The rapid growth of financial markets and the increasing diffusion of corporate ownership have placed tremendous emphasis on the effectiveness of corporate governance in resolving agency conflicts within the firm. This study investigates the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation by implementing various econometric modelling methods to disaggregate causal relations and spurious correlations. Using a panel dataset of Australian firms, a comprehensive suite of corporate governance mechanisms are considered; including the ownership, remuneration, and board structures of the firm. Initial ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects panel specifications report significant causal relations between various corporate governance measures and firm outcomes. However, the dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) results indicate that no causal relations exist when taking into account the effects of simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. Moreover, these results remain robust when accounting for the firm??s propensity for fraud. The findings support the equilibrium theory of corporate governance and the firm, suggesting that a firm??s corporate governance structure is an endogenous characteristic determined by other firm factors; and that any observed relations between governance and firm outcomes are spurious in nature. Chapter 2 examines the corporate governance and firm performance relation. Using a comprehensive suite of corporate governance measures, this chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm performance when accounting for the biases introduced by simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. This result is consistent across all firm performance measures. Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance and likelihood of firm failure relation by implementing the Merton (1974) model of firm-valuation. Similarly, no significant causal relations between a firm??s corporate governance structure and its likelihood of failure are detected when accounting for the influence of endogeneity on the parameter estimates. Chapter 4 re-examines the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation within the context of corporate fraud. Using KPMG and ASIC fraud databases, the corporate governance and firm outcome relations are estimated whilst accounting for the firms?? vulnerability to corporate fraud. This chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm outcomes when conditioning on a firm??s propensity for fraud.

The rapid growth of financial markets and the increasing diffusion of corporate ownership have placed tremendous emphasis on the effectiveness of corporate governance in resolving agency conflicts within the firm. This study investigates the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation by implementing various econometric modelling methods to disaggregate causal relations and spurious correlations. Using a panel dataset of Australian firms, a comprehensive suite of corporate governance mechanisms are considered; including the ownership, remuneration, and board structures of the firm. Initial ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects panel specifications report significant causal relations between various corporate governance measures and firm outcomes. However, the dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) results indicate that no causal relations exist when taking into account the effects of simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. Moreover, these results remain robust when accounting for the firm??s propensity for fraud. The findings support the equilibrium theory of corporate governance and the firm, suggesting that a firm??s corporate governance structure is an endogenous characteristic determined by other firm factors; and that any observed relations between governance and firm outcomes are spurious in nature. Chapter 2 examines the corporate governance and firm performance relation. Using a comprehensive suite of corporate governance measures, this chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm performance when accounting for the biases introduced by simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. This result is consistent across all firm performance measures. Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance and likelihood of firm failure relation by implementing the Merton (1974) model of firm-valuation. Similarly, no significant causal relations between a firm??s corporate governance structure and its likelihood of failure are detected when accounting for the influence of endogeneity on the parameter estimates. Chapter 4 re-examines the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation within the context of corporate fraud. Using KPMG and ASIC fraud databases, the corporate governance and firm outcome relations are estimated whilst accounting for the firms?? vulnerability to corporate fraud. This chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm outcomes when conditioning on a firm??s propensity for fraud.