In this dissertation, I explain why scholars are unable to conclusively find evidence that divided government is the main determinant of legislative gridlock. I argue this unsettled debate is largely attributable to an imprecise conceptual view of inter-branch tensions, and that these conceptual limitations are exacerbated by unrefined measurement practices. I argue refined measures such as party polarization and gridlock intervals better explain institutional behavior than divided government. Using unique datasets estimating legislator preferences on domestic and foreign policy, findings show that when compared to more refined measures, split-party government is not the sole or even the most important source of partisan conflict. In addition, compared to other studies on divided government, I argue the reason the distinction between unified and divided government is often blurred is that a number of underlying political and institutional pressures make sweeping policy change difficult even for most unified governments. These factors contribute to the public’s growing dissatisfaction with government’s inability to solve many economic and social problems. / text

Conflict among legislators has been an ever-present component of the legislative process in the U.S. Congress. However, most political scientists have treated all dissension within the legislature as the result of partisan disagreement over various policy options. I propose in this thesis that a second dimension of conflict exists within Congress, one caused by personal rivalries unrelated to the discussion of issues. This category, which I have termed "personality conflict," or "incivility," can take the form of actions between legislators such as name-calling and fist-fights. In my research, I have created a measure of these incivilities and studied the movement in the levels of personality conflict within Congress from 1851 through 2004. In addition, I compare these trends to a conventional measure of party polarization or partisan conflict. The analysis suggests that the two types of conflict are distinct, but also that levels of one type of congressional conflict can have important effects on the absolute level of the other.

This thesis examines the determinants of presidential success with Congress. Seven essential sources of presidential power in the current era of party polarization were derived from the extant literature, and these factors were delineated into the institutional (formal) and non-institutional (informal) policymaking tools of the presidency. Variables that explain presidential legislative success include: intraparty support in Congress, the use of veto bargaining, executive orders and signing statements (institutional factors); as well as public approval, ‘going public,’ and strategic lobbying of Congress (non-institutional factors). Case studies of the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush analyze the role of these policymaking tools in four key legislative battles of each presidency. Regression models were constructed to test the effect of these variables on presidential legislative success. The case studies elucidate the relationship between noninstitutional factors and their subsequent impact on key presidential policy priorities, particularly the interaction between public approval and going public. Findings indicate a positive relationship between a president’s strategic bargaining ability with Congress and subsequent legislative success. Findings also show no significant relationship between intraparty support and presidential success when focusing on only key legislative battles between the executive and legislative branches, contrary to the findings of prior research. Future research might examine the various relationships between these policymaking tools and how they affect the nature of presidential power in the current era of heightened party polarization and ideological homogeneity.

No description available.

Political climates are undoubtedly changing across the nation and creating volatile fluctuations of attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. In a more entertaining season of presidential primaries, both parties – Democratic and Republican – have nominees that will once again be scrutinized by many across the country. I argue the levels of scrutiny will more likely than not be enhanced to new proportions. Since a consistent reliance on media involvement and attack ads have grown immensely amongst presidential candidates, this will translate into a wider gap in party polarization and subsequently tie into the trust of American citizens. Previous scholars have shown consistent data that political trust has no bearing on the actual turnout of presidential elections (Citrin 1974). But, historic distrustful ratings between major-party candidates may prove to alter political cultures for subsequent years. In this study, I thoroughly examine the growing significance of political trust on presidential voting in the United States.

Studies of political parties in Latin America have often been descriptive and not directed to link a theoretical foundation about political parties with qualitative or quantitative empiricism. This was in part because parties in the region were usually perceived as rather unimportant in the political arena. This study attempts to correct this often unjustified proposition by focusing on the development of political parties in five Central American countries: Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The analysis focuses particularly on the relationship between party fragmentation, party polarization, the level of democracy, and socio-economic modernization. The quantitative analysis uses a cross-national longitudinal research design and tries to overcome shortcomings in prior descriptive approaches based on case studies. The overall findings show that party fragmentation and party polarization are positively related to the level of democracy in Central America.

ObamaCare 2010: Political Aspects of U.S. Health-care Reform Katarína Dujčíková Abstract The enactment of the comprehensive health-care reform in March 2010 is one of major political achievements of the administration of the 44th president of the United States of America, a Democrat Barack Obama and the 111th Congress with the majority of Democrats in both chambers. Democratic politicians reacted to the need to answer three major problems of American health care system; rising cost, average quality and limited access to standard health care services for million Americans. The historical passage of health-care reform enacted despite unified opposition by Republicans was possible due to the rare combination of favorable conditions, or so-called window of opportunity and legislative tactic, which had to be adopted in order to diffuse opposition and secure enough votes from undecided congressmen. Compromises that had to be made necessarily altered an initial reform proposal. This diploma thesis has focused on two major aims. First, it examines in detail the legislative process of health-care reform, actions of its major players (public, congressional parties, president, and interest groups) as well as its result (the reform bills), which compares to the initial reform proposals of President Obama. The findings...

Les partis politiques macédoniens ont été relativement peu étudiés. Les problèmes de la construction du nouvel Etat, à la fois dans un environnement difficile et quant à l’intégration de l’importante minorité albanaise, ont éclipsé ceux du nouveau système politique. L’attention portée à l’ingénierie constitutionnelle y a contribué. Pourtant, les partis sont au cœur de la démocratie pluraliste.En dehors de la problématique commune de la formation des partis politiques dans les transitions post-communistes, le cas macédonien présente des originalités par le rôle des racines historiques pour les partis relevants et l’importance des partis ethniques, qui ont évolué entre la contestation de l’Etat et du nouveau système et l’intégration politique par la participation grandissante au jeu démocratique, y compris au niveau gouvernemental. / Macedonian political parties have been relatively little studied. In Macedonia, political system transformation has been mainly dominated by state building issues, problems related to Albanian minority integration and the process of designing a new constitutional arrangement. Nevertheless, political parties are considered to be key actors in pluralist democracy. Macedonian parties have their own particularities when compared to general models of post-communist party development. The originality of the Macedonian parties thus lies in the importance accorded to historical legacies in party formation, as well as in the role played by ethnic actors in the process of democratization.

Il y a une préoccupation croissante parmi les experts en ce qui a trait à la polarisation idéologique des élites politiques en raison de son potentiel à pousser les masses vers les extrêmes et à exacerber la polarisation affective. Ces préoccupations sont-elles justifiées? Cette thèse comprend trois articles distincts mais liés, chacun contribuant à apporter une réponse à cette question. Le premier chapitre empirique (chapitre 2) examine si la polarisation idéologique des élites a augmenté au fil du temps en Europe de l’Ouest. Pour ce faire, ce chapitre se concentre sur la polarisation des partis politiques (c’est-à-dire la polarisation idéologique des élites) sur trois dimensions (économique, sociale et sur la question de l’intégration européenne) simultanément, car la transformation post-industrielle de l’espace politique européen a entraîné une politique multidimensionnelle qui n’est pas toujours alignée avec l’une et l’autre. De plus, le chapitre 2 compare ces tendances à celles fondées sur la dimension traditionnelle gauche-droite. En utilisant les jugements d’experts du Chapel Hill Expert Survey comme indicateur des positions des partis, la polarisation des parties est mesurée en fonction de leur dispersion moyenne des partis par rapport au centre relatif du système politique. Ce chapitre montre une tendance vers une plus grande polarisation des partis sur la dimension gauche-droite ainsi que sur les dimensions économique et sociale, mais pas sur la dimension d’integration européenne. Les partis prennent de plus en plus de positions distinctes sur les questions économique et sociales, et le "menu" idéologique servi aux citoyens est devenu plus diversifié u fil du temps. De plus, il montre que la polarisation des partis sur les dimensions économique, sociales et d’intégration européenne est modérément corrélée à celle de la dimension gauche-droite traditionnelle, tandis que les corrélations de la polarisation des partis sur ces dimensions entre elles sont plutôt faibles. Bien que la dimension gauche-droite agisse comme une position super-thématique qui absorbe les positions des partis sur d’autres dimensions, elles ne sont pas nécessairement alignées les unes sur les autres. Ayant établi que la polarisation idéologique des élites est en hausse en Europe de l’Ouest, le deuxième chapitre empirique (chapitre 3) examine comment les masses réagissent à l’augmentation de la polarisation idéologiques des élites. Plus précisément, la question est de savoir si la polarisation idéologique des élites conduit à une polarisation idéologique des masses. En d'autres termes, lorsque des propositions de politique plus extrêmes sont disponibles pour les citoyens, adoptent-ils également des préférences de politique plus extrêmes? Ce chapitre avance que les masses se polarisent suivant deux mécanismes. En vertu de la théorie de l’identité sociale, les partisans devraient suivre leur parti et adopter une position idéologique plus extrême, tandis que les non-partisans devraient réagir à l'opposé. De plus, ce chapitre soutient que si les partisans se polarisent en fonction des changements qui surviennent à l'interieur de leur parti dépend de leur position spatiale par rapport à ce même parti sur l’échelle idéologique. Par exemple, seuls ceux qui sont parfaitement alignée avec leur parti ou plus à droite que leur parti devraient se conformer aux mouvements des élites. Ce chapitre teste ces attentes dans un cadre réel en s’appuyant sur un design quasi-expérimentale. Le chapitre exploite une augmentation subite de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite qui s’est produite lorsque le Parti travailliste au Royaume-Uni a subi une changement de position soudain avec l’élection de Jeremy Corbyn à titre de nouveau chef. À l’aide des données du British Election Study Internet Panel, ce chapitre ne trouve que des éléments de preuves limitées supportant l'hypothèse que la polarisation de l’élite entraîne une polarisation idéologique de masse : ni les partisans du Parti travailliste ni les autres partisans ne sont devenus plus polarisés à la suite du changement de position du Parti travailliste. Seule une petite minorité de partisans travaillistes situés à droite du parti ont suivi le parti en adoptant une position plus à gauche sur le plan idéologique. De plus, contrairement aux attentes, la plupart des partisans et des non-partisans ont modéré leurs positions. Ce chapitre examine les raisons potentielles de cet effet inattendu. Dans l’ensemble, ces résultats améliorent nos connaissances sur la manière dont les masses réagissent à la polarisation de l’élite et contribuent à dissiper les préoccupations des experts selon lesquelles les masses deviendraient elles-mêmes idéologiquement polarisées lorsque les partis politiques se polarisent. Le troisième chapitre empirique (chapitre 4) étend l’étude aux réactions affectives des citoyens. Les masses deviennent-elles affectivement plus polarisées lorsque la polarisation idéologique de l’élite augmente ? En se basant sur le contexte britannique, qui a connu une montée de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite en raison du virage à gauche du Parti travailliste et du conflit du Brexit en cours, ce chapitre constate qu’une augmentation de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite conduit à une polarisation affective plus élevée des masses, même parmi les partisans de l’opposition et ceux qui ne sont pas attachés à un parti (c’est-à-dire les indépendants). Les résultats montrent que l’effet de la polarisation de l’élite sur la polarisation affective des masses est davantage influencé par les sentiments envers le parti avec lequels identifient les individus que par les sentiments que ceux-ci entretiennent envers le parti opposé. Ces résultats suggèrent que la polarisation affective ne reflète pas nécessairement de l’animosité envers le parti opposé, mais peut fluctuer en raison des changements dans le niveau d’enthousiasme à l'égard de son propre parti. Ce chapitre constate également une relation causale bidirectionnelle entre la perception par des citoyens de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite et leur polarisation affective. Cela signifie que la polarisation affective est enracinée à la fois dans l’identité et l’idéologie. Les résultats suggèrent que la polarisation affective peut être tempérée dans une certaine mesure par une position modérée des partis, mais que certains niveaux de polarisation affective sont inhérents aux systems démocratiques. Les analyses présentées dans cette thèse permettent d'apporter une réponse claire mais nuancée concernant les préoccupations des experts concernant sur l’augmentation de la polarisation idéologique et ses effets potentiellement néfastes. La polarisation idéologique des élites a augmenté en Europe de l’Ouest. Cependant, l’augmentation de la polarisation idéologique des élites ne conduit pas nécessairement à une polarisation idéologique accrue des masses, bien qu’elle conduise à une polarisation affective accrue parmi les citoyens. Dans la mesure où des niveaux excessifs de polarisation affective peuvent compromettre les démocraties représentatives, il peut être raisonnable pour les experts de s’inquiéter de l’augmentation des niveaux de polarisation idéologique des élites. Cependant, si la polarisation affective ne représente pas une menace pour les démocraties représentatives et ne conduit pas au délitement du tissu social, il peut ne pas être nécessaire de s’inquiéter immédiatement de l’impact de la polarisation idéologique des élites sur ce phénomène. / There is a growing concern among experts and policymakers about the increasing elite ideological polarization due to its potential to push the masses to the extremes and exacerbate affective polarization. Are these concerns warranted? This dissertation has 3 standalone articles, each of which contributes to providing an answer to this overarching question. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) examines whether elite ideological polarization has increased over time in Western Europe. To do so, it focuses on party polarization (i.e., elite ideological polarization) on three dimensions (the economic, social, and European integration dimensions) simultaneously, as the post-industrialization transformation of the European political space has resulted in multi-dimensional politics that are not always aligned with each other. Additionally, it compares these trends to those based on the traditional left-right dimension. Using mean expert judgments from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey as an indicator of party positions, party polarization is measured based on the average dispersion of parties from the relative center of the political system. This chapter finds a trend towards more party polarization on the left-right, economic, and social dimensions, but not on the European integration dimension. Parties increasingly take more distinct positions from each other on economic and social issues, and the available ideological menu available to citizens has become more diverse over time. Moreover, it shows that party polarization on economic, social, and European integration dimensions moderately correlates with that on traditional left-right dimension while the correlations of party polarization on these dimensions are relatively weak. While left-right acts like a super-issue position that absorbs party positions on other dimensions, they are not necessarily aligned with each other. Having established that elite ideological polarization is on the rise in Western Europe, second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) turns to how the masses react to the increasing elite ideological polarization. Specifically, the question is whether elite ideological polarization leads to mass ideological polarization. When more extreme policy proposals are available to citizens, do they also adopt more extreme policy preferences? This chapter argues that masses become polarized through two mechanisms. Based on social identity theory, in-partisans should follow their party and adopt a more extreme ideological stance, while out-partisans should backlash and move in the opposite direction. Additionally, this chapter argues that whether in-partisans become polarized when their party does so depends on their spatial location relative to the party on the ideological scale. For example, only those who are perfectly aligned with the party or more right-wing than the party should follow the party to the left when it moves in that direction. This chapter tests these expectations in a real-world setting by relying on a quasi-experimental design. It leverages a sudden increase in elite ideological polarization that occurred when the Labour Party in the United Kingdom underwent a sudden position change when Jeremy Corbyn was elected as its new leader. Using British Election Study Internet Panel data, this chapter finds limited evidence that elite polarization leads to mass ideological polarization: Neither in-partisans nor out-partisans became more polarized following the change in the Labour Party’s position. Only a small minority of Labour partisans that were located to the right of the Labour Party followed the party by adopting a more left-wing ideological stance. Moreover, contrary to the expectations, I find that most in- and out-partisans moderated their positions. This chapter discusses the potential reasons for this unexpected effect. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) extends the investigation to citizens’ affective reactions. Do the masses become affectively more polarized when elite ideological polarization increases? Relying on the British context, which experienced a surge in elite ideological polarization as a result of both the leftward pivot of the Labour Party and the ongoing Brexit conflict, this chapter finds that an increase in elite ideological polarization leads to higher mass affective polarization, even among out-partisans (i.e., those who identify with the out-party) and those who lack partisan attachment (i.e., independents). The results show that the effect of elite polarization on affective mass polarization is driven more by in-party feelings than out-party feelings. These results suggest that affective polarization is not necessarily a reflection of out-party animosity, but can fluctuate due to changes in in-party enthusiasm. This chapter also finds a bidirectional causal relationship between how citizens perceive elite ideological polarization and how affectively polarized they are. This means that affective polarization is rooted both in identity and ideology. The findings suggest that affective polarization can be tamed to some extent by moderate position-taking by parties, but some levels of affective polarization are inherent in democratic systems. Coming back to whether pundits' concerns about growing ideological polarization is warranted, this dissertation provides a clear but a nuanced answer. Elite ideological polarization has increased in Western Europe. However, increasing elite ideological polarization does not necessarily lead to more ideologically polarized masses although it leads to more affectively polarized masses. To the extent that excessive levels of affective polarization can undermine representative democracies, it may be reasonable for pundits to express concern about rising levels of elite ideological polarization. However, if affective polarization does not pose a threat to representative democracies and does not hinder societal coexistence, then there may not be a need for immediate concern regarding the impact of elite ideological polarization on this phenomenon.