This thesis explores the relationship variables of Western European defence-related SMEs when they cooperate with their competitors (coopetition). In particular, how do these various relationship variables affect these SMEs when partnering with competitors? Many researchers have examined partnering with competitors however, this concept has been widely overlooked in the Western European defence sector. The research proceeds as follows: 1. Qualitative research with five different defence-related SME manufacturers in Western Europe. 2. Perceptions and answers of our interviews were further analysed, and 3. the empirical data is interpreted to support our research findings. The study concludes that, based on the empirical data, the relationship variables that can affect negatively to the SMEs are customer power, political forces, SME size, and coopetition in the defence sector. Also, coopetition itself can affect a relationship in a positive way. Moreover, the political landscape plays a critical role, by acting as a force of intervention when partnering. Additionally, the lack of resources has a decisive role in the decision-making process when choosing to collaborate.

The public procurement of defence materiel was previously regulated in Directive 2004/18/EC but due to the special character of the defence market, a new Directive has been issued; Directive 2009/81/EC. The purpose of this Directive is to be better suited for the special features of the defence market. Directive 2009/81/EC will now regulate most of the contracts that, due to their sensitive and secret character, were earlier exempted from the rules of the Treaties on the basis of Article 346 TFEU and from Directive 2004/18/EC on the basis of its Article 14. It is, however, still possible to exempt some contracts on the basis of these Articles. Directive 2009/81/EC regulates the procedure for contract awarding and affects the possibilities of the Member State to choose a tender with Offset agreement over one without and thereforethe Directive affects the offering company as well.Earlier a company has been free to shape its contracts concerning public procurement of defence material with little regard to the regulations of the Internal Market. With the implementation of the new directive, the situation has become uncertain. In particular the state of law concerningOffset agreements, commonly offered as a part of a tender in contracts concerning defenceprocurement, has become uncertain. This as Offset is not explicitly mentioned in Directive2009/81/EC but several bodies of the European Union have expressed opinions regarding the legality of Offset and whether or not it is a discriminating measure.We have found that Offset agreements, both related and un-related to the subject matter of the contract, can be exempted on the basis of Article 346 TFEU if they support essential security interest. However, that the procurement concerns the defence sector is not enough for contracts to be exempted if these contracts only support other interests, e.g. industrial or economical, rather than those of essential security. This as the exemption of these contracts would have adistorting effect on the trade on other markets than the one related to defence procurement.Even though Offset is not mentioned as a criterion for awarding of contracts in Article 47.1(a) Directive 2009/81/EC, this does not exclude the possibility that it could be. If Offset is to be used as an award criterion, it cannot be of significant weight when determining the economically most advantageous tender and can in no case be discriminating. Also, a differencebetween direct and indirect Offset must be made since indirect Offset agreements do not fulfill the requirements, in 47.1(a) Directive 2009/81/EC, in order to be considered asan award criterion. It is therefore only possible to use direct Offset agreements as an award criterion according to Directive 2009/81/EC if this is done in a non-discriminating way.

The thesis Higher Cicrcles in Defence Sector and Corruption in Defence Materiel Procurement in the Czech Republic deals with the question of presence of military-industrial complex (MIC) in the Czech society and economy after than more 65 years its constitution in Czechoslovakia by communist defence minister A. Čepička. His effort was initiated by a confidential wish expressed by J. V. Stalin in 1951 within a political meeting with defence ministers newly established people's republics in East Europa. Due to fact that MIC is usually linked with corruption, the thesis deals with the issue of corruption in acquisition of defence materiel; in particular, after 1994 when the first design of building-up the Czech military power was adapted as well as the first acquisition plan of military materiel was introduced for the next 10 years. So, the aim of the thesis is to verify the theory MIC's presence in the Czech Republic and to diagnose the stage of corruption in acquisition of military materiel at the Ministry of Defence. Author scrutinised the validity of two hypotheses: (H1) the MIC is in the Czech Republic omnipresent and (H2) the corruption in acquisition of military materiel at the Ministry of Defence is the stage of systemic corruption. With application of comparative analysis comparing the Czech...