Volumes 2 and 3 comprise a catalogue of about 2,500 early Byzantine brickstamps from Istanbul. Volume 3 contains the illustrative material, derived primarily from the notes of Ernest Mamboury, other archives, museums, scholars and numerous publications. Volume 2 provides transcriptions of the inscriptions and details of bricks and stamps. The brickstamps in both volumes are arranged alphabetically according to the names upon the stamps. Indexes are provided to locate brickstamps according to place of publication, provenance, museum or archive. Volume 1 analyses selected material in the catalogue. Part I discusses the brickmaking industry, the purpose of the brickstamps, the management of production and supply, and the beginning and end of brickstamping in Constantinople. Part II discusses the chronology of brickstamps. Part II, Sections 1-3 discuss the dating of selected fifth-century, sixth-century and undated sites on the grounds of external evidence (i. e. literary and archaeological evidence, but not brickstamp evidence). Section 4 examines the brickstamp evidence from the sites discussed in Sections 1-3 and demonstrates the characteristics distinguishing brickstamps of the fifth and sixth centuries. The names that are to be associated with the respective centuries are tabulated. More precise dates are assigned to stamps where literary evidence allows. Section 5 applies the results deduced in Section 4 to a number of sites that have yielded samples presenting greater difficulties of interpretation. It is argued that the brickstamps carry the names of wealthy owners or lessees of land, and that they were used to prove to officials that the annual liability of brick production associated with the land had been met. Primary chronological results include the redating of St. Polyeuktos and the Palace of Antiochus and the clarification of dates of other minor monuments, such as the Balaban. Ağa Mescidi and the substructures on Cemal Nadir Sokaği.

Surveying an extensive range of British travel texts, the thesis explores the manner in which the Balkans have been viewed as a significant `other' of British civilisation over the last one hundred and fifty years, particularly from 1989 to 2001, between the demise of the communist adversary and the rise of `global terrorism'. The thesis pursues three major objectives, all of which advance upon previous studies of cross-cultural representation and travel writing. Firstly, I argue that despite its heterogeneous nature, balkanist discourse has passed through three distinct paradigms. These are denigration before 1914, romanticisation in the inter-war years, and, after an ambivalent mixture of sympathy and disappointment during the Cold War, a return to denigration in the 1990s. Secondly, I contend that such paradigms are dependent not on conditions within the Balkans, but on the forms and transformations of the travellers' own cultural background. Most importantly, I explore the links between the three paradigms and the cultural moments of imperialism, modernity and poshnodernity. I examine, for example, how pre-1914 denigration reveals close similarities to colonial discourse, how inter-war romanticism reflects the modernist quest for exoticism and psychological escape, and how the reappearance of denigration coincides with the advent of postmodern scepticism. As a central component of such study, I explore how the changing identity positions of British travellers since 1850, shifting from the imperial subjects of the Victorian age to today's postromantic generation, have impacted on balkanist representation. The third major objective is to analyse how these constructions have served economic and political power. Making use of that Foucauldian strand of poststructuralism common in postcolonial studies of cultural discourse, I examine the way in which British support for Ottoman hegemony in the Balkans in the nineteenth century, which denigratory representation helped to vindicate, found its equivalents in the shifting patterns of western influence and conquest that the Balkans have been subject to in the twentieth century.

The thesis analyses the Croatian city of Vukovar as a way of animating theoretical debates about the relationship between security, emancipation and practice. It claims that emancipation must be understood through experiences of security and insecurity as they are lived. Located in security studies, it begins with a critical reading of the Welsh School. Ken Booth's original move to associate security with emancipation opened up new possibilities for reimagining the field and for practicing security, but subsequent developments orientated the security as emancipation move towards closure. A genuinely open way of exploring this move is the context of Andrew Linklater's adaptation of Habermasian discourse ethics. In this way an engagement between Booth and Linklater is opened which runs throughout the thesis. The second part introduces Vukovar. It details the violence of late-1991 seen in the city, and outlines how the emergence of Croatian democracy represents a form of settlement. Yet patterns of memorialisation and reconstruction in Vukovar entrench a pro-Croat narrative of settlement at the expense of non-Croats who are unjustly excluded. Furthermore, interviews with leaders of local civil society, religious and political groups suggest that difference and contestation, rather than settlement, characterise the post-war period in Vukovar. The third part presents an analysis of the emancipatory practices which take place within the local context of contestation. Interviews with NGOs in Vukovar support Booth's emphasis on civil society groups as agents of emancipation. Subsequent interviews challenge his view in important ways as the human limits of emancipatory practices are revealed. However, even when such limitations are taken into account, certain civil society practices show how Booth and Linklater's respective understandings of emancipatory practice are played out in what are termed microdialogic communities. These alternative dialogues open new spaces and allow dominant understandings of the war to be challenged.

This thesis examines the extent to which and the conditions under which Turkish foreign policy is Europeanised. In doing so, it analyses the formal, behavioural and discursive dimensions of Europeanisation in Turkish foreign policy since 1987 to assess the extent to which the European Union (EU) foreign policy principles and norms are institutionalised. The empirical puzzle is derived from the focus of the literature on the Europeanisation of non-members that has concentrated on Central and European Countries (CEECs) before their accession to the EU. Foreign policy is a policy area that remains under-examined within the context of non-member state Europeanisation. This thesis addresses this gap, focusing on the case of Turkey. At the theoretical level, it applies the insights of rational choice and constructivist approaches that inspire two broad models, the External Incentives Model (ElM) and the Social Learning Model (SLM), to the study of 'foreign policy change'. The thesis examines normative and substantive areas of foreign policy and distinguishes a formal, behavioural and discursive dimension of Europeanisation. In the normative area, it analyses the formal dimension of Europeanisation over Turkey's adherence to good neighbourly relations and the behavioural dimension of Turkey's peace-making initiatives through mediation and Official Development Assistance (ODA). In the substantive area, it analyses the formal dimension of Turkey's alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the behavioural dimension of the geographical direction of high profile official visits. Finally, the discursive dimension of foreign policy statements is analysed with reference to both the normative and the substantive areas. The empirical analysis of the five areas shows that EU rules were initially not institutionalised in Turkish foreign policy. The analysis reveals that Europeanisation in all five areas started in 1987; rather than in 1999 as is commonly believed. Yet Europeanisation before 1999 came in the form of policy adjustment, while the transformation of foreign policy only occurred after 1999 in the substantive areas and after 2002 in the normative areas. Moreover, the thesis finds that in four areas covered, with the notable exception of the behavioural dimension of Europeanisation covered by peace-making initiatives, policy retrenchment occurred after 2005. Furthermore, the thesis argues that different degrees and directions of Europeanisation are better captured by the ElM than the SLM. In particular, the analysis reveals that the Europeanisation of foreign policy in Turkey is triggered by domestic factors. Among them, the degree of compatibility of the position of the governing parties with EU foreign policy principles and norms and the degree of domestic capacity best explain different degrees and directions of Europeanisation. Before 1999, and particularly before 2002, domestic capacity was low and did not allow a transformation type of Europeanisation to occur even at times when the governing parties pursued a strong pro-EU orientation.

This thesis is a case-study of Slobodan Milosevic as a prototype of the "criminal" leader. Challenging the existing consensus among Western liberals, for whom Milosevic is unquestionably criminal, it asks whether and to what extent Milosevic is a criminal leader. It approaches this by first dissecting the Western construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader into its key components -- his actions and intentions, his motivations, his personality and psychology, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders. This normative-driven construction is then empirically tested, using two main sources. The speeches of Milosevic, fundamentally misrepresented by many Western commentators, are analyzed. The second primary source used is semi-structured interviews (supported by public opinion poll data). Strongly influenced by bottom-up studies of the Hitler and Stalin regimes, two leaders that can be seen as crucial cases of the criminal leader, this research is particularly concerned with exploring how ordinary people in Serbia - heavily neglected in the existing Western literature - view Milosevic. This allows us to ascertain whether and to what extent the Western, liberal construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader has domestic/field validity. What the interview data reveals is a sharp discrepancy between the external (Western) and domestic (Serbian) viewpoints. The Serbian interviewees overwhelmingly view Milosevic not as a criminal leader, but as a "bad" (unsuccessful) leader and/or as a victim. This discrepancy is translated into, and used to develop, a general concept of the criminal leader. This conceptualization emphasizes both the externally constructed nature of the criminal leader (policy dimension) and the importance of studying the criminal leader from below (domestic dimension).

The end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the choice for a market economy and democracy by these societies was the beginning of a vast process of change that affected all aspects of social life. In spite of the simultaneity of these changes, and the general realisation that integrative approaches are needed to do justice to this complexity, most scholarly analyses remain confined within existing disciplinary boundaries such as Economics and Politics. In this thesis, reflexive theories in Economics, Politics and International Political Economy are used to derive a set of working hypotheses about the relationships between the economic and political spheres, domestic and international. These hypotheses are then used to illuminate the empirical case of marketisation in Romania. The dominant neo-Iiberal explanations about the meaning and direction of postcommunist changes created a hierarchy of performance (i.e. conformity with the neoliberal ideals) between the countries of CEE. In this reading, Romania was a laggard in 'transition' and this was attributed to the incomplete democratisation of the political system and the neo-comrnunist and nationalistic ideology of the 1990-6 governments. The analysis proposed in this thesis challenges this simplistic explanation and the content and pace of economic reforms in Romania are linked to four factors. These are the fragile political consensus around reform; the structural power of industrial interests and their ability to co-opt factions of the political elite; the weak institutional basis; and the cultural gap between the expectations of the public and the requirements of a market economy.

This thesis examines the implementation of ownership reforms following the collapse of Communist rule in Romania in 1989. It concentrates upon the rural sector and, in particular, the question of what to do with the collective farms. The aim has been to provide a critical account of the roots of the post-Communist land question, going back as far as the agrarian situation in the last century. To this end, regard is had to the land question in the pre-Communist era, concentrating on the efforts made by the state to create a sustainable system of land tenure. The second part of the work investigates how the Communist regime reformed land use and agricultural production, in particular, the methods by which the private control of land was transformed during collectivisation. In this way, the recent land reforms are linked to a much longer history of struggle over land. The objective has been to examine the legal process of implementing post-Communist land reforms as a means whereby history is rewritten, both nationally and locally. The land reforms are, partly, the official recognition of abuses committed by the former regime and yet, they are also a means of restructuring the country's agricultural sector. As in other countries in eastern Europe, Communist rule in Romania transformed a predominantly agrarian society into an industrial one. Before the Communists almost three-quarters of the population lived and worked on the land. By the time President Nicolae Ceausescu fell, the proportion was less than a third. The land question in post-Communist Romania centred on the extent to which the need to compensate former landowners could direct the content of reform.

This research project explores Romania’s process of detachment from Moscow from 1953 to 1963 within the context of the global Cold War. Through a multi-archival investigation, the dissertation investigates the first full process of peaceful de-satellization within the Eastern bloc by considering the broader framework of the bipolar international climate. In so doing, it provides both a bottom-up, as well as a top-down analysis. This project focuses, in particular, on the tenure of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1947-65), Romania’s first Communist leader, as it was under his leadership that the country shifted from complete subservience to the Soviet Union to political and economic autonomy. In 1958, Romania negotiated a full troop withdrawal, remaining the only Warsaw Pact country without Soviet military presence until the fall of the Berlin Wall. And by 1963, it also dared to challenge Moscow’s plans for economic specialization within COMECON, thereby asserting its sovereign right to pursue national interest over the greater socialist good, and thus stymying the Kremlin’s initiative for an integrated bloc economy. This project provides an in-depth investigation into the reasons why Romania was able to boldly confront the Soviet Union without fear of retribution, by tracing the process through which Dej gradually removed Romania’s political straightjacket, and exploring those elements within the international climate which allowed him to negotiate Romania’s detachment.

The growth of a nation-state in the 19th century led to the protection of heritage as a distinct discipline. Initially, the prime objective was physical protection and conservation of archaeological and architectural monuments valued for their aesthetic and historic importance. However, the 20th century practice of imposing nationalist ideas onto communities and cultures which share the same territory, but not religion and/or language, brought into prominence a discipline of heritage management. One of the main characteristics of heritage management is its interpretation in national terms which, when used for nation-building purposes, often becomes the subject of contested grand narratives; i.e. ethnically, religiously and socially divisive tool in the hands of political elites interested in securing and maintaining their powers. Historical changes of political systems and state ideologies, however, witnessed the lasting impact on the interpretation of heritage over la longue durée, almost always with negative outcomes. The Wars of Yugoslav Succession during the 1990s resulted not only in the creation of new nation-states, but also their own new national narratives and languages, often rooted in flagrant revisionism of the interpretation of historical sources and surviving heritage. This thesis examines the evolution of national narratives in five ex- Yugoslav republics and Albania from the time of their individual inception until the present. It employs chronologically juxtaposed nation-building processes in the observed states and points to the differences in interpretation which usually coincided with changes of political systems. It also highlights the contemporary interpretations of the heritage as understood by both local and international researchers and publicists, affected by the surrounding political atmosphere. It explores the destruction, vandalism, and “culturcide” and their condemnations and justifications by the media and biased scholarship. The thesis also points to the negative influence of the external political factors in heritage management through the extensive production of poorly and/or partially researched publications. Finally, it concludes that the (re)interpretation of heritage is a recurring process, which will be employed every time when the balance of power in Europe changes and almost always with detrimental consequences for the local population.

In this thesis the rationales of corporate risk management, as well as the implementation of different risk management strategies and the use of risk management instruments in Croatian and Slovenian companies have been investigated. Based on arguments arising from the review of the literature, we have proposed several hypotheses. We have tested whether the decision to hedge or not, and the decision to hedge with derivatives made by Croatian and Slovenian non-financial companies, is a function of six factors – financial distress costs, agency costs, capital market imperfections and costly external financing, taxes, managerial utility maximisation and hedge substitutes. We have also tested the assumption that corporate risk management is more developed or has different rationales among Slovenian than among Croatian companies. On the basis of our research results, it could be concluded that the explored hedging rationales have little predictive power in explaining corporate risk management decisions both in Croatian and Slovenian companies. The evidence based on univariate and multivariate empirical relations between the decision to hedge or use derivatives in Croatian companies and the predicted theories of hedging fails to provide support for any of the tested hypotheses but one - capital market imperfections and costly external financing. The univariate analysis and multivariate regression conducted for Slovenian companies have revealed that there is no statistically significant explanatory variable for the decision to hedge; therefore we can conclude it is not dependent on any of the predicted theories of hedging. The decision to use derivatives, however, has been shown as dependent on the size of the company. The multivariate test has proven a positive relation between the use of derivatives and the size of Slovenian companies, which supports the informational and transactional scale economies argument that larger firms will be more likely to use derivatives. The analysis conducted to explore differences between risk management practices in Slovenian and Croatian companies has shown statistically significant evidence that Slovenian companies use all types of derivatives, especially structured derivatives, more intensively than Croatian companies. Additionally, Croatian companies use simple risk management instruments like natural hedging to a greater extent in comparison with Slovenian companies. These findings are consistent with our research prediction that Slovenian companies have more advanced risk management practices than Croatian companies.