Este trabalho apresenta uma investigação sobre o alcance da aplicação da teoria da onerosidade excessiva, prevista nos artigos 478 a 480 do Novo Código Civil, aos acordos de acionistas, tipo contratual cada vez mais presente na realidade empresarial brasileira. Especial atenção é dada ao fato de que o acordo de acionistas está inserido em um contexto marcado não só por um ambiente negocial e mercadológico sujeito a acontecimentos imprevisíveis que podem desequilibrar as prestações de forma excessivamente onerosa para uma das partes, mas também marcado por um equilíbrio na composição do conteúdo contratual e na alocação de riscos correspondente combinados pelas partes. Para isso, serão analisadas as questões relativas ao alcance da aplicação do mecanismo de reequilíbrio contratual mencionado em acordo de acionistas, à identificação do objeto do conteúdo contratual que contém o programa de alocação de risco e ao elemento-guia utilizado pela jurisprudência nesse sentido, uma vez que foi o uso desenfreado do reequilíbrio contratual que fez com que este fosse quase expulso da sistemática contratual durante o período clássico. A pesquisa apontou como elemento-guia autorizador da aplicação da onerosidade excessiva pelos órgãos judiciais estudados a conjunção da identificação dos critérios legais com a identificação do fato de a onerosidade excessiva estar além daquele risco implícito e da álea normal da natureza do negócio jurídico celebrado. Tais resultados apontam para uma criteriosa possibilidade de correção de desequilíbrio contratual compatível com a dinâmica e o ambiente dos acordos de acionistas / This work presents an investigation concerning the scope of application of the excessive onerous theory, provided in articles 478 to 480 of the Brazilian Civil Code, in the sharesholders agreement matter, a contractual type increasingly present in the Brazilian business reality. Special attention is given to the fact the sharesholders agreement is inserted in a context characterized not only by the negotial and market environment subject to unpredictable events that may disrupt the provision in an excessive onerous way to a relevant party, but also characterized by a balance in the composition of the content and of the contractual allocation of risks combined by the relevant parties. For this, we analyze the issues related to the scope of application of the mentioned contractual rebalancing mechanism in the shareholders agreement matter, to the identification of the contractual content object that contains the risk allocation program and to the guide-element used in the jurisprudence in this sense, since it was the umlimited use of contractual rebalancing that caused this was almost kicked out of the contractual systematically during the classical period. The survey pointed out as guide-element to the application of excessive onerous by the legal courts studied the association of the legal criteria identification with the identication of the fact that the excessive onerous being beyond that inherent and normal risk concluded of the nature of the legal business. These results point to the possibility of a careful correction of contractual imbalance compatible with the shareholders agreements dynamic and environment.

Este trabalho apresenta uma investigação sobre o alcance da aplicação da teoria da onerosidade excessiva, prevista nos artigos 478 a 480 do Novo Código Civil, aos acordos de acionistas, tipo contratual cada vez mais presente na realidade empresarial brasileira. Especial atenção é dada ao fato de que o acordo de acionistas está inserido em um contexto marcado não só por um ambiente negocial e mercadológico sujeito a acontecimentos imprevisíveis que podem desequilibrar as prestações de forma excessivamente onerosa para uma das partes, mas também marcado por um equilíbrio na composição do conteúdo contratual e na alocação de riscos correspondente combinados pelas partes. Para isso, serão analisadas as questões relativas ao alcance da aplicação do mecanismo de reequilíbrio contratual mencionado em acordo de acionistas, à identificação do objeto do conteúdo contratual que contém o programa de alocação de risco e ao elemento-guia utilizado pela jurisprudência nesse sentido, uma vez que foi o uso desenfreado do reequilíbrio contratual que fez com que este fosse quase expulso da sistemática contratual durante o período clássico. A pesquisa apontou como elemento-guia autorizador da aplicação da onerosidade excessiva pelos órgãos judiciais estudados a conjunção da identificação dos critérios legais com a identificação do fato de a onerosidade excessiva estar além daquele risco implícito e da álea normal da natureza do negócio jurídico celebrado. Tais resultados apontam para uma criteriosa possibilidade de correção de desequilíbrio contratual compatível com a dinâmica e o ambiente dos acordos de acionistas / This work presents an investigation concerning the scope of application of the excessive onerous theory, provided in articles 478 to 480 of the Brazilian Civil Code, in the sharesholders agreement matter, a contractual type increasingly present in the Brazilian business reality. Special attention is given to the fact the sharesholders agreement is inserted in a context characterized not only by the negotial and market environment subject to unpredictable events that may disrupt the provision in an excessive onerous way to a relevant party, but also characterized by a balance in the composition of the content and of the contractual allocation of risks combined by the relevant parties. For this, we analyze the issues related to the scope of application of the mentioned contractual rebalancing mechanism in the shareholders agreement matter, to the identification of the contractual content object that contains the risk allocation program and to the guide-element used in the jurisprudence in this sense, since it was the umlimited use of contractual rebalancing that caused this was almost kicked out of the contractual systematically during the classical period. The survey pointed out as guide-element to the application of excessive onerous by the legal courts studied the association of the legal criteria identification with the identication of the fact that the excessive onerous being beyond that inherent and normal risk concluded of the nature of the legal business. These results point to the possibility of a careful correction of contractual imbalance compatible with the shareholders agreements dynamic and environment.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline. / La franchise: une recette magique que chacun aimerait maîtriser pour s'assurer la réussite dans le monde des affaires. Or, le secret de cette recette revient à appliquer un simple postulat: réitérer, par un franchisé, la réussite du concept d'un franchiseur qui a déjà fait ses preuves. Mais, auparavant, il est essentiel que le franchiseur transmette au franchisé les éléments qui lui ont valu cette même réussite, quitte à ce que ce dernier s'engage à les mettre en oeuvre selon les prescriptions de son initiateur et sous son contrôle. Une telle mise en ouvre appelle, cependant, que les deux protagonistes empruntent une avenue basée sur la coopération, la confiance, la loyauté et la bonne foi. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas évidente en pratique en ce que les deux partenaires sont animés par des intérêts divergents, conflictuels et antimoniques. Dès lors, le rapport contractuel né du contrat de franchise se verra empreint par un déséquilibre manifeste entre les prestations réciproques des parties issu de la position économiquement dominante du franchiseur. Ce dernier, sera à même de fixer unilatéralement le contenu contractuel, de sorte à diminuer ses obligations tout en élargissant le champ de ses droits. Surgit alors tout un pan de comportements opportunistes du franchiseur se traduisant, notamment, par des abus au détriment du franchisé qui ne peut qu'acquiescer à la volonté de son partenaire. En effet, l'étude du droit civil révèle que les systèmes civilistes reposent sur une conception libérale du contrat permettant de présumer que les parties sont capables de défendre leurs intérêts. En vertu de la théorie de l'autonomie de la volonté, le contrat est présumé être conforme aux intérêts respectifs des parties. À défaut de tout vice de consentement, le contrat ne peut qu'être équilibré. Cependant, s'il se trouve que le contrat est malgré tout déséquilibré, le droit civil, à moins de circonstances exceptionnelles, n y pourra rien en pareil cas. La lésion ne vicie pas les conventions conclues entre majeurs non protégés, et la théorie de l'imprévision est rejetée par la plupart des systèmes civilistes. L'indifférence du droit civil face à ce déséquilibre se justifie essentiellement par deux impératifs: la liberté contractuelle et la sécurité juridique. Le principe de la force obligatoire du contrat s'impose aux parties autant qu'au juge et, partant, exclut toute tentative du juge de réviser un contrat déséquilibré. Toutefois, devant cette indifférence et cet immobilisme de la loi, le droit a, depuis, énormément évolué dans le sens d'apporter une protection plus accrue à la partie la plus faible au contrat. À ce titre, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une double intervention plus réaliste: l'intervention du juge et celle du législateur (particulièrement dans les contrats d'adhésion). D'abord, le juge manifeste une volonté accrue de corriger des déséquilibres contractuels choquants, notamment en présence de clauses contractuelles manifestement abusives, et ce au regard des exigences d'une justice contractuelle basée sur la bonne foi des parties et l'exigence d'agir raisonnablement. Ensuite, le législateur à travers l'élaboration de droits spéciaux ayant pour finalité la protection de la partie la plus faible, instaure des règles impératives destinées à condamner les éventuels déséquilibres contractuels. Ce souci de protection justifie l'atteinte ainsi portée au principe de la force obligatoire du contrat. Aussi, le postulat de Fouillée se voit inversé par Lacordaire qui souligne pertinemment que « entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui asservit et la loi qui libère ». En somme, la protection du franchisé appelle au glissement du rapport contractuel d'un rapport conflictuel vers un rapport de coopération et notamment par la reconnaissance du concept de solidarisme contractuel. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas sans troubler l'ordre normal de l'idée classique du contrat. D'une part, l'introduction d'obligations implicites au contrat renie en quelque sorte l'idée traditionnelle qu'on a des obligations contractuelles basée sur la commune intention des parties, et d'autre part, elle appelle à la reconsidération, par les systèmes civilistes, de la théorie de l'imprévision comme le suggère le droit uniforme et notamment le Guide d'UNIDROIT sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale, mais aussi les Principes relatifS aux contrats du commerce international. / The Franchise: a magic formula that each individual would like to possess to be able to ensure success in the business world. The secret of this formula exists in the shape of a simple postulate: for the franchisee to reiterate success of the franchised concept, which has already proven itself successful. But first, it is essential that the franchisor transmit the essential elements ofthat success to the franchisee, so that the latter may put into practice those prescribed elements as per the created by the initiators concept and control. This kind of transaction requires that both protagonists enter into their dealing in a manner that is based on cooperation, trust, loyalty and goodfaith. Nevertheless, this process is not easy to establish. In deed, both parties may have divergent interests, causing conflicts and antipathies. Thus, the contractual relationship born ofthe franchise concept, will have at its core a manifest imbalance created by the dominant financial status ofthe franchisor. The latter, is in a position to unilaterally stipulate the contractual contents, in such a manner as to diminish his own obligations while enlarging the scope of his rights. From this, a plethora of opportunistic behaviours from the franchisor translating into varied kinds of abuse to the detriment of the franchisee whom has not choice but to acquiesce to the franchisors wishes. In truth, the study of civil law reveals that the civil systems are founded on a liberal conception of the contract, presuming that both parties are capable of defending their interests. By virtue of the theory of autonomy of the will, the contract is presumed to respect each partie 's interests. Without any vice of consent, the contract can only be balanced. However, if the contract proves to be imbalanced, civil law, unless there are no exceptional circumstances, will have no effect, in such a case. Lesion don't vice conventions concluded between unprotected parties, and the imprevision theory is rejected by most civil systems. The indifference of civil law to the contractual imbalance is justified by two imperatives: contractual liberty and judicial security. The principal of the obligatory force of a contract imposes on both parties, as well as to the judge, and, in that way, excludes all attempts by judge to revise the imbalanced contract. Nonetheless, in spite of the laws indifference and opposition to change, the law has since evolved enormously in supplying more protection to the weakest party of a contract. Thus, we are now witness to a double, more realistic intervention: the intervention of the judge and the legislator (particularly in contracts of adhesions). First, the judge manifests a will to correct the more obviously imbalanced aspects of the contract, most notably with regards to the presence of abusive contractual clauses, taking into account the requirements of a contractual justice based on the goodfaith of both parties and the obligation to act in a reasonable manner. Furthermore, the legislator through the use of special rights for the purpose of protecting the weakest party within the contract, implements imperative rules to restore the balance and fairness of the contract. This worry of protection is justified by the undermine as so imposed to the obligatory force of the contract. Also, the postulate of Fouillée is here revoked by Lacordaire which underlines that between the strong and the weak, it is freedom that enslaves and the law that liberates. To summarize, the protection of the franchisee calls for the modification of the contractual obligation from one of conflict to one of cooperation and notably by the recognition of the contractual solidarity concept. Nevertheless, such a measure does not take place without disturbing the classic concept of the contract. On the one hand, the introduction of the implied terms into the contract denies the traditional idea of the contractual obligations based on the common intention of both parties, and also, it calls for the reconsideration, by the civil systems, of the theory of imprevision as is suggested by the uniform law and especially the Guide to international master franchise arrangements, but also the Unidroit Principles of international commercial contracts.

La franchise: une recette magique que chacun aimerait maîtriser pour s'assurer la réussite dans le monde des affaires. Or, le secret de cette recette revient à appliquer un simple postulat: réitérer, par un franchisé, la réussite du concept d'un franchiseur qui a déjà fait ses preuves. Mais, auparavant, il est essentiel que le franchiseur transmette au franchisé les éléments qui lui ont valu cette même réussite, quitte à ce que ce dernier s'engage à les mettre en oeuvre selon les prescriptions de son initiateur et sous son contrôle. Une telle mise en ouvre appelle, cependant, que les deux protagonistes empruntent une avenue basée sur la coopération, la confiance, la loyauté et la bonne foi. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas évidente en pratique en ce que les deux partenaires sont animés par des intérêts divergents, conflictuels et antimoniques. Dès lors, le rapport contractuel né du contrat de franchise se verra empreint par un déséquilibre manifeste entre les prestations réciproques des parties issu de la position économiquement dominante du franchiseur. Ce dernier, sera à même de fixer unilatéralement le contenu contractuel, de sorte à diminuer ses obligations tout en élargissant le champ de ses droits. Surgit alors tout un pan de comportements opportunistes du franchiseur se traduisant, notamment, par des abus au détriment du franchisé qui ne peut qu'acquiescer à la volonté de son partenaire. En effet, l'étude du droit civil révèle que les systèmes civilistes reposent sur une conception libérale du contrat permettant de présumer que les parties sont capables de défendre leurs intérêts. En vertu de la théorie de l'autonomie de la volonté, le contrat est présumé être conforme aux intérêts respectifs des parties. À défaut de tout vice de consentement, le contrat ne peut qu'être équilibré. Cependant, s'il se trouve que le contrat est malgré tout déséquilibré, le droit civil, à moins de circonstances exceptionnelles, n y pourra rien en pareil cas. La lésion ne vicie pas les conventions conclues entre majeurs non protégés, et la théorie de l'imprévision est rejetée par la plupart des systèmes civilistes. L'indifférence du droit civil face à ce déséquilibre se justifie essentiellement par deux impératifs: la liberté contractuelle et la sécurité juridique. Le principe de la force obligatoire du contrat s'impose aux parties autant qu'au juge et, partant, exclut toute tentative du juge de réviser un contrat déséquilibré. Toutefois, devant cette indifférence et cet immobilisme de la loi, le droit a, depuis, énormément évolué dans le sens d'apporter une protection plus accrue à la partie la plus faible au contrat. À ce titre, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une double intervention plus réaliste: l'intervention du juge et celle du législateur (particulièrement dans les contrats d'adhésion). D'abord, le juge manifeste une volonté accrue de corriger des déséquilibres contractuels choquants, notamment en présence de clauses contractuelles manifestement abusives, et ce au regard des exigences d'une justice contractuelle basée sur la bonne foi des parties et l'exigence d'agir raisonnablement. Ensuite, le législateur à travers l'élaboration de droits spéciaux ayant pour finalité la protection de la partie la plus faible, instaure des règles impératives destinées à condamner les éventuels déséquilibres contractuels. Ce souci de protection justifie l'atteinte ainsi portée au principe de la force obligatoire du contrat. Aussi, le postulat de Fouillée se voit inversé par Lacordaire qui souligne pertinemment que « entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui asservit et la loi qui libère ». En somme, la protection du franchisé appelle au glissement du rapport contractuel d'un rapport conflictuel vers un rapport de coopération et notamment par la reconnaissance du concept de solidarisme contractuel. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas sans troubler l'ordre normal de l'idée classique du contrat. D'une part, l'introduction d'obligations implicites au contrat renie en quelque sorte l'idée traditionnelle qu'on a des obligations contractuelles basée sur la commune intention des parties, et d'autre part, elle appelle à la reconsidération, par les systèmes civilistes, de la théorie de l'imprévision comme le suggère le droit uniforme et notamment le Guide d'UNIDROIT sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale, mais aussi les Principes relatifS aux contrats du commerce international. / The Franchise: a magic formula that each individual would like to possess to be able to ensure success in the business world. The secret of this formula exists in the shape of a simple postulate: for the franchisee to reiterate success of the franchised concept, which has already proven itself successful. But first, it is essential that the franchisor transmit the essential elements ofthat success to the franchisee, so that the latter may put into practice those prescribed elements as per the created by the initiators concept and control. This kind of transaction requires that both protagonists enter into their dealing in a manner that is based on cooperation, trust, loyalty and goodfaith. Nevertheless, this process is not easy to establish. In deed, both parties may have divergent interests, causing conflicts and antipathies. Thus, the contractual relationship born ofthe franchise concept, will have at its core a manifest imbalance created by the dominant financial status ofthe franchisor. The latter, is in a position to unilaterally stipulate the contractual contents, in such a manner as to diminish his own obligations while enlarging the scope of his rights. From this, a plethora of opportunistic behaviours from the franchisor translating into varied kinds of abuse to the detriment of the franchisee whom has not choice but to acquiesce to the franchisors wishes. In truth, the study of civil law reveals that the civil systems are founded on a liberal conception of the contract, presuming that both parties are capable of defending their interests. By virtue of the theory of autonomy of the will, the contract is presumed to respect each partie 's interests. Without any vice of consent, the contract can only be balanced. However, if the contract proves to be imbalanced, civil law, unless there are no exceptional circumstances, will have no effect, in such a case. Lesion don't vice conventions concluded between unprotected parties, and the imprevision theory is rejected by most civil systems. The indifference of civil law to the contractual imbalance is justified by two imperatives: contractual liberty and judicial security. The principal of the obligatory force of a contract imposes on both parties, as well as to the judge, and, in that way, excludes all attempts by judge to revise the imbalanced contract. Nonetheless, in spite of the laws indifference and opposition to change, the law has since evolved enormously in supplying more protection to the weakest party of a contract. Thus, we are now witness to a double, more realistic intervention: the intervention of the judge and the legislator (particularly in contracts of adhesions). First, the judge manifests a will to correct the more obviously imbalanced aspects of the contract, most notably with regards to the presence of abusive contractual clauses, taking into account the requirements of a contractual justice based on the goodfaith of both parties and the obligation to act in a reasonable manner. Furthermore, the legislator through the use of special rights for the purpose of protecting the weakest party within the contract, implements imperative rules to restore the balance and fairness of the contract. This worry of protection is justified by the undermine as so imposed to the obligatory force of the contract. Also, the postulate of Fouillée is here revoked by Lacordaire which underlines that between the strong and the weak, it is freedom that enslaves and the law that liberates. To summarize, the protection of the franchisee calls for the modification of the contractual obligation from one of conflict to one of cooperation and notably by the recognition of the contractual solidarity concept. Nevertheless, such a measure does not take place without disturbing the classic concept of the contract. On the one hand, the introduction of the implied terms into the contract denies the traditional idea of the contractual obligations based on the common intention of both parties, and also, it calls for the reconsideration, by the civil systems, of the theory of imprevision as is suggested by the uniform law and especially the Guide to international master franchise arrangements, but also the Unidroit Principles of international commercial contracts. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.