This thesis explores whether independent directors in the USA and Canada are effective in holding management accountable by: (1) analyzing how the policy of relying on independent directors developed and operates; (2) introducing the main theoretical critiques of independent directors’ monitoring effect; and (3) examining whether empirical studies in the field of management science and financial economics support the policy in both countries of relying on independent directors as corporate monitors. Empirical evidence shows that boards with a majority of independent directors, in some circumstances, were associated with better firm performance (in the post-SOX period) and fulfilled certain board tasks effectively in the United States. Canadian studies, however, have not shown a positive association with improved firm performance. Audit committees composed entirely of independent directors have been effective in ensuring the quality of financial reporting in the United States, but this effect has not been found in Canada. Compensation committees composed fully of independent directors neither constrained the level of executive compensation nor tied CEO pay to firm performance in either country. US firms with an audit committee member who had accounting expertise, rather than financial analysis or supervisory expertise, were associated with a higher quality of financial reporting, while Canadian firms with an audit committee member who has financial expertise, instead of financial literacy, were associated with a similar effect. Studies also showed that independent directors perform better in certain circumstances. Based on empirical evidence, US regulators should consider: (1) changing the current mandatory requirements for an independent board and a completely independent compensation committee to a comply-or-explain requirement; (2) narrowing the qualification of a financial expert to an individual who has accounting expertise; and (3) recruiting independent directors who have two or fewer outside directorships, hold more of the corporation’s shares, have lower cost of acquiring corporate information, and have no social connections with the CEO. In Canada, weak evidence of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors supports the existing comply-or-explain approach. Canadian regulators may only need to require or recommend that at least one audit committee member has financial expertise, instead of only financial literacy.

This thesis explores whether independent directors in the USA and Canada are effective in holding management accountable by: (1) analyzing how the policy of relying on independent directors developed and operates; (2) introducing the main theoretical critiques of independent directors’ monitoring effect; and (3) examining whether empirical studies in the field of management science and financial economics support the policy in both countries of relying on independent directors as corporate monitors. Empirical evidence shows that boards with a majority of independent directors, in some circumstances, were associated with better firm performance (in the post-SOX period) and fulfilled certain board tasks effectively in the United States. Canadian studies, however, have not shown a positive association with improved firm performance. Audit committees composed entirely of independent directors have been effective in ensuring the quality of financial reporting in the United States, but this effect has not been found in Canada. Compensation committees composed fully of independent directors neither constrained the level of executive compensation nor tied CEO pay to firm performance in either country. US firms with an audit committee member who had accounting expertise, rather than financial analysis or supervisory expertise, were associated with a higher quality of financial reporting, while Canadian firms with an audit committee member who has financial expertise, instead of financial literacy, were associated with a similar effect. Studies also showed that independent directors perform better in certain circumstances. Based on empirical evidence, US regulators should consider: (1) changing the current mandatory requirements for an independent board and a completely independent compensation committee to a comply-or-explain requirement; (2) narrowing the qualification of a financial expert to an individual who has accounting expertise; and (3) recruiting independent directors who have two or fewer outside directorships, hold more of the corporation’s shares, have lower cost of acquiring corporate information, and have no social connections with the CEO. In Canada, weak evidence of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors supports the existing comply-or-explain approach. Canadian regulators may only need to require or recommend that at least one audit committee member has financial expertise, instead of only financial literacy.

The purpose of this investigation is to review the first four years of municipal government operation under the Administrator-Director form of government in Fort Smith, Arkansas. The basis of this investigation is the reconstruction and review of the political forces and circumstances operating in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and their impact on the Administrator-Director form of government. In addition to the above, an examination of the progress made by the current Administrator-Director form of government will be undertaken.

One of the most common questions of any artist is “Where did that idea come from?”— often closely followed by “What does it mean?” Like many of my films, Into the South started as a small inspiration but gradually attracted other ideas to it, changing and morphing and growing like a great snowball rolled down a hill, picking up sticks and dirt and grass along the way. This report is a reflection of my preparations and experiences making the 35mm short film Into the South. It is weighted more heavily toward development and pre-production, with a few memorable moments and musings interspersed, mostly for my own benefit. But I will do my best to explain to the University where this idea came from, and what does it mean. / text

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Termination of office of the member in a governing body of a limited company (Vacation of Company's Directors) This paper examines the process of resignation of members of the organs of a company. It considers both protection of the member and the company. In the first part it analyzes several issues concerning the interpretation of section 66 of the Commercial Code on the basis of judicial decisions. It focuses on the following issues: the purpose of statutory provisions; ways to notify the resignation; on which day the resignation should have been discussed; who is obliged to summon the meeting and what consequences follow the breach of this duty. The Supreme Court has ruled that the protection of a company and its director is equally important. Resignation can be notified either at the meeting or delivered to the company. The director is obliged to do whatever may be reasonably required of him to ensure the organ concerned is given a real opportunity to discuss the resignation. If the director does not fulfill their duties and the resignation is not discussed, their tenure will not end. The end of the tenure cannot always be conditioned by convening the general meeting or placing the discussion of the resignation on the agenda. If a director cannot be rightfully required to summon the general meeting,...

The following thesis describes the development and process of the responsibilities and skills necessary for a director of photography in the motion picture industry. Pre-production and production aspects pertaining to experiences as a cinematographer are covered. Furthermore, the progression of learning about the field of cinematography is explained through personal examples of logistical, technical, and artistic requirements on both short and feature student films. Storyboards are included in the appendices.