Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods, sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'. Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions, depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs' initial equit)' stake is small.

Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods, sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'. Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions, depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs' initial equit)' stake is small. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate

M.Ing. (Engineering Management) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Wits Business School 4 November 2016 / Sub-Saharan Africa faces severe infrastructure deficits including in power generation, water facilities, transportation, and telecommunications. These deficits compound the socio-economic challenges of the most impoverished region in the world. It is estimated that funding of US$ 90 billion per annum is required to address infrastructure deficiencies. Other developing regions including Asia, the Middle East, and South America, have with varying degrees of success utilised the project finance framework to address similar infrastructure deficiencies, and also develop other commercial ventures. Africa has lagged behind in this respect, and still accounts for less than 3% of international project finance flows. The ability to attract and access international and domestic project finance capital, and execute the underlying ventures is an important opportunity to address the challenges noted above. The study contributes to knowledge by deepening our understanding of project finance in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in the following ways. Firstly, it offers a model through which to monitor key contextual factors that influence the success, failure, and shaping of project and infrastructure ventures. Secondly, it interrogates the main capital structure theories including the static trade off and pecking order theories, and their applicability and relevance for project and infrastructure finance in the selected jurisdictions. It then compares capital structure theory with actual practice of capital structure formulation in the 7 cases studies investigated. This yields important insights as to the most important factors influencing capital structure in project finance in the three selected countries. In particular the constrained supply of capital is observed as the top factor determining capital structure. It further enhances our understanding of why ventures using project finance in these countries may have significantly lower leverage than other similar ventures in developed regions of the world. Thirdly, the study extracts key insights into how stakeholder interactions evolve in the projects by applying stakeholder agency theory to project sponsors, managers, contractors, state institutions, and community organisations. Collectively these insights should contribute to attracting increased capital to project finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and arranging projects with greater prospects of operational success. / MT 2017

published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy