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Financing long-gestation projects with uncertain demandStorey, Jim 11 1900 (has links)
Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is
something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital
appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model
in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods,
sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate
private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project
development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and
permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon
the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the
information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed
ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried
on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial
aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'.
Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project
suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may
occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions,
depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control
over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This
may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order
to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the
pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt
accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not
voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no
suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs'
initial equit)' stake is small.
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Financing long-gestation projects with uncertain demandStorey, Jim 11 1900 (has links)
Financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have caused some to wonder if there is
something inherently unstable about financial markets that thwarts their ability to allocate capital
appropriate^- and ultimately causes these crises. I build a multi-period, industry-level credit model
in which debt-financed entrepreneurs develop homogeneous projects with long gestation periods,
sequential investment requirements, and no intermediate cash flows. Entrepreneurs accumulate
private signals about terminal demand, and if the signals are bad enough, may decide to halt project
development before completion. The prevalence of project suspensions aggregates information and
permits the industry size to adjust to the true state of terminal demand. Debt contracts depend upon
the pricing power of the creditor; these contracts impact the size of the industry and the timing of the
information aggregation. When demand realisations are poor, some investors will be disappointed
ex post; aggregate disappointment will depend upon how long the investment behaviour has carried
on before suspensions occur, and how large the industry is. I interpret situations of substantial
aggregate disappointment as a 'crisis'.
Principal results relate to the impact of debt finance on the timing and likelihood of project
suspensions. With all equity (self) financing, suspensions will typically be observed, but they may
occur relatively late in the game. In contrast, debt finance may lead to very rapid suspensions,
depending upon the tools allocated to the creditor. When creditors exercise monopoly control
over credit allocation and pricing, profit-maximising creditors can and will force suspensions. This
may involve reducing the entrepreneurs' equity contribution and / or subsidizing credit in order
to ensure entrepreneurial participation. When credit markets are competitive, creditors lack the
pricing power that can be used to structure credit policies that force early suspensions. As debt
accumulates and the entrepreneurs' share of liquidation proceeds dwindles, entrepreneurs may not
voluntarily suspend operations as this will lead to loss of private benefits. Therefore, there may be no
suspensions observed in equilibrium. This problem will be particularly acute when the entrepreneurs'
initial equit)' stake is small. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate
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The analysis of the application and implementation of public private partnerships (PPP) projects in South AfricaLewis, Claude Pierre 26 June 2015 (has links)
M.Ing. (Engineering Management) / Please refer to full text to view abstract
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An investigation into the qualitative characteristics of large infrastructure and project finance ventures in Southern AfricaMakovah, David Takaendisa January 2016 (has links)
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management,
University of the Witwatersrand in fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Wits Business School
4 November 2016 / Sub-Saharan Africa faces severe infrastructure deficits including in power
generation, water facilities, transportation, and telecommunications. These
deficits compound the socio-economic challenges of the most
impoverished region in the world. It is estimated that funding of US$ 90
billion per annum is required to address infrastructure deficiencies. Other
developing regions including Asia, the Middle East, and South America,
have with varying degrees of success utilised the project finance
framework to address similar infrastructure deficiencies, and also develop
other commercial ventures. Africa has lagged behind in this respect, and
still accounts for less than 3% of international project finance flows. The
ability to attract and access international and domestic project finance
capital, and execute the underlying ventures is an important opportunity to
address the challenges noted above.
The study contributes to knowledge by deepening our understanding of
project finance in South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe in the
following ways. Firstly, it offers a model through which to monitor key
contextual factors that influence the success, failure, and shaping of
project and infrastructure ventures. Secondly, it interrogates the main
capital structure theories including the static trade off and pecking order
theories, and their applicability and relevance for project and infrastructure
finance in the selected jurisdictions. It then compares capital structure
theory with actual practice of capital structure formulation in the 7 cases
studies investigated. This yields important insights as to the most
important factors influencing capital structure in project finance in the three
selected countries. In particular the constrained supply of capital is
observed as the top factor determining capital structure. It further
enhances our understanding of why ventures using project finance in
these countries may have significantly lower leverage than other similar
ventures in developed regions of the world. Thirdly, the study extracts key
insights into how stakeholder interactions evolve in the projects by
applying stakeholder agency theory to project sponsors, managers,
contractors, state institutions, and community organisations. Collectively
these insights should contribute to attracting increased capital to project
finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and arranging projects with greater
prospects of operational success. / MT 2017
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The relationship between project funding and construction systemsChan, Man-wai., 陳文偉. January 1997 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy
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