I investigate why the majority of firms do not issue earnings warnings in the face of upcoming earnings disappointments. SEC Rule 10b-5 imposes a duty on managers to correct or update when they discover that prior disclosures are misleading. I posit that managers assess the 10b-5 duty to disclose based on private information about optimism and misstatements embedded in their prior disclosures. Specifically, I hypothesize that managers who did not issue forecasts or managers who previously issued non-optimistic forecasts are more likely to be silent about upcoming earnings disappointments than managers who previously issued optimistic forecasts. I also hypothesize that managers who perceive that prior disclosures include misstatements that are difficult to verify in the court are more likely to remain silent than are managers who perceive that prior disclosures include misstatements that are easy to verify in the court. My results support these hypotheses. In additional tests, after controlling for the endogeneity between warnings and the likelihood of litigation, I find that earnings warnings issued by managers who perceive that they are not bound by a duty to disclose increase litigation risk. I also find that warnings by firms with misstatements containing less verifiable information do not reduce settlement costs when these firms are sued. Overall, my evidence indicates that when managers perceive that they have no duty to disclose, their earnings warnings are likely to have an adverse impact on litigation risk and, thus, managers are likely to remain silent to avoid this outcome. / published_or_final_version / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Washington State University, August 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 122-137).

The real-life disclosure of sensitive information is associated with intra- and interpersonal benefits in the disclosure literature, but the current work suggests it is often associated with regret. In Chapter 1, an overview is provided of the disclosure literature, and common constructs across sub-disciplines are identified and categorized on select attributes. A general process model of disclosure is proposed. Chapter 2 features empirical examination of factors that contribute to regret following the disclosure of sensitive information. Across five survey-based studies, the qualities of 11,854 disclosures from 974 participants are correlated with participants' reports of post-disclosure regret and gladness. Specific qualities of disclosure are identified that are associated with post-disclosure regret, including that people disclose unintentionally. Conclusions from these studies suggest that planning the disclosure of sensitive information is associated with less post-disclosure regret.

Huang, Fang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-39). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 2. --- Review of literatures and regulations --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1. --- MBO in the US --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2. --- MBO in China --- p.14 / Chapter 3. --- Data selection and sources --- p.16 / Chapter 4. --- Announcement effect of MBO --- p.17 / Chapter 4.1. --- Research method --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2. --- Group division of MBO companies --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.1. --- Division rules --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.2. --- Apparent MBO: significant negative --- p.19 / Chapter 4.2.3. --- Founder buyouts: significant positive --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2.4. --- Other groups: insignificant positive but not representative for MBO effect --- p.20 / Chapter 4.3. --- Factor analysis --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.1. --- Year: before 2003/ after 2003 (include 2003) --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.2. --- Underlying asset: parent company / the listing company itself --- p.22 / Chapter 4.3.3. --- ESOP participation: Yes/No --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3.4. --- Competitive purchaser: Yes/No --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3.5. --- Results: Success / Failure --- p.24 / Chapter 4.4. --- Summary of announcement effect --- p.25 / Chapter 5. --- Evidence on profitability and pricing --- p.25 / Chapter 5.1. --- Data and methodology --- p.26 / Chapter 5.2. --- Profitability of MBO companies --- p.28 / Chapter 5.3. --- DuPont analysis of companies with successful MBO --- p.29 / Chapter 5.4. --- Dividend payment --- p.31 / Chapter 5.5. --- Shareholder´ةs returns --- p.32 / Chapter 5.6. --- MBO pricing and pre-MBO behavior of NAV --- p.33 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.33

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Emory University, 2007. / Adviser: Grace Pownall. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Freiburg Universität, 2006/07. / Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Antioch University, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed April 3, 2007). Advisor: Carolyn B. Kenny. Keywords: self-disclosure, leaders, hermeneutic phenomenology, self-awareness, communication, gender. Includes bibliographical references (p. 262-274).

Thesis ( Ph.D. ) -- University of Texas at Arlington, 2008.

This dissertation consists of two essays in the area of corporate voluntary disclosure of predecision information. The first essay entitled, "Disclosure Choice in a Duopoly", focusses on the phenomenon of partial disclosure, where the manager of the firm discloses selected signals and withholds the rest. The manager may or may not receive private information which is related to both firm-specific and industry-wide common factors. The motivation for disclosure (non-disclosure) is derived from the proprietary nature of the manager's private information. The cost (benefit) of disclosure is modelled in an imperfectly competitive product market, where an uninformed opponent’s reaction to a disclosure affects the manager's expected profit. Our results indicate that the nature of the manager's optimal disclosure policy is crucially dependent on whether the signal is more informative about firm-specific or industry-wide common factors. Unfavourable news is disclosed and favourable news withheld if the signal is more informative about common factors. On the other hand, favourable news is disclosed and unfavourable news is withheld if the signal is more informative about firm-specific factors. Comparative statics show that the sensitivity of the optimal disclosure policy and the probability of disclosure to some key parameters are also dependent on this characteristic of a signal. The empirical implications of our results suggest that when testing hypotheses involving voluntary disclosures, failure to take the above characteristic into account may confound the results. The second essay entitled, "Disclosure and Reputation in Credit Markets", deals with a different aspect of voluntary disclosures. A reputation game is modelled in the absence of credible disclosure. The manager's ability with respect to obtaining predecision information is of interest to the firm's creditors. The manager's future nominal interest charges depend on the creditors' belief about the manager's ability, i.e., on his reputation. Hence, the manager attempts to communicate this ability through sub-optimal production choice and creditors learn about the manager by observing the end of period revenue realization. If credible disclosures are possible the manager may make direct disclosures to communicate his information gathering ability to the creditors. This alternative mechanism avoids the cost of reputation building incurred by selecting a suboptimal project. However, it is shown that if these two mechanisms for reputation acquisition are not "independent", then the possibility of disclosure increases the manager's incentive to select a sub-optimal action.