The business corporation is an important engine for the creation of wealth and it plays a vital role in promoting economic development and social progress in both domestic and international economies. Hence companies must operate within a governance framework that keeps them focused on their objectives and accountable for their actions. There is the need to establish adequate and credible governance arrangements. The degree of observance to the basic principles of good corporate governance is an important factor for investment decisions. / Traditional corporate doctrine has taken the separation of ownership from control as the core problem of corporate governance. On this view, the principal function of corporate law is to devise strategies and mechanisms to ensure that corporate decision-making is based only on shareholders' interests. However, corporate managers are subject to influence from many other sources. Thus, the study of corporate governance must take account of all factors that affect managerial decision-making. / In this thesis, I examine the influence that debt financing brings to bear on corporate governance and examine whether debt-holders should be beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties. I conclude that any such duty should be narrowly cast.

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This dissertation comprises three essays. In the first essay, I develop a contingent-claims model to investigate the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate policies and security valuation. The model emphasizes the role that managerial agency issues play in determining both a firm's dividend payout and capital structure. I show quantitatively that self-interested managers' leverage choices deviate from those ex ante maximize firm values. The results suggest that dividend yields are negatively affected by both leverage ratios and managerial entrenchment. They provide implications for empirical research attempting to relate dividend policy to capital structure. In addition, the model offers a new framework to measure managerial entrenchment using observed leverage and dividend payout. / In the second essay, we use a set of structural models to evaluate the price of default protection for a sample of US corporations. In contrast to previous evidence from corporate bond data, CDS premia are not systematically underestimated. In fact, one of our studied models has little difficulty on average in predicting their level. For robustness, we perform the same exercise for bond spreads by the same issuers on the same trading date. As expected, bond spreads relative to the Treasury curve are systematically underestimated, consistent with their being driven by significant non-default components. This is not the case when the swap curve is used as a benchmark, suggesting that previously documented underestimation results may be sensitive to the choice of risk free rate. / In the third essay, we develop a valuation model that simultaneously captures credit risk and interest rate risk, and apply it to study the valuation of putable corporate bonds. We ask what risks put features provide insurance against in practice - credit risk, liquidity risk or interest rate risk - and to what degree? We find that they reduce the components of all three risks in bond spreads. The most important, perhaps surprisingly is default or spread risk, followed by term structure risk. The reduction in the liquidity component is present but rather small.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (May 2, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-125).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-125).

Submitted in compliance with the requirements for the Doctorate degree in Technology, Department of Public Management and Economics, Durban University of Technology, 2014. / Identifying the best level of debt financing within corporations and its determinants is one of the main issues in financial management theory, as the use of debt is believed to have an important influence on the performance of corporations. The majority of studies on debt financing have been undertaken using data from developed economies, focusing more on private sector non-financial corporations. This study investigated the factors influencing debt financing and whether the use of debt positively or negatively influences the financial performance of state corporations in Kenya. The “financial leverage”, which is the proportion of debt financing of state corporations in the Kenyan region, based on the total debt and the total assets, was the object of analysis for the period 2007 to 2011. Applying both descriptive and inferential statistics, and a hybrid of cross sectional and longitudinal quantitative surveys, primary data from questionnaires, and secondary data from the corporations’ financial statements, were utilized. The sample size used was 50 income generating state corporations in Kenya. Using the primary and secondary data, the study, in addition, determined the extent of debt financing and analysed the different types of debt financing used by the various state corporations. It focused on the use of financial ratio analysis to identify the financial performance of the corporations by applying a pooling of cross-section analysis. Moreover, the “financial leverage” ratio was analysed in correlation with the financial performance ratios, in order to identify the potential of anticipation for future financing options for state corporations in Kenya. Further, the regression analysis result was used to demonstrate whether there is a relationship between the corporation’s “financial leverage” and its financial performance ratios and the debt financing theory suitable for explaining debt capital structure within the state corporations. The panel data for financial performance helped in identifying whether there was a significant relationship between “financial leverage” of corporations and their financial performance. The results identified the main factors influencing debt financing within state-owned corporations in Kenya to include profitability, asset tangibility and corporation growth. It was also determined that debt financing is inversely related to financial performance of state-owned corporations in Kenya. In addition, the results revealed that state-owned corporations from developed and developing economies use capital market debt securities, such as bonds and notes, and derivative financial instruments, such as swaps, options and forward contracts. In contrast, these types of debt are not common within the Kenyan state-owned corporations. The developed and developing economies state-owned corporations are perceived to have embraced the new public sector financial management reforms agenda and operate in more developed and efficient capital markets. However, in Kenya, the new public sector financial management agenda may have not been implemented positively within the state-owned corporations and the country’s capital market may still be efficient. It is expected that the findings of this study would have vital policy implications for Kenyan state-owned corporations, in particular, and the government, in general.

Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods, sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'. Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions, depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs' initial equit)' stake is small.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 26, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-117).