This diploma thesis deals with the Czech regulation of criminal liability in the area of environmental protection. Apart from provisions of Title VIII of Second Part of the Criminal Code, the thesis also discusses other facts-of-the-crime definitions that are not included in this title, but are relevant for the protection of environment, and certain other issues concerning the general provisions of criminal law, including the criminal liability of legal persons. The thesis also focuses on legislation falling outside the scope of criminal law that can serve as a basis for determination of illegality of these acts.

Valstybės civilinės deliktinės atsakomybė už žalą, atsiradusią dėl neteisėto nuteisimo, neteisėto suėmimo kardomosios priemonės taikymo tvarka, neteisėto sulaikymo, neteisėto procesinės prievartos priemonių pritaikymo, neteisėto administracinės nuobaudos - arešto - paskyrimo, atlyginimo sąlygas reglamentuoja CK 6.272 straipsnio 1 dalis. Šios normos pagrindu Lietuvos teismuose pareiškiama nemažai ieškinių, todėl pagrindinė nukentėjusiojo garantija gauti teisingą patirtos žalos atlyginimą, - tinkamas normoje numatytų atsakomybės sąlygų aiškinimas ir taikymas teismų praktikoje. Atlikta pastarųjų metų teismų praktikos analizė atskleidė, kad teismų praktikoje pastebimas neteisėtų veiksmų sampratos plėtimas. CK 6.272 straipsnio 1 dalyje įtvirtintas neteisėtų veiksmų sąrašas nelaikomas baigtiniu. Civilinėje byloje sprendimas dėl veiksmų teisėtumo ar neteisėtumo, nagrinėjant, ar yra pagrindas atlyginti žalą pagal CK 6.272 straipsnio 1 dalį, priimamas nepriklausomai nuo to, ar atitinkamas procesinis veiksmas buvo skundžiamas baudžiamajame ar administraciniame procese. Išteisinamasis teismo nuosprendis nėra pagrindas civilinėje byloje konstatuoti, jog visas baudžiamasis procesas, taip pat konkretūs pareigūnų veiksmai ikiteisminiame tyrime buvo neteisėti. Teismų praktika nacionaliniu lygmeniu sąlygojo, jog esant teisės į teismą per kuo trumpiausią laiką pažeidimui, galimybė reikalauti žalos atlyginimo pagal LR CK 6.272 straipsnį 1 dalį yra laikoma teisinės gynybos priemone... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Provisions of state's liability in the cases of damage resulting either from unlawful conviction, or unlawful arrest, as a measure of suppression, as well as from unlawful detention, or application of unlawful procedural measures of enforcement, or unlawful infliction of administrative penalty - arrest - are contained in Article 6.272 part I of the Civil Code. This provision is the legal basis for many lawsuits that are submitted to Lithuanian courts. Therefore, the proper interpretation of the provisions provided by the law in court practice is the main guarantee for the aggrieved person to receive just compensation for the damage. The analysis of courts' practice of late years reveals that the concept of unlawful actions has been broadened. The list of actions envisaged in Article 6.272 part I of the Civil Code is not finite. The decision of lawfulness or unlawfulness of actions in a civil case while analyzing existence of right to the compensation of damage in accordance with Article 6.272 part I of the Civil Code is taken irrespective of the fact whether the aggrieved person lodged a complaint of particular procedural decision in criminal or administrative proceedings. The decision, by which the person has been acquitted, is not a presumption to declare in a civil case that the whole criminal proceedings, as well as certain actions of officers in pre-trial investigation, were unlawful. Court's practice stipulated that in case of the breach of "reasonable time" requirement... [to full text]

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die siviele lasterreg word gekenmerk deur verdeeldheid aangaande bewyspligtigheid. 'n Unieke situasie doen horn voor: weerlegbare regsvermoedens van onregmatigheid en animus iniuriandi word opgevolg deur verskeie regsverdigingsgronde. Bykomend hiertoe stel die Grondwet die vereiste van konstitusionele regverdiging vir beperkings op fundamentele regte. 'n Oorsig oor die regspraak in sowel die voorgrondwetlike - as na-grondwetlike bedeling, dui op 'n versuim deur die howe om behoorlik aandag te skenk aan die bewyspligtigheidsgevolge van die regverskynsels wat hulself in die lasterreg voordoen. In hierdie verhandeling word bewyspligtigheid in lastersake krities ondersoek om vas te stel of dit die reg korrek weerspieel en om 'n werkbare bewyslasformule vir lasteraksies in 'n konstitusionele litigasie te vind. Daar word voorgestel dat die probleem opgelos word deur 'n tweefase-benadering: Die eiser moet in die eerste fase die omvang van sy reg bewys en dat daarop inbreuk gemaak is. In die tweede fase moet die verweerder sy regverdigingsgronde bewys, asook dat dit konstitusioneel regverdigbaar is. / The civil law of defamation is marked by discord regarding onus of proof. A unique situation evidences itself: rebuttable presumptions of law concerning unlawfulness and animus iniuriandi are followed by various grounds of justification. In addition thereto the Constitution sets the requirement of constitutional justification for limitations on fundamental rights. An overview of case law in the pre-constitutional as well as the post-constitutional dispensation, indicates a failure by the courts to pay proper attention to the evidentiary consequences of the legal phenomena found in the law of defamation. In this dissertation onus of proof in defamation cases is critically examined to ascertain whether it reflects the law correctly and to find a workable "onus of proof" -formula for defamation cases in a constitutional dispensation. It is suggested that the problem be solved by a two stage approach: in the first phase, the plaintiff must prove the extent of his right and the encroachment thereof . In the second phase the defendant must prove his grounds of justification and show that they are constitutionally justifiable. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nayara Graciela Sales Brito.pdf: 1228124 bytes, checksum: 994fcb02f2abcb654e77ed919e77f2fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-06 / The scope of this study is to examine the ignorance of the law issue beginning with a historical study of criminal liability and mistake, moving on to the birth of culpability theories and the approaches to the knowledge of unlawfulness. This study addresses the development of culpability and mistake of law in Brazil, mainly through the study of Brazilian criminal statutes and bills. To this end, this study shows the development of the theory around the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness, and the prevailing opinions of Brazilian jurists in the sense of considering it to be in opposition to the established order of the community. This study is justified by the complexity and importance of the topic, both to crime theory and legal pragmatics, especially when one considers the numerous statutes enacted in Brazil, many of which date from the post-industrial period, as a means of keeping up with the risks posed by a global and technological society. The theoretical framework follows the historical and chronological line, and is not intended to exhaust the approaches to the subject nor is it aimed at offering solutions to all the lines of thought herein mentioned. This study covers different conceptions of culpability: psychological, normative, finalist, and the functional views of Claus Roxin and Günther Jakobs. Next, formal, material and intermediary theories of the object of the knowledge of unlawfulness is addressed in order to attain a critical view of inexcusable nature of the ignorance of the law defense in the face of the dignity of the human person / Esta dissertação tem como escopo a análise da especial questão do desconhecimento da lei penal, partindo-se do estudo histórico da responsabilidade criminal e do erro até o advento das teorias da culpabilidade e os respectivos tratamentos sobre a consciência da ilicitude. Examina-se a evolução da culpabilidade e do erro de proibição no Brasil, sobretudo por meio do estudo dos diversos diplomas penais, como também de alguns projetos de lei. Expõem-se o desenvolvimento teórico sobre o objeto da consciência da ilicitude e a posição majoritária da doutrina brasileira no sentido de considerá-lo como sendo a contrariedade à ordem comunitária. Justifica-se o trabalho pela complexidade e relevância do tema, tanto para a teoria do delito, quanto para a pragmática jurídica, mormente em se considerando a edição de inúmeras leis que ingressam no ordenamento jurídico pátrio, muitas delas advindas do período pós- industrial, como meio de se acompanhar os riscos da sociedade globalizada e tecnológica. O percurso teórico filia-se à linha histórico-cronológica, sem a pretensão de esgotar as abordagens relativas ao assunto, nem oferecer soluções para todas as correntes de pensamento expostas. Apresentam-se as concepções sobre a culpabilidade: psicológicas, normativas, finalistas e as visões funcionalistas de Claus Roxin e de Günther Jakobs. Em seguida, o estudo perpassa pelas teorias formal, material e intermediária do objeto da consciência da ilicitude, para se alcançar um posicionamento crítico da inescusabilidade da ignorância da lei penal em face do princípio da culpabilidade e da dignidade da pessoa humana

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die siviele lasterreg word gekenmerk deur verdeeldheid aangaande bewyspligtigheid. 'n Unieke situasie doen horn voor: weerlegbare regsvermoedens van onregmatigheid en animus iniuriandi word opgevolg deur verskeie regsverdigingsgronde. Bykomend hiertoe stel die Grondwet die vereiste van konstitusionele regverdiging vir beperkings op fundamentele regte. 'n Oorsig oor die regspraak in sowel die voorgrondwetlike - as na-grondwetlike bedeling, dui op 'n versuim deur die howe om behoorlik aandag te skenk aan die bewyspligtigheidsgevolge van die regverskynsels wat hulself in die lasterreg voordoen. In hierdie verhandeling word bewyspligtigheid in lastersake krities ondersoek om vas te stel of dit die reg korrek weerspieel en om 'n werkbare bewyslasformule vir lasteraksies in 'n konstitusionele litigasie te vind. Daar word voorgestel dat die probleem opgelos word deur 'n tweefase-benadering: Die eiser moet in die eerste fase die omvang van sy reg bewys en dat daarop inbreuk gemaak is. In die tweede fase moet die verweerder sy regverdigingsgronde bewys, asook dat dit konstitusioneel regverdigbaar is. / The civil law of defamation is marked by discord regarding onus of proof. A unique situation evidences itself: rebuttable presumptions of law concerning unlawfulness and animus iniuriandi are followed by various grounds of justification. In addition thereto the Constitution sets the requirement of constitutional justification for limitations on fundamental rights. An overview of case law in the pre-constitutional as well as the post-constitutional dispensation, indicates a failure by the courts to pay proper attention to the evidentiary consequences of the legal phenomena found in the law of defamation. In this dissertation onus of proof in defamation cases is critically examined to ascertain whether it reflects the law correctly and to find a workable "onus of proof" -formula for defamation cases in a constitutional dispensation. It is suggested that the problem be solved by a two stage approach: in the first phase, the plaintiff must prove the extent of his right and the encroachment thereof . In the second phase the defendant must prove his grounds of justification and show that they are constitutionally justifiable. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

This article addresses the issue referred to harmful lawful acts which also generate liability, thus ruling out the unlawfulness as an essential element for the generation of liability. In this regard, the author makes a conceptual analysis of the unlawfulness or illegality, and he examines three cases of liability, such as environmental damage, the interim resolution and withdraw the work of trade; demonstrating, effectively, the dispensable nature of the unlawfulness and the existence of scenarios of liability arising from harmful lawful acts. / El presente artículo aborda la temática referida a los actos lícitos dañosos, los cuales también generan responsabilidad civil, descartando así a la ilicitud como un elemento indispensable para la generación de responsabilidad civil. En este sentido, el artículo parte del análisis conceptual de la ilicitud o antijuridicidad, para luego arribar al examen de tres supuestos de responsabilidad civil, como lo son el daño ambiental, la resolución cautelar y el retiro de la obra del comercio; demostrando, efectivamente, el carácter prescindible de la ilicitud y la existencia de escenarios de responsabilidad civil derivados de actos lícitos dañosos.

The South African legal system is dualistic in nature with the one part consisting of the Western common law and the other consisting of African customary law. Although these two legal systems enjoy equal recognition, they regularly come into conflict with each other due to their divergent value systems. It is especially within the context of the South African criminal law that this conflict becomes apparent, because an accused's conduct can be viewed as lawful in terms of African customary law, but unlawful in terms of the South African common law. In such cases the accused may attempt to raise a cultural defence by putting forth evidence of his cultural background or values to convince the court that his prima facie unlawful conduct is actually lawful and that he should escape criminal liability. Alternatively, an accused may put forth evidence of his cultural background or values in an attempt to receive a lighter sentence. The question which therefore arises is whether a so-called "cultural defence" exists in the South African criminal law, and if so, what the influence of such a defence on the South African criminal law is. The conflict between African Customary law and the South African common law in the context of the criminal law arises due to the fact that the indigenous belief in witchcraft, (including witch-killings), the indigenous belief in the tokoloshe and the use of muti-medicine (including muti-murders), as well as the phenomenon of "necklacing" and the custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of various common law crimes. In the case of witch-killings, the perpetrators can be charged with the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, attempted murder, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Similarly, necklacing, as a method used for killing witches, can also result in the commission of these common law crimes. What is more, the perpetrators of witch-killings can also be charged with the statutory crimes of accusing someone of witchcraft, pointing the victim out as being a witch or wizard or injuring a person based on information received from a traditional healer, or similar person. The indigenous belief in the tokoloshe can lead to the commission of the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The perpetrators of mutimurders can also face charges of murder or attempted murder, if the victim survives. The indigenous custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of common law crimes such as abduction, kidnapping and common assault, as well as the statutory crime of rape. A perusal of South African case law dealing with the indigenous beliefs and customs above reveals that the accused in such cases have indeed attempted to put forth evidence of their indigenous beliefs or customs to persuade the criminal courts that they should escape criminal liability for a particular crime. In fact, these arguments were raised within the context of the existing common law defences such as private defence, necessity, involuntary conduct and a lack of criminal capacity. However, the South African criminal courts have up till now in general been unwilling to accept arguments of indigenous beliefs and customs to serve as a defence, either alone or within the context of the existing defences above, for the commission of a common law or statutory crime. They have, however, been more willing to accept evidence of an accused's indigenous belief or custom to serve as a mitigating factor during sentencing. The extent to which an accused's cultural background will serve as a mitigating factor will, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. As a result an accused who is charged with the commission of a culturally motivated crime has no guarantee that his cultural background and values will in fact be considered as a mitigating factor during his criminal trial. It is thus ultimately concluded that a so-called "cultural defence" does not exist in the South African Criminal law. The indigenous beliefs and customs above not only result in the commission of common law or statutory crimes, but also in the infringement of various fundamental human rights in the Constitution. Witch-killings result in the infringement of the constitutional right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person. However, witches and wizards who are persecuted for practising witchcraft are also denied their right to a fair trial entrenched in the Constitution. Similarly, muti-murders and necklacing also result in the infringement of the right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person entrenched in the Constitution. The custom of ukuthwala results in the infringement of the right to equality, the right to freedom and security of the person, the right to live in an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being, the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour, the right to basic education and other constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting children. In light of the constitutional right to freedom of culture and the right to freely participate in a cultural life of one's choosing the question can be asked whether the time has come to formally recognise a cultural defence in the South African criminal law. In this study it is argued that these constitutional rights do not warrant the formal recognition of a cultural defence. Instead, it is recommended that the conflict between African customary law and the South African common law can be resolved by bringing indigenous beliefs and customs in line with the values that underpin the Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa. Of course, this does not mean that the courts should ignore cultural considerations during a criminal trial if and when they arise. In fact, as pointed out in this study, the courts have a constitutional duty to apply African customary law when that law is applicable. It goes without saying that, when an accused attempts to escape criminal liability for his unlawful conduct by raising arguments of his cultural background, African customary law will be applicable and must be considered by the court. This in turn raises the question as to how the criminal courts can ensure that they give enough consideration to the possibility that an accused's criminal conduct was culturally motivated so as to comply with their constitutional mandate referred to above. Although it would be nearly impossible to formulate a perfect or flawless approach according to which a judicial officer can adjudicate criminal matters involving culturally motivated crimes, the author suggests the following practical approach which may provide some guidance to judicial officers in dealing with cases involving culturally motivated crimes: • Step 1: Consider whether the commission of the crime was culturally motivated or not. If it seems as though the accused did not commit a culturally motivated crime, the trial can continue on that basis. If, however, it is evident that the accused indeed committed a culturally motivated crime, step 2 follows. • Step 2: Once it has been determined that the commission of the crime was culturally motivated, the next step is to determine which indigenous belief or custom led to the commission of the crime. Once the relevant indigenous belief or custom has been identified, step 3 follows. • Step 3: When it is clear which indigenous belief or custom led to the accused's commission of the crime, the next step is to determine whether arguments pertaining to that particular indigenous belief or custom may be raised within the context of the existing defences in the South African Criminal law in order to exclude the accused's criminal liability. If an accused relies on one of the existing defences in the South African criminal law, he will have to lay a proper evidential foundation for his defence before the court. In assessing the evidence put forth by the accused, the judicial officer must consider the judgment and reasoning in previous cases dealing with the particular indigenous belief or custom. A judicial officer must also consider the values underpinning the Constitution when conducting such an assessment. If a judicial officer upholds an accused's defence, the accused is acquitted. However, if the judicial officer rejects an accused's defence, the accused must be convicted and step 4 follows. • Step 4: Once an accused has been convicted, a court should consider whether arguments of his cultural background can serve as an extenuating circumstance, mitigating the punishment to be imposed on him. However, the practical approach above merely serves as a suggestion to judicial officers in dealing with culturally motivated crimes and ultimately it will be up to the judiciary to develop both the Western common law and African customary law to resolve the criminal law conflicts between these two legal systems. The research for this study was concluded in November 2013. / LLD, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The South African legal system is dualistic in nature with the one part consisting of the Western common law and the other consisting of African customary law. Although these two legal systems enjoy equal recognition, they regularly come into conflict with each other due to their divergent value systems. It is especially within the context of the South African criminal law that this conflict becomes apparent, because an accused's conduct can be viewed as lawful in terms of African customary law, but unlawful in terms of the South African common law. In such cases the accused may attempt to raise a cultural defence by putting forth evidence of his cultural background or values to convince the court that his prima facie unlawful conduct is actually lawful and that he should escape criminal liability. Alternatively, an accused may put forth evidence of his cultural background or values in an attempt to receive a lighter sentence. The question which therefore arises is whether a so-called "cultural defence" exists in the South African criminal law, and if so, what the influence of such a defence on the South African criminal law is. The conflict between African Customary law and the South African common law in the context of the criminal law arises due to the fact that the indigenous belief in witchcraft, (including witch-killings), the indigenous belief in the tokoloshe and the use of muti-medicine (including muti-murders), as well as the phenomenon of "necklacing" and the custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of various common law crimes. In the case of witch-killings, the perpetrators can be charged with the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, attempted murder, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Similarly, necklacing, as a method used for killing witches, can also result in the commission of these common law crimes. What is more, the perpetrators of witch-killings can also be charged with the statutory crimes of accusing someone of witchcraft, pointing the victim out as being a witch or wizard or injuring a person based on information received from a traditional healer, or similar person. The indigenous belief in the tokoloshe can lead to the commission of the common law crimes of murder or, if the victim survives, common assault or assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The perpetrators of mutimurders can also face charges of murder or attempted murder, if the victim survives. The indigenous custom of ukuthwala can result in the commission of common law crimes such as abduction, kidnapping and common assault, as well as the statutory crime of rape. A perusal of South African case law dealing with the indigenous beliefs and customs above reveals that the accused in such cases have indeed attempted to put forth evidence of their indigenous beliefs or customs to persuade the criminal courts that they should escape criminal liability for a particular crime. In fact, these arguments were raised within the context of the existing common law defences such as private defence, necessity, involuntary conduct and a lack of criminal capacity. However, the South African criminal courts have up till now in general been unwilling to accept arguments of indigenous beliefs and customs to serve as a defence, either alone or within the context of the existing defences above, for the commission of a common law or statutory crime. They have, however, been more willing to accept evidence of an accused's indigenous belief or custom to serve as a mitigating factor during sentencing. The extent to which an accused's cultural background will serve as a mitigating factor will, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. As a result an accused who is charged with the commission of a culturally motivated crime has no guarantee that his cultural background and values will in fact be considered as a mitigating factor during his criminal trial. It is thus ultimately concluded that a so-called "cultural defence" does not exist in the South African Criminal law. The indigenous beliefs and customs above not only result in the commission of common law or statutory crimes, but also in the infringement of various fundamental human rights in the Constitution. Witch-killings result in the infringement of the constitutional right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person. However, witches and wizards who are persecuted for practising witchcraft are also denied their right to a fair trial entrenched in the Constitution. Similarly, muti-murders and necklacing also result in the infringement of the right to life and the right to freedom and security of the person entrenched in the Constitution. The custom of ukuthwala results in the infringement of the right to equality, the right to freedom and security of the person, the right to live in an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being, the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour, the right to basic education and other constitutional safeguards aimed at protecting children. In light of the constitutional right to freedom of culture and the right to freely participate in a cultural life of one's choosing the question can be asked whether the time has come to formally recognise a cultural defence in the South African criminal law. In this study it is argued that these constitutional rights do not warrant the formal recognition of a cultural defence. Instead, it is recommended that the conflict between African customary law and the South African common law can be resolved by bringing indigenous beliefs and customs in line with the values that underpin the Constitution as the supreme law of South Africa. Of course, this does not mean that the courts should ignore cultural considerations during a criminal trial if and when they arise. In fact, as pointed out in this study, the courts have a constitutional duty to apply African customary law when that law is applicable. It goes without saying that, when an accused attempts to escape criminal liability for his unlawful conduct by raising arguments of his cultural background, African customary law will be applicable and must be considered by the court. This in turn raises the question as to how the criminal courts can ensure that they give enough consideration to the possibility that an accused's criminal conduct was culturally motivated so as to comply with their constitutional mandate referred to above. Although it would be nearly impossible to formulate a perfect or flawless approach according to which a judicial officer can adjudicate criminal matters involving culturally motivated crimes, the author suggests the following practical approach which may provide some guidance to judicial officers in dealing with cases involving culturally motivated crimes: • Step 1: Consider whether the commission of the crime was culturally motivated or not. If it seems as though the accused did not commit a culturally motivated crime, the trial can continue on that basis. If, however, it is evident that the accused indeed committed a culturally motivated crime, step 2 follows. • Step 2: Once it has been determined that the commission of the crime was culturally motivated, the next step is to determine which indigenous belief or custom led to the commission of the crime. Once the relevant indigenous belief or custom has been identified, step 3 follows. • Step 3: When it is clear which indigenous belief or custom led to the accused's commission of the crime, the next step is to determine whether arguments pertaining to that particular indigenous belief or custom may be raised within the context of the existing defences in the South African Criminal law in order to exclude the accused's criminal liability. If an accused relies on one of the existing defences in the South African criminal law, he will have to lay a proper evidential foundation for his defence before the court. In assessing the evidence put forth by the accused, the judicial officer must consider the judgment and reasoning in previous cases dealing with the particular indigenous belief or custom. A judicial officer must also consider the values underpinning the Constitution when conducting such an assessment. If a judicial officer upholds an accused's defence, the accused is acquitted. However, if the judicial officer rejects an accused's defence, the accused must be convicted and step 4 follows. • Step 4: Once an accused has been convicted, a court should consider whether arguments of his cultural background can serve as an extenuating circumstance, mitigating the punishment to be imposed on him. However, the practical approach above merely serves as a suggestion to judicial officers in dealing with culturally motivated crimes and ultimately it will be up to the judiciary to develop both the Western common law and African customary law to resolve the criminal law conflicts between these two legal systems. The research for this study was concluded in November 2013. / LLD, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

A dissertação objetiva defender a possibilidade do princípio da insignificância incidir sobre os atos de improbidade administrativa, à luz da hipótese analisada, na busca de uma interpretação mais humanizante ao viés extremamente sancionatório que a jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça aplica à Lei 8.429/92, ao impedir, sequer, cogitar-se do princípio nessa seara. Sem olvidar a relevância da moralidade administrativa, o escopo do trabalho é apenas o de abrir uma fresta para a possibilidade de cabimento do princípio da insignificância, enquanto fundamento de validade principiológica da eventual absolvição de acusados da prática de atos de improbidade administrativa, cuja conduta, na análise do caso concreto, tenha se revelado dotada de ofensividade mínima ao bem jurídico protegido. A relevância normativa dos princípios, bem como das garantias e limites constitucionais contra o poder punitivo do Estado, são decorrência do antropocentrismo que fundamenta a Constituição vigente, levando a Suprema Corte a estabelecer vetores de aplicação do princípio da insignificância, que devem ter a possibilidade de serem estendidos, quando cabíveis, ao julgamento dos atos de improbidade administrativa, seja pelos princípios da proporcionalidade e da razoabilidade, limitadores da discricionariedade, seja por princípios de comum cabimento no direito sancionador, diante do conceito universal de antijuridicidade. Por fim, tendências jurisprudenciais e normativas indicam a possibilidade de aplicação do princípio da insignificância aos atos de improbidade administrativa, para corrigir o entrave criado pelo absolutismo da posição que veda, por completo, a mera cogitação de incidência do princípio. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the likelihood of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance, in view of the hypothesis analyzed, in the search for a more human approach rather than the extremely punitive perspective followed by the Brazilian superior court of justice in relation to Law 8.429/92, by completely disregarding the principle in this sense. Notwithstanding the importance of the administrative morality, the purpose of this paper is to simply look at the possibility of considering the principle of insignificance, as a valid principle of eventual acquittal of those accused of administrative malfeasance, and whose actions might have been perceived as offensive to the assets protected by the law through the analysis of the case. The normative relevance of the principles and the warranties and constitutional limitations against the punitive powers of the State arise from the anthropocentrism that supports the current Constitution, which cause the Brazilian superior court of justice to veto the enforcement of the principle of insignificance, which should be extended, whenever possible, to the judgment of administrative malfeasance, either through principles of proportionality and reasonability, which limit discretion, either through common principles common to the punitive law or to the universal concept of unlawfulness. Finally, case lawrelated and normative trends show the possibility of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance to correct problems caused by the absolutism of the position that vetoes the possibility of the principle.

The Criminal Code exempts from criminal liabilityany person when they act with valid consent fromthe holder of the legal asset of free disposal. This exclusion of criminal responsibility raises multiplequestions.Which legal rights can be freely disposed? Is it that all individual legal rights are of free disposal? If that is the case, which legal basis justifies it? Does the holder’s consent means that the behavior is unlawful, or is it a non-criminal behavior?In this paper, the author answers all these questions, emphasizing that, according to the type of State we live in, the legal-criminal rights are protected to allow the self-realization of every person. Based on that, the author maintains that all criminal-legal rights are of free disposal, and that  the  holder’s  consent  is  a non-criminality cause. / El Código Penal exime de responsabilidad penal aquien actúa con consentimiento válido del titular del bien jurídico de libre disposición. Esta eximentetrae múltiples cuestionamientos.¿Qué  bienes  jurídicos  tienen  dicha  naturaleza? ¿Acaso todos los bienes jurídicos individuales sonde libre disposición? De ser ese el caso, ¿cuál sería el fundamento de ello? ¿El consentimiento deltitular implica que la conducta es antijurídica, o estaríamos ante una conducta atípica?En el presente artículo, la autora responde a estas interrogantes resaltando que, en el modelo de Estado en que vivimos, los bienes jurídico-penales se protegen porque se busca la autorrealización del individuo. Sobre la base de ello, la autora sostiene que todos los bienes jurídico-penales individuales son disponibles, siendo el consentimiento una causa de atipicidad de la conducta.