He, Zheng. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-54). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / CONTENT --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.2 / Chapter CHAPTER II. --- LITERATURES REVIEWS --- p.5 / Chapter CHAPTER III. --- FEATURES OF MBO IN CHINA --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1 --- Dichotomy of stock structure --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2 --- Pre-buyout Ownership structure --- p.14 / Chapter 3.3 --- Buyout styles --- p.15 / Chapter 3.4 --- MBO CONSEQUENCES --- p.16 / Chapter CHAPTER IV. --- DATA DESCRIPTION --- p.17 / Chapter CHAPTER V. --- EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.22 / Chapter 5.1 --- Underbidding Analysis --- p.22 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Transaction Variables --- p.29 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Corporate Governance Variables --- p.32 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- Regional Variables --- p.35 / Chapter 5.1.4 --- Multivariate Regressions: --- p.36 / Chapter 5.2 --- Performance Analysis --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Control Group Matching --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- DID Estimation --- p.43 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Longer Performance Comparison --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- Comparison with other M&A --- p.48 / Chapter CHAPTER VI. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.50 / REFERENCE --- p.53 / TABLES AND CHARTS --- p.55

Huang, Fang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 35-39). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 2. --- Review of literatures and regulations --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1. --- MBO in the US --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2. --- MBO in China --- p.14 / Chapter 3. --- Data selection and sources --- p.16 / Chapter 4. --- Announcement effect of MBO --- p.17 / Chapter 4.1. --- Research method --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2. --- Group division of MBO companies --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.1. --- Division rules --- p.18 / Chapter 4.2.2. --- Apparent MBO: significant negative --- p.19 / Chapter 4.2.3. --- Founder buyouts: significant positive --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2.4. --- Other groups: insignificant positive but not representative for MBO effect --- p.20 / Chapter 4.3. --- Factor analysis --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.1. --- Year: before 2003/ after 2003 (include 2003) --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.2. --- Underlying asset: parent company / the listing company itself --- p.22 / Chapter 4.3.3. --- ESOP participation: Yes/No --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3.4. --- Competitive purchaser: Yes/No --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3.5. --- Results: Success / Failure --- p.24 / Chapter 4.4. --- Summary of announcement effect --- p.25 / Chapter 5. --- Evidence on profitability and pricing --- p.25 / Chapter 5.1. --- Data and methodology --- p.26 / Chapter 5.2. --- Profitability of MBO companies --- p.28 / Chapter 5.3. --- DuPont analysis of companies with successful MBO --- p.29 / Chapter 5.4. --- Dividend payment --- p.31 / Chapter 5.5. --- Shareholder´ةs returns --- p.32 / Chapter 5.6. --- MBO pricing and pre-MBO behavior of NAV --- p.33 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.33

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

China's different economic environment, government infrastructure, and legal system might cause different management buyout procedures and results from management buyout procedures in the United States. Management buyout was originally created to increase efficiency and reduce agency cost in the United States in the 1960s; but management buyout in China is merely a tool to provide incentive programs for current management teams and reduce state-owned corporate shares.