"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006." / Advisor(s): Engelbeck, R. Marshall. ; Rendon, Rene G. "December 2006." "MBA professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on June 12, 2009. DTIC Identifiers: Far(Federal Acquisition Regulation), Riff(Rapid Identification Friend Or Foe) Test Kit, Gsr(Gunshot Residue), Mou(Memorandum Of Understanding), Define And Validate Need. Author(s) subject terms: Coordinative acquisition, acquisition reform, acquisition architecture, streamlined acquisition, Gunshot-residue (GSR) Testing, Rapid Identification Friend or Foe (RIFF) test kit, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-69).

Human Systems Integration Capstone / Approved for public release;distribution is unlimited / MANPRINT efforts have the greatest impact when initiated early in the acquisition process, when changes to a system can be made most easily. At this point in time, MANPRINT activities are funded directly by the Program Manager (PM)/Program Executive Office (PEO), who do not tend to allocate appropriate funding for early MANPRINT efforts. For this reason, HRED FE personnel must become MANPRINT salesmen and promote the value of their inclusion and market themselves to the acquisition managers. As support of acquisition programs early in their lifecycle has the greatest need for guidance, this document will largely discuss methods for moving MANPRINT â to the leftâ that can be undertaken at the HRED FE working level. Specifically, this document will detail how to become part of the PMâ s team and what activities would best support the PM once included.

A key component of defense acquisition programs operating using the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management System is the reliance on the triple constraints of cost, schedule, and performance. While the use of Modeling and Simulation tools and capabilities is prevalent and well established in the Research and Development, Analysis, and Training domains, acquisition programs have been reluctant to use Modeling and Simulation in any great depth due to inaccessibility of tools, Subject Matter Experts, and implications to cost and schedule. This presents a unique Simulation Management challenge which requires an in-depth understanding of the technical capabilities available within an organization, their applicability to support immediate needs, and the flexibility to utilize these capabilities within the programmatic environment to provide a value added service. The focus of this dissertation is to study the use of Modeling and Simulation in the Defense arena, and to review the applicability of Modeling and Simulation within programmatic acquisition environments which are constrained by cost, schedule, and performance. This research draws comparisons between Modeling and Simulation to other Process Improvement initiatives, such as Lean and Six Sigma, and reviews case studies involving the application of Modeling and Simulation within triple constrained environments. The development of alternate scenarios allows cost benefit analysis to be conducted for each scenario and alternate scenario, developing a case for whether or not the application of Modeling and Simulation within the triple constrained environment delivered any consequential benefit to the acquisition process. Observations are made regarding the level of Modeling and Simulation as applied within each case study, and generalized recommendations are made for the inclusion of cost benefit iv analysis methodologies for analyzing proposed Modeling and Simulation activities within acquisition programs. Limitations and shortcomings of the research activity are discussed, along with recommendations for potential future work in the Simulation Management field, both with respect to the specific case studies reviewed in this study and the general field.

For decades, the Department of Defense has been plagued by persistent cost, schedule, and performance problems in defense acquisition programs. Recent changes in Department of Defense acquisition policy were intended to improve efficiency and are demonstrating some improvement in terms of overall cost improvements, yet little is understood about whether training efforts related to the new policies are producing policy-compliant behavior on the job. Using Edgar Schein's 'Onion Model' of organizational change as the theoretical construct, the purpose of this study was to examine through an ex post facto, cross-sectional longitudinal study whether there is a significant relationship between learning achieved from Defense Acquisition University (DAU) training in acquisition policy and application of learned policy-compliant behavior, as represented by the variables learning achieved and applied training. Data were obtained from DAU that spanned 19 months and over 334,000 training events separated into 40 course-type subgroups. These data were analyzed through hierarchical regression analysis to test whether concepts learned in policy training predicted policy compliance. The findings confirmed that the independent variable of 'learning achieved' is predictive of policy compliance.

Due to the complexities of modern military operations and the technologies employed on today's military systems, acquisition costs and development times are becoming increasingly large. Meanwhile, the transformation of the global security environment is driving the U.S. military's own transformation. In order to meet the required capabilities of the next generation without buying prohibitively costly new systems, it is necessary for the military to evolve across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). However, the methods for analyzing DOTMLPF approaches within the early acquisition phase of a capability-based assessment (CBA) are not as well established as the traditional technology design techniques. This makes it difficult for decision makers to decide if investments should be made in materiel or non-materiel solutions. This research develops an agent-based constructive simulation to quantitatively assess doctrine alongside materiel approaches. Additionally, life-cycle cost techniques are provided to enable a cost-effectiveness trade. These techniques are wrapped together in a decision-making environment that brings crucial information forward so informed and appropriate acquisition choices can be made. The methodology is tested on a future unmanned aerial vehicle design problem. Through the implementation of this quantitative methodology on the proof-of-concept study, it is shown that doctrinal changes including fleet composition, asset allocation, and patrol pattern were capable of dramatic improvements in system effectiveness at a much lower cost than the incorporation of candidate technologies. Additionally, this methodology was able to quantify the precise nature of strong doctrine-doctrine and doctrine-technology interactions which have been observed only qualitatively throughout military history. This dissertation outlines the methodology and demonstrates how potential approaches to capability-gaps can be identified with respect to effectiveness, cost, and time. When implemented, this methodology offers the opportunity to achieve system capabilities in a new way, improve the design of acquisition programs, and field the right combination of ways and means to address future challenges to national security.

No description available.

The goal of this research project is to tell the story of acquisition expertise development within the DOD using the evolution of the Defense Acquisition University as its backdrop. It is a story about the persistent frame that claims expertise leads to acquisition success. It is about 40 plus years of competing perspectives of how best to acquire that expertise and their shaping effects. It is about technology choices amidst cultural and political conflict. It is about how budget, users, infrastructure, existing and emerging technologies, identity and geography all interrelate as elements within the technology of expertise development. Finally, it is about how at various times in the evolution of the Defense Acquisition University the technologies of tacit knowledge transfer have been elevated or diminished. / Ph. D.

Despite nearly 50 years of attempts at reform, the US defense acquisition system continues to deliver weapon systems over budget, behind schedule, and with performance shortfalls. Why has acquisition reform failed? Three potential contributors were identified in the literature: the misalignment of incentives, a lack of a systems view, and a lack of objective evaluation criteria. This thesis considers these problems in the context of the most recent effort to transform the defense acquisition enterprise, evolutionary acquisition. First, game theory was employed to analyze the incentives of participants in the defense acquisition enterprise regarding the use of immature technology. It was found that there is a tragedy of the commons at work where acquisition programs serve as a common resource for stakeholders to meet their goals. The result is that participants are incentivized to use immature technology in contradiction of evolutionary acquisition policies. Second, the cost and performance of evolutionary acquisition in the context of the defense acquisition system was analyzed using a discrete event simulation. What was found was that evolutionary acquisition may lead to better performance from fielded systems and lower cost programs but also that the cost of operating the acquisition system as whole may actually rise. Finally, a method using price indices was developed to translate the gain in buying power resulting from improvements to the defense acquisition system into a monetary valuation. This allows for the application of options analysis to determine whether or not it is cost effective to pursue a potential improvement. A comparison with a more traditional approach revealed that simply using the NPV of cost savings may significantly understate value.