This thesis posits that Christian Democracy arose in Central America because of its emphasis on basic reforms and social justice, and that its messianic appeal and charismatic leadership propelled it to national political power in El Salvador and Guatemala. The study continues by examining the presidencies of Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador and Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala, concluding that their economic, political, and foreign policy agendas did not resolve the basic social conflicts which fuel both countries civil wars and economic crises. The findings of the study indicate that these Christian Democrats' alliances with their countries' armed forces and their inability to tap the potential of the movement's messianic, reformist vigor, prevented their administrations from ending the political violence and achieving a national unity capable of launching equitable development.

Studies of political parties in Latin America have often been descriptive and not directed to link a theoretical foundation about political parties with qualitative or quantitative empiricism. This was in part because parties in the region were usually perceived as rather unimportant in the political arena. This study attempts to correct this often unjustified proposition by focusing on the development of political parties in five Central American countries: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The analysis focuses particularly on the relationship between party fragmentation, party polarization, the level of democracy, and socio-economic modernization. The quantitative analysis uses a cross-national longitudinal research design and tries to overcome shortcomings in prior descriptive approaches based on case studies. The overall findings show that party fragmentation and party polarization are positively related to the level of democracy in Central America.

U.S. policymakers consistently argue that U.S. security depends on hemispheric democracy. As an instrument of U.S. policy, did foreign assistance promote democracy in Central America, 1946 through 1994? Finding that U.S. foreign assistance directly promoted neither GDP nor democracy in Central America, 1946 through 1994, I conclude that U.S. policy failed consistently in this specific regard.