Thesis (Ph. D.)--Open University. Author no. M7205110. BLDSC no. DX230734.

Dissertation (MBus) -- AUT University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references. Also held in print (ix, 113 leaves ; 30 cm.) in City Campus Theses Collection (T 658.4080951 LI)

Thesis (M.M.S. Accounting) -- University of Waikato, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 170-187) Also avaiable via the World Wide Web.

I develop a general equilibrium model to examine the innovation and welfare effects of expanding mandatory financial disclosure to a broader set of firms. In the model, disclosure by relatively small firms reveals proprietary information about their local markets, which helps larger firms enter and compete. Consistent with previous empirical findings, the model predicts that mandatory disclosure encourages (discourages) innovation by larger (smaller) firms. More importantly, I identify conditions for when expanding the scope of disclosure regulation increases aggregate innovation and/or welfare. I structurally estimate the model using innovation data and plausibly exogenous variation in the extent of disclosure regulation in Europe. My estimates suggest that subjecting 15% more firms to full reporting requirements decreases aggregate innovation by around -0.26% but increases welfare by around 1%. This disparity is driven by the fact that production shifts to larger firms that innovate less but are more efficient in exploiting the fruits of innovations.

金融危机中发达证券化市场出现的信息披露问题给新兴市场敲响了警钟。这些新兴市场意识到在引入证券化的有关结构性改革措施的同时，增加信息披露和市场透明度也十分重要。 / 首先，本文就金融危机中证券化所暴露的问题和危险进行分析。在证券化过程中存在的一系列结构和制度性问题中，有关基础资产质量和风险转移的信息披露和透明度不足。这个问题在金融危机中尤其突出，美国次贷市场中低质量的抵押贷款得以通过证券化将这些贷款的风险以一种复杂且不透明的方式散布到整个金融体系。 / 第二，本文首先回顾了信息披露在现代金融监管中的角色和作用。接着分析了证券化产品的信息披露的特殊性以及美国和欧盟采用的不同披露监管制度。次之，本文介绍了金融危机后各国就证券化信息披露制度的缺陷进行的改革措施。 / 第三，本文重点分析了中国证券化市场中的信息不对称问题，以及信息披露制度的严重缺陷。鉴于从金融危机中所获取的经验和教训，以及中国证券化市场的特点，本文通过对比分析来探讨一个健全的信息披露制度对新兴的中国证券化市场潜在的影响，以及该制度是否能支撑这个市场的健康和可持续发展。本研究最后提出具体建议来改进中国现有的证券化信息披露制度，这些建议将有助于减少证券化本身固有的风险。 / Disclosure failures exposed in mature securitization markets during the global financial crisis sent warnings to emerging markets. Those emerging markets learned that it is critical to improve disclosure and market transparency in addition to the introduction of broad structural reforms into the securitization process. / First, an investigation into the dangers associated with asset securitization shows a number of structural and institutional flaws in the securitization process. The lack of adequate disclosure and the poor level of transparency regarding asset quality and risk transfer were paramount. This became obvious during the 2007-09 financial crisis as the risks associated with low-quality residential mortgage loans in the United States were distributed along the securitization process to the entirety of the financial sector in a complex and relatively opaque way. / Second, I review of the role of disclosure in financial regulation. There will be an assessment of the special features of securitization-related disclosure regulation and the different disclosure regulatory systems adopted in the US and the EU. This will be followed by an introduction of post-crisis disclosure reform initiatives. / Thirdly, I will examine the poor level of market transparency and the lack of adequate disclosure requirements. This leads to an analysis of the consequent information asymmetry problems that are endemic to the Chinese securitization market. Based on lessons drawn from the financial crisis and the unique characteristics of the Chinese securitization market, I then explore from a comparative point of view the potential impact of a comprehensive and sound disclosure regime and examine whether it can support a sustainable and healthy development for the emerging Chinese securitization market. This study concludes with specific proposals that aim to promote the effectiveness of disclosure and transparency for the purpose of curtailing risks inherent in securitization in the Chinese Context. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Tan, Fugui. / "November 2012." / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / 摘要 --- p.iii / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / Table of Abbreviations --- p.v / List of Diagrams and Tables --- p.vii / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Rationale and Research Questions --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- General --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.2 --- Information Problems in Securitization Processes and Markets --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1.3 --- Disclosure and Securitization --- p.4 / Chapter 1.1.4 --- Securitization Disclosure Regulation in China --- p.5 / Chapter 1.1.5 --- Research Questions --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2 --- Organization --- p.9 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Methodology --- p.10 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Securitization and Its Evolution --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- An Overview of Securitization --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- General --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Definition and Transaction Structure --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Transaction Parties and Structural Issues --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2.3.1 --- General --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2.3.2 --- Originator / Sponsor --- p.18 / Chapter 2.2.3.3 --- The Issuing Entity - SPV --- p.20 / Chapter 2.2.3.4 --- Credit Rating Agencies --- p.22 / Chapter 2.2.3.5 --- Arranger / Underwriter --- p.23 / Chapter 2.2.3.6 --- Servicer --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.3.7 --- Trustee --- p.25 / Chapter 2.2.3.8 --- Legal Counsel --- p.26 / Chapter 2.2.3.9 --- Structural Issues --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3 --- Main Legal Issues and Challenges --- p.31 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- General --- p.31 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- The Validity of the Asset Transfer --- p.32 / Chapter 2.3.2.1 --- True Sale --- p.32 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- Alternatives to True Sale --- p.35 / Chapter 2.3.2.3 --- Re-characterization --- p.39 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Bankruptcy Remoteness --- p.40 / Chapter 2.3.3.1 --- Bankruptcy Remoteness of the SPV --- p.40 / Chapter 2.3.3.2 --- Risk of Substantive Consolidation --- p.41 / Chapter 2.4 --- Legal Documentation in the Securitization Process --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- General --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Transfer Agreements --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Trust Deeds --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- Servicing Agreements --- p.45 / Chapter 2.4.5 --- Offering Circulars and Prospectuses --- p.45 / Chapter 2.4.6 --- Other Documentation --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5 --- The Rationale of Securitization --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- General --- p.46 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Balance Sheet Considerations --- p.47 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Cheaper Funding --- p.51 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- Matching Assets and Liabilities --- p.52 / Chapter 2.5.5 --- Obtaining A Varied Investor Base --- p.53 / Chapter 2.5.6 --- Risk Management --- p.53 / Chapter 2.5.7 --- Making Profits through Arbitrage --- p.54 / Chapter 2.6 --- The Evolution of Securitization --- p.54 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- General --- p.54 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Securitization and Structured Finance --- p.55 / Chapter 2.6.3 --- The Variety of Asset Types and Securitized Products --- p.56 / Chapter 2.6.3.1 --- General --- p.56 / Chapter 2.6.3.2 --- MBSs --- p.57 / Chapter 2.6.3.3 --- ABSs --- p.57 / Chapter 2.6.3.4 --- CDOs --- p.58 / Chapter 2.6.4 --- Static and Dynamic Securitization Structures --- p.61 / Chapter 2.6.4.1 --- Static Structure --- p.61 / Chapter 2.6.4.2 --- Dynamic Structure --- p.61 / Chapter 2.6.5 --- International Diffusion of Securitization --- p.64 / Chapter 2.7 --- Conclusion --- p.68 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- Information Failures in Securitization: the Example of the 2007-09 Financial Crisis --- p.71 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.71 / Chapter 3.2 --- From the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown to the Financial Crisis --- p.73 / Chapter 3.3 --- Information Asymmetries in Mortgage Securitization Markets --- p.83 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- General --- p.83 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Information Asymmetries at the Loan-Origination Level --- p.84 / Chapter 3.3.2.1 --- Originator’s Information Advantage --- p.84 / Chapter 3.3.2.2 --- Problems of the Originate-To-Distribute Model --- p.86 / Chapter 3.3.2.3 --- Moral Hazard in the Mortgage Markets --- p.91 / Chapter 3.3.2.4 --- The Failure of Preventive Mechanisms --- p.93 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Information Asymmetries in the Securitization Process --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3.3.1 --- General --- p.96 / Chapter 3.3.3.2 --- Information Asymmetries between Securitizers and Investors --- p.97 / Chapter 3.3.3.3 --- Information Asymmetries between Servicers and Investors --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.3.4 --- Limitations of US Disclosure Regulation --- p.101 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Information Failures Caused by the Complexity of Securitized Products --- p.107 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Information Failures in the Credit Rating Process --- p.111 / Chapter 3.3.5.1 --- General --- p.111 / Chapter 3.3.5.2 --- The Role of Credit Ratings in the Securitization Industry --- p.112 / Chapter 3.3.5.3 --- Information Failure in the Credit Rating Industry --- p.114 / Chapter 3.3.6 --- The Impacts of Insufficient Disclosure during the Financial Crisis --- p.119 / Chapter 3.4 --- Conclusion --- p.121 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Disclosure and Securitization --- p.124 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.124 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Role of Disclosure in Financial Markets --- p.125 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- General --- p.125 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Protection of Investors --- p.128 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Promotion of Market Efficiency --- p.129 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Reduction of Systemic Risk --- p.132 / Chapter 4.2.5 --- Disclosure Based Regulatory System versus Merit Based Regulatory System --- p.133 / Chapter 4.3 --- Securitization Disclosure Regulation --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- The Characteristics of Securitization Disclosure Regulation --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1.1 --- General --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1.2 --- Assets versus the Issuing Entity --- p.136 / Chapter 4.3.1.3 --- Vertical versus Horizontal --- p.138 / Chapter 4.3.1.4 --- Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure --- p.139 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- US and EU Disclosure Requirements for Public Offerings of Asset-Backed Securities --- p.141 / Chapter 4.3.2.1 --- General --- p.141 / Chapter 4.3.2.2 --- US Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure --- p.142 / Chapter 4.3.2.3 --- EU Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure --- p.144 / Chapter 4.3.2.4 --- Information on Transaction Parties in US and EU ABS Prospectuses --- p.147 / Chapter 4.3.2.5 --- Information on Transaction Structures in US and EU ABS Prospectuses --- p.152 / Chapter 4.3.2.6 --- Information on the Underlying Assets in US and EU ABS Prospectuses --- p.154 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Post-Issuance Disclosure: EU Post-Issuance Reporting and US Ongoing Reporting --- p.155 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- A Comparison between the EU and US Disclosure Regulations --- p.157 / Chapter 4.4 --- Policy Initiatives for the Improvement of Securitization Disclosure --- p.160 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- An Overview of Policy Initiatives --- p.160 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Enhancing Disclosure on the Underlying Assets --- p.163 / Chapter 4.4.2.1 --- Asset-Level Information --- p.163 / Chapter 4.4.2.2 --- Enhancing Disclosure for the Due Diligence Efforts of the Issuer --- p.166 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Enhancing Disclosure on Transaction Structures --- p.167 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Efficient and Smart Disclosure --- p.168 / Chapter 4.4.5 --- Improved Disclosure on Credit Ratings --- p.170 / Chapter 4.4.6 --- Disclosure in Private Markets --- p.172 / Chapter 4.5 --- Interaction between Disclosure and Other Policy Initiatives --- p.173 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- General --- p.174 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- Reducing Conflict of Interests --- p.174 / Chapter 4.5.3 --- Product Standardization and Simplification --- p.177 / Chapter 4.5.4 --- Improving Credit Ratings --- p.178 / Chapter 4.5.5 --- The Interaction between Disclosure and other Policy Initiatives --- p.179 / Chapter 4.6 --- Conclusion --- p.180 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Securitization Practices and Laws in China --- p.182 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.182 / Chapter 5.2 --- An Overview of the Economic Reforms in China --- p.183 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Economic Reforms in China since 1978 --- p.183 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- SOE Reforms --- p.185 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Banking Reforms --- p.190 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- The Development of Capital Markets --- p.195 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Introduction of Securitization in China --- p.201 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- General --- p.201 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Stage I (1990s -2004): From Offshore Securitization Deals to Domestic Experiments --- p.202 / Chapter 5.3.2.1 --- General --- p.202 / Chapter 5.3.2.2 --- Offshore Securitization Deals --- p.202 / Chapter 5.3.2.3 --- Domestic Securitization Experiments - NPL Deals --- p.205 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Stage II (2005- present): Pilot Securitization Programs in China --- p.207 / Chapter 5.3.3.1 --- The Emergence of the Interbank Securitization Market --- p.207 / Chapter 5.3.3.2 --- Securitization by Non-Financial Institutions: Special Asset Management Plan (SAMP) --- p.215 / Chapter 5.4 --- Legal Framework for Securitization in China --- p.220 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- General --- p.220 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Stage I: (1990s -2004) --- p.221 / Chapter 5.4.2.1 --- Specific SPV Issues --- p.221 / Chapter 5.4.2.2 --- True Sale --- p.223 / Chapter 5.4.2.3 --- Transfer of Security Interests --- p.224 / Chapter 5.4.2.4 --- Tax and Accounting Issues --- p.227 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Stage II: 2005 - Present --- p.228 / Chapter 5.4.3.1 --- The Legal Framework for the Interbank Securitization Market --- p.228 / Chapter 5.4.3.2 --- The Legal Framework for SAMPs --- p.249 / Chapter 5.5 --- Problems of A Sustainable Development of Securitization in China in Light of --- p.the / Chapter Global --- Financial Crisis --- p.254 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- General --- p.254 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Insufficient Information Disclosure --- p.255 / Chapter 5.5.3 --- Overreliance on Rating Agencies --- p.257 / Chapter 5.5.4 --- Moral Hazard Problem --- p.259 / Chapter 5.6 --- Conclusion --- p.260 / Chapter Chapter 6 --- Sustainable Securitization Disclosure Regulation in China: Status, Problems, and Suggestions --- p.262 / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.262 / Chapter 6.2 --- Disclosure Regulations in China’s Interbank Securitization Market --- p.264 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- General --- p.264 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Parties Responsible for the Information Disclosure --- p.267 / Chapter 6.2.2.1 --- The Legal Framework --- p.267 / Chapter 6.2.2.2 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.271 / Chapter 6.2.2.3 --- Suggestions --- p.272 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Disclosure Requirements related to Prospectuses --- p.273 / Chapter 6.2.3.1 --- General --- p.273 / Chapter 6.2.3.2 --- Information on Transaction Parties --- p.275 / Chapter 6.2.3.3 --- Information on Transaction Structures and Asset-Backed Securities --- p.277 / Chapter 6.2.3.4 --- Information on the Underlying Assets --- p.281 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Ongoing Reporting --- p.289 / Chapter 6.2.4.1 --- General --- p.289 / Chapter 6.2.4.2 --- The Legal Framework --- p.290 / Chapter 6.2.4.3 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.291 / Chapter 6.2.4.4 --- Legal Practice and Problems --- p.292 / Chapter 6.2.4.5 --- Suggestions --- p.293 / Chapter 6.2.5 --- Disclosure in Relation to Credit Ratings --- p.295 / Chapter 6.2.5.1 --- General --- p.295 / Chapter 6.2.5.2 --- The Legal Framework --- p.295 / Chapter 6.2.5.3 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.296 / Chapter 6.2.5.4 --- Legal Practice and Problems --- p.296 / Chapter 6.2.5.5 --- Suggestions --- p.297 / Chapter 6.2.6 --- General Principles --- p.297 / Chapter 6.2.6.1 --- General --- p.297 / Chapter 6.2.6.2 --- The Legal Framework --- p.298 / Chapter 6.2.6.3 --- Problems of the Legal Framework --- p.299 / Chapter 6.2.6.4 --- Legal Practice and Problems --- p.300 / Chapter 6.2.6.5 --- Suggestions --- p.302 / Chapter 6.3 --- A Feasible Disclosure Approach for China’s Securitization Regulation --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- General --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- The Transferability of Foreign Disclosure Models to China --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.2.1 --- Legal Transplants --- p.311 / Chapter 6.3.2.2 --- Transplanting Foreign Disclosure Models to China --- p.315 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- A Hybrid of Disclosure Based and Merit Based System --- p.319 / Chapter 6.3.3.1 --- General --- p.319 / Chapter 6.3.3.2 --- Merits of Merit Based Approach for China’s Securitization Regulation --- p.320 / Chapter 6.3.3.3 --- Excursus: Improving Current Merit Based System --- p.323 / Chapter 6.4 --- The Implementation of Disclosure Regulation --- p.325 / Chapter 6.5 --- Conclusion --- p.328 / Chapter Chapter 7 --- Final Remarks --- p.330 / Reference List --- p.336 / Chapter Part I. --- Chinese-Language Literature and Legal Instruments --- p.336 / Chapter 1. --- Books, Book Chapters and Articles --- p.336 / Chapter 2. --- ABS Prospectuses, Trustee Reports, and Credit Rating Reports --- p.341 / Chapter 3. --- Chinese Laws and other Legal Instruments --- p.342 / Chapter a. --- Laws by the National People’s Congress and Its Standing Committee --- p.342 / Chapter b. --- Administrative Regulations by the State Council and Departmental Administrative Rules by the Ministries --- p.344 / Chapter Part II. --- English-Language Literature and Legal Instruments --- p.348 / Chapter 1. --- Books, Book Chapters and Articles --- p.348 / Chapter 2. --- Laws and Other Legal Instruments --- p.375

This thesis extends the literature on institutional accounting by providing a new channel---proprietary information leakage between competitors---through which institutions affect accounting attributes and information disclosure. Weak property rights protection exacerbates outflow of proprietary information on operation, thus reduces managers' incentive to disclose financial information and other operation related information since the disclosed information will be helpful for competitors to learn more about proprietary information on operation of the firm. The channel is built with two links. One is the link between property rights protection and R&D spillovers, which proxy for proprietary information disclosure, and the other is the link between R&D spillovers and transparency. Empirical results show that R&D spillovers are negatively associated with regional property rights protection. In addition, I find that innovation output depends less on in house R&D investment and more on R&D spillovers from competitors in regions with weak property rights protection than in regions with strong protection and that the level of R&D expenditures is positively associated with property rights protection. Some evidence is found that firms with more R&D spillovers are more likely to have opaque earnings and disclose less firm-specific information. The relationship is stronger in regions with weak property rights protection than in regions with strong protection, indicating that firms are more likely to utilize opacity to prevent proprietary information leakage when R&D spillovers are large. / Yu, Xin. / Adviser: Joseph P. H. Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2123. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 72-79). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

by Fung Pak-Wai Patrick. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45-47). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS --- p.v / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vi / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.vii / CHAPTER / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- BANKING STRUCTURE AND THE DISCLOSURE CHANGE --- p.4 / Pre-1994 disclosure requirement --- p.5 / Reasons for Change --- p.9 / New Disclosure Requirement --- p.11 / Comparison with the disclosure requirement of IAS 30 --- p.13 / Chapter III. --- EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.18 / Chapter IV. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.21 / The Sample --- p.21 / The Data --- p.22 / The Models --- p.23 / Chapter V. --- FINDINGS --- p.26 / Comparison of Predicted with Actual Returns During the Issuance Period --- p.26 / Disaggregation of the Sample: Significance Tests --- p.30 / Interpretation of Results --- p.32 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.33 / APPENDIX --- p.34 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.45

This study examines the usefulness of general price level information (GPL) and current cost information (CC) originally provided by SFAS No. 33 as compared to historical cost information (HC) in predicting bankruptcy. The study also examines the usefulness of GPL data versus CC data when each supplements HC data. In addition, this study tests the usefulness of the three types of information systems combined in one model (HC, GPL, and CC) versus HC data in predicting bankruptcy. The study focuses on the predictability of business failure using financial ratios as predictors. A comparison of these predictors is made in order to identify the accounting system that yields a better prediction of bankruptcy. Two multivariate statistical techniques, multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) and logistic regression analysis (LRA), are used to derive the ex—post classification and the ex-ante prediction results. Six functions are developed, based on ratios computed with HC, CC, GPL, the combined HC and GPL, the combined HC and CC, and the combined HC, GPL, and CC. The resulting functions are used to classify 40 firms as failed or nonfailed. The analysis is repeated for three time bases—one, two, and three years before bankruptcy. The main results of the various analyses indicate that the combined HC and CC model has more discriminant power than does the HC, the GPL, or the combined HC and GPL models in each of the three years before bankruptcy. The results also show that there are significant differences in the overall classification rate derived from the combined HC, GPL, and CC model and the HC model, the GPL model, or the combined HC and GPL model . The differences between the combined HC and CC and the combined HC, GPL, and CC models are not significant in each of the three years before bankruptcy. The results also indicate that the differences in the the performance of MDA and LRA are not significant except in the second year before bankruptcy when the combined HC and GPL model is used.

M.Comm. / The study is an examination of current practices with regard to financial reporting to employees. International developments and disclosure requirements are examined at the outset. Generally Accepted Accounting Practice in South Africa, like in most other countries of the world, does not require disclosure of financial information to employees. The study clearly showed that employees do have a need for financial information and that this need deserves to be addressed, while taking the skills levels of the South African labour force into consideration. The study suggests a reporting framework geared to the specific needs of the employee as one of the many users of financial information. It is suggested that the value-added statement and employment report be part of reporting to the employees of a company. The value-added statement reports on income earned by a widely defined group of people, whereas the income statement reports on income earned for the shareholders. The value-added statement quantifies value added to the organisation by employees of the organisation. The employment report enables employees to measure returns and risks within their employer organisation in order to evaluate expectations regarding years of service, for example. The practical implications of such a reporting framework are considered. Various benefits and disadvantages of the value added statement and employment report are examined. The writer looks at the employee report of Alusaf Limited and evaluates the report given the information needs of employees. South Africa has a huge labour force to utilise and therefore each organisation should strive to meet the reasonable information needs of labour in South Africa. An honest effort to disclose relevant information to employees will be a positive step in creating better relationships with labour considering the volatile labour relations in South Africa during recent years. At the end of the study the writer comes to the following conclusions: • Employees with their specific information needs, as AC 000 defined users of financial statements, should be recognised. • The different competency levels of employees should be considered when publishing an employee report. • There are advantages for both companies and employees when publishing financial information to employees. • The value-added statement and employment report will contribute to the information needs of employees being met. • There are companies in South Africa who are concerned about the information needs of their employees. • It is no longer a matter of acting politically correct, it is essential for companies in South Africa to publish financial information for their employees.

I examine how managerial reputation affects the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures and how the market reacts to non-GAAP earnings disclosures associated with managerial reputation. Although there was an initial dip in the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures after SOX and Regulation G, the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures has increased in recent years (Brown, Christensen, Elliott and Mergenthaler 2012). Motivated by the efficient contracting theory and managerial reputation incentives, I investigate whether reputable managers are associated with higher quality non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I also investigate whether the market is more responsive to non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers. Using empirical models modified from prior research, I find that reputable managers are less likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the efficient contracting explanation. I also find that reputable managers exclude more recurring items that are related to future operating earnings when they disclose non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the rent extraction explanation in prior research. Finally, I find that managerial reputation has an incremental effect on the market reaction and that the market is more responsive to non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers if the unexpected earnings are positive. The study contributes to both non-GAAP earnings disclosures literature and managerial reputation incentives literature. It also has implications for investors, managers, and regulators. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection