A number of historians have studied the meanings of reputation in early modern English society through the medium of defamation cases in the church courts. More recent work has tended to focus on the gendering of participation in ecclesiastical litigation and the differences in the ways that men and women constructed and maintained their good names. This thesis takes a broader approach, and places defamation cases firmly in their legal and social context. The main focus of this thesis is a sample of defamation cases from the Chester consistory court in the later seventeenth century; this is supplemented by material from the church courts of Sussex and various secular tribunals in both Cheshire and Sussex. A discussion of the law forms an important part of this thesis for it shaped both the patterns of participation in litigation and the content of insults that were alleged. A central objective of this thesis is to discuss the complexity of the gendering of reputation in this period and to show that reputation was not as rigidly polarised around gender as has previously been thought. It explores the ways in which reputation was constructed for both men and women and relates this to both the sorts of social relationships which tended to produce litigation, and the mechanisms of social control which operated within communities. It is argued that defamation litigation reveals much more about attitudes to gender relations, reputation and social order than has been realised hitherto, and that reputation was experienced not as an abstract value, but in relation to the social situations of individual women and men.

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Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University

Defamation law‘s truth defence – the oldest, most obvious and principal defence – has failed Australian media defendants. Few who mount the defence succeed. Many, discouraged by the defence‘s onerousness, do not even attempt it. As a consequence the journalistic articulation of matters of public concern is stifled. This thesis argues that the limitations of the Australian truth defence are inconsistent with established freedom of speech ideals and the public interest in having a robust media. As a result society is constrained from enlightened participation in public affairs. This thesis proposes reforms to alleviate the heavy demands of the defence so as to promote the publication of matters of public concern and to strike a more contemporary balance between freedom of speech and the protection of reputation. These reforms employ defamation law‘s doctrinal calculus to reposition the speech-reputation fulcrum. While defamation law has for decades attracted reform attention, the truth defence has languished by the wayside. This thesis steps into the breech. The cornerstone of this thesis is a proposal to reverse the burden so that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity of the defamatory publication where: the complainant is a public figure; the matter complained about is a matter of public concern; and the suit involves a media defendant. While this proposal is likely to dramatically alter the prevailing Australian freedom of speech/protection of reputation equilibrium, other measures are proposed to serve as a bulwark against the wanton destruction of reputation.

Protection of personality in the tabloid media in Czech and English legal environment Abstract in English The purpose of this work is to analyze the approach to the protection of personal rights in the media with regard to the nature of the tabloid media. The main goal of this work is to describe the approach to the protection of personal rights in the Czech Republic and in England in relation to the media, especially the tabloid character, interfaces and vice versa differences in it. The work is divided into seven parts. The first part deals with the media, their basic characteristics and the characteristics of the nature of the tabloid media, the definition also includes responsibility for the content of the media, remedies under media laws and a brief preview of the rights and responsibilities of journalists. The second section lists the sources of the right of privacy in the Czech Republic and in England in view of the different legal systems of these countries. The third part deals with the concept of personal rights with regard to access to basic human rights, the protection of which personality based in the Czech Republic and in England, and the definition of public figures and the public interest. In the fourth part deals with the concept of the right to freedom of expression taking into account the...

In 2001, I began the field work in an empirical study of the laws of defamation in New Zealand. This study involved a comprehensive mail-out survey of the New Zealand media, and an adapted survey of defamation lawyers, which were designed to discover how the laws of defamation affected both groups, and what the respondents thought about those laws. The survey was augmented by an extensive search of defamation court files in the most important New Zealand High Court registries. The question behind the survey was essentially whether New Zealand’s defamation laws have a chilling effect on the media, to the extent that stories which should be told do not see the light of day. In this thesis, I contextualise and report on the results of the survey. I first describe and analyse the sources and trends in current defamation law, the other forms of regulation of the media in New Zealand, and the patterns of media ownership. I go on to utilise background data from the survey to present a character and business profile of the media who responded to the survey and find the data confirms the representative nature of those respondents. I then complete contextualisation of the survey by analysing the nature of the chilling effect doctrine itself, a canon which began as a predictive theory importing sociological concepts into legal analysis, but which is now a doctrine applied somewhat inconsistently, but with substantive effects, by the courts. In the following chapters I present the results of the media survey, the court file search and the survey of defamation lawyers, both in narrative and graph or tabular form. My tentative initial finding, that New Zealand’s defamation laws do not have an excessive chilling effect on our media, although they do have some, is progressively confirmed, with each set of data appearing to mirror and corroborate that which went before. In the final chapters, I take this somewhat surprising finding and augment it by theorising about future developments in defamation law. I suggest that increased constitutionalisation of this area of private law, in the form of full incorporation of a Bill of Rights methodology, is both desirable and necessary to protect against any chilling effects, such as they are. I conclude by posing a question about a possible joint future for defamation and privacy claims.

Since the mid-1990s, American Internet service providers (ISPs) have enjoyed immunity from liability for defamation under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. As Congress originally intended in 1996, Section 230 has strongly protected freedom of online speech and allowed ISPs to thrive with little fear of being sued for online users' comments. Such extraordinary statutory immunity for ISPs reflects American free-speech tradition that freedom of speech is preferred to reputation. Although the Internet landscape has changed over the past 20 years, American courts have applied Section 230 to shield ISPs almost invariably. ISPs won in 83 of 85 cases in 1997 to 2014. Nearly all types of ISPs have been held to be eligible to immunity unless they are original online speakers. Even when ISPs have operated websites that have left digital "scarlet letters" on individuals, they have not been liable if the ISPs did not "create or develop" the defamatory contents. Bloggers, as website operators, could be immunized even when they exercised the "traditional editorial functions" unlike the traditional journalists. By contrast, ISPs in the United Kingdom could not enjoy such absolute immunity. Following the U.K. tradition of plaintiff-friendly libel law, the Defamation Act 1996 did not adopt any separate provision for ISP liability. Under Section 1, ISPs in England are subject to liability for defamation by third parties if they are notified of harmful online contents but fail to remove the postings promptly. Meanwhile, the new Defamation Act 2013 provides a separate provision for ISP liability. Section 5 is novel because ISP liability hinges on whether the original speaker is identifiable. I suggest that CDA Section 230 should be revised. One possible way of revising Section 230 is borrowing from the U.K. Defamation Act 2013. But such adoption is not compellingly urgent. It needs time to see what impact the new U.K. defamation law will have on freedom of speech. Regardless, the U.K. experience with ISP liability will provide a useful comparative framework to rebalance free speech with reputation on the Internet.

Cyberspace produces friction when the law is implemented by domestic courts using 'state-laws'. These laws are based on a ‘physical presence’ of an individual within the territory. It elevates conflicts relating to cyberspace jurisdiction. This research examines private international law complications associated with cyberspace. The paradigm of libel that takes place within the domain of social media is used to evaluate the utility of traditional laws. This research is conducted using ‘black-letter’ methodology, keeping in mind the changes constituted by the Defamation Act 2013. It pinpoints that the instantaneous nature of social media communication demands an unambiguous exercise of 'personal-jurisdiction', beyond the doctrine of territoriality. An innovation to the code of Civil Procedure is recommended to revise the process of service for non-EU defendants. The permission to serve a writ via social networks (or to the relevant Embassy of the defendant’s domicile state), can accelerate the traditional judicial process. This thesis can be utilised as a roadmap by libel victims for preliminary information. It contributes to the knowledge by discovering that the thresholds under Section 1 and Section 9 of the Defamation Act 2013 overlap with the conventional ‘forum-conveniens’ tests. This crossover is causing legal uncertainty in the application of existing rules to the digital libel proceedings. Section 1 and Section 9 thresholds do not fulfil the purpose of eliminating ‘libel-tourism’ and maintaining a balance between speech freedom and reputation rights. They raised the bar for potential victims and restricted their rights to justice. It is proposed that the traditional ‘conveniens test’ must be used for social media libel victims to produce legal certainty in cyberspace defamation.

With the fast pace that technology is currently developing, technology forms a bigger part of our day to day lives. Technological advancement has an impact on all aspects of life, including how we communicate with one another. This has caused an increase in social media usage. South Africa is in no way an exception to this growing trend. The escalation of the use of social media platforms has brought with it the rise in the wrongful use of social media. The growth in wrongful use would lead to the proliferation of legal consequences for defamatory statements with regard to social media situations. The question arises if South Africa‘s current legislation is able to regulate the new phenomena of defamatory statements on social media platforms. The conclusion was reached that South Africa‘s current legislation is more than adequate to regulate this new form of defamation. With the qualification that that judges apply the current legal principles of the law of delict to this new form of defamation correctly. Educating and informing judges, as well as the public is vital in preventing this new form of defamation to become problematic. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

With the fast pace that technology is currently developing, technology forms a bigger part of our day to day lives. Technological advancement has an impact on all aspects of life, including how we communicate with one another. This has caused an increase in social media usage. South Africa is in no way an exception to this growing trend. The escalation of the use of social media platforms has brought with it the rise in the wrongful use of social media. The growth in wrongful use would lead to the proliferation of legal consequences for defamatory statements with regard to social media situations. The question arises if South Africa‘s current legislation is able to regulate the new phenomena of defamatory statements on social media platforms. The conclusion was reached that South Africa‘s current legislation is more than adequate to regulate this new form of defamation. With the qualification that that judges apply the current legal principles of the law of delict to this new form of defamation correctly. Educating and informing judges, as well as the public is vital in preventing this new form of defamation to become problematic. / LLM, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015