Cyprus, a small island in the eastern Mediterranean which, since the beginning of recorded history, had always been dominated by a foreign power, obtained its independence in August, 1960. At that time it ceased to be a part of the British Empire and became a member of the Commonwealth. Great Britain, the last power to control the island, obtained it in 1878, as a base from which to check Russian expansion into the Near East. From 1878 until 1914 the island was held on a temporary basis from Turkey. After that date, when the two powers became involved as enemies at war, Britain annexed the island. In 1925, Cyprus became a Crown Colony. During the period of British administration many changes in all aspects of Cypriot life occurred. Economic and social progress until after the Second War was slow but continuous. The greatest changes were to be found in the areas of public works and communications, water development, agriculture and the elimination of rural indebtedness, forestry, trade and commerce, education, health, and government administration and finance. From 1946 until 1959, Cyprus, like other British colonies, benefited from the Colonial Development Programmes and other plans, during which time large sums of money were expended to accelerate the island's economic and social advancement. By 1959 the standards of economic and social life, in Cyprus were comparable to, if not better than, any in that area of the world. A most important force which operated throughout the whole period was Enosis, the desire of the Greek Cypriots to join with Greece. Requests and manifestations for Enosis occurred continually during the British administration. The leaders were the ecclesiasts of the Orthodox Church who assumed social and political, as well as religious authority and leadership. The first violent manifestation against British rule occurred in 1931. No further outbreaks occurred until 1956, from which time violence continued incessantly until the final truce. During the last four years of the period the organization known as EOKA, organized and directed by Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas, conducted a campaign of resistance and terrorism against all aspects of British rule, in an attempt to obtain Enosis. The result was four years of communal strife and civil chaos. The Turkish inhabitants, who formed almost twenty-percent of the island's population, opposed every attempt on the part of the Greeks to achieve Enosis. The Turkish Cypriot policy hardened into one of adamant resistance, stating that Britain must either maintain the status quo or return the island to Turkey. Cyprus was governed under a Constitution promulgated in 1882, which was withdrawn in 1931 due to the outbreak of violence, and then replaced by the autocratic rule of the Governor and his Council. The Constitution was resented by many because of its very limited nature. The lack of any real political, responsibility for the Cypriots was another reason for their dissatisfaction with the British regime. From 1946 until 1959 constitutional offers and counter offers were put forth by the British and the Cypriots in an attempt to arrive at a solution. None of these offers was able to provide a compromise solution which would be satisfactory to the British, Cypriots, Greeks, and Turks, The British emphasized the strategic necessity of maintaining Cyprus; the Greeks and Greek Cypriots the desire for self-determination, as expressed constantly through the United Nations; and the Turks the necessity either to maintain the status quo, or to partition the island. It seems evident that only the prospect of continued violence and stalemate led all the powers concerned to come together at the end of 1958 and the beginning of 1959 and work out a compromise solution which became the basis of the Constitution. In viewing the many conflicting factors involved, It seems that the only possible type of agreement was one based on compromise. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

It is the purpose of this study to propose that perceptions of peacebuilding activities in all tracks of divided societies (political, civil society leaders, and grassroots), and the perceptions of the collaboration between the tracks are essential processes to a sustainable peace agreement at the political level. This study will examine multi-track peacebuilding and the collaboration (or lack of it) between tracks in Cyprus. Additionally, it will analyze the perceptions of the necessity of collaboration across tracks. The analysis of this study is conducted in two phases: (1) analyzing interviews with Track One diplomats and examining previous and existing peacebuilding processes within Cyprus through observation, interviews, and analysis of existing studies; and (2) through student observations and interviews of the Cypriot populace on the perceptions of the conflict and peacebuilding collaborations among and across tracks. The results of this research indicate that there is a need for stronger connections between the political and societal level peacebuilding strategies in Cyprus for a sustainable peace agreement. Furthermore, the findings of this research suggest that multi-track collaboration should be added to Conflict Transformation Theory.

In 1878, Britain occupied Cyprus to protect imperial interests in the Near East and India, interests, both strategic and economic, that Russian expansion threatened and Ottoman weakness undermined. By 1912, Cyprus had become a pawn. The island had not been converted into the strategic, economic or political base to protect and extend British interests in the Near East. The policy of 1878 had failed because it was perceived rather than actual benefits that underlay the imposition of British rule. / The primary aim of this study is to present Cyprus as a failed case of imperialism. Historians have traditionally claimed that Cyprus was a strategic asset within the British imperial structure throughout British rule (1878-1960). That notion is challenged for the first phase of British rule – from the occupation of Cyprus in 1878 to when it was annexed in 1914 and then offered to Greece in October 1915. The approach is to situate the island within the British imperial imagination, which will help to understand why the island was occupied, and then to situate it within the British imperial structure after it was occupied to determine its place, value and viability. Understanding British politics and imperial policy is vital when trying to grasp the complexities of the imperial imagination(s) and the role of Cyprus within the imperial structure. This dissertation will show that perceptions generate reality and inform policy and that often these perceptions are imagined and exaggerated and thus, not based on evidence or reality. / This study will show that the British perceived Cyprus within two competing imaginaries that were at the heart of an imagined European spiritual identity: the Christian/Crusader/Holy Land tradition and that of Ancient Greece. The first tradition helps to explain why Cyprus was occupied; understanding the second provides one of the main reasons why the British failed in their imperial venture in Cyprus. Many British Conservative politicians and those that knew the Near East, through their imagined view of the Holy Land and their travels, diplomatic and military careers, situated Cyprus within the first tradition. They considered it strategically vital to the Levant and beyond to Armenia and Mesopotamia. Liberal leaders perceived Cyprus to be apart of Europe and, more significantly, within the unitary ideal of Modern Greece that the British had fashioned in continuum of the unitary ideal of Ancient Greece. Although the identity of the Cypriots was complex, the British imposed – unwittingly – modernity on the Cypriots. / Ultimately, it was the latter imagination that became dominant and with the failure of Cyprus to have a place within imperial strategy, it became a pawn to be parted to Greece with.

In 1878, Britain occupied Cyprus to protect imperial interests in the Near East and India, interests, both strategic and economic, that Russian expansion threatened and Ottoman weakness undermined. By 1912, Cyprus had become a pawn. The island had not been converted into the strategic, economic or political base to protect and extend British interests in the Near East. The policy of 1878 had failed because it was perceived rather than actual benefits that underlay the imposition of British rule. / The primary aim of this study is to present Cyprus as a failed case of imperialism. Historians have traditionally claimed that Cyprus was a strategic asset within the British imperial structure throughout British rule (1878-1960). That notion is challenged for the first phase of British rule – from the occupation of Cyprus in 1878 to when it was annexed in 1914 and then offered to Greece in October 1915. The approach is to situate the island within the British imperial imagination, which will help to understand why the island was occupied, and then to situate it within the British imperial structure after it was occupied to determine its place, value and viability. Understanding British politics and imperial policy is vital when trying to grasp the complexities of the imperial imagination(s) and the role of Cyprus within the imperial structure. This dissertation will show that perceptions generate reality and inform policy and that often these perceptions are imagined and exaggerated and thus, not based on evidence or reality. / This study will show that the British perceived Cyprus within two competing imaginaries that were at the heart of an imagined European spiritual identity: the Christian/Crusader/Holy Land tradition and that of Ancient Greece. The first tradition helps to explain why Cyprus was occupied; understanding the second provides one of the main reasons why the British failed in their imperial venture in Cyprus. Many British Conservative politicians and those that knew the Near East, through their imagined view of the Holy Land and their travels, diplomatic and military careers, situated Cyprus within the first tradition. They considered it strategically vital to the Levant and beyond to Armenia and Mesopotamia. Liberal leaders perceived Cyprus to be apart of Europe and, more significantly, within the unitary ideal of Modern Greece that the British had fashioned in continuum of the unitary ideal of Ancient Greece. Although the identity of the Cypriots was complex, the British imposed – unwittingly – modernity on the Cypriots. / Ultimately, it was the latter imagination that became dominant and with the failure of Cyprus to have a place within imperial strategy, it became a pawn to be parted to Greece with.

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished