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I use a brand of social contract theory derived from David Gauthier to delimit precisely what might be permissible in the methods of conception and gestation of a child. More specifically, Gauthier posits a rule that is supposed to govern behavior among individuals prior to but in anticipation of the rise of social interaction. I argue that this rule can be appropriately applied to the interactions between a parent and her unborn child. I review other social contract models in an effort to show that Gauthier's is preferable to these. I also address other accounts concerned with parental obligations to the unborn, to see how these fare against Gauthier's. I conclude that, because of its breadth of applicability, as well as its plausibility, Gauthier's model is a powerful force for guiding us through these issues.

Walden (1854), by the American author Henry David Thoreau (1817--1862), is explored as a work of literature with significant implications for environmental ethics in contemporary architectural practice. This reading challenges ethical models which depend for their legitimacy on determining a static representation of the world around us. Thoreau's literary discussion of the construction of his shelter and the subsequent revealing of a view of nature is offered as a more complete approach to finding a significant discourse concerning the relationship between humanity and the earth. The relevance of the poetic imagination is asserted through exploring the many aspects of the metaphors of verticality and flight in Walden . Thoreau's effort is extended into a brief discussion of Australian architect Glenn Murcutt (born 1936) and a consideration of the natural world in light of the phenomenon of a gift.

This work, the Nature and Value of Scepticism, shows that the metaphilosopby arising from what David Hume calls "true scepticism," is of use and value, refuting three standard objections to sceptical philosophy: the charges of unlivability, of idleness and of being dangerous and destructive. / The unlivability charge is refuted with an examination of the work of a self-proclaimed extreme sceptic, Sextus Empiricus. The idleness charge is answered by questioning its assumption that if scepticism does not lead to an extreme conclusion, it must be idle and without philosophical interest. The destructive charge, that the acceptance of scepticism would result in the death of rationality, is countered in reviewing the work of Hume and Ludwig Wittgenstein, showing that their outlook is not against philosophy but only a particular type of philosophy, namely dogmatic philosophy. / Chapter 1 argues that two reasonable interpretations of Sextus's writings yield a scepticism that is livable and philosophically important. Chapter 2 shows Hume's philosophy is livable and not destructive. Chapter 3 examines the connection between Hume's philosophy and his sceptical approach, arguing that his true scepticism informs his philosophical outlook. Chapter 4 argues that Wittgenstein shares much with Hume's "true scepticism," and that his work is not anti-philosophical as widely supposed. Chapter 5 provides examples of how a sceptically informed metaphilosophy can help address questions in epistemology and metaethics.

Lawrence's revision of the fiction of his English comtemporary E. M. Forster is a key to the way in which Lawrence's imagination worked. He discovered in early 1915 that Forster was already producing a body of fiction which treated many of his own themes in a manner which resembled the visionary and prophetic mode he wished to create. This study demonstrates that Lawrence's motivation and method in the writing of many scenes in The Rainbow, Women in Love, The Lost Girl, Aaron's Rod, and St. Mawr are governed by his compulsive misreading of scenes, symbols, characters, settings, plots and motifs in Forster's fiction. It is evident that Lawrence needed to establish dominance over Forster in this manner in order to keep alive what he called his "passional inspiration."

This thesis is an examination of sex in D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover and Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness as it relates to the social, linguistic and political elements of literary modernism. Both novels "think sex," allowing specific concepts of sex to act as methods of communication between artists and readers. By writing sex, Hall and Lawrence address the modern reader, providing a script for ideal readerly and writerly approaches to the novel. The first chapter examines contemporary cultural and gender theory's understanding of the relationship between sex and discourse and relates this to political and literary considerations of modernism. The second chapter looks at psychosexual medical texts that influenced modernism's understanding of sex and art; the final chapter examines "thinking sex" in Lady Chatterley's Lover and The Well of Loneliness by examining the content and reception of both works.

This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc. / Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."

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