Thesis(MA) -- Stellenbosch University, 1949. / No abstract available

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: 1. The purpose of the first chapter was to give a short introduction to the study. Philosophy is the search for wisdom; to know what a virtuous life is and to know what the morally correct thing to do is. Our lifelong relationship with animals, our attitudes towards them and the ways we treat them are some of the issues that beg philosophers to think. An important question in this regard is if it is morally correct to eat meat or should humans become vegetarian. To answer this question the „Animal Liberation‟ argument, as presented by Peter Singer, was critically analyzed. Does this argument balance our concern for animals with human interests? 2. To understand our attitude towards animals, reviews of the Judeo-Christian and philosophical traditions were done in Chapter 2. The different views related to these traditions were also discussed. The Judeo-Christian view is based on the interpretation of Genesis and the idea of human dominion. Philosophical views on the moral status of animals and moral consideration of animals can be classified in three categories namely indirect theories, direct-but-unequal theories and equal moral status theories. 3. The nature and extent of the current beef production debate was discussed in Chapter 3. The most important issues were the environmental impact of beef production, socio-economic and human health concerns as well as ethical issues related to the inhumane treatment of animals. It was then concluded that most attacks on beef production were biased and did not take context into account. 4. The „Animal Liberation‟ argument was critically analyzed from a logical perspective in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 by using the so called FRISCO approach – with emphasis on the Focus of the argument, Reasons given for the conclusion, the quality of Inferences, the Situation or context of the argument as well as the Clarity of the argument. This argument lacks objectivity and rationality. It includes a number of fallacies, false statements and emotional language. Ideas, concepts and principles were not applied consistently. The argument was therefore found to be unsound. 5. In Chapter 7 the conclusion was stated namely that the “animal liberation” approach could not formulate a sound argument for a vegetarian diet. The „Animal Liberation‟ argument was also unable to balance our concern for animals with human interests, in the process compromising human dignity and freedom. However, human attitudes towards animals and the treatment of animals need to be improved. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: 1. Die doel van die eerste hoofstuk was om ʼn kort inleiding tot die studie te gee. Filosofie is die strewe en soeke na wysheid; om te weet wat ʼn deugsame lewe is, en om te weet wat moreel korrek en aanvaarbaar is. Ons verhouding met diere, ons ingesteldheid teenoor diere, asook die manier hoe ons diere behandel, is slegs enkele van die kwessies wat filosowe dwing om daaroor na te dink. ʼn Belangrike vraag in die verband is die volgende: Is dit moreel aanvaarbaar om vleis te eet, of moet die mens ʼn vegetariese dieet volg? Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord word die “Animal Liberation”-argument, soos aangebied deur Peter Singer, krities ontleed. Is hierdie argument in staat om ons kommer oor die behandeling van diere met menslike belange te balanseer? 2. Om die mens se houding en ingesteldheid teenoor diere beter te verstaan, word ʼn oorsig van die Joods-Christelike en filosofiese tradisies in Hoofstuk 2 gedoen. Die verskillende sienings, wat verband hou met hierdie tradisies, word ook kortliks bespreek. Die Joods-Christelike siening is gebaseer op ʼn spesifieke vertolking van Genesis en die idee van menslike heerskappy. Die filosofiese sienings van die morele status, en gevolglik ook die morele inagneming van diere, kan in drie kategorieë, naamlik indirekte teorieë, direk-maar-ongelyke teorieë en die gelyke-morele-status teorieë, opgedeel word. 3. Die aard en omvang van die beesvleisproduksie-debat word in Hoofstuk 3 bespreek. Die belangrikste kwessies, onderliggend aan hierdie debat, het betrekking op die omgewingsimpak van vleisproduksie, sosio-ekonomiese en menslike gesondheidskwessies, asook etiese kwessies wat verband hou met die onaanvaarbare behandeling van diere. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die meeste aanvalle op vleisproduksie eensydig is en ook nie konteks in ag neem nie. 4. Die “Animal Liberation”-argument word in Hoofstuk 4, 5 en 6 krities ontleed vanuit „n logiese perspektief met behulp van die sogenaamde FRISCO-metode – waarin die klem val op die Fokus van die argument, Redes wat aangevoer word vir die konklusie, die gehalte van die afleidings, die Situasie of konteks van die argument, en die helderheid van die argument. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die argument nie objektief en rasioneel is nie, en gebuk gaan onder denkfoute, vals stellings en emosionele taal. Idees, konsepte en beginsel word ook nie konsekwent toegepas nie. Die argument is dus nie betroubaar nie. 5. In Hoofstuk 7 word die bevinding van die tesis gestel, naamlik dat die “animal liberation” benadering nie „n betroubare argument vir ʼn vegetariese dieet kon formuleer nie. Die argument was ook nie in staat om ons kommer oor diere met menslike belange te balanseer nie, en het in die proses menslike waardigheid en vryheid gekompromitteer. Die mens se houding en behandeling van diere, moet egter verander.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis explores the possibility of promoting social justice through the direct confrontation and rectification of manifest injustices in our existing social institutions and practices, as opposed to the more conventional theoretical approach of attempting to offer comprehensive accounts of ideal justice based on the identification of ultimate principles of justice or perfectly just institutional arrangements. Through an analysis and moral evaluation of the intergenerational transfer of wealth through the practice of inheritance, the study attempts to illustrate how a narrower theoretical focus on specific existing social institutions and practices will enhance conceptual clarity regarding their morally relevant features and, by taking the actual social and political context into account from the outset, increase the political and real-world relevance of the resulting proposal. This study also offers a thorough examination of property rights, because an understanding of the nature of ownership and the justificatory theories of entitlement claims necessarily provides the background context against which the issue of inheritance has to be addressed. As property rights give specific people claims to resources to the exclusion of others, any considerations on property rights also brings up questions of distributive and social justice. Within this broader framework of property rights and distributive justice, this study seeks to show that inheritance is not only inconsistent with the values underlying capitalism, but also an unfair and outdated practice that helps to perpetuate economic and social inequality, which undermines the ideal of democratic citizenship. To this end, a proposal is made to cap inheritance by placing an upper limit to the amount an individual will be allowed to bequeath to any other individual(s). It is argued that this limit should be high enough to allow for the transfer of a family home and objects with sentimental value, but not so high as to ensure a life of complete leisure to future generations. The merits of inheritance taxation will then be discussed in detail and arguments in favour of limiting inheritance will be subdivided into three broad categories: The first concerns the legitimacy of the practice of inheritance itself, as well as the tension between the liberal-democratic principles underlying capitalism and the practice of inheritance, the second relates to the undesirability of the social outcomes that are realised based on the practice of inheritance, and the third focuses on the potential gains that the alternative arrangement will bring. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tesis ondersoek die moontlikheid dat sosiale geregtigheid deur die direkte konfrontasie en regstelling van ongeregtighede in ons bestaande instellings en praktyke bevorder kan word, in teenstelling met die meer konvensionele teoretiese benadering wat poog om alomvattende teorieë van ideale geregtigheid op die identifikasie van finale beginsels van geregtigheid of volmaakte institusionele organisering te baseer. Die studie poog om deur die analise en morele evaluering van die praktyk van erflating te illustreer dat ‘n nouer teoretiese fokus op spesifieke bestaande sosiale instellings en praktyke die konseptuele duidelikheid aangaande hul moreel relevante aspekte kan verbeter, en dat die relevansie van voorstellings verhoog kan word deur die werklike politieke en sosiale konteks uit die staanspoor in ag te neem. Die studie bied ook ‘n deeglike analise van eiendomsreg aan, omdat ‘n begrip van die aard van eienaarskap en die teorieë wat besitsreg regverdig noodwendig die agtergrond konteks skep waarteen die kwessie van erflating aangespreek moet word. Omdat eiendomsreg vir spesifieke mense regte tot hulpbronne gee tot die uitsluiting van ander, bring enige oorwegings aangaande eiendomsreg ook die kwessie van sosiale geregtigheid na vore. Binne hierdie breër raamwerk van eiendomsreg en sosiale geregtigheid, poog die studie om te wys dat erflating nie net teenstrydig is met die waardes onderliggend aan kapitalisme nie, maar ook 'n onregverdige en verouderde praktyk is wat bydra tot die voortbestaning van ekonomiese en sosiale ongelykheid, en dus die ideaal van demokratiese burgerskap ondermyn. Die studie stel voor dat erflating beperk moet word deur ‘n limiet te plaas op die bedrag wat enige persoon van ander persone af kan erf. Die meriete van erflatingsbelasting word in detail bespreek en argumente ten gunste van ‘n limiet op erflatings word breedweg in drie kategorieë verdeel: Die eerste betref die legitimiteit van die praktyk van erflating self, sowel as die spanning tussen die liberaal-demokratiese beginsels onderliggend aan kapitalisme en die praktyk van erflating; die tweede het betrekking tot die onaanvaarbare sosiale uitkomste wat ontstaan vanweë die praktyk van erflating; en die derde fokus op die verbeteringe wat alternatiewe praktyke kan bring.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Every year, the South African President delivers a State of the Nation Address. This speech provides him with the opportunity to raise his opinion on the current state of affairs in the country. As can be expected, the country's different media channels then report extensively on the speech. These reports can, however, be regarded as much more than simple commentaries on the speech – they are in fact, reframed versions of the speech that affect and shape the opinions and ideologies of their readers. These media channels also provide the perfect vehicles through which links can be established between citizens to support their belief that they form part of an established community (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009:33). Wherever communication is present or necessary, it is impossible to escape the process or effect of framing, as framing implies “‘how speakers mean what they say’” (Tannen and Wallat, 1993:60; in Baker, 2006:105). Therefore, the presence and effects of framing should not be ignored, instead, translation scholars should be aware of framing and how this process affects translated texts. Mona Baker introduced the idea that the translated and reformulated narratives that we are exposed to constitute the everyday stories that shape the way we perceive reality (Baker 2006:3). By studying these translated versions of the speech one can gain insight into the ideologies of the intended target readership (Bielsa and Bassnett 2009:10). In the ever-growing field of Translation Studies it is important to focus on finding an approach that provides enough freedom for scholars to elaborate on existing approaches and include new findings and results. This thesis focuses on the narrative approach and explores Baker's views by taking a deeper look at rewritten versions of the SONA in the shape of newspaper articles. It also suggests that this approach has the potential to provide scholars with a much-needed framework. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Elke jaar gee die President van Suid-Afrika ʼn staatsrede waarin hy sy mening lug oor die huidige stand van sake in die land. Dit is te verwagte dat die verskillende mediakanale dan breedvoerig oor hierdie toespraak verslag lewer. Hierdie verslae is egter veel meer as eenvoudige kommentaar op die President se toespraak, hulle is in effek, hergekonstrueerde weergawes van die toespraak, wat sodoende deel van ʼn nuwe raamwerk uitmaak – ʼn raamwerk wat ʼn belangrike rol speel in die vorming van lesers se menings en ideologieë. Hierdie mediakanale bied ook die perfekte mediums om kommunikasie tussen die onderskeie lede van ʼn gemeenskap in werking te stel sodat hulle sal glo dat hulle deel vorm van ʼn gevestigde gemeenskap (Bielsa en Bassnett 2009:33). Waar kommunikasie ter sprake is, is dit onmoontlik om die proses van herskrywing te vermy, aangesien die plasing van inligting in ʼn nuwe raam verwant is aan “‘hoe sprekers bedoel wat hulle sê’” (Tannen en Wallat, 1993:60; in Baker, 2006:105). Dus moet die effek van herskrywing nie onderskat word nie; inteendeel, vertalers moet bewus wees van die implikasies daarvan en hoe dit vertaalde tekste beïnvloed. Mona Baker het vorendag gekom met die idee dat die manier waarop ons realiteit waarneem, beïnvloed word deur die vertaalde en herskryfde narratiewe waaraan ons elke dag blootgestel word (2006:3). Vertalings word spesifiek geskep met die doellesers in gedagte, daarom kan verdere insig oor die ideologieë van die doellesers verkry word deur hierdie vertalings verder te bestudeer (Bielsa en Bassnett 2009:10). In die steeds groeiende veld van vertaalteorie, is dit belangrik om ʼn benadering te vind wat kenners genoeg vryheid toelaat om bestaande teorieë uit te brei en nuwe resultate en bevindings tot die vertaalwetenskap te kan byvoeg. Hierdie studie bestudeer dus Baker se argumente en die impak van ʼn narratiewe benadering op vertaalteorie deur te fokus op herskrywings van die staatsrede in die vorm van koerantberigte. Dit suggereer ook dat hierdie narratiewe benadering van herskrywing deur inligting binne ʼn nuwe raam te plaas, die potensiaal het om aan wetenskaplikes ʼn nuwe teoretiese ondersoekbasis te bied.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The overall aim of this study is to establish the implications, effectiveness and limitations of making Aristotelian virtue theory a meta-theory of business. The study intends to test what the business world would be like with the virtue framework as its meta-theory, i.e. if virtue theory provided the fundamental principles that underlie the formation and operation of business enterprises, thus making virtue the philosophy of business. Since virtue is concerned with moral character rather than moral principles – it is community-based rather than individualistic – the application of the virtue framework to business implies that we will have to deal with the reality that individualistic capitalism is corrosive to virtue. The virtue framework is only compatible with collective forms of capitalism, not individualistic forms. Thus, in order to nurture virtues, it is necessary to build an economic system, a type of capitalism that is compatible with the virtue framework. Such a project is morally plausible because it is congruent with human nature, which is rational and social. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die algehele doel van hierdie studie is om die implikasies, effektiwiteit en beperkings van die toepassing van die Aristoteliaanse teorie van deug as metateorie vir besigheid vas te stel. Die studie beoog om te toets hoe die besigheidswêreld sou lyk met deugdeteorie as metateorie, dit wil sê as deugdeteorie die fundamentele beginsels wat die formasie en bedryf van besigheidsondernemings onderlê voorsien en dus deug die filosofie van bedryf maak. Deugde is bemoei met morele karakter eerder as morele beginsels omdat dit gemeenskapsgegrond eerder as individualisties is. Die toepassing van ʼn deugde-raamwerk op die sakewêreld impliseer dus dat ons moet afreken met die realiteit dat individualistiese kapitalisme korrosief is vir deugde. Die deugde-raamwerk is slegs verenigbaar met kollektiewe vorme van kapitalisme, eerder as individualistiese vorme. Om die deugde te koester is dit dus nodig om ’n ekonomiese sisteem te bou in die vorm van ’n kapitalistiese stelsel wat verenigbaar is met die raamwerk. Só ʼn projek is moreel aanneemlik omdat dit ooreenstem met die menslike natuur, wat rasioneel en sosiaal is.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis, the South African legal system's attempt to address sexual violence is explored through the lens of the work of the French feminist philosopher, Luce Irigaray. It will be argued that the South African equality jurisprudence lays the foundation for a strongly Irigarayan approach to the transformation of sex and gender relations in so far as our right to equality can be interpreted as being underpinned by an acknowledgment of embodiment, sexual particularity and difference. Our Constitution envisions equality as a value informed by difference rather than sameness and, in accordance with Irigaray’s work, it can be said that the implication of this is that the pursuit of the transformation of sex and gender relations on the one hand, and an acknowledgment of sexual difference on the other, are not mutually exclusive, but that sex equality instead calls for a fundamental recognition of sexual difference and an authentic response to the demands thereof. However, it will be argued that our newly reformed sexual violence legislation undermines the progress made on a constitutional level by entrenching a problematic approach to sexual difference in the definition of the crime of rape. This is done through firstly, defining the crime of rape in gender-neutral terms and secondly, retaining the concept of consent as the distinguishing characteristic between sex and rape. I will argue that through these features, our sexual violence legislation reflects the most basic mistakes that Irigaray identifies with the law. It will be argued that the legislation, on the one hand, denies sexual difference in a way that is prejudicial to women through its gender-neutral language, while at the same time, through the concept of consent, (re-)introducing a hierarchical construction of masculine and feminine sexuality into the Act in terms of which femininity is construed as derivative of, and inferior to, masculinity. Furthermore, the combination of the gender neutrality of the definition and the concept of consent exacerbates the situation, in so far as the gender neutrality masks the harmful construal of sexual difference that is incorporated in the definition through the concept of consent. Accordingly, judged from an Irigarayan perspective, the South African sexual violence legislation is deeply problematic. In addition, the legislation undercuts important constitutional developments, in so far as it ignores the constitutional insights that, firstly, sexual violence is a problem of sex inequality, and that secondly, the pursuit of the transformation of sex and gender relations is served, rather than undercut by a concern with particularities. On this basis, it is argued that the South African sexual violence legislation should be amended so that the concept of consent is removed and the crime of rape is defined in sex-specific language (while still allowing for male victims and female perpetrators) that facilitates judicial understanding of the complexities of the crime of rape. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis sal die Suid-Afrikaanse regsisteem se poging om seksuele geweld aan te spreek, deur die lens van die werk van Luce Irigaray, ‘n Franse feministiese filosoof, ondersoek word. Daar sal geargumenteer word dat die Suid-Afrikaanse gelykheidsjurisprudensie ‘n grondslag vir ‘n sterk Irigarayiese benadering tot die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge lê, in soverre ons reg op gelykheid geïnterpreteer kan word om in ‘n erkenning van beliggaming, seksuele spesifiekheid en verskil (“difference”) begrond te wees. Ons Grondwet stel gelykheid as ‘n waarde wat deur verskil eerder as eenvormigheid geïnformeer is, voor oë, en in lyn met die werk van Irigaray, kan daar gesê word dat die implikasie hiervan is dat die nastrewing van die transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge aan die een kant, en die erkenning van geslagsonderskeid (“sexual difference”) aan die ander, nie wedersyds uitsluitlik is nie, maar dat geslagsgelykheid eerder juis ‘n fundamentele erkenning van geslagsonderskeid en ‘n outentieke reaksie op die eise daarvan, noop. Daar sal egter geargumenteer word dat ons nuuthervormde wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die vordering wat op ‘n grondwetlike vlak gemaak is, ondermyn deur ‘n problematiese benadering tot geslagsonderskeid in die definisie van die misdaad van verkragting te verskans. Dit word bewerkstellig deur eerstens, die misdaad van verkragting in geslagsneutrale taal te formuleer, en tweedens, om die begrip van toestemming as onderskeidende kenmerk tussen seks en verkragting, te behou. Ek sal argumenteer dat dit deur hierdie eienskappe is, wat ons wetgewing oor seksuele geweld die mees basiese probleme wat Irigaray in die reg identifiseer, weerspieël. Daar sal voorgehou word dat die wetgewing, aan die een kant, deur die geslagsneutrale taal, geslagsonderskeid ontken op ‘n manier wat vrouens benadeel, terwyl dit terselfdertyd, deur die begrip van toestemming, ‘n hiërargiese verhouding tussen die manlike en die vroulike in die wetgewing daarstel, in terme waarvan die vroulike as derivatief en minderwaardig tot die manlike verstaan word. Verder, die situasie word deur die kombinasie van die geslagsneutraliteit van die definisie en die begrip van toetsemming, vererger deurdat die geslagsneutraliteit van die taal die skadelike vertolking van geslagonderskeid wat deur die begrip van toestemming in die definisie ingesluit word, verberg. Dus, vanuit ‘n Irigarayiese perspektief is die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor seksuele geweld diep problematies. Verder, die wetgewing ondermyn belangrike grondwetlike ontwikkelinge in soverre dit die volgende grondwetlike insigte ignoreer: eerstens, dat seksuele geweld ‘n probleem van geslagsongelykheid is en tweedens, dat die strewe na transformasie van geslagsverhoudinge gedien, eerder as ondermyn word deur ‘n besorgdheid met die partikuliere. Op hierdie gronde word daar geargumenteer dat die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing oor seksuele geweld gewysig behoort te word, deur die begrip van toestemming te verwyder en die misdaad te definieer in geslagspesifieke taal (op ‘n manier waardeur manlike slagoffers en vroulike oortreders steeds ingesluit word) wat geregtiglike begrip van die kompleksiteite van die misdaad van verkragting bemiddel.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to determine what responsibilities democratic states have toward refugees. This problem is stated within the broader framework of the tension inherent in all democratic states: on the one hand, the sovereign right of a state over its territory and, on the other hand, the cosmopolitan or universal human rights norms upon which the state‟s constitution is founded. I argue that this tension is brought to the fore when refugees cross borders and enter into democratic territories, asking for protection and claiming their human rights. The sheer magnitude of the refugee crisis makes this an issue every state should address. My answer to the question of state responsibility is worked out in four phases. Firstly, I give a conceptual clarification of refugeehood, sovereignty, and cosmopolitanism. I show that neither absolute sovereignty (which implies closed borders) nor extreme cosmopolitanism (which implies no borders) is desirable. Secondly, I draw on Immanuel Kant‟s cosmopolitan theory as a possible solution. Kant proposes a world-federation of states in which right is realised on the civic, international, and cosmopolitan level. Kant also insists that every individual has the right to hospitality – a right which foreign states should recognise. Thirdly, I examine three prominent theories which could offer us a way to address the refugee crisis. I argue that the first two – multiculturalism and John Rawls‟ „law of peoples‟ – are not adequate responses to the refugee crisis, but that the third – Seyla Benhabib‟s cosmopolitan federalism – is more promising. Hospitality is the first responsibility states have toward refugees, and Benhabib proposes that it be institutionalised by (i) forming a federation of states founded on cosmopolitan principles, (ii) revising membership norms through the political process of democratic iterations, and (iii) extending some form of political membership to the state to refugees. Lastly, I justify the claim that political membership should be extended by referring to Hannah Arendt‟s argument that the ability to speak and act publicly is part of what it means to be human. If we deny refugees this ability, or if we deny them access to political processes, we deny their humanity. Benhabib proposes institutional measures to ensure that this does not happen, including allowing for political membership on sub-national, national, and supranational levels. Ultimately, I argue that democratic states have the responsibility to (i) allow entry to refugees, (ii) give refugees legal status and offer protection, and (ii) extend political membership to them on some level. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om te bepaal wat die verantwoordelikhede van demokratiese state teenoor vlugtelinge is. Ek plaas hierdie probleem binne die breër raamwerk van die onderliggende spanning in demokratiese state: die soewereine reg van ‟n staat oor sy grondgebied, aan die een kant, en die kosmopolitiese of universele menseregte-norme waarop die staat se grondwet berus, aan die ander kant. Ek argumenteer dat hierdie spanning na vore gebring word wanneer vlugtelinge, op soek na beskerming, grense oorsteek, demokratiese state binnetree en aanspraak maak op hulle regte. Ek bespreek die vraagstuk in vier stappe. Eerstens verduidelik ek die begrippe van vlugtelingskap, soewereiniteit en kosmopolitisme. Ek toon aan dat nóg absolute soewereiniteit (wat geslote grense impliseer), nóg ekstreme kosmopolitisme (wat geen grense impliseer) ‟n wenslike ideaal is. Tweedens kyk ek na Immanuel Kant se kosmopolitiese teorie vir ‟n moontlike oplossing. Kant stel voor dat state saamkom in ‟n wêreld-federasie, om sodoende reg te laat geskied op die plaaslike, internasionale, en kosmopolitiese vlak. Kant dring ook aan daarop dat elke individu die reg tot gasvryheid besit, ‟n reg wat ook deur ander state buiten die individu se staat van herkoms erken behoort te word. Derdens ondersoek ek drie prominente teorieë wat moontlike oplossings bied vir die vlugteling-krisis. Ek argumenteer dat die eerste twee – multikulturalisme en John Rawls se „law of peoples‟ – nie voldoende is om die vlugteling-krisis die hoof te bied nie. Die derde teorie, Seyla Benhabib se kosmopolitiese federalisme, blyk meer belowend te wees. Benhabib stel voor dat die staat se verantwoordelikheid om gasvryheid te toon geïnstitusionaliseer kan word deur (i)‟n federasie van state gegrond op kosmopolitiese beginsels te vorm, (ii) lidmaatskap-norme te hersien deur ‟n politieke proses genaamd demokratiese iterasie, en (iii) politieke lidmaatskap van een of ander aard aan vlugtelinge toe te ken. Laastens regverdig ek die aanspraak op lidmaatskap. Ek verwys na Hannah Arendt se argument dat die vermoë om in die publieke sfeer te praat en dade te kan uitvoer, deel uitmaak van wat dit beteken om ‟n mens te wees. As ons verhoed dat vlugtelinge hierdie twee vermoëns kan uitleef, ontken ons hulle menslikheid. Benhabib stel sekere institutionele maatreëls voor om dit te voorkom. Dit sluit politieke lidmaatskap op ‟n sub-nasionale, nasionale, en supra-nasionale vlak in. Uiteindelik argumenteer ek dat demokratiese state se verantwoordelikhede teenoor vlugtelinge uit die volgende bestaan: (i) toegang tot hierdie state se grondgebied, (ii) wetlike status en beskerming, en (iii) politieke lidmaatskap op een of ander vlak.

Thesis (DPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / This thesis sets out to uncover why environmental concerns are not being effectively addressed in economic decision-making. It investigates this by analyzing the key values underpinning neo-classical economics and ecological economics, and concludes that both approaches remain trapped in a form of moral monism and are thus unable to express the full range of environmental values that exist. This results in a form of reductionism in economic thinking where all environmental value is expressed in the form of exchange value. In order to escape from this reductionism, it is asserted that ecological economics needs to adopt a moral pluralist philosophy that can accommodate both exchange values and subjective intrinsic value. Mindful of the quagmires of moral relativism, the thesis seeks out an approach to economic decision-making that is able to justify courses of action amid seemingly competing economic and environmental values. Environmental pragmatism, a form of moral pluralism, that focuses on the contextual nature of truth and value, is found fitting for the task. It uses experience to reduce uncertainty and moves decision-makers towards courses of action that can support a plurality of values within a given context. Environmental pragmatist Bryan Norton’s philosophy of adaptive management, with its guidelines of experimentalism, multi-scalar analysis and localism, is found to be particularly helpful in achieving this. The second half of the thesis concentrates on demonstrating the value of environmental pragmatism in economic decision-making by using it to analyse the South African National Budget of 2005. Norton’s guidelines are first used as critical tools of analysis to show up the gaps and inconsistencies in the budget process and then, secondly, as creative tools to reconstruct the budget process. To demonstrate what this would mean in concrete terms, the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Agriculture budget votes are analysed using the sustainability indicators of The City of Cape Town’s Sustainability Report of 2005 and the 2020 goals of The City of Cape Town’s Integrated Development Plan of 2004/5.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The primary concern of this dissertation will be to understand under what conditions novelty arises within a system. In classical philosophy, the notion of novelty is usually said to arise out of an event. However, the notion of an event often carries with it metaphysical and conservative implications. Therefore, part of the concern of this dissertation is to begin to develop an approach to novelty which is not dependent upon the event. This approach is developed through the insights offered by Critical Complexity and post‐structuralist philosophy. In social science the model of the frame has dominated how to think about the limitations to the context specific nature of knowledge. Instead of the analogy of a frame, this dissertation argues that it is better to adopt the notion of an ‘economy’. This is due to the fact that the notion of an economy allows social scientists to better theorize the relationships which constitute the models they create. The argument for an economy is made by exploring the connections between the work of Jacques Derrida, the complexity theorist Edgar Morin and Georges Bataille. However, when using the notion of an economy, one must always take the excess of this economy into consideration. This excess always feeds back to disrupt the economy from which it is excluded. Using terms developed in complexity theory, this dissertation illustrates how a system adapts to the environment by using this excess. Due to this there can never be a comprehensively modelled complex system because there are always facets of this system which remain hidden to the observer. The work of Alain Badiou, whose central concern is the notion of novelty arising out of an event, is introduced. The implications of depending on the event for novelty to arise are drawn out by discussing the affinities between the work of Derrida and Badiou. In this regard, Derrida’s use of the term ‘event’ much more readily agrees with a complexity informed understanding of the term in contrast to the quasi‐religious definition which Badiou uses. This complexity‐informed understanding of the event illustrates that what the event reveals is simultaneously a dearth and wealth of possibilities yet to be realized. Therefore the event cannot be depended upon to produce novelty. However, the notion of the event must not be discarded too quickly; classical science has traditionally discarded this idea due to its reductive approach. The idea of process opens up an understanding of the radical novelties produced in history to the possibility of the event and to a new understanding of ontology. This dissertation proposes that one can begin to think about radical forms of novelty without the event through the notion of experimentation. This approach allows one to engage with what exists rather than relying upon an event to produce novelty. This argument is made by following Bataille, who argues that through an engagement with non‐utilitarian forms of action, by expending for the sake of expenditure, the world is opened up to possibilities which remain unrealized under the current hegemony. In this light, this dissertation begins to develop a definition of novelty as that which forces a rereading of the system’s history. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie proefskrif onderneem hoofsaaklik om die omstandighede waaronder nuwigheid binne ʼn stelsel ontstaan te verstaan. Daar word in die klassieke filosofie voorgehou dat nuwigheid gewoonlik vanuit ʼn gebeurtenis ontstaan. Die idee van ʼn gebeurtenis hou egter dikwels ongewenste metafisiese en konserwatiewe implikasies in. Hierdie proefskrif onderneem dus om, deels, ʼn benadering tot nuwigheid te ontwikkel wat onafhanklik van die gebeurtenis staan. Hierdie benadering word verder uitgebrei met behulp van insigte vanuit die Kritiese Kompleksiteits‐ en Post‐Strukturalistiese filosofie. Tot onlangs het die model van die raamwerk die wyse waarop daar oor die beperkinge van die konteks‐spesifieke aard van kennis in die sosiale wetenskappe gedink word oorheers. In hierdie proefskrif word voorgehou dat die idee van ʼn ‘ekonomie’ in plaas van die analogie van ʼn raamwerk hier gebruik behoort te word, omdat dit ons sal toelaat om die verhoudings binne die modelle wat deur sosiale wetenskaplikes gebruik word beter te verken. Verder word die moontlike verbande tussen Jacques Derrida , die kompleksiteitsfilosoof Edgar Morin en Georges Bataille teen hierdie agtergrond verken. Wanneer daar van ʼn ekonomie gepraat word, moet die oormaat van die ekonomie altyd in ag geneem word. Hierdie oormaat ontwrig altyd die ekonomie waarby dit uitgesluit word. Om te wys hoe die stelsel van so ʼn oormaat gebruik maak om by sy omgewing aan te pas, sal terminologie wat in die konteks van kompleksiteitsteorie ontwikkel is gebruik word. As gevolg van die oorvloed binne ʼn stelsel sal daar nooit ʼn volledige model van die stelsel ontwikkel kan word nie ‐‐ fasette van die stelsel sal altyd vir die waarnemer verborge bly. Verder sal die werk van Alain Badiou, wie se filosofie rondom die idee van nuwigheid wat uit ʼn gebeurtenis ontstaan gesentreed is, in hierdie verhandeling bespreek word. Die implikasies van die idee dat nuwigheid van die gebeurtenis afhanklik is word uitgelig deur die verwantskappe tussen die werke van Derrida en Badiou te bespreek. Derrida se gebruik van die term ‘gebeurtenis’ dra ʼn noue verwantskap met kompleksiteitsteorie, en dit word teenoor Badiou se amper‐godsdienstige gebruik van die term gestel. Daar word aangevoer dat daar binne ʼn kompleksiteits‐ingeligte verstaan van ʼn gebeurtenis beide ʼn skaarste en ʼn oorvloed van moontlikhede bestaan wat vervul kan word. Daarom kan daar juis nié op die gebeurtenis staatgemaak word om nuwigheid te skep nie. Die idee van die gebeurtenis moet egter nie te gou verwerp word nie. As gevolg van die klassieke wetenskap se reduksionisme is die idee van ʼn gebeurtenis tradisioneel ontken. Daarteenoor ontsluit die idee van ʼn proses die moontlikheid van radikale nuwighede in die geskiedenis as gevolg van ʼn verstaan van die gebeurtenis wat tot ʼn nuwe verstaan van die ontologie lei. Hierdie proefskrif stel dus voor dat ons voortaan aan radikale nuwigheid dink in terme van die denkbeeld van eksperimentering eerder as in terme van die gebeurtenis. Eksperimentering laat ons toe om te werk met wat ons het, eerder as om op ʼn gebeurtenis te moet wag. Na aanleiding van Bataille is die voorstel dat daar deur om te gaan met nieutilitaristiese vorms van optrede nuwe geleenthede vir die wêreld oopgemaak word; geleenthede wat onder die huidige hegemonie ongerealiseerd sal bly. In hierdie verband stel die proefskrif ʼn definisie van nuwigheid voor as dít wat mens dwing om die geskiedenis van ʼn stelsel te herformuleer.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Autonomy and informed consent are two interrelated concepts given much prominence in contemporary biomedical discourse. The word autonomy, from the Greek autos (self) and nomos (rule), originally referred to the self-governance of independent Hellenic states, but was extended to individuals during the time of the Enlightenment, most notably through the work of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. In healthcare, the autonomy model is grounded in the idea of the dignity of persons and the claim people have on each other to privacy, self-direction, the establishment of their own values and life plans based on information and reasoning, and the freedom to act on the results of their contemplation. Autonomy thus finds expression in the ethical and legal requirement of informed consent. Feminists and multiculturalists have however argued that since autonomy rests on the Enlightenment ideals of rationality, objectivity and independence, unconstrained by emotional and spiritual qualities, it serves to isolate the individual and thus fails to rectify the dehumanisation and depersonalisation of modern scientific medical practice. It only serves to exacerbate the problematic power-differential between doctor and patient. Medicine is a unique profession since it operates in a space where religion, morality, metaphysics, science and culture come together. It is a privileged space because health care providers assume responsibility for the care of their patients outside the usual moral space defined by equality and autonomy. Patients necessarily relinquish some of their autonomy and power to experts and autonomy thus cannot account for the moral calling that epitomizes and defines medicine. Recognition of the dependence of patients need not be viewed negatively as a lack of autonomy or incompetence, but could rather reinforce the understanding of our shared human vulnerability and that we are all ultimately patients. There is however no need to abandon the concept of autonomy altogether. A world without autonomy is unconceivable. When we recognise how the concept functions in the modern world as a social construct, we can harness its positive properties to create a new form of identity. We can utilise the possibility of self-stylization embedded in autonomy to fashion ourselves into responsible moral agents that are responsive not only to ourselves, but also to others, whether in our own species or in that of another. Responsible agency depends on mature deliberators that are mindful of the necessary diversity of the moral life and the complex nature of the moral subject. I thus argue that the development of modern individualism should not be rejected altogether, since we cannot return to some pre-modern sense of community, or transcend it altogether in some postmodern deconstruction of the self. We also do not need to search for a different word to supplant the concept of autonomy in moral life. What we rather need is a different attitude of being in the world; an attitude that strives for holism, not only of the self, but also of the moral community. We can only be whole if we acknowledge and embrace our interdependence as social and moral beings, as Homo moralis. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Outonomie en ingeligte toestemming is twee nou verwante konsepte wat beide prominensie in moderne bioetiese diskoers verwerf het. Die woord outonomie, van die Grieks autos (self) en nomos (reël), het oorspronklik verwys na die selfbestuur van onafhanklike Griekse state, maar is in die tyd van die Verligting uitgebrei om ook na individue te verwys, grotendeels deur die werk van Immanuel Kant en John Stuart Mill. In medisyne is die outonomie model gegrond op die idee van die waardigheid van die persoon en die beroep wat mense op mekaar het tot privaatheid, selfbepaling, die daarstelling van hulle eie waardesisteem en lewensplan, gebasseer op inligting en redenasie, en die vryheid om op die uitkoms van sulke redenasie te reageer. Outonomie word dus vergestalt in die etiese en wetlike bepaling van ingeligte toestemming. Feministe en multikulturele denkers beweer egter dat, siende outonomie gebasseer is op die Verligting ideale van rasionaliteit, objektiwiteit en onafhanklikheid, sonder die nodige begrensing deur emosionele en spirituele kwaliteite, dit die individu noodsaaklik isoleer en dus nie die dehumanisering en depersonalisering van moderne wetenskaplike mediese praktyk teenwerk nie. As sulks, vererger dit dus die problematiese magsverskil tussen die dokter en pasiënt. Die beroep van medisyne is ‘n unieke professie aangesien dit werksaam is in die sfeer waar geloof, moraliteit, metafisika, wetenskap en kultuur bymekaar kom. Dit is ‘n bevoorregde spasie aangesien gesondheidswerkers verantwoordelikheid vir die sorg van hulle pasiënte aanvaar buite die gewone morele spasie wat deur gelykheid en outonomie gedefinieer word. Pasiënte moet noodgedwonge van hulle outonomie en mag aan deskundiges afstaan en outonomie kan dus nie genoegsaam die morele roeping wat medisyne saamvat en definieer, vasvang nie. Bewustheid van die afhanklikheid van pasiënte hoef egter nie in ‘n negatiewe lig, as gebrek aan outonomie of onbevoegtheid, beskou te word nie, maar moet eerder die begrip van ons gedeelde menslike kwesbaarheid en die wete dat ons almal uiteindelik pasiënte is, versterk. Dit is verder nie nodig om die konsep van outonomie heeltemal te verwerp nie. ‘n Wêreld sonder outonomie is ondenkbaar. Wanneer ons bewus word van hoe die konsep in die moderne wêreld as ‘n sosiale konstruk funksioneer, kan ons die positiewe aspekte daarvan inspan om ‘n nuwe identiteit te bewerkstellig. Ons kan die moontlikheid van self-stilering, ingesluit in outonomie, gebruik om onsself in verantwoordelike morele agente te omskep sodat ons nie slegs teenoor onsself verantwoordelik is nie, maar ook teenoor ander, hetsy in ons eie spesie of in ‘n ander. Verantwoordelike agentskap is afhanklik van volwasse denkers wat gedagtig is aan die noodsaaklike diversiteit van die morele lewe en die komplekse aard van die morele subjek. Ek voer dus aan dat die ontwikkeling van moderne individualisme nie volstrek verwerp moet word nie, siende dat ons nie na ‘n tipe premoderne vorm van gemeenskap kan terugkeer, of dit oortref deur ‘n postmoderne dekonstruksie van die self nie. Ons het verder ook nie ‘n nuwe woord nodig om die konsep van outonomie in die morele lewe mee te vervang nie. Ons het eerder ‘n ander instelling van ons menswees in die wêreld nodig; ‘n instelling wat streef na volkomendheid, nie net van onsself nie, maar ook van die morele gemeenskap. Ons kan slegs volkome wees wanneer ons ons interafhanklikheid as sosiale en morele entiteite, as Homo moralis, erken en aangryp.