E-crimes continue to generate grave challenges to the ICT regulatory agenda. Because e-crimes involve a wrongful appropriation of information online, it is enquired whether information is property which is capable of being stolen. This then requires an investigation to be made of the law of property. The basis for this scrutiny is to establish if information is property for purposes of the law. Following a study of the Roman-Dutch law approach to property, it is argued that the emergence of an information society makes real rights in information possible. This is the position because information is one of the indispensable assets of an information society. Given the fact that information can be the object of property, its position in the law of theft is investigated. This study is followed by an examination of the conventional risks that ICTs generate. For example, a risk exists that ICTs may be used as the object of e-crimes. Furthermore, there is a risk that ICTs may become a tool in order to appropriate information unlawfully. Accordingly, the scale and impact of e-crimes is more than those of the offline crimes, for example theft or fraud. The severe challenges that ICTs pose to an information society are likely to continue if clarity is not sought regarding: whether ICTs can be regulated or not, if ICTs can be regulated, how should an ICT regulatory framework be structured? A study of the law and regulation for regulatory purposes reveals that ICTs are spheres where regulations apply or should apply. However, better regulations are appropriate in dealing with the dynamics of these technologies. Smart-regulations, meta-regulations or reflexive regulations, self-regulations and co-regulations are concepts that support better regulations. Better regulations enjoin the regulatory industries, for example the state, businesses and computer users to be involved in establishing ICT regulations. These ICT regulations should specifically be in keeping with the existing e-authentication measures. Furthermore, the codes-based theory, the Danger or Artificial Immune Systems (the AIS) theory, the Systems theory and the Good Regulator Theorem ought to inform ICT regulations. The basis for all this should be to establish a holistic approach to e-authentication. This approach must conform to the Precautionary Approach to E-Authentication or PAEA. PAEA accepts the importance of legal rules in the ICT regulatory agenda. However, it argues that flexible regulations could provide a suitable framework within which ICTs and the ICT risks are controlled. In addition, PAEA submit that a state should not be the single role-player in ICT regulations. Social norms, the market and nature or architecture of the technology to be regulated are also fundamental to the ICT regulatory agenda. / Jurisprudence / LL. D.

Les attaques massives par déni de service représentent une menace pour les services Internet. Ils impactent aussi les fournisseurs de service réseau et menace même la stabilité de l’Internet. Il y a donc un besoin pressant de contrôler les dommages causés par ces attaques. De nombreuses recherches ont été menées, mais aucune n’a été capable de combiner le besoin d’atténuation de l’attaque, avec l’obligation de continuité de service et les contraintes réseau. Les contre mesures proposées portent sur l’authentification des clients légitimes, le filtrage du trafic malicieux, une utilisation efficace des interconnections entre les équipements réseaux, ou l’absorption de l’attaque par les ressources disponibles. Dans cette thèse, nous proposons un mécanisme de contrôle de dommages. Basé sur une nouvelle signature d’attaque et les fonctions réseaux du standard Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), nous isolons le trafic malicieux du trafic légitime et appliquons des contraintes sur la transmission du trafic malicieux. Le but est de rejeter suffisamment de trafic d’attaque pour maintenir la stabilité du réseau tout en préservant le trafic légitime. La solution prend en compte des informations sur l’attaque, mais aussi les ressources réseaux. Considérant que les opérateurs réseaux n’ont pas une même visibilité sur leur réseau, nous étudions l’impact de contraintes opérationnelles sur l’efficacité d’une contre mesure régulièrement recommandée, le filtrage par liste noire. Les critères d’évaluation sont le niveau d’information sur l’attaque ainsi que sur le trafic réseau. Nous formulons des scénarios auxquels chaque opérateur peut s’identifier. Nous démontrons que la l’algorithme de génération des listes noires doit être choisi avec précaution afin de maximiser l’efficacité du filtrage / Massive Denial of Service attacks represent a genuine threat for Internet service, but also significantly impact network service providers and even threat the Internet stability. There is a pressing need to control damages caused by such attacks. Numerous works have been carried out, but were unable to combine the need for mitigation, the obligation to provide continuity of service and network constraints. Proposed countermeasures focus on authenticating legitimate traffic, filtering malicious traffic, making better use of interconnection between network equipment or absorbing attack with the help of available resources. In this thesis, we propose a damage control mechanism against volumetric Denial of Services. Based on a novel attack signature and with the help of Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network functions, we isolate malicious from legitimate traffic. We apply a constraint-based forwarding to malicious traffic. The goal is to discard enough attack traffic to sustain network stability while preserving legitimate traffic. It is not only aware of attack details but also network resource, especially available bandwidth. Following that network operators do not have equal visibility on their network, we also study the impact of operational constraints on the efficiency of a commonly recommended countermeasure, namely blacklist filtering. The operational criteria are the level of information about the attack and about the traffic inside the network. We then formulate scenario which operators can identify with. We demonstrate that the blacklist generation algorithm should be carefully chosen to fit the operator context while maximizing the filtering efficiency