This thesis addresses the question of divine action in the mind: Is human consciousness a uniquely nonphysical causal joint wherein divine intentions meet natural realities without contravening lawlike physical processes? It is argued that consciousness is not uniquely spiritual but wholly natural (and possibly physical). However, this need not lead to the conclusion that divine action in the mind does not occur. Rather, this thesis argues that noninterventionist causal joint programs (such as those privileging the mind as uniquely open to divine action) are both scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient, resting on questionable metaphysical presuppositions that are not necessitated by either theology or the natural sciences. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in the mind (and elsewhere). It is argued that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divine action in the mind than that offered by standard causal joint theories. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God’s active presence, one is then free to affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part One engages with the scientific and philosophical literature surrounding human consciousness, and uses debates about the nature of the mind to offer a sustained analysis and critique of what is termed the “standard model” of divine action. It is argued that the noninterventionist, incompatibilist model of divine action that has spurred the development of various causal joint theories is scientifically and theologically insufficient, and that this is seen particularly clearly in recent theories locating (and constraining) divine action in the emergent human mind. Chapter 2 analyses the contemporary divine action scene, arguing that the standard model presumes noninterventionism, incompatibilism, and a high view of the laws of nature. However, the God-world relationship implied by this model is theologically insufficient. Chapter 3 examines Philip Clayton’s divine action theory, which locates divine action in the emergent human mind and is the latest manifestation of the causal joint model described in Chapter 2. After using emergence theory itself to critique Clayton’s approach, the thesis then examines the philosophy and science of consciousness, in Chapters 4 and 5. It is suggested that a physicalist understanding of the mind is a well-supported position. Part Two of the thesis reframes divine action in the mind within an explicitly theological framework. The thesis does this by analysing what is termed the “theological turn” in divine action debates – the recent tendency to react against standard causal joint theories by rejecting the idea that science can say anything about how and whether divine action occurs. Proponents of the theological turn instead understand divine action from explicitly theological perspectives, affirming compatibilist models in which God is seen to work in, through, and with natural processes – precisely because God is never absent from nature in the first place. Such an approach allows theologians to accept physicalist explanations of the mind, precisely because all the natural world is necessarily involved with God. Chapter 6 introduces this theological turn by exploring various versions of naturalism, ultimately suggesting that neither philosophy nor science mandates the sort of metaphysical naturalism assumed not only by those who deny divine action, but (ironically) noninterventionist divine action theorists as well. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 then introduce, compare, and contrast three different versions of strong theistic naturalism: Thomism, panentheistic naturalism, and pneumatological naturalism. While each of these explicitly theological frameworks is distinctive, they share an affirmation of the intimate relationship between God’s immanent, active presence in the natural world, and suggest the naturalised mind as a relatively intense locus of divine action, as human minds actively participate in and with God. It is concluded that the participatory ontology supported by these theistic naturalisms does, after all, suggest the mind as a locus of intensified divine action – but for very different reasons than those motivating causal joint theorists.

The publication of The Origin of Species in 1859 raised a host of theological issues. Chief amongst them is the question of how a good, loving, and powerful God could create through an evolutionary process that involved so much suffering, pain, and violence. The traditional Christian answers for suffering in the natural world are not plausible in an evolutionary world. We cannot blame natural evil on human sin, since earth history shows that non-human suffering long preceded humans. Nor can we say that God allows suffering because it allows opportunity for moral choice, spiritual closeness with God, and the development of virtue, as none of these apply to the non-human realm. A new approach is needed to address the question of suffering and violence amongst non-human animals. In this dissertation, I address the question of evolutionary suffering with a multi-disciplinary approach of biblical studies, philosophical theology, and systematic theology to build a compound theodicy. After a survey of the various scholarly contributions in this area, I begin with biblical considerations of the God-world relationship. I set aside, based on exegetical examinations of Genesis 1-9, notions of “fallenness” in the natural world. I therefore argue that evolution was God’s intended process of creation, and that we should not attribute it to any kind of corruption. The rest of the dissertation engages in the development of a compound theodicy rooted in a philosophical and theological definition of love. How does a God who loves creatures respond to their suffering? I argue that God’s action in creation is characterised by kenotic restraint, the giving of freedom, co-suffering with creatures, and the work of redemption.

We are living in the information age and this has had an effect on both science and theology. Our understanding of the fundamental role of information has increased significantly. One can even say that information has become an overarching metaphor in the world of science. This dissertation gives an overview of the impact of the information-based scientific world-view on the dialogue between science and theology. The study investigates the metaphorical use of information concepts to secure a better understanding of God's action in the world and the role that information plays in the processes of life. The focus is on the role of biological information, and its relation to divine action is investigated. The scientific importance of information and the possible impact of information concepts on the science and theology dialogue of the future are discussed. / Systematic Theology & Theological Ethics / M. Th.(Systematic Theology)

This dissertation investigates the God-world relationship between Joseph Bracken as a process theologian, Philip Clayton as a panentheist, and the open theism. They have affinities and differences as conversational partners in their multilayered relations. Their common question must be as follows: “What does it mean to believe in God today?” In this dissertation I compare their respectively theological perspectives and explore their affinities and differences. Many scholars have already noted more affinities than untenable differences among Bracken’s theology, Clayton’s panentheism, and the open theism. On the one hand, even though theological perspectives of Bracken and Clayton are obviously different from each other, they are both influenced in specific ways by Whitehead. On the other hand, open theism is a movement that emphasizes “the openness of God,” from within evangelical theism. The fact that there is even within classical theism the pursuit of new models of God such as revised classical theism or modified classical theism might suggest the need for contemporary models of God in philosophical theology. This dissertation will thus explore philosophical theologies that are proper both to the biblical faith and intellectual earnestness, that is, 居敬窮理 (geo (to live) kyeong (piety) kung (to acknowledge) li (reason)) in Eastern philosophy, which means distinctions but not separation between piety and intelligence, and that stand between classical theism and “orthodox” process theism. If there is no consistency among biblical, rational and existential descriptions of God, how can we establish philosophical theologies? Our theological task is to frame a new constructive theology whose primary aspect must synthesize both classical theism and process theology in the hermeneutical circle. For example, this new theism admits an infinitely qualitative difference between God and the world, as well as a really radical relation between God and the world. Aspects and domains do not encroach upon each other.

We are living in the information age and this has had an effect on both science and theology. Our understanding of the fundamental role of information has increased significantly. One can even say that information has become an overarching metaphor in the world of science. This dissertation gives an overview of the impact of the information-based scientific world-view on the dialogue between science and theology. The study investigates the metaphorical use of information concepts to secure a better understanding of God's action in the world and the role that information plays in the processes of life. The focus is on the role of biological information, and its relation to divine action is investigated. The scientific importance of information and the possible impact of information concepts on the science and theology dialogue of the future are discussed. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M. Th.(Systematic Theology)

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Recent years have seen increased interest in using theism (the perspective that assumes that God is currently actively in the world) as a conceptual framework for scientific inquiry. This interest has built particular momentum in psychology where several scholars have expressed that traditional naturalistic approaches limit understanding and investigation of psychology's subject matter and thus are insufficient to fully account for human phenomena. Others have previously made the case for the consideration of theism as a legitimate alternative basis for psychological theory, research, and practice. This dissertation begins with that consideration and examines what would be required to move a theistic approach to psychology forward. In other words, if God is assumed to be active in the world (including the psychological world-theism), what difference would that make for the ideas, methods, and practices of psychology? As the current activity of God is the foundational assumption of theism, clarity about what that activity would entail is especially essential for those seeking to develop a theistic approach to psychology and to describe how their discipline would be different from that perspective. Unfortunately, there is currently a lack of clear and explicitly articulated conceptions of God's actions in and for psychology. This dissertation provides a conceptual analysis of the activity of God that synthesizes disparate approaches to divine action into a tentative conceptualization or taxonomic schema. This schema organizes the scholarly literature from across several major traditions into six major heads and elucidates multiple subordinate concepts. The conceptualization serves as an orientation to important issues such as strong v weak theisms, the limitations of naturalism, and practical theistic applications for psychology. Detailed illustrations of these concepts as applied to psychological theory, research (both in the qualitative and quantitative modes), and practice further demonstrate the utility of such a conceptualization. These examples provide a specific focus on the unique contributions of a theistic perspective over and against those of naturalism.