The thesis comprises of two essays. Although the two essays deal with somewhat different situations and use different approaches, both of them essentially examine the problem of making decisions that affect some group of individuals. The first essay is on moral hazard and looks at the principal's problem in a principal-agent(s) free-rider problem in which, unlike most existing work, the principal is not precluded from participating in the production process. Furthermore, there are no uncertainties, but moral hazard is caused by joint production which renders the action of each individual in the production process unobservable. A multi-stage extensive game in which only the principal can propose the output sharing rule determines both the set of individuals who actually participate in the joint production process and the output sharing rule. The main conclusion we draw in the first essay is that, when designing the optimal output sharing rule, the principal need not look for any output sharing rule more sophisticated than the linear or piecewise linear rules we frequently observe. We also characterize the condition under which the principal chooses to take part in production, and conclude that the issue of mitigation of moral hazard and sustainability of efficiency crucially hinges on whether the principal actually participates in production or not. More concretely, we show that moral hazard dissipates completely whenever the principal does not participate in production, however, even then she does not achieve as much welfare as in the First Best situation if her best option in the First Best situation is to take part in production. The second essay is in stochastic social choice theory. In a paper published in 1986 in Econometrica, Pattanaik and Peleg formulated stochastic analogues for each of Arrow's axioms and concluded that the stochastic social choice functions that satisfy their axioms are essentially randon dictatorships when individuals have strict preferences. More precisely, there is a unique weight associated with each individual such that the vector of these individual weights has the properties of a probability distribution over the set of individuals, and, given any preference profile and any feasible set, the probability that a feasible alternative is chosen is equal to the sum of the weights of those individuals who have this alternative as their best feasible alternative. We extend the analysis of Pattanaik and Peleg by allowing individuals to have weak preferences. As in their paper, it turns out that the probabilistic versions of Arrow's condition simply that there are individual weights. However, now, given a preference profile and a feasible set, we partition the society so that any two individuals from different elements of the partition have no common best feasible alternatives, but the set of best feasible alternatives of each individual in an element of the partition overlaps with that of some other individual in the same element. Using this partition, it is shown that the only restriction on the stochastic social choice function is that the sum of the weights of all individuals belonging to the same element in the partition is equal to the probability that some alternative which is best in the feasible set for one of these individuals is chosen. When everyone has unique best feasible alternatives, the rules characterized here reduce to those of Pattanaik and Peleg.

The thesis comprises of two essays. Although the two essays deal with somewhat different situations and use different approaches, both of them essentially examine the problem of making decisions that affect some group of individuals. The first essay is on moral hazard and looks at the principal's problem in a principal-agent(s) free-rider problem in which, unlike most existing work, the principal is not precluded from participating in the production process. Furthermore, there are no uncertainties, but moral hazard is caused by joint production which renders the action of each individual in the production process unobservable. A multi-stage extensive game in which only the principal can propose the output sharing rule determines both the set of individuals who actually participate in the joint production process and the output sharing rule. The main conclusion we draw in the first essay is that, when designing the optimal output sharing rule, the principal need not look for any output sharing rule more sophisticated than the linear or piecewise linear rules we frequently observe. We also characterize the condition under which the principal chooses to take part in production, and conclude that the issue of mitigation of moral hazard and sustainability of efficiency crucially hinges on whether the principal actually participates in production or not. More concretely, we show that moral hazard dissipates completely whenever the principal does not participate in production, however, even then she does not achieve as much welfare as in the First Best situation if her best option in the First Best situation is to take part in production. The second essay is in stochastic social choice theory. In a paper published in 1986 in Econometrica, Pattanaik and Peleg formulated stochastic analogues for each of Arrow's axioms and concluded that the stochastic social choice functions that satisfy their axioms are essentially randon dictatorships when individuals have strict preferences. More precisely, there is a unique weight associated with each individual such that the vector of these individual weights has the properties of a probability distribution over the set of individuals, and, given any preference profile and any feasible set, the probability that a feasible alternative is chosen is equal to the sum of the weights of those individuals who have this alternative as their best feasible alternative. We extend the analysis of Pattanaik and Peleg by allowing individuals to have weak preferences. As in their paper, it turns out that the probabilistic versions of Arrow's condition simply that there are individual weights. However, now, given a preference profile and a feasible set, we partition the society so that any two individuals from different elements of the partition have no common best feasible alternatives, but the set of best feasible alternatives of each individual in an element of the partition overlaps with that of some other individual in the same element. Using this partition, it is shown that the only restriction on the stochastic social choice function is that the sum of the weights of all individuals belonging to the same element in the partition is equal to the probability that some alternative which is best in the feasible set for one of these individuals is chosen. When everyone has unique best feasible alternatives, the rules characterized here reduce to those of Pattanaik and Peleg. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Telecommunications, Information Studies and Media, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on June 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 62-68). Also issued in print.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-72).

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-68). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Arizona, 1997. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Understanding household long-term decisions concerning residential location/relocation, car ownership and short-term activity travel choices are crucial for land use and transport planning. However, when addressing these issues, multitudes of choice models applying individual or unitary household decision-making mechanisms have dominated in transport studies, ignoring the interactions among household members in consensual decision making in real situations. To promote the investigation of these issues from a group decision-making perspective, this study explores the applicability of various group decision-making approaches to investigate multiple long-term decisions and short-term choices. Specifically, this thesis has four main research objectives: 1) adopt a utilitarian approach to develop an integrated model that links household members' consensual long-term decisions like housing, vehicle ownership and short-term activity-travel decisions like time use, explicitly capturing expenditure tradeoff for long-term decisions on housing and car ownership; 2) employ the Nash bargaining approach to model household members' consensual car ownership choice and examine this choice from the perspective of household time allocation; 3) apply an egalitarian bargaining approach (capture household members' concern for equity) to model household residential relocation choice, make a comparative study among this approach, Nash bargaining approach, and conventional utilitarian approach, and then accommodate these heterogeneous group decision mechanisms in a unified modeling framework; 4) examine the impacts of vehicle usage rationing policy on household car ownership and spouses' time allocation patterns. The database that serves for empirical applications of the formulated models is from a two-wave household activity-travel diary survey conducted in Beijing. This thesis contributes to current literature by adopting new approaches to investigate various group decision-making mechanisms among household members, comparing and assessing the predictive performance of different group decision approaches, as well as explicitly capturing household's long-term expenditure tradeoff. Insights and findings from this study are helpful for gaining profound understanding of spatial distribution of residence, household car ownership and individuals' activity-travel patterns, which will be conducive to the formulation of relevant policies for sustainable urban development.

Originally presented as the author's Ph. D. thesis, University Fridericiana, Karlsruhe, Germany. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [199]-205).

This case study examined how a team of middle school teachers from different subject areas collaboratively planned interdisciplinary experiences for their students. Using fieldwork research methods, including long-term participant-observation, interviewing and document analysis, the study explored how team members planned interdisciplinary experiences. Data were analyzed through a process of searching for patterns, coding and comparison, utilizing the Hackman and Oldham (1980) model of group effectiveness as a heuristic for understanding the group processes. The results of this study raise questions about the preeminence of the "interdisciplinary thematic unit" in middle school rhetoric. The team developed a conception of interdisciplinary that progressed through phases of elusion and inclusion to allusion. Team members chose not to create any tightly-structured interdisciplinary thematic units, and they did not follow any established planning processes designed for creating such units; rather, they dialogued about their subject areas in ways that allowed them to make ongoing connections between subjects. Through their dialogues, team members gained insight into both their own subject areas and connections among subject areas. The Interdisciplinary Judgment Matrix was developed as a means of understanding team members' decision-making in determining whether to plan interdisciplinary experiences. This matrix presents the teachers' decision-making as a process of judging the relevance of potential interdisciplinary experiences both to the established curriculum and to the subject specialists’ criteria for what students ought to derive from a course. The matrix argues that team members do not merely follow a curriculum guide or textbook, but make professional judgments balancing the demands of the curriculum with subject specialists' assumptions and concerns. The study has implications for both practitioners and researchers. Middle school team members need to be given time to develop a conception of interdisciplinarity that fits with their understanding of the purposes of teaming. Also, rather than implementing pre-packaged interdisciplinary thematic units, such teams should be encouraged to dialogue about their subject areas in order to make meaningful and ongoing connections for their students. Rather than adhering to a set of steps for creating interdisciplinary thematic units, middle school teams must learn to discuss the substance of their teaching with one another. Such discussion promises professional growth through everyday occupational conditions. Based on the findings of this study, researchers might profitably investigate the role of unit planning as the common focus of collaborative planning. The study also suggests research into the effectiveness of pre-established planning models as compared to the dialoguing the study recommends. Finally, the study raises a research question about the interplay of collaborative groups with the larger culture of the school.