Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcio Lamonica Bovino.pdf: 1134865 bytes, checksum: 8598d6fb6e560c08655717e7b28cb283 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-08 / The objective of this work comprehends the study of abuse of the right of demanding focusing on the author s procedural behavior even before the demand is initiated. Based on the concepts of the material right about the theory of abuse of the right, associated to the assumption that the lawsuit should start under the ethics, good faith, loyalty and truth principles, we will show specifically the abuse of action of legal process and its consequences to solve the dispute, that including possible effects of antitrust act which is mentioned on the theory of sham litigation. We will also try highlight the abuse of the right on demanding as a consequence of extinguishment due to lack of procedural interest, without prejudice of penalties provided for in the CPC and of the right of compensation that injured party may demand / O objetivo deste trabalho envolve o estudo do abuso de direito de demandar com enfoque para o comportamento processual do autor antes mesmo de iniciada a demanda. Importando os conceitos do direito material acerca da teoria do abuso de direito, aliado à premissa de que o processo deve se iniciar sob os ditames da ética, boa-fé, lealdade e verdade, trabalharemos especificamente o abuso do direito processual de ação e suas consequências práticas para solução da demanda, inclusive dos possíveis efeitos anticoncorrenciais de que trata a teoria da "sham litigation". Buscaremos enquadrar o abuso do direito de demandar como causa de extinção por ausência de interesse processual, sem prejuízo das sanções previstas no CPC e do direito de indenização que o prejudicado (lesado) possa demandar em sede própria

O presente estudo busca analisar a influência do princípio da boa-fé objetiva nos limites do planejamento tributário, mormente no que se refere à possibilidade de desconsideração de atos e negócios jurídicos lícitos realizados pelos contribuintes com o objetivo de minorar a carga tributária. Sobre o tema, parte da doutrina nacional e da jurisprudência administrativa propõe uma releitura da autonomia da vontade, de modo que seriam ilegítimos os planejamentos tributários praticados com abuso do direito, neste compreendido suas diversas espécies, como abuso de formas, falta de propósito negociai, fraude à lei e demais patologias do negócio jurídico. A partir dessa constatação, a boa-fé assume papel de relevo, porquanto serve como elemento conformador da licitude do modo de exercício dos direitos subjetivos e formativos, atuando como verdadeiro fundamento de validade do abuso do direito. Assim, a compreensão dos limites do que pode ser considerado como lícito ou ilícito em matéria de planejamento tributário passa pela definição do conteúdo e da operatividade da boafé no Direito Tributário. Nessa tarefa, no entanto, a doutrina e a jurisprudência, de um modo geral, acabam por realizar uma transposição acrítica do conteúdo da boa-fé objetiva nas relações de Direito Privado, esquecendo-se que o standard de conduta exigido pela boa-fé é influenciado pelas demais normas de um determinado ramo normativo. No caso, as peculiaridades do Direito Tributário, tais como a força com que se liga aos princípios da segurança jurídica e da legalidade e a responsabilidade imposta à Administração Pública decorrente da presunção de legitimidade de seus atos, fazem com que a boa-fé objetiva assuma papel muito mais protetivo do contribuinte. Dessa forma, em que pese a boa-fé objetiva imponha limites ao exercício do direito do contribuinte de planejar suas atividades, esse limite não alcança a possibilidade reconhecer como ilícitos os atos e negócios jurídicos praticados pelos contribuintes no sentido de elidir a norma tributária. / The present study seeks to analyze the influence of the principie of objective good faith in the limits of tax planning, especially in relation to the possibility of disregarding lícít legal acts and business carríed out by taxpayers in order to reduce the tax burden. On the subject, part of the national doctrine and administratíve jurisprudence proposes a rereading of the autonomy of will, so that would be illegitimate the tax planning practiced with abuse of right, in this understood its various species, such as abuse of forms, fraud on the law and other pathologies of the legal business. Based on this observation, good faith plays an important role, since it serves as a constítutíve element of the lawfulness of the way of exercising subjectíve and formatíve rights, actíng as a true basís for the validíty of abuse of right. Thus, the understanding of the limits of what can be considered licit or illícit in tax planning is defíned by the content and operability of good faíth in Tax Law. In this task, however, doctrine and jurisprudence, in a general way, end up performing an uncritical transpositíon of the content of good faith from Prívate Law relatíons, forgetting that the standard of conduct required by good faith ís influenced by the other norms of a certain normatíve area. In this case, the peculíarities of Tax Law, such as the strength with which it is linked to the principies of legal certainty and legality and the responsibility imposed on the Public Administration arisíng from the presumptíon of legitimacy of its acts, make good faith assume a taxpayer's much more protective role. Thus, even though good faith limits the exercise of the ríght of the taxpayer to plan its activities, this limit does not reach the possibility to recognize as illegal the acts and legal business practiced by the taxpayers in the sense of avoidíng the tax rule.

O presente estudo busca analisar a influência do princípio da boa-fé objetiva nos limites do planejamento tributário, mormente no que se refere à possibilidade de desconsideração de atos e negócios jurídicos lícitos realizados pelos contribuintes com o objetivo de minorar a carga tributária. Sobre o tema, parte da doutrina nacional e da jurisprudência administrativa propõe uma releitura da autonomia da vontade, de modo que seriam ilegítimos os planejamentos tributários praticados com abuso do direito, neste compreendido suas diversas espécies, como abuso de formas, falta de propósito negociai, fraude à lei e demais patologias do negócio jurídico. A partir dessa constatação, a boa-fé assume papel de relevo, porquanto serve como elemento conformador da licitude do modo de exercício dos direitos subjetivos e formativos, atuando como verdadeiro fundamento de validade do abuso do direito. Assim, a compreensão dos limites do que pode ser considerado como lícito ou ilícito em matéria de planejamento tributário passa pela definição do conteúdo e da operatividade da boafé no Direito Tributário. Nessa tarefa, no entanto, a doutrina e a jurisprudência, de um modo geral, acabam por realizar uma transposição acrítica do conteúdo da boa-fé objetiva nas relações de Direito Privado, esquecendo-se que o standard de conduta exigido pela boa-fé é influenciado pelas demais normas de um determinado ramo normativo. No caso, as peculiaridades do Direito Tributário, tais como a força com que se liga aos princípios da segurança jurídica e da legalidade e a responsabilidade imposta à Administração Pública decorrente da presunção de legitimidade de seus atos, fazem com que a boa-fé objetiva assuma papel muito mais protetivo do contribuinte. Dessa forma, em que pese a boa-fé objetiva imponha limites ao exercício do direito do contribuinte de planejar suas atividades, esse limite não alcança a possibilidade reconhecer como ilícitos os atos e negócios jurídicos praticados pelos contribuintes no sentido de elidir a norma tributária. / The present study seeks to analyze the influence of the principie of objective good faith in the limits of tax planning, especially in relation to the possibility of disregarding lícít legal acts and business carríed out by taxpayers in order to reduce the tax burden. On the subject, part of the national doctrine and administratíve jurisprudence proposes a rereading of the autonomy of will, so that would be illegitimate the tax planning practiced with abuse of right, in this understood its various species, such as abuse of forms, fraud on the law and other pathologies of the legal business. Based on this observation, good faith plays an important role, since it serves as a constítutíve element of the lawfulness of the way of exercising subjectíve and formatíve rights, actíng as a true basís for the validíty of abuse of right. Thus, the understanding of the limits of what can be considered licit or illícit in tax planning is defíned by the content and operability of good faíth in Tax Law. In this task, however, doctrine and jurisprudence, in a general way, end up performing an uncritical transpositíon of the content of good faith from Prívate Law relatíons, forgetting that the standard of conduct required by good faith ís influenced by the other norms of a certain normatíve area. In this case, the peculíarities of Tax Law, such as the strength with which it is linked to the principies of legal certainty and legality and the responsibility imposed on the Public Administration arisíng from the presumptíon of legitimacy of its acts, make good faith assume a taxpayer's much more protective role. Thus, even though good faith limits the exercise of the ríght of the taxpayer to plan its activities, this limit does not reach the possibility to recognize as illegal the acts and legal business practiced by the taxpayers in the sense of avoidíng the tax rule.

O presente estudo busca analisar a influência do princípio da boa-fé objetiva nos limites do planejamento tributário, mormente no que se refere à possibilidade de desconsideração de atos e negócios jurídicos lícitos realizados pelos contribuintes com o objetivo de minorar a carga tributária. Sobre o tema, parte da doutrina nacional e da jurisprudência administrativa propõe uma releitura da autonomia da vontade, de modo que seriam ilegítimos os planejamentos tributários praticados com abuso do direito, neste compreendido suas diversas espécies, como abuso de formas, falta de propósito negociai, fraude à lei e demais patologias do negócio jurídico. A partir dessa constatação, a boa-fé assume papel de relevo, porquanto serve como elemento conformador da licitude do modo de exercício dos direitos subjetivos e formativos, atuando como verdadeiro fundamento de validade do abuso do direito. Assim, a compreensão dos limites do que pode ser considerado como lícito ou ilícito em matéria de planejamento tributário passa pela definição do conteúdo e da operatividade da boafé no Direito Tributário. Nessa tarefa, no entanto, a doutrina e a jurisprudência, de um modo geral, acabam por realizar uma transposição acrítica do conteúdo da boa-fé objetiva nas relações de Direito Privado, esquecendo-se que o standard de conduta exigido pela boa-fé é influenciado pelas demais normas de um determinado ramo normativo. No caso, as peculiaridades do Direito Tributário, tais como a força com que se liga aos princípios da segurança jurídica e da legalidade e a responsabilidade imposta à Administração Pública decorrente da presunção de legitimidade de seus atos, fazem com que a boa-fé objetiva assuma papel muito mais protetivo do contribuinte. Dessa forma, em que pese a boa-fé objetiva imponha limites ao exercício do direito do contribuinte de planejar suas atividades, esse limite não alcança a possibilidade reconhecer como ilícitos os atos e negócios jurídicos praticados pelos contribuintes no sentido de elidir a norma tributária. / The present study seeks to analyze the influence of the principie of objective good faith in the limits of tax planning, especially in relation to the possibility of disregarding lícít legal acts and business carríed out by taxpayers in order to reduce the tax burden. On the subject, part of the national doctrine and administratíve jurisprudence proposes a rereading of the autonomy of will, so that would be illegitimate the tax planning practiced with abuse of right, in this understood its various species, such as abuse of forms, fraud on the law and other pathologies of the legal business. Based on this observation, good faith plays an important role, since it serves as a constítutíve element of the lawfulness of the way of exercising subjectíve and formatíve rights, actíng as a true basís for the validíty of abuse of right. Thus, the understanding of the limits of what can be considered licit or illícit in tax planning is defíned by the content and operability of good faíth in Tax Law. In this task, however, doctrine and jurisprudence, in a general way, end up performing an uncritical transpositíon of the content of good faith from Prívate Law relatíons, forgetting that the standard of conduct required by good faith ís influenced by the other norms of a certain normatíve area. In this case, the peculíarities of Tax Law, such as the strength with which it is linked to the principies of legal certainty and legality and the responsibility imposed on the Public Administration arisíng from the presumptíon of legitimacy of its acts, make good faith assume a taxpayer's much more protective role. Thus, even though good faith limits the exercise of the ríght of the taxpayer to plan its activities, this limit does not reach the possibility to recognize as illegal the acts and legal business practiced by the taxpayers in the sense of avoidíng the tax rule.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carla Smith de Vasconcellos Crippa.pdf: 1195525 bytes, checksum: cc16220bf4da5f438c79d0f46cf95e8c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-08 / The subject of this academic work is the abuse of right in the judicial restructuring and its objective is to verify the criteria to allow the recognition and punishment of abusive behaviors in the judicial restructuring, analyzing the legal regulation of the abuse, its requirements and consequences. Law No. 11,101/2005 does not rule the abuse of right, being silent on this subject. However, we have seen abusive behaviors by creditors, debtors, shareholders and officers, violating the limits imposed by good faith, good manners and the economic and social purpose of the judicial restructuring. To avoid that such behaviors are not punished as a consequence of an omission in Law No. 11,101/2005, we investigate the regulation of the abuse by Brazilian Law and the possibility of application of such regulation to the judicial restructuring on a subsidiary basis. The investigation is primarily analytic, dealing with the conceptualization of judicial restructuring and abuse of right and the principles and laws applicable to them. It is also empiric, reviewing court precedents. This work aims at setting out parameters that may be used in the discussion of particular cases, as to contribute to the development of court precedents and to the drafting of fair and equitable judicial restructuring plans, which comply with the purposes of Law No. 11,101/2005 / O tema desta dissertação é o abuso de direito na recuperação judicial e o seu objetivo é verificar os critérios que permitem o reconhecimento e a repressão de condutas abusivas na recuperação judicial, analisando a regulamentação legal do abuso, seus pressupostos e consequências. A Lei 11.101/2005 não disciplina o abuso de direito, sendo silente sobre o assunto. No entanto, tem-se visto comportamentos abusivos de credores, devedores, sócios e administradores, que violam os limites impostos pela boa-fé, pelos bons costumes e pela finalidade econômica e social da recuperação judicial. Para evitar que esses comportamentos deixem de ser reprimidos em razão de uma lacuna na Lei 11.101/2005, investigou-se a regulamentação do abuso pela legislação brasileira e a possibilidade de aplicação subsidiária dessa regulamentação à recuperação judicial. A investigação é eminentemente analítica, tratando da conceituação da recuperação judicial e do abuso de direito e da análise dos princípios e leis a eles aplicáveis. É, também, empírica, efetuando uma análise de casos. Esta dissertação procura estabelecer parâmetros para a discussão de casos concretos, visando a contribuir para o desenvolvimento da jurisprudência e para a consecução de planos de recuperação judicial justos, equilibrados e que cumpram com as finalidades da Lei 11.101/2005

<p>The VAT Directive (2006/112/EC) does not regulate Member States’ opportunities to intervene against tax evasion. The European Court of Justice has clarified the situation in case C-255/02 Halifax. This case establish that the universal principle against the abuse of rights applies to VAT, which means that Member States have the opportunity to redefine transactions not involving a breach of law but nevertheless goes past what the legislature envisaged at the introduction of the provision.</p><p>A debate has risen as to whether the principle against the abuse of rights is equally ap-plicable in Swedish domestic law on VAT. The administrative court of appeal in Go-thenburg, Case No. 622-05, has ascertained that the principle is not applicable when it derives from the Directive and the provision has not been implemented in Swedish law as it should. Hence there is no basis for applying the principle. The Swedish tax authori-ty has released a statement asserting that the principle applies to Swedish domestic law on VAT. They believe that the principle has its basis in primary legislation and there-fore does not require legal basis in domestic law to be applicable. Most of the Swedish literature agree with the tax authority and establish that the principle should be regarded as applicable in Swedish domestic law.</p><p>The Swedish tax authority is an investigating and taxing authority and they are to follow their own positions and orientations and the principle against the abuse of rights should therefore be regarded as applicable is in Swedish domestic law on VAT.</p><p>The interpretation of legal certainty and predictability should prevail in Swedish tax law. When applying the purpose of the principle against the abuse of rights, there may be a collision between the principle against the abuse of rights and the principle of pre-dictability. The conflict is based on the state´s interest of taxation that the principle</p><p>against the abuse of rights could be considered to intend to protect and a taxpayer's right to certainty in taxation.</p><p>For the taxpayer’s certainty to be fulfilled, she shall with reasonable reliability be able to predict the tax consequences of her actions. This means that the law must be followed due to the principle of legality and future cases should be consistent with previous deci-sions. Predictability is rarely perfect and should be considered more gradually. When a taxpayer has taken an active action to maximize her tax benefits the action should be considered as a choice to give up some of the predictability provided by the taxation system. For that reason it should not be regarded as disproportionate that the principle against the abuse of rights must prevail over the principle of predictability. The ECJ has suggested it to be done like this within European Law, in case C-255/02 Halifax.</p> / <p>Då mervärdesskattedirektivet (2006/112/EG) ej reglerar medlemsstater möjlighet att ingripa mot skatteflykt har Europeiska unionens domstol i Mål C-255/02 Halifax klargjort denna situation. Den allmängiltiga principen mot rättsmissbruk anses vara tillämplig på mervärdesskatteområdet. Detta innebär att medlemsstater har möjlighet att omdefiniera transaktioner som i sig inte innebär ett lagbrott men likväl går förbi vad lagstiftaren åsyftat vid införandet av bestämmelsen.</p><p>Det har uppkommit en diskussion gällande huruvida principen mot rättsmissbruk är tillämplig även inom svensk intern rätt på mervärdesskatteområdet. Kammarrätten Göteborg har i mål nr. 622-05 konstaterat att principen ej är tillämplig då den härstammar från direktiv och att bestämmelsen ej har implementerats i svensk rätt som sig bör. Det finns därför ingen grund för att tillämpa principen. Skatteverket har publicerat ett ställningstagande som hävdar att principen är tillämplig i svensk intern rätt på mervärdesskatteområdet. De anser att principen har sin grund i primärrätten och därför inte kräver lagstöd i intern rätt för att vara tillämpningsbar. Större delen av svensk doktrin anser, likt Skatteverket, att principen ska anses vara tillämpningsbar i svensk intern rätt.</p><p>Då Skatteverket är utredande och beskattande myndighet och de har att följa sina egna ställningstaganden och riktlinjer måste det anses vara konstaterat att principen mot rättsmissbruk är tillämpningsbar i svensk intern rätt på mervärdesskatteområdet. Detta då de baserar sitt ställningstagande på att principen härrör från primär EU-rätt.</p><p>Inom svensk skattelagstillämpning ska rättssäkerhet och förutsebarhet vara rådande. Vid tillämpning av principen mot rättsmissbruk kan det uppkomma en kollision mellan nämnda princip och förutsebarhetsprincipen.  Intressekonflikten grundas i statens beskattningsintresse som principen mot rättsmissbruk bör kunna anses ha som syfte att skydda, och den skatteskyldiges rätt till förutsebarhet inom beskattningen.</p><p>För att den skatteskyldiges förutsebarhet ska anses vara uppfylld ska denne med rimlig säkerhet kunna förutse skattekonsekvenserna av sitt handlande. Detta innebär att lagen måste följas, legalitetsprincipen, och att ny praxis går i linje med tidigare avgöranden.  Förutsebarheten är sällan fullkomlig utan bör betraktas mer gradmässigt. Vid skatteflykt har man gjort ett aktiv handlande att maximera sin skattefördel och bör därför anses ha valt bort en del av den förutsebarhet som systemet erbjuder.  Det bör därför inte anses vara oproportionerligt att man låter principen mot rättsmissbruk får företräde framför förutsebarhetsprincipen, så som man i målet C-255/02 Halifax antytt att det ska ske inom EU-rätten.</p>

The VAT Directive (2006/112/EC) does not regulate Member States’ opportunities to intervene against tax evasion. The European Court of Justice has clarified the situation in case C-255/02 Halifax. This case establish that the universal principle against the abuse of rights applies to VAT, which means that Member States have the opportunity to redefine transactions not involving a breach of law but nevertheless goes past what the legislature envisaged at the introduction of the provision. A debate has risen as to whether the principle against the abuse of rights is equally ap-plicable in Swedish domestic law on VAT. The administrative court of appeal in Go-thenburg, Case No. 622-05, has ascertained that the principle is not applicable when it derives from the Directive and the provision has not been implemented in Swedish law as it should. Hence there is no basis for applying the principle. The Swedish tax authori-ty has released a statement asserting that the principle applies to Swedish domestic law on VAT. They believe that the principle has its basis in primary legislation and there-fore does not require legal basis in domestic law to be applicable. Most of the Swedish literature agree with the tax authority and establish that the principle should be regarded as applicable in Swedish domestic law. The Swedish tax authority is an investigating and taxing authority and they are to follow their own positions and orientations and the principle against the abuse of rights should therefore be regarded as applicable is in Swedish domestic law on VAT. The interpretation of legal certainty and predictability should prevail in Swedish tax law. When applying the purpose of the principle against the abuse of rights, there may be a collision between the principle against the abuse of rights and the principle of pre-dictability. The conflict is based on the state´s interest of taxation that the principle against the abuse of rights could be considered to intend to protect and a taxpayer's right to certainty in taxation. For the taxpayer’s certainty to be fulfilled, she shall with reasonable reliability be able to predict the tax consequences of her actions. This means that the law must be followed due to the principle of legality and future cases should be consistent with previous deci-sions. Predictability is rarely perfect and should be considered more gradually. When a taxpayer has taken an active action to maximize her tax benefits the action should be considered as a choice to give up some of the predictability provided by the taxation system. For that reason it should not be regarded as disproportionate that the principle against the abuse of rights must prevail over the principle of predictability. The ECJ has suggested it to be done like this within European Law, in case C-255/02 Halifax. / Då mervärdesskattedirektivet (2006/112/EG) ej reglerar medlemsstater möjlighet att ingripa mot skatteflykt har Europeiska unionens domstol i Mål C-255/02 Halifax klargjort denna situation. Den allmängiltiga principen mot rättsmissbruk anses vara tillämplig på mervärdesskatteområdet. Detta innebär att medlemsstater har möjlighet att omdefiniera transaktioner som i sig inte innebär ett lagbrott men likväl går förbi vad lagstiftaren åsyftat vid införandet av bestämmelsen. Det har uppkommit en diskussion gällande huruvida principen mot rättsmissbruk är tillämplig även inom svensk intern rätt på mervärdesskatteområdet. Kammarrätten Göteborg har i mål nr. 622-05 konstaterat att principen ej är tillämplig då den härstammar från direktiv och att bestämmelsen ej har implementerats i svensk rätt som sig bör. Det finns därför ingen grund för att tillämpa principen. Skatteverket har publicerat ett ställningstagande som hävdar att principen är tillämplig i svensk intern rätt på mervärdesskatteområdet. De anser att principen har sin grund i primärrätten och därför inte kräver lagstöd i intern rätt för att vara tillämpningsbar. Större delen av svensk doktrin anser, likt Skatteverket, att principen ska anses vara tillämpningsbar i svensk intern rätt. Då Skatteverket är utredande och beskattande myndighet och de har att följa sina egna ställningstaganden och riktlinjer måste det anses vara konstaterat att principen mot rättsmissbruk är tillämpningsbar i svensk intern rätt på mervärdesskatteområdet. Detta då de baserar sitt ställningstagande på att principen härrör från primär EU-rätt. Inom svensk skattelagstillämpning ska rättssäkerhet och förutsebarhet vara rådande. Vid tillämpning av principen mot rättsmissbruk kan det uppkomma en kollision mellan nämnda princip och förutsebarhetsprincipen.  Intressekonflikten grundas i statens beskattningsintresse som principen mot rättsmissbruk bör kunna anses ha som syfte att skydda, och den skatteskyldiges rätt till förutsebarhet inom beskattningen. För att den skatteskyldiges förutsebarhet ska anses vara uppfylld ska denne med rimlig säkerhet kunna förutse skattekonsekvenserna av sitt handlande. Detta innebär att lagen måste följas, legalitetsprincipen, och att ny praxis går i linje med tidigare avgöranden.  Förutsebarheten är sällan fullkomlig utan bör betraktas mer gradmässigt. Vid skatteflykt har man gjort ett aktiv handlande att maximera sin skattefördel och bör därför anses ha valt bort en del av den förutsebarhet som systemet erbjuder.  Det bör därför inte anses vara oproportionerligt att man låter principen mot rättsmissbruk får företräde framför förutsebarhetsprincipen, så som man i målet C-255/02 Halifax antytt att det ska ske inom EU-rätten.

[pt] O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a dupla função do parágrafo único do artigo 473 do Código Civil: (i) garantir que a denúncia seja feita após o cumprimento de um período mínimo do contrato, apto a permitir o seu adimplemento satisfativo e a amortização dos investimentos realizados pelo denunciatário e (ii) garantir que o denunciatário seja notificado com antecedência necessária para tomar providências a fim de se preparar para o término do contrato. Tendo em vista os interesses que o parágrafo único do artigo 473 do Código Civil visa tutelar, pretende-se verificar se o referido dispositivo legal deve acarretar a manutenção compulsória do contrato ou o pagamento de indenização por danos materiais e quais danos devem ser indenizados. Para isso, parte-se da análise da resilição unilateral, prevista no caput do artigo 473 do Código Civil, como direito potestativo, distinguindo-a do distrato, da resolução do contrato e da denúncia. Também serão examinadas as hipóteses em que a lei admite a resilição unilateral e a possibilidade de as partes estabelecerem contratualmente a denúncia unilateral do contrato mediante aviso prévio ou pagamento de multa. Em seguida, se examinará a boa-fé objetiva como critério de aferição da abusividade da denúncia; a função do dever de aviso prévio; a função do prazo estabilizador; e os critérios para fixação de prazo razoável. Por fim, o terceiro capítulo irá tratar das formas de reparação do dano decorrente da resilição unilateral do contrato - quais sejam, a execução específica da obrigação e o pagamento de indenização por danos materiais - e dos danos a serem indenizados. / [en] This dissertation aims to analyze the double function of the sole paragraph of article 473 of the Civil Code: (i) ensure the termination by notice is made after the fulfillment of a minimum period of the contract, allowing its satisfactory performance and the amortization of the investments made by the reported party, and (ii) ensure the reported party is notified early enough to take action in order to prepare for the termination of the contract. In view of the interests that the sole paragraph of article 473 of the Civil Code aims to protect we intend to verify whether the aforementioned legal provision should result in the compulsory maintenance of the contract or the payment of compensation for material damages, and which damages should be compensated. To that end, we initially analyze the unilateral termination, foreseen in the caption of article 473 of the Civil Code, as a potestative right, distinguishing it from dissolution, contract cancellation and termination by notice. Also examined are the hypotheses in which the law allows unilateral termination and the possibility of the parties contractually establishing the termination by claim of the contract upon prior notice or payment of a fine. Then, objective good faith is examined as a criterion for assessing the abusiveness of the termination by notice; the duty of prior notice; the function of the stabilizing period; and the criteria for setting a reasonable period. Finally, the third chapter deals with the remedies for unilateral termination of the contract - namely, the specific performance of the obligation and the payment of compensation for material damages - and the damages to be compensated.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline. / La franchise: une recette magique que chacun aimerait maîtriser pour s'assurer la réussite dans le monde des affaires. Or, le secret de cette recette revient à appliquer un simple postulat: réitérer, par un franchisé, la réussite du concept d'un franchiseur qui a déjà fait ses preuves. Mais, auparavant, il est essentiel que le franchiseur transmette au franchisé les éléments qui lui ont valu cette même réussite, quitte à ce que ce dernier s'engage à les mettre en oeuvre selon les prescriptions de son initiateur et sous son contrôle. Une telle mise en ouvre appelle, cependant, que les deux protagonistes empruntent une avenue basée sur la coopération, la confiance, la loyauté et la bonne foi. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas évidente en pratique en ce que les deux partenaires sont animés par des intérêts divergents, conflictuels et antimoniques. Dès lors, le rapport contractuel né du contrat de franchise se verra empreint par un déséquilibre manifeste entre les prestations réciproques des parties issu de la position économiquement dominante du franchiseur. Ce dernier, sera à même de fixer unilatéralement le contenu contractuel, de sorte à diminuer ses obligations tout en élargissant le champ de ses droits. Surgit alors tout un pan de comportements opportunistes du franchiseur se traduisant, notamment, par des abus au détriment du franchisé qui ne peut qu'acquiescer à la volonté de son partenaire. En effet, l'étude du droit civil révèle que les systèmes civilistes reposent sur une conception libérale du contrat permettant de présumer que les parties sont capables de défendre leurs intérêts. En vertu de la théorie de l'autonomie de la volonté, le contrat est présumé être conforme aux intérêts respectifs des parties. À défaut de tout vice de consentement, le contrat ne peut qu'être équilibré. Cependant, s'il se trouve que le contrat est malgré tout déséquilibré, le droit civil, à moins de circonstances exceptionnelles, n y pourra rien en pareil cas. La lésion ne vicie pas les conventions conclues entre majeurs non protégés, et la théorie de l'imprévision est rejetée par la plupart des systèmes civilistes. L'indifférence du droit civil face à ce déséquilibre se justifie essentiellement par deux impératifs: la liberté contractuelle et la sécurité juridique. Le principe de la force obligatoire du contrat s'impose aux parties autant qu'au juge et, partant, exclut toute tentative du juge de réviser un contrat déséquilibré. Toutefois, devant cette indifférence et cet immobilisme de la loi, le droit a, depuis, énormément évolué dans le sens d'apporter une protection plus accrue à la partie la plus faible au contrat. À ce titre, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une double intervention plus réaliste: l'intervention du juge et celle du législateur (particulièrement dans les contrats d'adhésion). D'abord, le juge manifeste une volonté accrue de corriger des déséquilibres contractuels choquants, notamment en présence de clauses contractuelles manifestement abusives, et ce au regard des exigences d'une justice contractuelle basée sur la bonne foi des parties et l'exigence d'agir raisonnablement. Ensuite, le législateur à travers l'élaboration de droits spéciaux ayant pour finalité la protection de la partie la plus faible, instaure des règles impératives destinées à condamner les éventuels déséquilibres contractuels. Ce souci de protection justifie l'atteinte ainsi portée au principe de la force obligatoire du contrat. Aussi, le postulat de Fouillée se voit inversé par Lacordaire qui souligne pertinemment que « entre le fort et le faible, c'est la liberté qui asservit et la loi qui libère ». En somme, la protection du franchisé appelle au glissement du rapport contractuel d'un rapport conflictuel vers un rapport de coopération et notamment par la reconnaissance du concept de solidarisme contractuel. Néanmoins, une telle démarche n'est pas sans troubler l'ordre normal de l'idée classique du contrat. D'une part, l'introduction d'obligations implicites au contrat renie en quelque sorte l'idée traditionnelle qu'on a des obligations contractuelles basée sur la commune intention des parties, et d'autre part, elle appelle à la reconsidération, par les systèmes civilistes, de la théorie de l'imprévision comme le suggère le droit uniforme et notamment le Guide d'UNIDROIT sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale, mais aussi les Principes relatifS aux contrats du commerce international. / The Franchise: a magic formula that each individual would like to possess to be able to ensure success in the business world. The secret of this formula exists in the shape of a simple postulate: for the franchisee to reiterate success of the franchised concept, which has already proven itself successful. But first, it is essential that the franchisor transmit the essential elements ofthat success to the franchisee, so that the latter may put into practice those prescribed elements as per the created by the initiators concept and control. This kind of transaction requires that both protagonists enter into their dealing in a manner that is based on cooperation, trust, loyalty and goodfaith. Nevertheless, this process is not easy to establish. In deed, both parties may have divergent interests, causing conflicts and antipathies. Thus, the contractual relationship born ofthe franchise concept, will have at its core a manifest imbalance created by the dominant financial status ofthe franchisor. The latter, is in a position to unilaterally stipulate the contractual contents, in such a manner as to diminish his own obligations while enlarging the scope of his rights. From this, a plethora of opportunistic behaviours from the franchisor translating into varied kinds of abuse to the detriment of the franchisee whom has not choice but to acquiesce to the franchisors wishes. In truth, the study of civil law reveals that the civil systems are founded on a liberal conception of the contract, presuming that both parties are capable of defending their interests. By virtue of the theory of autonomy of the will, the contract is presumed to respect each partie 's interests. Without any vice of consent, the contract can only be balanced. However, if the contract proves to be imbalanced, civil law, unless there are no exceptional circumstances, will have no effect, in such a case. Lesion don't vice conventions concluded between unprotected parties, and the imprevision theory is rejected by most civil systems. The indifference of civil law to the contractual imbalance is justified by two imperatives: contractual liberty and judicial security. The principal of the obligatory force of a contract imposes on both parties, as well as to the judge, and, in that way, excludes all attempts by judge to revise the imbalanced contract. Nonetheless, in spite of the laws indifference and opposition to change, the law has since evolved enormously in supplying more protection to the weakest party of a contract. Thus, we are now witness to a double, more realistic intervention: the intervention of the judge and the legislator (particularly in contracts of adhesions). First, the judge manifests a will to correct the more obviously imbalanced aspects of the contract, most notably with regards to the presence of abusive contractual clauses, taking into account the requirements of a contractual justice based on the goodfaith of both parties and the obligation to act in a reasonable manner. Furthermore, the legislator through the use of special rights for the purpose of protecting the weakest party within the contract, implements imperative rules to restore the balance and fairness of the contract. This worry of protection is justified by the undermine as so imposed to the obligatory force of the contract. Also, the postulate of Fouillée is here revoked by Lacordaire which underlines that between the strong and the weak, it is freedom that enslaves and the law that liberates. To summarize, the protection of the franchisee calls for the modification of the contractual obligation from one of conflict to one of cooperation and notably by the recognition of the contractual solidarity concept. Nevertheless, such a measure does not take place without disturbing the classic concept of the contract. On the one hand, the introduction of the implied terms into the contract denies the traditional idea of the contractual obligations based on the common intention of both parties, and also, it calls for the reconsideration, by the civil systems, of the theory of imprevision as is suggested by the uniform law and especially the Guide to international master franchise arrangements, but also the Unidroit Principles of international commercial contracts.

Salariat et liberté d'expression : la contradiction apparaît irréductible. La subordination inhérente à la relation de travail semble en effet exclure l’exercice de cette liberté. Le salarié, parce qu’il demeure citoyen, doit toutefois en jouir de façon effective. Le représentant élu et désigné, parce que le mécanisme de la représentation collective l’exige, doit également le pouvoir. Accorder au salarié une telle liberté peut s’avérer dangereux pour l’autorité de l’employeur ou la survie de l’entreprise. Des notions floues, complexes à circonscrire, telles que l’obligation de confidentialité ou l’abus, peuvent autoriser l’employeur à restreindre l’exercice par le salarié de la liberté d'expression et à le sanctionner. Face au mutisme du législateur et à l’indécision du juge, l’insécurité règne. S’impose alors de dégager une définition plus précise et une articulation plus cohérente des règles légitimant tant l’exercice par le salarié de cette liberté que sa limitation par l’employeur. Bien que périlleuse, cette quête d’équilibre mérite d’être entreprise afin que le caractère nécessaire de cette liberté au monde du travail se révèle. Salariat et liberté d'expression : la contradiction n’apparaîtra qu’apparente. / The employee status and freedom of expression : the contradiction appears to be irreducible. The subordination, which is inherent to the employment relationship, seems indeed to exclude the exercice of such freedom. The employee, because he remains a citizen, must however enjoy it in an effective way. The elected and designated representative, because the collective representation mecanism commands it, must enjoy it as well. Granting the employee with such freedom may prove dangerous for the authority of the employer and the survival of the company. Vague notions, that are hard to define, such as the duty of confidentiality or the abuse of right, authorize the employer to restrict the exercice of this freedom by his employee and to sanction him. Given the legislative mutism and the judge's indecision, insecurity is prevailing. It therefore becomes essential to draw a more precise definition and a more coherent articulation of the rules legitimating the exercise of this freedom by the employee, as well as its limitation by the employer. Althought it is jeopardous, this search for balance deserves to be attempted, so that it is revealed that such freedom is essential to the world of work. The employee status and freedom of expression : the contradiction will eventually reveal to be only apparent.