Thesis (Ph. D)--UCLA, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 153-158).

In this thesis, I examine the extent to which moral enhancement, the biomedical alteration of an individual’s disposition to act according to good or bad motives, will in uence his capacity for selfgovernance. Following a discussion of the salient features of moral enhancement, a plausible list of conditions against which to measure the compatibility of moral enhancement with personal autonomy is expounded. e core elements of moral enhancement are weighed against these conditions in order to establish the ways in which these core elements are compatible with the conditions of personal autonomy. I argue that moral enhancement need not lead to a diminishment of personal autonomy, provided it serves merely as a mechanism to help an agent overcome the deterministic limitations that prevent him from bringing his lower-order desires into conformity with the higher-order desires that he has arrived at through independent, thoughtful deliberation.

Technological neutrality in law is, roughly, the idea that law should not pick technological winners and losers, that law should neither help nor hinder particular types of technological aItefacts. It has become an increasingly recognized principle in the international stage, adopted by courts, legislatures, governmental and inter-governmental organizations alike. The grounds on which the principle has been adopted, however, are yet to see more in-depth articulation. This thesis takes up the task of more rigorously questioning whether technological neutrality is a sound principle for law and policy making in the information age. It does so by asking both whether technological neutrality makes sense internally, as a coherent proposition of the institutional normative order, and externally, as an unsuspected manifestation of the much more established, if contested, idea of political neutrality. Internally, the thesis questions: i) the ability of the principle to itself enable law to survive technological change; ii) the coherence of excluding reasons concerning dimensions of technological altefacts beyond the utilitarian functions of these from incorporation by law; iii) the soundness of transforming an idea of vagueness into a general principle for law and policy making in the information age; iv) the extent to which technological neutrality fUlther exacerbates the already problematic idea of instrumentalism in law. Externally, after demonstrating the political contours of technological neutrality, the thesis questions: i) whether technological neutrality would be able to survive the challenges that have been levelled at political neutrality by authors of diverse theoretical affiliations; and ii) whether the normative articulation of new forms of authority in the background culture of the information environment calls on the state to protect personal autonomy in ways thl1t are incompatible with the exclusionary methodology of political neutrality. Technological neutrality, the thesis demonstrates, does not live up to these or other challenges that the thesis introduces.

The aim of the thesis is to develop a theory of autonomy-respecting paternalism which delineates an area of morally permissible paternalistic interference. Paternalism is defined as any infringement of a prima facie right to non-interference for the purpose of protecting or promoting the recipient's well-being. It is argued that autonomy involves not only liberty of action, but also the achievement of self-construction and self-control. The role of rational reflection in the achievement of self-construction is discussed at some length, and the importance of knowledge, including self-knowledge and moral sensitivity is emphasized. The right to non-interference is taken to be grounded in the intrinsic value of autonomy, and possession of a prima facie right to non-interference is extended to all beings with desires. This general right is discussed in terms of three rights of greater specificity: non-interference with actions, states, and opportunities. An account of the vehicle for alienation of the right to non-interference is developed in terms of a technical notion of subsequent approval. The principle of respect for autonomy is shown to be as applicable in paternalistic dealings with children as it is with adults, without this having counter-intuitive consequences in practice. It is also shown how far the paternalistic promotion of a recipient's well-being, understood as the satisfaction of informed desires, can be reconciled with the principle of respect for autonomy. Finally, the theory is applied to particular cases of paternalism in familial, medical, and legal contexts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-262). / Microfiche. / xiv, 262 leaves, bound 29 cm

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-148). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Montana, 2007. / Title from title screen. Description based on contents viewed June 19, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-56).

盧傑雄. / 論文(博士)--香港中文大學, 2000. / 參考文獻 (p. 198-214) / 中英文摘要. / Available also through the Internet via Dissertations & theses @ Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Lu Jiexiong. / Lun wen (bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2000. / Can kao wen xian (p. 198-214) / Zhong Ying wen zhai yao.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2009. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-151).

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Multicultural conflicts pervade our world and have sparked considerable debate about their possible resolution. We argue that how culture is conceptualized is crucial to the continued dialogue about multicultural conflicts. Specifically, we argue that approaches that argue for the protection of cultures run into significant problems if they do not employ a conception of cultures as delineated entities. However, we also hold that the notion that cultures cannot be distinct in any way, does very little to contribute to dialogue. From the very beginning, it excludes the notion of a culture that is to be protected and thus stops the dialogue there and then. To be true to the principle of audi ad alteram partem, approaches to multicultural conflicts must conceive of an alternative model, provided that such a model is logically possible. This may provide the dialogue with a much needed point of common understanding from which to proceed. Accordingly, we develop a model of culture whereby it is possible to delineate cultures. In this model, a culture can be delineable in a manner analogous to how we delineate persons. Our model of personal delineation suggests a dual structure whereby a trivial personal boundary contains a unity of conflict within the person. In persons, this unity of conflict lies in the relationship between the “I” and repressed meanings. This relationship must be characterised by self-referential decisions and the capacity to make self-referential decisions is central to our definition of personal autonomy. In cultures, we argue that multicultural conflicts provide the necessary conditions that enable us to conceptualize trivial boundaries in cultures in terms of the communicative relationships between members of a particular culture. Multicultural conflicts prompt self-categorizations by individuals and such self-categorizations are made in terms of group membership. Though all members may not agree as to who belongs to the culture and who does not, the claims made about membership serve to differentiate the communicative relationships inside the culture from those outside it. Furthermore, we show that, inside this trivial boundary, a unity of conflict analogous to the one found in personal autonomy, can be exhibited by cultures. We show how a culture, through its institutions, particularly through an institutionalised exit possibility, 1) may exhibit self-reference and 2) relate to a source of authority in the same way as a person does when making selfreferential decisions. In this regard, we argue that institutionalised exit possibilities embody adherence to the consensus vs. power criterion, according to which the dominant account of a culture is achieved through consensus, as opposed to through the exertion of power. Furthermore, we argue that with a strong analogy between cultures’ and personal delineation, it becomes reasonable to extend concepts we usually apply to persons, such as fairness, attachment and viability, so that they can also apply to cultures. We show that the application of these concepts clarifies certain current multicultural issues. The application of theses concepts also leads to the development of a decision making process to deal with multicultural issues. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Multikulturele konflikte kom wêreldwyd voor en het reeds aansienlike debat oor die resolusie van sodanige konflik ontlok. Ons voer aan dat hoe kultuur gekonseptualiseer word, besonder belangrik is vir die voorgesette dialoog oor multikulturele konflikte. Meer spesifiek voer ons aan dat benaderings wat vir die beskerming van kulture argumenteer, beduidende probleme ondervind indien dit nie `n konsepsie van kulture as delinieerbare entiteite gebruik nie. Die gedagte dat kulture nie op enige manier afgebaken kan word nie, dra egter ook weinig by tot dialoog. Dit sluit van meet af die gedagte dat kulture beskerm moet word, uit en staak dus die dialoog daar en dan. Ten einde getrou te wees aan die beginsel van audi ad alteram partem, moet benaderings tot multikulturele konflik `n alternatiewe model van kultuur bedink, mits so `n model logies moontlik is. So `n model kan die dialoog van `n broodnodige gemeenskaplike uitgangspunt voorsien. Ons ontwikkel dienooreenkomstig `n model van kultuur waarvolgens dit moontlik is om kulture te delinieer. Volgens hierdie model kan `n kultuur delinieer word in analogie met hoe persone delinieer word. Ons model van persoonlike deliniëring stel `n tweeledige struktuur voor, waarvolgens `n triviale persoonlike grens `n eenheid van konflik binne die persoon omspan. In persone lê hierdie eenheid van konflik in die verhouding tussen die “ek” en onderdrukte betekenisse. Hierdie verhouding moet deur self-referensiële besluite gekenmerk word. Die vermoë tot self-referensiële besluite, so voer ons aan, is ook die sentrale kenmerk van persoonlike outonomie. Ons voer aan dat multikulturele konflikte die noodsaaklike toestande skep wat ons in staat stel om triviale grense in kulture te definieer in terme van die kommunikatiewe verhoudings tussen lede van `n spesifieke kultuur. Multikulturele konflikte ontlok self-kategorisering deur individue en sodanige kategorisering word in terme van groeplidmaatskap gedoen. Hoewel alle lede van die kultuur nie noodwendig saamstem oor wie aan die kultuur behoort en wie nie, maak die bewerings wat oor lidmaatskap gemaak word dit moontlik om die kommunikatiewe verhoudings binne die kultuur te onderskei van dié buite die kultuur. Verder demonstreer ons dat, binne hierdie triviale grens, kulture `n eenheid van konflik ten toon kan stel wat soortgelyk aan die eenheid van konflik by persoonlike outonomie is. Ons wys hoe `n kultuur, deur sy instellings, en vernaam deur `n geïnstitusionaliseerde uitgangsmoontlikheid (‘exit possibility’) 1) self-referensie ten toon kan stel en 2) in verhouding met `n bron van gesag kan staan soos `n persoon wanneer s/hy self-referensiële besluite maak. In dié verband voer ons aan dat geïnstitusionaliseerde uitgangsmoontlikhede die beliggaming is van die nakoming van die konsensus vs. mag-kriterium, waarvolgens die dominante weergawe van `n kultuur bereik word deur konsensus, teenoor deur die uitoefen van mag. Verder voer ons aan dat `n sterk analogie tussen kulture en persone se deliniëring dit moontlik maak om begrippe soos regverdigheid, binding en lewensvatbaarheid, wat gewoonlik op persone toegepas word, op kulture toe te pas. Die toepassing van hierdie begrippe verbeter ons begrip van sekere huidige multikulturele kwessies en lei ook tot die ontwikkeling van `n besluitnemingsproses vir multikulturele kwessies.