A smart grid cost/benefit analysis answers a series of economic questions that address the incremental benefits of each stage or decision point. Each stage of the economic analysis provides information about the incremental benefits of that stage with respect to the previous stage. With this approach stages that provide little or no economic benefits can be identified. In this study there are series of applications,-including quasi-steady state power flows over time-varying loads and costs of service, Monte Carlo simulations, reconfiguration for restoration, and coordinated control - that are used to evaluate the cost-benefits of a series of smart grid investments. In the electric power system planning process, engineers seek to identify the most cost-effective means of serving the load within reliability and power quality criteria. In order to accurately assess the cost of a given project, the feeder losses must be calculated. In the past, the feeder losses were estimated based upon the peak load and a calculated load factor for the year. The cost of these losses would then be calculated based upon an expected, fixed per-kWh generation cost. This dissertation presents a more accurate means of calculating the cost of losses, using hourly feeder load information and time-varying electric energy cost data. The work here attempts to quantify the improvement in high accuracy and presents an example where the economic evaluation of a planning project requires the more accurate loss calculation. Smart grid investments can also affect response to equipment failures where there are two types of responses to consider -blue-sky day and storm. Storm response and power restoration can be very expensive for electric utilities. The deployment of automated switches can benefit the utility by decreasing storm restoration hours. The automated switches also improve system reliably by decreasing customer interruption duration. In this dissertation a Monte Carlo simulation is used to mimic storm equipment failure events, followed by reconfiguration for restoration and power flow evaluations. The Monte Carlo simulation is driven by actual storm statistics taken from 89 different storms, where equipment failure rates are time varying. The customer outage status and durations are examined. Changes in reliability for the system with and without automated switching devices are investigated. Time varying coordinated control of Conservation Voltage Reduction (CVR) is implemented. The coordinated control runs in the control center and makes use of measurements from throughout the system to determine control settings that move the system toward optimum performance as the load varies. The coordinated control provides set points to local controllers. A major difference between the coordinated control and local control is the set points provided by the coordinated control are time varying. Reduction of energy and losses of coordinated control are compared with local control. Also eliminating low voltage problems with coordinated control are addressed. An overall economic study is implemented in the final stage of the work. A series of five evaluations of the economic benefits of smart grid automation investments are investigated. Here benefits that can be quantified in terms of dollar savings are considered here referred to as "hard dollar" benefits. Smart Grid investment evaluations to be considered include investments in improved efficiency, more cost effective use of existing system capacity with automated switches, and coordinated control of capacitor banks and voltage regulators. These Smart Grid evaluations are sequentially ordered, resulting in a series of incremental hard dollar benefits. Hard dollar benefits come from improved efficiency, delaying large capital equipment investments, shortened storm restoration times, and reduced customer energy use. The evaluation shows that when time varying loads are considered in the design, investments in automation can improve performance and significantly lower costs resulting in "hard dollar" savings. / Ph. D.

No description available.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Engineering in the School of Electrical and Information Engineering, July 2017 / This dissertation presents the design and testing of controllers intended to provide au- tonomous demand response, through the use of water heater loads and grid frequency measurements. The controllers use measured frequency as an indication of the strain on a utility grid, which allows demand side management to be isolated from any form of central control. Water heaters can operate as exible loads because their power consump- tion can be dispatched or deferred without directly impacting users. These properties make it possible to control individual water heaters based on the functioning of the grid, rather than end user input. The purpose of this research is to ultimately provide a low- cost alternative to a traditional Smart Grid, that will improve the resilience of a grid without negatively impacting users. The controllers presented here focus on ensuring that users receive hot water, while attempting to reduce any imbalance between power generated and power consumed on the grid. Simulations of these controllers in various situations highlight that while the controllers developed respond suitably to variations in the grid frequency and adequately ensure end users receive hot water, the practical bene t of the controllers depends largely on the intrinsic characteristics of the grid. / CK2018

A model of the accurate harmonic allocation methods is developed to improve the current emission limits of IEEE Std.519. IEC 61000-3-6 and IEEE Std. 519 have by now been accepted as two well known standards for interconnecting the MV and HV-EHV customers to utility systems and widely adopted as standards to many power utilities. It is worth noting that the harmonic current emission limits of both standards have not been compared and justified with analytical proofs because there is still no explanation that discusses the origin of the emission limits in IEEE Std. 519, or the complex feature of IEC 61000-3-6. Two new novel methods of allocating the harmonic current emission limits for MV customers and HV-EHV customers have been proposed. Both methods have been developed in accordance with the principles of IEC 61000-3-6. Task II has compared and investgated the emission limits of both IEC 61000-3-6 and IEEE Std. 519. The difference, inconsistency and inaccuracy have been proven with the perspective of practical evaluations based on their own principles. The investigations focus on the specific numerical proofs of the resulting voltage distortions and the current emission limits in the MV and HV-EHV systems rather than on the philosophies. The proposed methods strongly support IEC 61000-3-6 and IEEE Std. 519, and add to their value; these methods could also help utilities allocate fairly and accurately harmonic emission limits to their MV and HV-EHV customers.

The objective of the proposed research is to analyze automated residential energy management technology using primary energy source utilization. A residential energy management system (REMS) is an amalgamation of hardware and software that performs residential energy usage monitoring, planning, and control. Primary energy source utilization quantifies power system levels impacts on power generation cost, fuel utilization, and environmental air pollution; based on power system generating constraints and electric load. Automated residential energy management technology performance is quantified through a physically-based REMS simulation. This simulation includes individual appliance operation and accounts for consumer behavior by stochastically varying appliance usage and repeating multiple simulation iterations for each simulated scenario. The effect of the automated REMS under varying levels of control will be considered. Aggregate REMS power system impacts are quantified using primary energy source utilization. This analysis uses a probabilistic economic dispatch algorithm. The economic dispatch algorithm quantifies: fuel usage and subsequent environmental air pollution (EAP) generated; based on power system generating constraints and electric load (no transmission constraints are considered). The analysis will comprehensively explore multiple residential energy management options to achieve demand response. The physically-based REMS simulation will consider the following control options: programmable thermostat, direct load control, smart appliance scheduling, and smart appliance scheduling with a stationary battery. The ability to compare multiple automated residential energy management technology options on an equal basis will guide utility technology investment strategies.

M.Com. (Informatics) / Critical Infrastructure is the term used to describe assets that are of utmost importance, or in other words, essential in the functioning of an environment. Societies depend on their critical infrastructure in order to maintain and continuously improve on their population’s standard of living. The creation of more self-sustainable methods of energy consumption and generation drives towards the creation of a better and more efficient evolution of the power grid critical infrastructure, named the smart grid. The introduction of the smart grid brought in a paradigm shift towards the practices used to manage the generation and distribution of electric power. The introduction of highly capable information systems to intrinsically work with current power grid technologies provided the ability to enhance economic and environmental efficiency of power systems. Although providing a wide variety of benefits, such information systems also created new points of vulnerabilities, which if exploited, place the smart grid at risk of disruptions. In order to address the security issues that occur at the application and data exchange level of smart grid information systems, the dissertation proposed the use of a security model to protect the smart grid. The Multi-Agent Smart Grid Security (MA-SGS) model is based on the use of multiple autonomous intelligent software agents which attempt to create operational stability and efficiency in the smart grid...

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / With the rapid growth of technology, scientists are trying to find ways to make the world a more efficient and eco-friendly place. The research and development of electric vehicles suddenly boomed since natural resource are becoming very scarce. The significance of an electric vehicle goes beyond using free energy, it is environ- mental friendly. The objective of this thesis is to understand what Vehicle to Grid Communication (V2G) for an electric vehicle is, and to implement a model of this highly efficient system into a Hybrid Petri Net. This thesis proposes a Hybrid Petri net modeling of Vehicle to Grid (V2G) Communication topology. Initially, discrete, continuous, and hybrid Petri net's are defined, familiarized, and exemplified. Secondly, the Vehicle and Grid side of the V2G communication system is introduced in detail. The modeling of individual Petri nets, as well as their combination is discussed thoroughly. Thirdly, in order to prove these systems, simulation and programming is used to validate the theoretical studies. A Matlab embedded simulation program known as SimHPN is used to simulate specific scenario's in the system, which uses Depth-first Search (DFS) Algorithm. In addition to SimHPN simulation program, Matlab program is made to output four levels of the reachability tree as well as specifying duplicate and terminate nodes. This code incorporates a technique known as Breadth-first Search (BFS) Algorithm.

The introduction of communication technology into the electric power grid has made the grid more reliable. Power system operators gain visibility over the power system and are able to resolve operational issues remotely via Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) technology. This reduces outage periods. Nonetheless, the remote-control capability has rendered the power grid vulnerable to cyberattacks. In December 2015, over 200,000 people in Ukraine became victims of the first publicly reported cyberattack on the power grid. Consequently, cyber-physical security research for the power system as a critical infrastructure is in critical need. Research on cybersecurity for power grids has produced a diverse literature; the multi-faceted nature of the grid makes it vulnerable to different types of cyberattacks, such as direct power grid, supply chain and ransom attacks. The attacks may also target different levels of grid operation, such as the transmission system, distribution system, microgrids, and generation. As these levels are characterized by varying operational constraints, the literature may be categorized not only according to the type of attack it targets, but also according to the level of power system operation under consideration. It is noteworthy that cybersecurity research for the transmission system dominates the literature, although the distribution system is noted to have a larger attack surface. For the distribution system, a notable attack type is the so-called direct switching attack, in which an attacker aims to disrupt power supply by compromising switching devices that connect equipment such as generators, and power grid lines. To maximize the damage, this attack tends to be coordinated as the attacker optimally selects the nodes and switches to attack. This decision-making process is often a bi- or tri-level optimization problem which models the interaction between the attacker and the power system defender. It is necessary to detect attacks and establish coordination/correlation among them. Determining coordination is a necessary step to predict the targets of an attack before attack completion, and aids in the mitigation strategy that ensues. While the literature has addressed the direct switching attack on the distribution system in different ways, there are also shortcomings. These include: (i) techniques to establish coordination among attacks are centralized, making them prone to single-point failures; (ii) techniques to establish coordination among attacks leverage only power system models, ignoring the influence of communication network vulnerabilities and load criticality in the decisions of the attacker; (iii) attacker-defender optimization models assume specific knowledge of the attacker resources and constraints by the defender, a strong unrealistic assumption that reduces their usability; (iv) and, mitigation strategies tend to be static and one-sided, being implemented only at the physical level, or at the communication network level. In light of this, this dissertation culminates in major contributions concerning real-time decentralized correlation of detected direct switching attacks and hybrid mitigation for electric power distribution systems. Concerning this, four novel contributions are presented: (i) a framework for decentralized correlation of attacks and mitigation; (ii) an attacker-defender optimization model that accounts for power system laws, load criticality, and cyber vulnerabilities in the decision-making process of the attacker; (iii) a real-time learning-based mechanism for determining correlation among detected attacks and predicting attack targets, and which does not assume knowledge of the attacker's resources and constraints by the power system defender; (iv) a hybrid mitigation strategy optimized in real-time based on information learned from detected attacks, and which combines both physical level and communication network level mitigation. Since the execution of intrusion detection systems and mechanisms such as the ones proposed in this dissertation may deter attackers from directly attacking the power grid, attackers may perform a supply chain cyberattack to yield the same results. Although, supply chain cyberattacks have been acknowledged as potentially far-reaching, and compliance directives put forward for this, the detection of supply chain cyberattacks is in a nascent stage. Consequently, this dissertation also proposes a novel method for detecting supply chain cyberattacks. To the best of the knowledge of the author, this work is the first preliminary work on supply chain cyberattack detection. / Doctor of Philosophy / The electric power grid is the network that transports electricity from generation to consumers, such as homes and factories. The power grid today is highly remote-monitored and controlled. Should there be a fault on the grid, the human operator, often remotely located, may only need to resolve it by sending a control signal to telemetry points, called nodes, via a communication network. This significantly reduces outage periods and improves the reliability of the grid. Nonetheless, the high level connectivity also exposes the grid to cyberattacks. The cyber connectivity between the power grid and the human operator, like all communication networks, is vulnerable to cyberattacks that may allow attackers to gain control of the power grid. If and when successful, wide-spread and extended outages, equipment damage, etc. may ensue. Indeed, in December 2015, over 200,000 people in Ukraine became victims to the first publicly reported cyberattack on a power grid. As a critical infrastructure, cybersecurity for the power grid is, therefore, in critical need. Research on cybersecurity for power grids has produced a diverse literature; the multi-faceted nature of the grid makes it vulnerable to different types of cyberattacks, such as direct power grid, supply chain and ransom attacks. Notable is the so-called direct switching attack, in which an attacker aims to compromise the power grid communication network in order to toggle switches that connect equipment such as generators, and power grid lines. The aim is to disrupt electricity service. To maximize the damage, this attack tends to be coordinated; the attacker optimally selects several grid elements to attack. Thus, it is necessary to both detect attacks and establish coordination among them. Determining coordination is a necessary step to predict the targets of an attack before attack completion. This aids the power grid owner to intercept and mitigate attacks. While the literature has addressed the direct switching attack in different ways, there are also shortcomings. Three outstanding ones are: (i) techniques to determine coordination among attacks and predict attack targets are centralized, making them prone to single-point failures; (ii) techniques to establish coordination among attacks leverage only power system physical laws, ignoring the influence of communication network vulnerabilities in the decisions of the attacker; (iii) and, studies on the interaction between the attacker and the defender (i.e., power grid owner) assume specific knowledge of the attacker resources and constraints by the defender, a strong unrealistic assumption that reduces their usability. This research project addresses several of the shortcomings in the literature, particularly the aforementioned. The work focuses on the electric distribution system, which is the power grid that connects directly to consumers. Indeed, this choice is ideal, as the distribution system has a larger attack surface than other parts of the grid and is characterized by computing devices with more constrained computational capability. Thus, adaptability to simple computing devices is a priority. The contributions of this dissertation provide leverage to the power grid owner to intercept and mitigate attacks in a resilient manner. The original contributions of the work are: (i) a novel realistic model that shows the decision making process of the attacker and their interactions with the defender; (ii) a novel decentralized mechanism for predicting the targets of coordinated cyberattacks on the electric distribution grid in real-time and which is guided by the attack model, (iii) and a novel hybrid optimized mitigation strategy that provides security to the power grid at both the communication network level and the physical power grid level. Since the power grid is constructed with smart equipment from various vendors, attackers may launch effective attacks by compromising the devices deployed in the power grid through a compromised supply chain. By nature, such an attack is evasive to traditional intrusion detection systems and algorithms such as the aforementioned. Therefore, this work also provides a new method to defend the grid against supply chain attacks, resulting in a mechanism for its detection in a critical power system communication device.

Este trabalho trata do desenvolvimento de uma metodologia e de uma ferramenta computacional de localização de faltas em sistemas elétricos de distribuição. Para tanto, considera-se o ambiente de Redes Elétricas Inteligentes, onde está à disposição uma grande diversidade de informações, como oscilografias de relés, dados de sensores, dados históricos, alarmes de medidores inteligentes, dentre outras. Convencionalmente, as metodologias de localização de defeitos em redes de distribuição se baseiam em conjuntos particulares de dados, que geralmente são medições apenas na saída do alimentador, e funcionam como uma ferramenta isolada no centro de operações. Este trabalho contribui para esse tema ao propor a Localização de Faltas como uma ferramenta de Automação Avançada, instalada em um Sistema de Gerenciamento da Distribuição. Ele deve estar integrado aos demais sistemas corporativos, dos quais obtém dados de medição, alarmes de atuação e indicação de eventos na rede, em tempo real. Um barramento de interoperabilidade permite a troca de informações entre os sistemas. O algoritmo de localização de faltas proposto considera os alarmes de atuação de chaves monitoradas, indicação de sensores, alarmes de ausência de tensão, dentre outras informações, para restringir ao máximo a área de busca do defeito. Por fim, uma implementação de Algoritmo Evolutivo permite estimar o local e a resistência de falta, a partir de testes de defeitos na área de busca. Nesse processo, os valores calculados são comparados com as medições obtidas dos respectivos pontos. Na etapa de aplicação da metodologia, foram consideradas algumas condições de monitoramento da rede elétrica: da condição de menor monitoramento ao cenário de maior monitoramento. Foi possível verificar como o aumento da quantidade de informações do sistema traz benefícios para a localização dos defeitos. / This work provides the development of a methodology and a computational tool for Fault Location (FL) in power distribution systems. The Smart Grid environment is considered, which provides a huge variety of information, such as relays waveforms, fault current sensors and historical data, smart meters alarms, among others. Conventionally, FL methodologies in power distribution systems are based on particular data sources, usually measurements at the beginning of the power feeder, which are not integrated with other corporate systems. This work contributes to the subject by proposing the FL as an Advanced Distribution Automation tool, to be installed in a Distribution Management System. As a part of the electric utility corporate systems, it obtains metering data, equipment alarms and events notifications, i.e. real time information. An Interoperability Bus (IB) allows the information exchange among the systems. The proposed FL algorithm considers monitored switches tripping alarms, current current sensors notifications, outage alarms, among other data, in order to narrow the search area as much as possible. Ultimately, an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) implementation estimates the fault point and the fault resistance, through short-circuit tests an the search area. During that process, the computed electric quantities are compared with the measured ones at each monitored point. When applying the methodology for the case studies, some power grid monitoring conditions were considered: from the least monitored condition to the most monitored scenario. This made it possible to verify how the increase of power grid information benefits the FL algorithms.

No description available.