Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pimentel_dissertacao.pdf: 916452 bytes, checksum: 5bb94023932cba1620c6001ba685b3f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-05-22 / Criminal procedure has two functions, which are equally relevant in the Democratic State under the Rule of Law. The first one, is to ensure the dignity of those accused determining that, to exercise its right to punish [jus puniendi], the State must conduct its actions based on the full respect for the rights of the individual. The second one, is to meet the social interest that the purpose of criminal procedure be the full and accurate enforcement of the law in order to accomplish the mission of securing peace and order in society. The identification of organized crime and rising violent crime rates among us have contributed for the creation of specific laws in the field of Brazilian criminal procedure, thus adding new operational means of investigation and proof in order to improve effectiveness. Such criminal instruments are highly incisive and endanger the rights of the individual and the procedural principles. In view of this new social and regulatory scenario, the constitutional legitimacy of these mechanisms is analyzed in the light of the principle of reasonability. It is finally suggested that the protective purpose of criminal procedure be sought, as closely as possible, by reasserting the accusation pattern and redefining the roles of the criminal judge and the Ministério Público [the Public Prosecutor s Office ], with emphasis on the investigation. / O processo penal cumpre duas funções igualmente relevantes no Estado Democrático de Direito. Uma garante a dignidade do acusado, estabelecendo que, para o exercício do jus puniendi, a intervenção estatal se realize com respeito aos direitos individuais. A outra tem em vista a satisfação do interesse social de que o processo penal sirva à escorreita aplicação da lei e cumpra a sua missão de pacificar a comunidade. A detecção entre nós do crime organizado e o recrudescimento da criminalidade violenta têm contribuído para proficiente produção legislativa no campo do processo penal brasileiro, nele se inserindo novos meios operacionais de investigação e prova, na busca de maior efetividade. Tais instrumentos são bastante incisivos e desafiam direitos individuais e princípios processuais. Nesses novos panoramas social e normativo, analisamos a legitimidade constitucional desses mecanismos à luz do princípio da proporcionalidade. Sugere-se, ao final, a reaproximação possível ao escopo garantista do processo penal pela reafirmação do modelo acusatório e redefinição dos papéis do juiz criminal e do Ministério Público, com ênfase na fase de investigação.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline. / La franchise: une recette magique que chacun aimerait maîtriser pour s'assurer la réussite dans le monde des affaires. Or, le secret de cette recette revient à appliquer un simple postulat: réitérer, par un franchisé, la réussite du concept d'un franchiseur qui a déjà fait ses preuves. Mais, auparavant, il est essentiel que le franchiseur transmette au franchisé les éléments qui lui ont valu cette même réussite, quitte à ce que ce dernier s'engage à les mettre en oeuvre selon les prescriptions de son initiateur et sous son contrôle. Une telle mise en ouvre appelle, cependant, que les deux protagonistes empruntent une avenue basée sur la coopération, la confiance, la loyauté et la bonne foi. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas évidente en pratique en ce que les deux partenaires sont animés par des intérêts divergents, conflictuels et antimoniques. Dès lors, le rapport contractuel né du contrat de franchise se verra empreint par un déséquilibre manifeste entre les prestations réciproques des parties issu de la position économiquement dominante du franchiseur. Ce dernier, sera à même de fixer unilatéralement le contenu contractuel, de sorte à diminuer ses obligations tout en élargissant le champ de ses droits. Surgit alors tout un pan de comportements opportunistes du franchiseur se traduisant, notamment, par des abus au détriment du franchisé qui ne peut qu'acquiescer à la volonté de son partenaire. En effet, l'étude du droit civil révèle que les systèmes civilistes reposent sur une conception libérale du contrat permettant de présumer que les parties sont capables de défendre leurs intérêts. En vertu de la théorie de l'autonomie de la volonté, le contrat est présumé être conforme aux intérêts respectifs des parties. À défaut de tout vice de consentement, le contrat ne peut qu'être équilibré. Cependant, s'il se trouve que le contrat est malgré tout déséquilibré, le droit civil, à moins de circonstances exceptionnelles, n y pourra rien en pareil cas. La lésion ne vicie pas les conventions conclues entre majeurs non protégés, et la théorie de l'imprévision est rejetée par la plupart des systèmes civilistes. L'indifférence du droit civil face à ce déséquilibre se justifie essentiellement par deux impératifs: la liberté contractuelle et la sécurité juridique. Le principe de la force obligatoire du contrat s'impose aux parties autant qu'au juge et, partant, exclut toute tentative du juge de réviser un contrat déséquilibré. Toutefois, devant cette indifférence et cet immobilisme de la loi, le droit a, depuis, énormément évolué dans le sens d'apporter une protection plus accrue à la partie la plus faible au contrat. À ce titre, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une double intervention plus réaliste: l'intervention du juge et celle du législateur (particulièrement dans les contrats d'adhésion). D'abord, le juge manifeste une volonté accrue de corriger des déséquilibres contractuels choquants, notamment en présence de clauses contractuelles manifestement abusives, et ce au regard des exigences d'une justice contractuelle basée sur la bonne foi des parties et l'exigence d'agir raisonnablement. Ensuite, le législateur à travers l'élaboration de droits spéciaux ayant pour finalité la protection de la partie la plus faible, instaure des règles impératives destinées à condamner les éventuels déséquilibres contractuels. Ce souci de protection justifie l'atteinte ainsi portée au principe de la force obligatoire du contrat. Aussi, le postulat de Fouillée se voit inversé par Lacordaire qui souligne pertinemment que « entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui asservit et la loi qui libère ». En somme, la protection du franchisé appelle au glissement du rapport contractuel d'un rapport conflictuel vers un rapport de coopération et notamment par la reconnaissance du concept de solidarisme contractuel. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas sans troubler l'ordre normal de l'idée classique du contrat. D'une part, l'introduction d'obligations implicites au contrat renie en quelque sorte l'idée traditionnelle qu'on a des obligations contractuelles basée sur la commune intention des parties, et d'autre part, elle appelle à la reconsidération, par les systèmes civilistes, de la théorie de l'imprévision comme le suggère le droit uniforme et notamment le Guide d'UNIDROIT sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale, mais aussi les Principes relatifS aux contrats du commerce international. / The Franchise: a magic formula that each individual would like to possess to be able to ensure success in the business world. The secret of this formula exists in the shape of a simple postulate: for the franchisee to reiterate success of the franchised concept, which has already proven itself successful. But first, it is essential that the franchisor transmit the essential elements ofthat success to the franchisee, so that the latter may put into practice those prescribed elements as per the created by the initiators concept and control. This kind of transaction requires that both protagonists enter into their dealing in a manner that is based on cooperation, trust, loyalty and goodfaith. Nevertheless, this process is not easy to establish. In deed, both parties may have divergent interests, causing conflicts and antipathies. Thus, the contractual relationship born ofthe franchise concept, will have at its core a manifest imbalance created by the dominant financial status ofthe franchisor. The latter, is in a position to unilaterally stipulate the contractual contents, in such a manner as to diminish his own obligations while enlarging the scope of his rights. From this, a plethora of opportunistic behaviours from the franchisor translating into varied kinds of abuse to the detriment of the franchisee whom has not choice but to acquiesce to the franchisors wishes. In truth, the study of civil law reveals that the civil systems are founded on a liberal conception of the contract, presuming that both parties are capable of defending their interests. By virtue of the theory of autonomy of the will, the contract is presumed to respect each partie 's interests. Without any vice of consent, the contract can only be balanced. However, if the contract proves to be imbalanced, civil law, unless there are no exceptional circumstances, will have no effect, in such a case. Lesion don't vice conventions concluded between unprotected parties, and the imprevision theory is rejected by most civil systems. The indifference of civil law to the contractual imbalance is justified by two imperatives: contractual liberty and judicial security. The principal of the obligatory force of a contract imposes on both parties, as well as to the judge, and, in that way, excludes all attempts by judge to revise the imbalanced contract. Nonetheless, in spite of the laws indifference and opposition to change, the law has since evolved enormously in supplying more protection to the weakest party of a contract. Thus, we are now witness to a double, more realistic intervention: the intervention of the judge and the legislator (particularly in contracts of adhesions). First, the judge manifests a will to correct the more obviously imbalanced aspects of the contract, most notably with regards to the presence of abusive contractual clauses, taking into account the requirements of a contractual justice based on the goodfaith of both parties and the obligation to act in a reasonable manner. Furthermore, the legislator through the use of special rights for the purpose of protecting the weakest party within the contract, implements imperative rules to restore the balance and fairness of the contract. This worry of protection is justified by the undermine as so imposed to the obligatory force of the contract. Also, the postulate of Fouillée is here revoked by Lacordaire which underlines that between the strong and the weak, it is freedom that enslaves and the law that liberates. To summarize, the protection of the franchisee calls for the modification of the contractual obligation from one of conflict to one of cooperation and notably by the recognition of the contractual solidarity concept. Nevertheless, such a measure does not take place without disturbing the classic concept of the contract. On the one hand, the introduction of the implied terms into the contract denies the traditional idea of the contractual obligations based on the common intention of both parties, and also, it calls for the reconsideration, by the civil systems, of the theory of imprevision as is suggested by the uniform law and especially the Guide to international master franchise arrangements, but also the Unidroit Principles of international commercial contracts.

A dissertação objetiva defender a possibilidade do princípio da insignificância incidir sobre os atos de improbidade administrativa, à luz da hipótese analisada, na busca de uma interpretação mais humanizante ao viés extremamente sancionatório que a jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça aplica à Lei 8.429/92, ao impedir, sequer, cogitar-se do princípio nessa seara. Sem olvidar a relevância da moralidade administrativa, o escopo do trabalho é apenas o de abrir uma fresta para a possibilidade de cabimento do princípio da insignificância, enquanto fundamento de validade principiológica da eventual absolvição de acusados da prática de atos de improbidade administrativa, cuja conduta, na análise do caso concreto, tenha se revelado dotada de ofensividade mínima ao bem jurídico protegido. A relevância normativa dos princípios, bem como das garantias e limites constitucionais contra o poder punitivo do Estado, são decorrência do antropocentrismo que fundamenta a Constituição vigente, levando a Suprema Corte a estabelecer vetores de aplicação do princípio da insignificância, que devem ter a possibilidade de serem estendidos, quando cabíveis, ao julgamento dos atos de improbidade administrativa, seja pelos princípios da proporcionalidade e da razoabilidade, limitadores da discricionariedade, seja por princípios de comum cabimento no direito sancionador, diante do conceito universal de antijuridicidade. Por fim, tendências jurisprudenciais e normativas indicam a possibilidade de aplicação do princípio da insignificância aos atos de improbidade administrativa, para corrigir o entrave criado pelo absolutismo da posição que veda, por completo, a mera cogitação de incidência do princípio. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the likelihood of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance, in view of the hypothesis analyzed, in the search for a more human approach rather than the extremely punitive perspective followed by the Brazilian superior court of justice in relation to Law 8.429/92, by completely disregarding the principle in this sense. Notwithstanding the importance of the administrative morality, the purpose of this paper is to simply look at the possibility of considering the principle of insignificance, as a valid principle of eventual acquittal of those accused of administrative malfeasance, and whose actions might have been perceived as offensive to the assets protected by the law through the analysis of the case. The normative relevance of the principles and the warranties and constitutional limitations against the punitive powers of the State arise from the anthropocentrism that supports the current Constitution, which cause the Brazilian superior court of justice to veto the enforcement of the principle of insignificance, which should be extended, whenever possible, to the judgment of administrative malfeasance, either through principles of proportionality and reasonability, which limit discretion, either through common principles common to the punitive law or to the universal concept of unlawfulness. Finally, case lawrelated and normative trends show the possibility of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance to correct problems caused by the absolutism of the position that vetoes the possibility of the principle.

La franchise: une recette magique que chacun aimerait maîtriser pour s'assurer la réussite dans le monde des affaires. Or, le secret de cette recette revient à appliquer un simple postulat: réitérer, par un franchisé, la réussite du concept d'un franchiseur qui a déjà fait ses preuves. Mais, auparavant, il est essentiel que le franchiseur transmette au franchisé les éléments qui lui ont valu cette même réussite, quitte à ce que ce dernier s'engage à les mettre en oeuvre selon les prescriptions de son initiateur et sous son contrôle. Une telle mise en ouvre appelle, cependant, que les deux protagonistes empruntent une avenue basée sur la coopération, la confiance, la loyauté et la bonne foi. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas évidente en pratique en ce que les deux partenaires sont animés par des intérêts divergents, conflictuels et antimoniques. Dès lors, le rapport contractuel né du contrat de franchise se verra empreint par un déséquilibre manifeste entre les prestations réciproques des parties issu de la position économiquement dominante du franchiseur. Ce dernier, sera à même de fixer unilatéralement le contenu contractuel, de sorte à diminuer ses obligations tout en élargissant le champ de ses droits. Surgit alors tout un pan de comportements opportunistes du franchiseur se traduisant, notamment, par des abus au détriment du franchisé qui ne peut qu'acquiescer à la volonté de son partenaire. En effet, l'étude du droit civil révèle que les systèmes civilistes reposent sur une conception libérale du contrat permettant de présumer que les parties sont capables de défendre leurs intérêts. En vertu de la théorie de l'autonomie de la volonté, le contrat est présumé être conforme aux intérêts respectifs des parties. À défaut de tout vice de consentement, le contrat ne peut qu'être équilibré. Cependant, s'il se trouve que le contrat est malgré tout déséquilibré, le droit civil, à moins de circonstances exceptionnelles, n y pourra rien en pareil cas. La lésion ne vicie pas les conventions conclues entre majeurs non protégés, et la théorie de l'imprévision est rejetée par la plupart des systèmes civilistes. L'indifférence du droit civil face à ce déséquilibre se justifie essentiellement par deux impératifs: la liberté contractuelle et la sécurité juridique. Le principe de la force obligatoire du contrat s'impose aux parties autant qu'au juge et, partant, exclut toute tentative du juge de réviser un contrat déséquilibré. Toutefois, devant cette indifférence et cet immobilisme de la loi, le droit a, depuis, énormément évolué dans le sens d'apporter une protection plus accrue à la partie la plus faible au contrat. À ce titre, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une double intervention plus réaliste: l'intervention du juge et celle du législateur (particulièrement dans les contrats d'adhésion). D'abord, le juge manifeste une volonté accrue de corriger des déséquilibres contractuels choquants, notamment en présence de clauses contractuelles manifestement abusives, et ce au regard des exigences d'une justice contractuelle basée sur la bonne foi des parties et l'exigence d'agir raisonnablement. Ensuite, le législateur à travers l'élaboration de droits spéciaux ayant pour finalité la protection de la partie la plus faible, instaure des règles impératives destinées à condamner les éventuels déséquilibres contractuels. Ce souci de protection justifie l'atteinte ainsi portée au principe de la force obligatoire du contrat. Aussi, le postulat de Fouillée se voit inversé par Lacordaire qui souligne pertinemment que « entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui asservit et la loi qui libère ». En somme, la protection du franchisé appelle au glissement du rapport contractuel d'un rapport conflictuel vers un rapport de coopération et notamment par la reconnaissance du concept de solidarisme contractuel. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas sans troubler l'ordre normal de l'idée classique du contrat. D'une part, l'introduction d'obligations implicites au contrat renie en quelque sorte l'idée traditionnelle qu'on a des obligations contractuelles basée sur la commune intention des parties, et d'autre part, elle appelle à la reconsidération, par les systèmes civilistes, de la théorie de l'imprévision comme le suggère le droit uniforme et notamment le Guide d'UNIDROIT sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale, mais aussi les Principes relatifS aux contrats du commerce international. / The Franchise: a magic formula that each individual would like to possess to be able to ensure success in the business world. The secret of this formula exists in the shape of a simple postulate: for the franchisee to reiterate success of the franchised concept, which has already proven itself successful. But first, it is essential that the franchisor transmit the essential elements ofthat success to the franchisee, so that the latter may put into practice those prescribed elements as per the created by the initiators concept and control. This kind of transaction requires that both protagonists enter into their dealing in a manner that is based on cooperation, trust, loyalty and goodfaith. Nevertheless, this process is not easy to establish. In deed, both parties may have divergent interests, causing conflicts and antipathies. Thus, the contractual relationship born ofthe franchise concept, will have at its core a manifest imbalance created by the dominant financial status ofthe franchisor. The latter, is in a position to unilaterally stipulate the contractual contents, in such a manner as to diminish his own obligations while enlarging the scope of his rights. From this, a plethora of opportunistic behaviours from the franchisor translating into varied kinds of abuse to the detriment of the franchisee whom has not choice but to acquiesce to the franchisors wishes. In truth, the study of civil law reveals that the civil systems are founded on a liberal conception of the contract, presuming that both parties are capable of defending their interests. By virtue of the theory of autonomy of the will, the contract is presumed to respect each partie 's interests. Without any vice of consent, the contract can only be balanced. However, if the contract proves to be imbalanced, civil law, unless there are no exceptional circumstances, will have no effect, in such a case. Lesion don't vice conventions concluded between unprotected parties, and the imprevision theory is rejected by most civil systems. The indifference of civil law to the contractual imbalance is justified by two imperatives: contractual liberty and judicial security. The principal of the obligatory force of a contract imposes on both parties, as well as to the judge, and, in that way, excludes all attempts by judge to revise the imbalanced contract. Nonetheless, in spite of the laws indifference and opposition to change, the law has since evolved enormously in supplying more protection to the weakest party of a contract. Thus, we are now witness to a double, more realistic intervention: the intervention of the judge and the legislator (particularly in contracts of adhesions). First, the judge manifests a will to correct the more obviously imbalanced aspects of the contract, most notably with regards to the presence of abusive contractual clauses, taking into account the requirements of a contractual justice based on the goodfaith of both parties and the obligation to act in a reasonable manner. Furthermore, the legislator through the use of special rights for the purpose of protecting the weakest party within the contract, implements imperative rules to restore the balance and fairness of the contract. This worry of protection is justified by the undermine as so imposed to the obligatory force of the contract. Also, the postulate of Fouillée is here revoked by Lacordaire which underlines that between the strong and the weak, it is freedom that enslaves and the law that liberates. To summarize, the protection of the franchisee calls for the modification of the contractual obligation from one of conflict to one of cooperation and notably by the recognition of the contractual solidarity concept. Nevertheless, such a measure does not take place without disturbing the classic concept of the contract. On the one hand, the introduction of the implied terms into the contract denies the traditional idea of the contractual obligations based on the common intention of both parties, and also, it calls for the reconsideration, by the civil systems, of the theory of imprevision as is suggested by the uniform law and especially the Guide to international master franchise arrangements, but also the Unidroit Principles of international commercial contracts. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.

A dissertação objetiva defender a possibilidade do princípio da insignificância incidir sobre os atos de improbidade administrativa, à luz da hipótese analisada, na busca de uma interpretação mais humanizante ao viés extremamente sancionatório que a jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça aplica à Lei 8.429/92, ao impedir, sequer, cogitar-se do princípio nessa seara. Sem olvidar a relevância da moralidade administrativa, o escopo do trabalho é apenas o de abrir uma fresta para a possibilidade de cabimento do princípio da insignificância, enquanto fundamento de validade principiológica da eventual absolvição de acusados da prática de atos de improbidade administrativa, cuja conduta, na análise do caso concreto, tenha se revelado dotada de ofensividade mínima ao bem jurídico protegido. A relevância normativa dos princípios, bem como das garantias e limites constitucionais contra o poder punitivo do Estado, são decorrência do antropocentrismo que fundamenta a Constituição vigente, levando a Suprema Corte a estabelecer vetores de aplicação do princípio da insignificância, que devem ter a possibilidade de serem estendidos, quando cabíveis, ao julgamento dos atos de improbidade administrativa, seja pelos princípios da proporcionalidade e da razoabilidade, limitadores da discricionariedade, seja por princípios de comum cabimento no direito sancionador, diante do conceito universal de antijuridicidade. Por fim, tendências jurisprudenciais e normativas indicam a possibilidade de aplicação do princípio da insignificância aos atos de improbidade administrativa, para corrigir o entrave criado pelo absolutismo da posição que veda, por completo, a mera cogitação de incidência do princípio. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the likelihood of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance, in view of the hypothesis analyzed, in the search for a more human approach rather than the extremely punitive perspective followed by the Brazilian superior court of justice in relation to Law 8.429/92, by completely disregarding the principle in this sense. Notwithstanding the importance of the administrative morality, the purpose of this paper is to simply look at the possibility of considering the principle of insignificance, as a valid principle of eventual acquittal of those accused of administrative malfeasance, and whose actions might have been perceived as offensive to the assets protected by the law through the analysis of the case. The normative relevance of the principles and the warranties and constitutional limitations against the punitive powers of the State arise from the anthropocentrism that supports the current Constitution, which cause the Brazilian superior court of justice to veto the enforcement of the principle of insignificance, which should be extended, whenever possible, to the judgment of administrative malfeasance, either through principles of proportionality and reasonability, which limit discretion, either through common principles common to the punitive law or to the universal concept of unlawfulness. Finally, case lawrelated and normative trends show the possibility of enforcing the principle of insignificance to administrative malfeasance to correct problems caused by the absolutism of the position that vetoes the possibility of the principle.

A tese busca identificar os elementos jurídicos e extrajurídicos que interferem sobre o comportamento judicial do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A análise é desenvolvida com base nos seguintes modelos decisórios: o modelo legalista, o modelo ideológico, o modelo institucional e o modelo estratégico de comportamento judicial. Ao longo do trabalho, examina-se a influência do direito, da ideologia, das normas que regem o Judiciário, das regras que regem as decisões colegiadas, do Poder Executivo, do Poder Legislativo, da opinião pública e da imprensa no processo decisório do Supremo Tribunal Federal. / This work aims at identifying legal and non-legal factors that interfere with Brazilian Supreme Court decisions. The analysis is developed with basis on the legal model, on the attitudinal model, on the institutional model and on the strategic model of judicial decision-making. It examines the influence of constitutional law, ideology, collegial process, Executive Power, Legislative Power, public opinion and of the media on Brazilian Supreme Court attitudes.

A tese busca identificar os elementos jurídicos e extrajurídicos que interferem sobre o comportamento judicial do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A análise é desenvolvida com base nos seguintes modelos decisórios: o modelo legalista, o modelo ideológico, o modelo institucional e o modelo estratégico de comportamento judicial. Ao longo do trabalho, examina-se a influência do direito, da ideologia, das normas que regem o Judiciário, das regras que regem as decisões colegiadas, do Poder Executivo, do Poder Legislativo, da opinião pública e da imprensa no processo decisório do Supremo Tribunal Federal. / This work aims at identifying legal and non-legal factors that interfere with Brazilian Supreme Court decisions. The analysis is developed with basis on the legal model, on the attitudinal model, on the institutional model and on the strategic model of judicial decision-making. It examines the influence of constitutional law, ideology, collegial process, Executive Power, Legislative Power, public opinion and of the media on Brazilian Supreme Court attitudes.