This study examines the coherency of David Miller’s immigration argument in favour of a state regulated immigration policy. It is an internal critique where Miller’s empirical understanding of immigration is questioned by an empirical analysis using external concepts taken from the substantive realist thinker’s Bonnie Honig and Marc Stears as well as Raymond Geuss. From Honig and Stears the theoretical tool of framing “the real” is used to claim that there are many national identity narratives. According to Clara Sandelind’s empirical research institutional narratives are more compatible with immigration than cultural ones. Miller on the other hand asserts that a liberal national identity that is culturally based is compatible with regulated immigration. Then according to the analysis with the second theoretical tool self-interest, which assumes a strife for power and security, the alleged problem of Miller’s theory is that it underestimates the conflict between national identity and immigration. The vertical relationship of power between insiders and immigrants gives insiders a national self-interest to exclude outsiders in order to preserve their national privilege. Miller’s conception of a quite allowing immigration policy therefore does not cohere with a more realistic interpretation of the political reality.

In his seminal work Strangers in Our Midst (2016a.), David Miller develops his version of liberal nationalism, where he argues for liberal states being justified in requiring immigrants to integrate themselves culturally before giving them access to formal citizenship equal to native citizens. Elsewhere, Miller (2016b.) has also expressed that there are instances when states are justified in revoking citizenships for national security reasons. This paper argues that these positions held by Miller are inconsistent with each other. To make the case against Miller for why this is, three arguments are presented. Firstly, the strict immigration policy suggested in liberal nationalism is permissible because once it is successfully completed, the naturalised citizen gains equal standing in citizenship to native born citizens. If denationalisation is applied in conjunction, but only to some, then their citizenship statis is not equal, and thus the justification for liberal nationalist immigration policy is undermined. Secondly, while it might otherwise be plausible that this injustice is permissible by viewing dual citizens secondary citizenship as a protective privilege, the necessary integration in liberal nationalism makes this response less believable. Finally, one of the most important objectives in liberal nationalism is to promote trust between members. If dual citizens are the only ones who can have their citizenship revoked, and the only reason for this is on suspicion of terrorism, then this risk promoting mistrust against these individuals, making the combination of liberal nationalism and denationalisation self-defeating.

Contemporary democratic states seems to be facing problems regarding who is to be included in demos. Without knowing who is included in the people, it is impossble to know who is to be granted political equality. Whithout political equality, there can be no democracy. This thesis undertakes an internal citique to establish whether the nationalist-principle (represented by David Miller), the all affected interests-principle (represented by Robert E. Goodin) and the coercion-principle (represented by Arash Abizadeh) can be justified on the basis of their own view of political equality. It will be argued that all of the principleas are more or less internally incoherent, meaning that none of the perpesctives of who is to be included in the demos is consistent with political equality. By pointing out these inconsistencies, this paper lays the foundation for a potential further developent of these principles, which could make them more in tune with political equality.