This dissertation examines two interconnected research questions: What conditions give rise and lead to the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and what are the consequences of this electoral success? Literature concerning anti-establishment parties fails to investigate this phenomenon in its entirety by focusing disproportionately on the electoral success of these parties neglecting the consequences of this electoral success. Although the electoral success of anti-establishment parties and the subsequent consequences have different theoretical underpinnings, the effects that anti-establishment parties have on individual parties and the party system are dependent upon the electoral success of these of parties. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on both the electoral success and the consequences of anti-establishment parties in Western Europe. Concerning electoral success, this dissertation offers a new approach to the literature by arguing that anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, are born out of the dissatisfaction towards traditional parties within the electorate. Using quantitative analyses of eighteen Western European countries covering the time period 1970-2005, this dissertation offers a unified analysis of anti-establishment parties, regardless of their placement on the political spectrum, examining the political, social, and economic conditions that give rise to the anti-establishment party phenomenon. The findings indicate that while the factors leading to the emergence of anti-establishment parties may be the same regardless of the placement of these parties on the political spectrum, the factors leading to their electoral success are dependent upon their ideological orientation. Furthermore, the electoral success of these new parties has consequences for other individual parties and the broader party system. This dissertation argues that the existence of these parties alone is not enough to accomplish this aim; these parties must be seen as threats to existing mainstream parties on either the left or the right or in some cases, both. In order to counter the threat from these anti-establishment parties, traditional parties may change their ideological positions or organizational structures. Utilizing qualitative (face-to-face interviews with party elites) and evidence from party manifestos from 1970-2005 in six countries, these analyses indicate that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties affects individual parties by altering the ideological placement, particularly on issues relevant to anti-establishment party electoral success. To a lesser extent, traditional parties alter their organizational structures (i.e., allocating more power to rank-and-file members, regional, and local branches), in order to counter this new electoral threat. Moreover, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties causes instability within the broader party system. Utilizing quantitative, statistical methods to analyze eighteen western European countries between 1970 and 2005, this dissertation finds that the electoral success of anti-establishment parties increases the amount of electoral volatility and the amount of polarization both within the system and between traditional parties. However, anti-establishment parties do not mobilize the electorate leading to increases voter turnout in these eighteen countries. Finally, anti-establishment parties, by gaining seats in national legislatures, upset the traditional coalitional dynamics. As such, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties leads to shorter coalitional governments within the party systems of Western Europe.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

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The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the reciprocal direct relationship between political regimes, political instability and economic growth. However, there is a lack of fit between the political and economic science especially when it comes to political determinants of economic growth. Thus, this thesis sheds further light on the question: To what extent do political regimes and their stability affects economic performance with reference to 20 Western European countries. A panel regression analysis is employed, by adopting multiple measures of government performance. The findings suggest that political regimes have an effect on economic growth and this effect is not directly dependent upon the broader governmental structure and political environment. This thesis further examines the puzzle of the nature between political instability and economic growth in Western Europe, by using both a more comprehensive measure of political instability than has previously been developed, and Greek growth cycles form 1919 to 2008 as a case to explore the nature of the researched issue. The findings propose that the relationship between political instability (PI) and economic growth is parabolic and fragile. Furthermore, this thesis supports the intuition that political instability can slow economic growth through increasing uncertainty in economic policies. The results illustrate that economic growth and political instability are jointly determined and that governmental changes plays no significant role on economic growth (with exceptions in the case study), especially after extended spells of political stability. It appears that what matters is the longevity of the polity itself and the specific forms of political instability. Moreover, by using Greece as a case, this thesis shows that there is a strong negative link between political instability and the volatility of the economic outcomes.

The thesis aims primarily to analyse the communication strategies of radical right parties. More specifically, the research examines three cases of radical right parties in Western Europe during the first decade of the twenty-first century with particular emphasis on the political communication along with marketing and branding techniques used to engage with the electorate to gain and maintain electoral support. These case studies comprise the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LA.O.S.), the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Italian National Alliance (AN). Different forms of content analysis are used in order to pinpoint the characteristics that identify the parties as members of the radical right family. Through this approach the thesis provides evidence that the parties, in their effort to become more appealing to their audiences, avoid direct engagement with issues, which reflect traditional ideological tenets of the radical right issues such as fascism, racism or xenophobia. Rather, they attempt to present a more mainstream and competitive profile in the political arena. From a market-oriented perspective, the thesis addresses questions on marketing and related explanations which focus both on how the parties choose to communicate with the electorate, what is their message and, through comparative analysis, whether there are similarities in communication techniques among the three parties and whether it can be argued that parties in the radical right family project a common profile in terms of their communication strategies. Furthermore, the application of such an approach to the use of political communication techniques of the selected radical right parties can contribute to a wider understanding of how the concept of ‘consumption’ has come to be applied increasingly in activities undertaken in the political arena.

This thesis investigates the determinants of Swedish foreign direct investments to 24 European countries during the period 1998 to 2008 with 2000 and 2008 as sample years. The thesis emphasizes five factors that affect the Swedish FDI flows to these countries, which are grouped into OECD countries and CEE countries (Central and Eastern European Countries). The explanatory variables studied are economic growth, property rights, labor cost and two dummy variables with one targeting whether the country is culturally affiliated with Sweden and the other is dealing with whether that country is an OECD country or not. We use multiple regressions to find out to what extent each of these variables can explain the variance of FDI during the years 2000 and 2008. The coefficient estimates show the expected sign in the relationship between FDI and the various explanatory variables, with the exception of labor cost but only OECD membership shows a significant relationship to FDI (and only when using 2000 data).

<p>This thesis investigates the determinants of Swedish foreign direct investments to 24 European countries during the period 1998 to 2008 with 2000 and 2008 as sample years. The thesis emphasizes five factors that affect the Swedish FDI flows to these countries, which are grouped into OECD countries and CEE countries (Central and Eastern European Countries). The explanatory variables studied are economic growth, property rights, labor cost and two dummy variables with one targeting whether the country is culturally affiliated with Sweden and the other is dealing with whether that country is an OECD country or not. We use multiple regressions to find out to what extent each of these variables can explain the variance of FDI during the years 2000 and 2008.</p><p>The coefficient estimates show the expected sign in the relationship between FDI and the various explanatory variables, with the exception of labor cost but only OECD membership shows a significant relationship to FDI (and only when using 2000 data).</p>

During the twentieth century, trends in childlessness varied strongly across European countries while educational attainment grew continuously across them. Using census and large-scale survey data from 13 European countries, we investigated the relationship between these two factors among women born between 1916 and 1965. Up to the 1940 birth cohort, the share of women childless at age 40+ decreased universally. Afterwards, the trends diverged across countries. The results suggest that the overall trends were related mainly to changing rates of childlessness within educational groups and only marginally to changes in the educational composition of the population. Over time, childlessness levels of the medium-educated and high-educated became closer to those of the low-educated, but the difference in level between the two better educated groups remained stable in Western and Southern Europe and increased slightly in the East.

The consequences and aftermaths of the 2008 Great Recession have played an important role in stirring people fear and agony to 'some' other people. The phenomenon is defined as the root of affective polarization. Research has claimed that affective polarization derives from partisan identity and the theory of social identity, and those affects are developed and reached beyond the classic concept of ideological polarization. During the post-economic crisis, a number of successful new radical right parties has surged across the continent. In addition, Western European politics has severely been polarized and increasingly characterized by growing hostility and incivility across partisan lines. Simultaneously, the trend of deinstitutionalization of party system goes upward across Europe. This article seeks to investigate a puzzle of whether and how increasing levels of party system deinstitutionalization are associated with increasing polarization. Assessing the association between party system deinstitutionalization and the two dimensions of polarization between 1997 and 2017 (82 elections in 15 countries), the empirical result shows such an unexpected result and strongly implies the underestimated effects of political structures on party system deinstitutionalization and polarization while...

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