This work is concerned generally with the relationship between logic and psychology, and in particular with the psychophilosophical foundations of deductive reasoning. This is against the recurrent background of logicians and psychologists knowing of the existence of each other but ignoring each others' work. However, cognitive psychology needs logic, not only as all sciences do to ensure coherence and consistency, but as an essential element of a general theory of cognition. This is a substantive claim, yet in its narrower form it highlights the need to study the precise way in which logic enters the theory of cognition. The contention here is that a theory of mental logic may satisfy both requirements: namely, to be the best explanation for everyday deductive reasoning and to offer an insight into the cognitive architecture. The theory maintains that deductive, reasoning consists of operations on internal representations in accordance with logical rules implemented in procedures activated by the forms of mental representation. Thus, the foundations of the logic(s) at which logicians aim, viz. the logical precepts and ideals, must be psychologically real in the sense of being instantiated in some form in the mind. The discussion is organised into three parts. The first part deals with several issues: arguments for and against the centrality of deduction, desiderata for a theory of deductive competence, and taxonomy of reasoning theories and topics. The second part considers the mental logic hypothesis from its inception to its latest formations. It reconstructs the mental logic paradigm and its transition from a general philosophical commonplace to a psychological hypothesis. The third part looks at the philosophical connections and consequences of the mental logic theory. The first connection is with the language of thought: the hypothesis seems naturally to commit itself to a language of thought on whose formulas abstract rules apply. Another connection is with the syntactic theory of mind and the question is whether mental logic is committed to it or not. Among the consequences, the notion of rationality and the significance of deduction for discovery and justification in science are examined

The ‘belief bias’ effect is one of the most pervasive findings in the study of syllogistic reasoning. Here, participants respond “valid” to more believable than unbelievable conclusions, regardless of the actual validity of the conclusion. There is also an interaction characteristic of the belief bias effect, in that conclusion believability plays a greater role when conclusions are invalid than when they are valid. The experiments reported in this thesis had two goals: first, to determine how individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity influence belief bias in reasoning; and second, to indentify which WM systems are involved in syllogistic deductive reasoning. To this end, both experiments employed a dual task paradigm. In Experiment 1, participants remembered spatial arrays whilst reasoning through syllogisms in order to load the visuospatial sketchpad. Results demonstrated that performance on the secondary spatial memory task suffered when participants reasoned through syllogisms of which the validity and believability of conclusions were incongruent (i.e., “conflict” problems), indicating that reasoning through conflict problems utilized limited visuospatial WM resources. Also, only participants with high WM capacities showed the typical belief-bias effect, with greater effects of conclusion believability on invalid than on valid conclusions. This interaction was not present for low WM span participants, because they made greater errors on problems with invalid, unbelievable conclusions. In Experiment 2, participants remembered digit sequences whilst reasoning in order to load the phonological loop. Both of the major results from Experiment 1 were replicated. Accuracy on the secondary digit recall task was impaired when participants reasoned through conflict problems, demonstrating that limited verbal WM resources were directed toward reasoning. Again, only high WM span participant showed the interaction between conclusion validity and believability characteristic of the belief bias effect. Effects were additive for low WM span participants because they made more errors on invalid, unbelievable syllogisms. Results from both experiments demonstrate first, that both visuospatial and verbal WM resources are involved in syllogistic reasoning, and second, that individuals with different amounts of available WM resources demonstrate differential belief bias. These results are discussed in terms of the mental models and mental logic theories of reasoning and in terms of dual process accounts of reasoning.

The ‘belief bias’ effect is one of the most pervasive findings in the study of syllogistic reasoning. Here, participants respond “valid” to more believable than unbelievable conclusions, regardless of the actual validity of the conclusion. There is also an interaction characteristic of the belief bias effect, in that conclusion believability plays a greater role when conclusions are invalid than when they are valid. The experiments reported in this thesis had two goals: first, to determine how individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity influence belief bias in reasoning; and second, to indentify which WM systems are involved in syllogistic deductive reasoning. To this end, both experiments employed a dual task paradigm. In Experiment 1, participants remembered spatial arrays whilst reasoning through syllogisms in order to load the visuospatial sketchpad. Results demonstrated that performance on the secondary spatial memory task suffered when participants reasoned through syllogisms of which the validity and believability of conclusions were incongruent (i.e., “conflict” problems), indicating that reasoning through conflict problems utilized limited visuospatial WM resources. Also, only participants with high WM capacities showed the typical belief-bias effect, with greater effects of conclusion believability on invalid than on valid conclusions. This interaction was not present for low WM span participants, because they made greater errors on problems with invalid, unbelievable conclusions. In Experiment 2, participants remembered digit sequences whilst reasoning in order to load the phonological loop. Both of the major results from Experiment 1 were replicated. Accuracy on the secondary digit recall task was impaired when participants reasoned through conflict problems, demonstrating that limited verbal WM resources were directed toward reasoning. Again, only high WM span participant showed the interaction between conclusion validity and believability characteristic of the belief bias effect. Effects were additive for low WM span participants because they made more errors on invalid, unbelievable syllogisms. Results from both experiments demonstrate first, that both visuospatial and verbal WM resources are involved in syllogistic reasoning, and second, that individuals with different amounts of available WM resources demonstrate differential belief bias. These results are discussed in terms of the mental models and mental logic theories of reasoning and in terms of dual process accounts of reasoning.

Student Number : 0001241N - M Industrial Psychology dissertation - School of Human and Community Development - Faculty of Humanities / The following thesis explores the variables of math anxiety, deductive reasoning and career appraisal. This dissertation investigates whether there is a relationship between math anxiety and deductive reasoning. A relationship is found to exist between these two variables and the relationship is of an indirectly proportional nature. As a result, when “math anxiety is high, deductive reasoning is low” and visa viz. 74 participants were used in this research study to assess whether their appraisal of various careers differed or were homogenous in nature. This thesis discusses how various careers were appraised heterogeneously and others homogenously between people with different levels of math anxiety and deductive reasoning. This phenomenon is also explained through the possibility of extraneous factors, influencing these results.

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This study compared the accuracy for the two general approaches to criminal profiling, inductive and deductive. Participants were 213 college students who participated in a 1-hour training session. Participants in the experimental groups were trained in either the inductive or deductive approach to profiling. Participants in the control group were trained in a crime topic unrelated to profiling (rape and sexual assault prevention). Following the training session, participants were asked to review a double sexual homicide case and then profile the offender by completing the Profiling Offender characteristics Questionnaire. Participants trained in the inductive profiling approach were more accurate when profiling the offender’s physical characteristics. Furthermore, the inductive profiling approach led to higher overall accuracy scores compared to the control condition. These results suggest that training naïve profilers to use the inductive approach may improve the accuracy of offender profiles in sexual homicide cases.

The belief bias effect – the finding that prior beliefs influence judgments of logic and evidence – has been a topic of much empirical investigation in both deductive and causal reasoning. However, to date, no research has examined the degree to which such biases are the result of common or distinct mechanisms in these two domains. By using common scales of measurement, I examine the degree to which individuals show common biases in these two domains in two experiments. Surprisingly, although the belief bias effect was observed in both paradigms, biases in one domain were unreliably associated with biases in the other domain. Experiment 2 included 6 measures of individual differences in an attempt to uncover the observation of differential biases in these domains. Dogmatism was found to be the single most predictive measure of belief bias, but only in deductive reasoning. These data are discussed in terms of dual process theories of reasoning.

The belief bias effect – the finding that prior beliefs influence judgments of logic and evidence – has been a topic of much empirical investigation in both deductive and causal reasoning. However, to date, no research has examined the degree to which such biases are the result of common or distinct mechanisms in these two domains. By using common scales of measurement, I examine the degree to which individuals show common biases in these two domains in two experiments. Surprisingly, although the belief bias effect was observed in both paradigms, biases in one domain were unreliably associated with biases in the other domain. Experiment 2 included 6 measures of individual differences in an attempt to uncover the observation of differential biases in these domains. Dogmatism was found to be the single most predictive measure of belief bias, but only in deductive reasoning. These data are discussed in terms of dual process theories of reasoning.

The main aim of this study is to investigate human understanding of process models and to develop an improved understanding of its relevant influence factors. Aided by assumptions from cognitive psychology, this article attempts to address specific deductive reasoning difficulties based on process models. The authors developed a research model to capture the influence of two effects on the cognitive difficulty of reasoning tasks: (i) the presence of different control-flow patterns (such as conditional or parallel execution) in a process model and (ii) the interactivity of model elements. Based on solutions to 61 different reasoning tasks by 155 modelers, the results from this study indicate that the presence of certain control-flow patterns influences the cognitive difficulty of reasoning tasks. In particular, sequence is relatively easy, while loops in a model proved difficult. Modelers with higher process modeling knowledge performed better and rated subjective difficulty of loops lower than modelers with lower process modeling knowledge. The findings additionally support the prediction that interactivity between model elements is positively related to the cognitive difficulty of reasoning. Our research contributes to both academic literature on the comprehension of process models and practitioner literature focusing on cognitive difficulties when using process models.

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