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Brokered bargaining: nuclear crises between middle powersYusuf, Moeed Wasim 22 January 2016 (has links)
This dissertation studies nuclear crisis behavior. Specifically, it theorizes behavior between middle powers with nuclear weapons that are nested within a world with larger hegemonic states. The situation represents a paradigm shift from the bipolar context of the Cold War where all nuclear crises involved one or both superpowers, thereby implying an absence of stronger third parties that could fundamentally alter their crisis behavior.
We have focused on the India-Pakistan rivalry, and specifically on their three nuclear crises since South Asia's overt nuclearization: the 1999 Kargil crisis; the 2001-02 standoff; and the 2008 Mumbai crisis. These three case studies form the universe of crises between two middle power nuclear states with stronger third parties present to influence their behavior. Using the structured focused comparison method and relying on existing empirical analyses of these crises, interviews with relevant officials and experts, and newspaper archival research, we have process-traced the key developments in each crisis to identify the processes and mechanisms underpinning behavior.
The dissertation argues that middle power nuclear crises ought to be seen as trilateral engagements that accord a key crisis management role to stronger third parties. Crisis behavior can be best understood through "brokered bargaining" - defined as a three-cornered bargaining exercise between the two principal antagonists and a third party which is primarily seeking crisis de-escalation. Brokered bargaining theory predicts that this three-cornered engagement will play out in the expected manner each time a middle power nuclear crisis occurs as long as the outside actors do not intervene as competitor third parties. We reject theories that posit the dynamics of bilateral nuclear deterrence as the principal drivers of de-escalation, and equally, analyses that see third parties as standalone explanations for peaceful outcomes. We contend that it is the process of trilateral interaction encompassed by the brokered bargaining model and marked by a recursive interplay of perceptions, expectations, incentives, and strategies of the three actors that shapes crisis behavior, and in turn, trajectories and outcomes. The research is generalizable to potential nuclear rivalries in the Middle East and remains relevant to the Sino-Indian dyad and rivalries on the Korean peninsula. / 2019-05-31
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Explaining State Crisis Behavior Using the Operational CodeGeorge, William 01 January 2014 (has links)
Does the operational code of a state's leadership have an effect on its behavior during foreign policy crises? Specifically, do states with more conflictual operational codes opt for a more conflictual response to crises, or do systemic and structural variables intervene to limit their significance? While the study of individual level psychology in international relations has been gaining momentum, the causal links between beliefs and behavior have yet to be solidified. This study used ordered logistic regression across three models to determine the effect of the operational code on state crisis behavior while controlling for key domestic and crisis dimension variables. Predicted probabilities were also used to better demonstrate the variables' substantive effects. The 50 cases used in this research are drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Dataset composed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld, and they focus on the United States as the major crisis actor. Operational code data were derived from computer-based content analysis using the Verbs In Context System (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). The theoretical goal of this paper was to explain variance in state crisis behavior through variations in the operational codes of US Presidents. The results demonstrate that the operational codes of leaders do affect state crisis behavior. Specifically, the operational code indices P1 and I1 show that a leader with a more conflictual view of the nature of the political universe and a conflictual direction of strategy is more likely to employ escalatory crisis behavior.
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