur verskeie regsverdigingsgronde. Bykomend hiertoe stel die Grondwet die vereiste van konstitusionele regverdiging vir beperkings op fundamentele regte. 'n Oorsig oor die regspraak in sowel die voorgrondwetlike - as na-grondwetlike bedeling, dui op 'n versuim deur die howe om behoorlik aandag te skenk aan die bewyspligtigheidsgevolge van die regverskynsels wat hulself in die lasterreg voordoen. In hierdie verhandeling word bewyspligtigheid in lastersake krities ondersoek om vas te stel of dit die reg korrek weerspieel en om 'n werkbare bewyslasformule vir lasteraksies in 'n konstitusionele litigasie te vind. Daar word voorgestel dat die probleem opgelos word deur 'n tweefase-benadering: Die eiser moet in die eerste fase die omvang van sy reg bewys en dat daarop inbreuk gemaak is. In die tweede fase moet die verweerder sy regverdigingsgronde bewys, asook dat dit konstitusioneel regverdigbaar is. / The civil law of defamation is marked by discord regarding onus of proof. A unique situation evidences itself: rebuttable presumptions of law concerning unlawfulness and animus iniuriandi are followed by various grounds of justification. In addition thereto the Constitution sets the requirement of constitutional justification for limitations on fundamental rights. An overview of case law in the pre-constitutional as well as the post-constitutional dispensation, indicates a failure by the courts to pay proper attention to the evidentiary consequences of the legal phenomena found in the law of defamation. In this dissertation onus of proof in defamation cases is critically examined to ascertain whether it reflects the law correctly and to find a workable "onus of proof" -formula for defamation cases in a constitutional dispensation. It is suggested that the problem be solved by a two stage approach: in the first phase, the plaintiff must prove the extent of his right and the encroachment thereof . In the second phase the defendant must prove his grounds of justification and show that they are constitutionally justifiable. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.