Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: D. Eric Hirst. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 131-141).

When children are sexually abused it usually takes place in concealment. This means that unless the child reveals the abuse, it will remain hidden. This study commences with an examination of the reasons as to why a child may delay the disclosure of sexual abuse. The result of research indicates that there are certain recognisable reasons, which are frequently encountered, as to why a child may either delay telling anyone about his or her experience or as to why s/he may never tell anyone. Traditional assumptions of what are considered normal reactions to sexual abuse are tested. The discussion then moves on to considering the approach of the South African courts in regard to evaluating the manner and timing of a child’s revelations, as well as to considering the impact which a delay may have on the acceptance of that child’s evidence. Intrinsic to this analysis is the progress made in our courts, and by the legislature, in recognising factors that influence a child to either blurt out the information immediately or conceal it for a period of time. Thereafter, the testimony of 97 child victims of sexual abuse is analysed with a view to determining whether these children fit the profiles raised in research on the subject and described in some of the case law. The rate of attrition in cases of sexual offences against children is considered as well as the role that cross-examination plays in either enhancing or reducing a child’s ability to accurately describe an acceptable motivation for the delay in disclosure. The study concludes with a discussion of how well child victims are served in a legal environment designed to provide a forum for eliciting the truth from a child witness. The use of intermediaries and the impact of cross-examination is discussed as well as the ability of judicial officers to adjudicate in matters requiring highly specialized knowledge and experience.

This dissertation studies topics in the areas of information in financial markets. In the first chapter, Should Information be Sold Separately? Evidence from MiFID II, we examine whether selling information separately improves its production. We use a recent regulation in Europe (MiFID II) that unbundles research from transactions to investigate this question. We show that unbundling causes fewer research analysts to cover a firm. This decrease does not come from small- or mid-cap firms but is concentrated in large firms. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the reduction in the coverage quantity is accompanied by an increase in the coverage quality. Further analyses suggest that the enhancement of analyst competition could drive the results: inaccurate analysts drop out (extensive margin) and analysts who stay produce better-quality research (intensive margin). Our findings suggest that selling information separately improves information quality at the cost of reducing information quantity. The second chapter, Going Public or Staying Private: The Cost of Mandated Transparency, focuses on how transparency requirements in public markets affect firms' decisions to go public or stay private. Public markets are transparent institutions, where disclosure is mandatory, and order flows observable. We show that transparency can lead to insufficient information acquisition and inefficient investment. Transparency of order flows in public markets discourages information acquisition. Insufficient information acquisition then exacerbates the cost of imperfect disclosure. When the short-term disclosable signal diverges from the long-run value of a project, entrepreneurs prefer opaque private markets where investors can bargain over the costs of acquiring information. Our model links a firm's preference for public markets to the quality of disclosure metrics. Imperfect communication between investors and entrepreneurs caused by market transparency is a mechanism by which mandatory disclosure may destroy value, leading firms to remain private. In the third chapter, Active and Passive Funds: An Equilibrium Analysis, we provide a benchmark model to analyze investors' equilibrium choices and the welfare consequences of active and passive investing. Active investing is costly, but it brings two benefits: investors can better hedge by freely trading each asset in the portfolio and can acquire information about the possible state of the world. Information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes. Investors will become active until the net value of being active shrinks to zero. We show that when the cost of acquiring information is low, equilibrium features the coexistence of informed active investors and passive investors. When the cost of acquiring information rises, informed active, uninformed active and passive investors could coexist. Finally, if the cost of being uninformed active is sufficiently low, passive investing is dominated by active investing. The benchmark model allows future research to explore whether the market equilibrium induces the optimal level of information acquisition and active investment.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Hamburg, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 270-290).

Thesis (MCur)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Understanding the incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS is important in addressing the ongoing epidemic. Understanding which factors influence the rate of transmission of the virus is critical in attempting to contain and ultimately eradicate the disease. Determining which factors influence a person’s decision to disclose his/her positive status to others, particularly the sexual partner, is essential in understanding this complex process and thereby improving disclosure rates. The aim of the study was to investigate which factors influence the disclosure of someone’s HIV positive status. The objectives were to determine whether aspects such as socio-demographic factors, stigma and discrimination, religion, culture, fear of abandonment and rejection as well as knowledge of the disease influences disclosure rates. These objectives were met through an in-depth descriptive correlational research design with a quantitative approach. The target population (N = 1200/100%) consisted of all the HIV infected clients who attended a Community Health Clinic (CHC) for HIV management in the Cape Metropolitan area. The convenience sampling method was used to select the sample of participants (n = 150/12.5%) who met the criteria and voluntarily agreed to participate in the study. A self-administered questionnaire was used consisting of mainly closed-ended questions, with a limited number of open-ended questions. Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the Health Research Ethics Committee at the Faculty of Health Sciences, Stellenbosch University. Permission was obtained from the City of Cape Town: City Health, to conduct the research. Informed consent was obtained from each participant. Reliability and validity were supported by a pilot study which was conducted on (n=15/10%) of participants at this CHC to assure the feasibility of the study. The data was analysed with the support of a statistician and was presented with histograms and frequency tables. Statistical associations were determined between the various variables. The qualitative data obtained from the open-ended questions were grouped in trends and analysed thematically and then these trends were quantified. The results show that there are numerous factors which influenced HIV status disclosure. The fear of stigmatisation was identified as a factor which influences HIV disclosure to others, especially among the male participants. The results revealed that this was the major reason for delayed or non-disclosure, as well as the fear of rejection and blame. The results showed that awareness of the sexual partner’s HIV status remained relatively low (n = 64/43%), with awareness of the partner’s status highest among married participants. The recommendations were to assure that HIV positive individuals have access to support groups and are given an opportunity to attend multiple counselling sessions. Community based initiatives are needed to reduce stigmatisation of individuals with HIV and to improve access to social support systems. It was concluded that disclosure is a multifaceted process and one particular factor does not necessarily influence disclosure of a HIV positive status but most often a combination of factors. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Dit is belangrik om die verspreiding en voorkoms van MIV/VIGS te verstaan om die gesprek rondom die voortdurende epidemie aan te roer. Kennis van watter faktore die snelheid beïnvloed waarteen die virus oorgedra word, is krities in ’n poging om dit onder beheer te hou en uiteindelik uit te wis. Om te bepaal watter faktore ’n mens se besluit beïnvloed om jou positiewe status van MIV aan andere bekend te maak, veral aan ’n seksuele maat, is dit belangrik om die kompleksiteit van die proses te begryp en sodoende die pas van bekendmaking te verbeter. Die doel van die studie is om te bepaal watter faktore beïnvloed die bekendmaking van ’n MIV positiewe status. Die doelwitte is om vas te stel of aspekte soos sosio-demografiese faktore, stigma en diskriminasie, godsdiens, kultuur, vrees vir verlating en verwerping en kennis van die siekte, die insidensie van bekendmaking beïnvloed. ’n Beskrywende korrelatiewe navorsingsontwerp met ’n kwantitatiewe benadering is toegepas. Die teikengroep (N=1200/100%) het bestaan uit al die MIV geïnfekteerde persone wat ’n Gemeenskapgesondheidskliniek vir die bestuur van MIV in die Kaapse Metropolitaanse area besoek het. Die gerieflikheidssteekproef metode is gebruik om die steekproef van deelnemers (n=150/12.5%) te kies wat vrywillig ingestem het om aan die kriteria vir die studie te voldoen. ’n Self-geadministreerde vraelys was gebruik wat hoofsaaklik uit geslote vrae met ’n beperkte aantal ope vrae bestaan. Etiese goedkeuring vir die studie is verkry van die Gesondheidsnavorsing se Etiese Komitee by die Fakulteit van Gesondheidswetenskappe, Universiteit van Stellenbosch. Toestemming is verkry van die stad Kaapstad: Stad Gesondheid, om die navorsing uit te voer. Ingeligte toestemming is van die deelnemers verkry. Betroubaarheid en geldigheid is ondersteun deur ’n loodsstudie wat op (n=15/10%) van die deelnemers beoefen is by die Gemeenskapsgesondheidkliniek om die uitvoerbaarheid van die studie te verseker.Die data is geanaliseer met die ondersteuning van ’n statistikus en is deur histogramme en frekwensie-tabelle voorgestel. Statistiese assosiasies is vasgestel tussen die verskeie veranderlikes. Die kwalitatiewe data is geneem vanuit ope vrae wat gegroepeer is in neigings en tematies geanaliseer is en die neigings is hierna gekwantifiseer. Die uitslae bewys dat daar heelwat faktore is wat die bekendmaking van MIV statusstatus beïnvloed. Die vrees vir stigmatisering is geïdentifiseer as ’n faktor met betrekking tot die bekendmaking van MIV aan andere, veral onder die manlike deelnemers. Die uitslae bewys dat dit die hoofrede vir terughoudendheid of nie-bekendmaking van die siekte is, asook die vrees vir ververwerping en blaam. Die resultate bewys dat die bewustheid van die seksuele maat se MIV statusstatus relatief laag bly (n=64/43%) met bewustheid van die maat se status die hoogste onder getroude deelnemers. Die aanbevelings is om te verseker dat MIV positiewe individue toegang het tot ondersteuningsgroepe en dat hulle geleentheid gegee word om veelvuldige voorligtingsessies by te woon. Gemeenskapgebaseerde inisiatiewe is nodig om stigmatisering van individue met MIV te verminder en vir die verbetering van toegang tot maatskaplike ondersteuningsisteme. Ter samevatting kan die gevolgtrekking gemaak word, dat; die bekend making van MIV positiewe status word nie noodwendig beïnvloed deur ʼn spesifieke faktor of meervlakkige besluitnemings proses nie, maar eerder deur ʼn kombinasie van faktore.

published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

M.Com. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Informational problems are prevalent in political organizations. To understand incentive structures, transparency and policy expertise in political organizations, we need to examine their informational problems. This collection of essays is a contribution to the theory and application of information revelation in political organizations. In Chapter 1, I develop a theory of office incentives in a setting in which agents’ effort is crucial for learning policy information. Many organizations, such as government agencies and NGOs, learn about policy effectiveness through de- centralized experimentation. However, unobserved effort by an agent can affect the outcome of an experiment, thus limiting its informativeness. A principal can improve the informativeness of an experiment by motivating the agent, using of- fice as an incentive. The principal may keep the agent in office only when the outcome of an experiment is good, thereby creating high-powered office incen- tives for the agent. High-powered office incentives motivate the agent’s effort in implementing the experiment in order to stay in office. However, they also reduce the agent’s expected informational benefits from experimentation, which can reduce the effort expended by the agent in implementing the experiment. The degree to which the agent values achieving organizational goals affects such trade-offs. I show that the principal is more likely to use high-powered incentives when the agent places a high value on achieving organizational goals and when multiple agents implement the same experiment. In Chapter 2, I analyze a model where an autocrat may choose transparency in disclosing information to members of ruling group, particular information per- taining to the effectiveness of valence-policy by her. The effectiveness of the au- tocrat’s policy directly reflects her competence. The members’ belief about auto- crat’s competence in valence-policy making affects their support. If the autocrat is transparent about policy effectiveness, particularly tell the truth of an ineffec- tive policy, a favorable message of policy effectiveness will be convincing. The members will support the autocrat upon receiving a favorable message thereby. However, transparency also means a higher frequency of unfavorable message which leads to the withdrawal of support by the members of ruling group. The model shows the effect of intra elite conflicts on transparency. When the rul- ing faction doesn’t depend much on the autocrat, the autocrat tends to be more transparent. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of ideological conflict among competing factions and transparency. As conflict increases, transparency increases up to a threshold. Beyond this threshold, in- creased conflict is associated with reduced transparency. In addition, the model has implications on quality of bureaucracies that gather and report information. Finally, in Chapter 3, I study how political polarization at the mass level af- fects politicians’ policy making in common value issues. In the model, politicians representing two groups of voters with divergent ideologies compete for office. Voters have limited information about policy as well as politicians’ competence in policy making. After observing the incumbent’s policy choice, voters make voting decisions. I study two variations of election. First, there is a majority group and a minority group in the society. Second, society is composed of two competitive groups. In both variations, I show that in a society with a high level of polariza- tion, the incumbent politician is more likely to exercise her expertise regarding common value issues.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.