This thesis concerns the collapse of Houston based Enron Corporation and its ongoing economic, political and legal implications. Specifically, I investigate spaces of corporate fraud to broadly ask, how is fraud located in the varied spatial contexts of the firm? My goal is to demonstrate that the corporation is contingent upon social, cultural and material relationships across space. In this regard, I explore three distinct corporate spaces. They include (1) financial statements, where I discuss Enron’s financial performances in two spatial contexts, what the public saw, and what went on in private, (2) the bodies of workers, where I consider the gendered exposure of Enron’s fraud to the public, and (3) the spaces of the courtroom where I document how the corporation, as a non-bodied entity, became embodied in a courtroom context. In each case, I demonstrate how fraud is situated differently, and in each case, I suggest the implications of corporate fraud play out with differing results for those involved. The research for this thesis involved an archeological and ethnographic approach towards gathering and analyzing narratives around Enron’s downfall. This means I rely on financial documents and other important papers published by the former company, semi-structured interviews with former Enron employees, interviews with key media persons documenting the Enron story, participant-observation of the criminal trial against former CEOs (Chief Executive Officer) Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, media analysis of news articles and other popular culture texts, and finally, journaling. Far from being solely a homo economicus, a rational economic actor guided by capitalist imperatives to extract profit, my data suggests that the corporation is constituted through cultural, social and material agents that are unstable and breakdown. With this, I suggest the use of a new metaphor for the corporation, the corporation as a body. The body I conceive is conceptually drawn from feminist post-structural theory. It is open, porous and embodied. This new metaphor enables me to draw on the corporation’s diverse embodiments as important constitutive moments of corporate fraud.

This thesis concerns the collapse of Houston based Enron Corporation and its ongoing economic, political and legal implications. Specifically, I investigate spaces of corporate fraud to broadly ask, how is fraud located in the varied spatial contexts of the firm? My goal is to demonstrate that the corporation is contingent upon social, cultural and material relationships across space. In this regard, I explore three distinct corporate spaces. They include (1) financial statements, where I discuss Enron’s financial performances in two spatial contexts, what the public saw, and what went on in private, (2) the bodies of workers, where I consider the gendered exposure of Enron’s fraud to the public, and (3) the spaces of the courtroom where I document how the corporation, as a non-bodied entity, became embodied in a courtroom context. In each case, I demonstrate how fraud is situated differently, and in each case, I suggest the implications of corporate fraud play out with differing results for those involved. The research for this thesis involved an archeological and ethnographic approach towards gathering and analyzing narratives around Enron’s downfall. This means I rely on financial documents and other important papers published by the former company, semi-structured interviews with former Enron employees, interviews with key media persons documenting the Enron story, participant-observation of the criminal trial against former CEOs (Chief Executive Officer) Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, media analysis of news articles and other popular culture texts, and finally, journaling. Far from being solely a homo economicus, a rational economic actor guided by capitalist imperatives to extract profit, my data suggests that the corporation is constituted through cultural, social and material agents that are unstable and breakdown. With this, I suggest the use of a new metaphor for the corporation, the corporation as a body. The body I conceive is conceptually drawn from feminist post-structural theory. It is open, porous and embodied. This new metaphor enables me to draw on the corporation’s diverse embodiments as important constitutive moments of corporate fraud.

This thesis concerns the collapse of Houston based Enron Corporation and its ongoing economic, political and legal implications. Specifically, I investigate spaces of corporate fraud to broadly ask, how is fraud located in the varied spatial contexts of the firm? My goal is to demonstrate that the corporation is contingent upon social, cultural and material relationships across space. In this regard, I explore three distinct corporate spaces. They include (1) financial statements, where I discuss Enron’s financial performances in two spatial contexts, what the public saw, and what went on in private, (2) the bodies of workers, where I consider the gendered exposure of Enron’s fraud to the public, and (3) the spaces of the courtroom where I document how the corporation, as a non-bodied entity, became embodied in a courtroom context. In each case, I demonstrate how fraud is situated differently, and in each case, I suggest the implications of corporate fraud play out with differing results for those involved. The research for this thesis involved an archeological and ethnographic approach towards gathering and analyzing narratives around Enron’s downfall. This means I rely on financial documents and other important papers published by the former company, semi-structured interviews with former Enron employees, interviews with key media persons documenting the Enron story, participant-observation of the criminal trial against former CEOs (Chief Executive Officer) Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling, media analysis of news articles and other popular culture texts, and finally, journaling. Far from being solely a homo economicus, a rational economic actor guided by capitalist imperatives to extract profit, my data suggests that the corporation is constituted through cultural, social and material agents that are unstable and breakdown. With this, I suggest the use of a new metaphor for the corporation, the corporation as a body. The body I conceive is conceptually drawn from feminist post-structural theory. It is open, porous and embodied. This new metaphor enables me to draw on the corporation’s diverse embodiments as important constitutive moments of corporate fraud. / Arts, Faculty of / Geography, Department of / Graduate

Abstract In the current scenario of the business world, organizations face the pervasive problem of corporate fraud. This leads to huge losses and deprivation results in reduced profitability, diminished shareholders returns, loss of growth in opportunities and in certain cases even these threaten the sustainability of the organizations. Though dedicated investigations units and courts, specific legislation enhanced awareness and monitoring organizations in developing countries but still corporate fraud are abound. Therefore, establishing the key drivers for corporate fraud will enable the organizations to better evaluate their risk strategy and also to understand how to reanalyzing the role of corporate governance in regards to corporate fraud in developing countries. The qualitative research was used firstly with deductive approach in this study in order to establish the key drivers of corporate fraud; and secondly, to assess the role of corporate governance in addressing these drivers of corporate fraud. A total number of 10 structured, and semi-structured on-line based interviews through Zoom were conducted with the gatekeepers, bank managers and the compliance officers in a diverse range of organizations to explore this research. A further 2 interviews were conducted with the experts in the field of forensic investigation and corporate governance, whose insights views were used to test the initial findings for the triangulation process. The insight derived formed the basis of the data which was analyzed to produce the findings for this research. From this research, both the internal and external drivers of corporate fraud identified some common themes, though the diverse nature of the organizations researched. Illegal collusion between employees as well as financial distress because of recent economic failure were found to be amongst the key drivers. More particularly, findings indicated that corporate governance does and even play a critical role in regards to these drivers, and thus making the organization more conscious and proactive to address corporate fraud. Nevertheless, poor and inadequate implementation of corporate governance standards weakens the effectiveness. Thereupon, the real picture is that corporate governance is not legislated and contributes to the haphazard manner in which this is applied in different organizations in developing countries. To conclude that, corporate governance needs to be more supported by an ethical culture which can therefore serve its actual purpose. Despite findings, evidence that corporate governance is neglected by certain organizations. However, the findings from the derived triangulations exercise in strong support on the above findings. / <p>This thesis has been published by Md Abdul Baten &amp; Clara Chidinma Amadi.</p>

I propose and test a dynamic model of corporate fraud pyramid using tax fraud, accounting and management compensation controversies (MCC). The pyramid facets represent the explanatory dimensions of corporate governance mechanisms, quality of audit and regulatory regimes, and executive compensation. I find that large-sized firms with bigger boards invariably indulge in tax fraud. Conversely, older firms, firms paying higher executive compensation, exhibiting greater audit committee expertise and greater board meeting frequency curtail tax fraud incidence. Increased board meeting frequency, firm age, senior executive compensation and firm size is associated with increase in accounting controversies. Conversely, increased gender diversity curtails accounting fraud. Increase in firm size, senior executive compensation and outsider director’s compensation is associated with increased MCC incidence. CEO duality, single biggest owner, regulatory quality, rising EPS and operating profit margin, linking CEO compensation with total shareholder return and audit committee management independence significantly curtail MCC incidence. Increased stock-based compensation is accompanied by an increase in MCC. Audit and nomination committees and board members may not be truly independent. Firms audited by Big4 auditors have the least chance of getting entangled in accounting controversies. However, firms paying higher audit fee have a greater tendency of indulging in accounting fraud. Firms exposed to better regulatory quality environment have a much greater chance of getting involved in tax fraud controversies. Various explanatory variables behaved differently before, during and after the financial crisis. Univariate analyses support the majority of results of multivariate analyses.

The law is stated as at July 2006, before the enactment of the United Kingdom Fraud Act 2006. This thesis covers ‘serious’ corporate fraud and not commonplace petty fraud. I examined corporate fraud, concentrating on a comparison of the United Kingdom’s fraud with that of two civil law neighbouring countries, France and Germany, both with high financial activity, and also with a few American states, common law systems like the English legal system. The objective of this study is to identify ways of combating fraud in the UK by enquiry and discovery as to how fraud occurs and how the two different legal systems- civil and common law- treat fraud. The study reveals factors contributing to corporate fraud and recommendations for combating corporate fraud. Exploring the concept of fraud, my findings are that corporate fraud is facing exponential increase, with the UK government beginning to acknowledge this. I examined the agencies that combat fraud in the states mentioned above including the UK. Although the UK is party to an impressive number of Treaties, which help to combat fraud, treaties dealing with terrorism, drug dealing, money laundering, and other organised crime, corporate fraud is still a serious problem. The conclusions can be summarised as follows. The UK could learn much from the French legal system and the way France prosecutes corporations as per Articles 132, 222, 432, 433 and 435 of the French Penal Code. Germany’s Criminal Code is equally comprehensive in its prescriptive definitions of frauds including corporate frauds as in chapters 8, 19, 2, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 30 of the German Criminal Code. The new UK’s non-codified general, core, offence of fraud, with fraud offences maintained in other statutes such as the Companies Act, likens the UK fraud regulation closer to the US’s with its Criminal Code and other statutes that deal with fraud. The UK has not yet caught up with the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 as regards electronic business systems’ rules. The USA’s federal prescriptive code for fraud offences is akin to the French and German criminal codes and these are found in US Federal Penal Code Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 47, sections 1020 to 1084. Legal privilege is fraud exempt in the United but not in France and Germany. Legal privilege in the UK is partly exempt for SFO investigations and mandatory money laundering reporting.

The Upper Echelons Theory states that CEO characteristics, among them the Dark Tetrad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism) of personality, affect decision-making. In an accounting context, the presence of the Dark Tetrad of personality in CEOs can reduce accounting information quality because the personalities of the Dark Tetrad are associated with callousness, impulsivity, manipulation, criminality, grandiosity, enjoyment of cruelty, and misconduct, therefore CEOs with these traits are likely to manipulate earnings or commit fraud. However, companies with strong reputation due to the credibility and trustworthiness built into the company values and culture can reduce the effect of dark personality in accounting information quality. In such context, this study aims to investigate the moderating effect of corporate reputation on the relationship between the Dark Tetrad of personality and accounting information quality. The main assumption is that CEOs with strong Dark Tetrad traits engage more in earnings management and fraud; however, in companies with strong reputation, earnings management and fraud would be lower due to the values, structures, and formal or informal rules built around corporate reputation. This implies that companies with strong reputation tend to suppress the opportunistic actions of CEOs, enabling better accounting information quality. The research design was divided into two parts: the first part involved an archival method and the second part used an experiment method. For the archival method, I analyzed 434 firms (2,645 observations) with headquarters in the United States, covering the period between 2010 and 2017, using abnormal accruals, real earnings management, and classification shifting for earnings management, the overall Fortune\'s World\'s Most Admired Companies score for reputation, CEO speeches, and dark personality literature to measure the Dark Tetrad of personality. I ran regressions to test the research hypotheses and found that the Dark Tetrad of personality shows a positive relationship with all types of earnings management. Regarding reputation, only abnormal accruals show a negative relationship with corporate reputation. In turn, the interaction between the Dark Tetrad of personality and corporate reputation is negatively related to all types of earnings management. For the experimental method, I used a 2x2 between-subjects experiment design involving 101 MBA students who, in general, have had experience in management in Brazil and the United States of America. To measure the Dark Tetrad of personality, I used the Short-Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) and the Assessment of Sadistic Personality (Plouffe et al., 2017). For reputation, I adapted the scenarios from Goldberg and Hartwick (1990) and Lafferty (2007). For fraud, I developed two proxies, the first with five situations based on literature addressing accounting issues, and the other based on D\'Souza and Lima (2015). To test the hypotheses, I applied Ordinary Least Squares regressions and Poisson regressions and found that psychopathy, sadism, Machiavellianism, and the Dark Tetrad of personality show a positive relationship with accounting fraud and misrepresentation. Regarding reputation, in all the models, reputation is not related to fraud. On the other hand, in relation to the interaction between the Dark Tetrad of personality and corporate reputation, only highly Machiavellian CEOs are discouraged from committing fraud by a strong reputation. Therefore, this study demonstrated that CEO personality can affect accounting information quality, however, corporate reputation is an intangible resource that influences CEO decision-making, so as a result, reputation helps to increase accounting information quality. / A Teoria dos Altos Escalões afirma que as características do CEO afetam a tomada de decisão deles, na qual uma delas é a Tétrade Sombria (narcisismo, maquiavelismo, psicopatia e sadismo) da personalidade. No contexto contábil, a presença de traços da Tétrade Sombria em CEOs pode reduzir a qualidade da informação contábil, porque as personalidades da Tétrade Sombria estão associadas à insensibilidade, impulsividade, manipulação, criminalidade, grandiosidade, prazer na crueldade e má conduta, portanto, CEOs com esses traços provavelmente gerenciariam resultados ou cometeriam fraudes. No entanto, as empresas com forte reputação devido à credibilidade e confiabilidade que estão incorporadas em valores e cultura da empresa podem reduzir o efeito da personalidade sombria na qualidade da informação contábil. Neste contexto, o presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar o efeito moderador da reputação corporativa sobre a relação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e a qualidade da informação contábil. Assim, o principal pressuposto é que os CEOs com traços altos da Tétrade Sombria envolvem mais em gerenciamento de resultados e fraude, no entanto, em empresas com forte reputação, o gerenciamento de resultados e fraude seriam menores devido aos valores, estruturas e regras formais ou informais construídas em empresas com forte reputação. Isso implica que as empresas com forte reputação tendem a suprimir as ações oportunistas do CEO, permitindo uma melhor qualidade da informação contábil. O método de pesquisa foi dividido em duas partes: primeira parte, um método documental; e segunda parte, um método experimental. Para o método documental, foram analisadas 434 empresas (2.645 observações) com sede nos Estados Unidos para o período entre 2010 e 2017, utilizando accruals anormais, gerenciamento de resultados por atividades e mudança de classificação para gerenciamento de resultados, a pontuação geral das empresas mais admiradas da Fortune World para reputação, e o discurso do CEO e a literatura de personalidade sombria para mensurara Tétrade Sombria da personalidade. Para, foram executadas regressões para testar as hipóteses de pesquisa e verificou-se que a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade possui uma relação positiva com todos os tipos de gerenciamento de resultados; em relação à reputação, apenas os accruals anormais mostram relação negativa com a reputação corporativa; por sua vez, a interação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e a reputação corporativa está negativamente relacionada a todos os tipos de gerenciamento de resultados. Para o método experimental, foi utilizado o desenho de experimento 2x2 entre sujeitos com 101 alunos de MBA do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos da América que, em geral, tiveram experiência em gestão. Para medir a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade, foi usado The Short-Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) e Assessment of Sadistic Personality (Plouffe et al., 2017). Para a reputação, foi adaptado os cenários de Goldberg e Hartwick, (1990) e Lafferty (2007). Já para a fraude, foi empregada duas variáveis, a primeira tem cinco situações baseadas em literatura abordando questões contábeis e a outra baseia-se em D\'Souza e Lima (2015).Para testar as hipóteses, aplicou-se regressão por Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários e regressão Poisson, e observou-se que a psicopatia, o sadismo, o maquiavelismo e a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade mostraram uma relação positiva com a fraude contábil e a falsa representação; sobre a reputação, a reputação de todos os modelos não apresentou relação com fraude; Por outro lado, em relação à interação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e reputação corporativa, apenas os CEOs altamente maquiavélicos estão desencorajados a cometer fraude devido a uma forte reputação. Portanto, este estudo demonstrou que a personalidade do CEO pode afetar a qualidade da informação contábil, no entanto, a reputação corporativa é um recurso intangível que influencia a tomada de decisão do CEO, então a reputação ajuda a aumentar a qualidade da informação contábil.

The rapid growth of financial markets and the increasing diffusion of corporate ownership have placed tremendous emphasis on the effectiveness of corporate governance in resolving agency conflicts within the firm. This study investigates the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation by implementing various econometric modelling methods to disaggregate causal relations and spurious correlations. Using a panel dataset of Australian firms, a comprehensive suite of corporate governance mechanisms are considered; including the ownership, remuneration, and board structures of the firm. Initial ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects panel specifications report significant causal relations between various corporate governance measures and firm outcomes. However, the dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) results indicate that no causal relations exist when taking into account the effects of simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. Moreover, these results remain robust when accounting for the firm??s propensity for fraud. The findings support the equilibrium theory of corporate governance and the firm, suggesting that a firm??s corporate governance structure is an endogenous characteristic determined by other firm factors; and that any observed relations between governance and firm outcomes are spurious in nature. Chapter 2 examines the corporate governance and firm performance relation. Using a comprehensive suite of corporate governance measures, this chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm performance when accounting for the biases introduced by simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. This result is consistent across all firm performance measures. Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance and likelihood of firm failure relation by implementing the Merton (1974) model of firm-valuation. Similarly, no significant causal relations between a firm??s corporate governance structure and its likelihood of failure are detected when accounting for the influence of endogeneity on the parameter estimates. Chapter 4 re-examines the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation within the context of corporate fraud. Using KPMG and ASIC fraud databases, the corporate governance and firm outcome relations are estimated whilst accounting for the firms?? vulnerability to corporate fraud. This chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm outcomes when conditioning on a firm??s propensity for fraud.

The rapid growth of financial markets and the increasing diffusion of corporate ownership have placed tremendous emphasis on the effectiveness of corporate governance in resolving agency conflicts within the firm. This study investigates the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation by implementing various econometric modelling methods to disaggregate causal relations and spurious correlations. Using a panel dataset of Australian firms, a comprehensive suite of corporate governance mechanisms are considered; including the ownership, remuneration, and board structures of the firm. Initial ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed-effects panel specifications report significant causal relations between various corporate governance measures and firm outcomes. However, the dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) results indicate that no causal relations exist when taking into account the effects of simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. Moreover, these results remain robust when accounting for the firm??s propensity for fraud. The findings support the equilibrium theory of corporate governance and the firm, suggesting that a firm??s corporate governance structure is an endogenous characteristic determined by other firm factors; and that any observed relations between governance and firm outcomes are spurious in nature. Chapter 2 examines the corporate governance and firm performance relation. Using a comprehensive suite of corporate governance measures, this chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm performance when accounting for the biases introduced by simultaneity, dynamic endogeneity, and unobservable heterogeneity. This result is consistent across all firm performance measures. Chapter 3 explores the corporate governance and likelihood of firm failure relation by implementing the Merton (1974) model of firm-valuation. Similarly, no significant causal relations between a firm??s corporate governance structure and its likelihood of failure are detected when accounting for the influence of endogeneity on the parameter estimates. Chapter 4 re-examines the corporate governance and firm performance/failure relation within the context of corporate fraud. Using KPMG and ASIC fraud databases, the corporate governance and firm outcome relations are estimated whilst accounting for the firms?? vulnerability to corporate fraud. This chapter finds no evidence of a causal relation between corporate governance and firm outcomes when conditioning on a firm??s propensity for fraud.

The Upper Echelons Theory states that CEO characteristics, among them the Dark Tetrad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism) of personality, affect decision-making. In an accounting context, the presence of the Dark Tetrad of personality in CEOs can reduce accounting information quality because the personalities of the Dark Tetrad are associated with callousness, impulsivity, manipulation, criminality, grandiosity, enjoyment of cruelty, and misconduct, therefore CEOs with these traits are likely to manipulate earnings or commit fraud. However, companies with strong reputation due to the credibility and trustworthiness built into the company values and culture can reduce the effect of dark personality in accounting information quality. In such context, this study aims to investigate the moderating effect of corporate reputation on the relationship between the Dark Tetrad of personality and accounting information quality. The main assumption is that CEOs with strong Dark Tetrad traits engage more in earnings management and fraud; however, in companies with strong reputation, earnings management and fraud would be lower due to the values, structures, and formal or informal rules built around corporate reputation. This implies that companies with strong reputation tend to suppress the opportunistic actions of CEOs, enabling better accounting information quality. The research design was divided into two parts: the first part involved an archival method and the second part used an experiment method. For the archival method, I analyzed 434 firms (2,645 observations) with headquarters in the United States, covering the period between 2010 and 2017, using abnormal accruals, real earnings management, and classification shifting for earnings management, the overall Fortune\'s World\'s Most Admired Companies score for reputation, CEO speeches, and dark personality literature to measure the Dark Tetrad of personality. I ran regressions to test the research hypotheses and found that the Dark Tetrad of personality shows a positive relationship with all types of earnings management. Regarding reputation, only abnormal accruals show a negative relationship with corporate reputation. In turn, the interaction between the Dark Tetrad of personality and corporate reputation is negatively related to all types of earnings management. For the experimental method, I used a 2x2 between-subjects experiment design involving 101 MBA students who, in general, have had experience in management in Brazil and the United States of America. To measure the Dark Tetrad of personality, I used the Short-Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) and the Assessment of Sadistic Personality (Plouffe et al., 2017). For reputation, I adapted the scenarios from Goldberg and Hartwick (1990) and Lafferty (2007). For fraud, I developed two proxies, the first with five situations based on literature addressing accounting issues, and the other based on D\'Souza and Lima (2015). To test the hypotheses, I applied Ordinary Least Squares regressions and Poisson regressions and found that psychopathy, sadism, Machiavellianism, and the Dark Tetrad of personality show a positive relationship with accounting fraud and misrepresentation. Regarding reputation, in all the models, reputation is not related to fraud. On the other hand, in relation to the interaction between the Dark Tetrad of personality and corporate reputation, only highly Machiavellian CEOs are discouraged from committing fraud by a strong reputation. Therefore, this study demonstrated that CEO personality can affect accounting information quality, however, corporate reputation is an intangible resource that influences CEO decision-making, so as a result, reputation helps to increase accounting information quality. / A Teoria dos Altos Escalões afirma que as características do CEO afetam a tomada de decisão deles, na qual uma delas é a Tétrade Sombria (narcisismo, maquiavelismo, psicopatia e sadismo) da personalidade. No contexto contábil, a presença de traços da Tétrade Sombria em CEOs pode reduzir a qualidade da informação contábil, porque as personalidades da Tétrade Sombria estão associadas à insensibilidade, impulsividade, manipulação, criminalidade, grandiosidade, prazer na crueldade e má conduta, portanto, CEOs com esses traços provavelmente gerenciariam resultados ou cometeriam fraudes. No entanto, as empresas com forte reputação devido à credibilidade e confiabilidade que estão incorporadas em valores e cultura da empresa podem reduzir o efeito da personalidade sombria na qualidade da informação contábil. Neste contexto, o presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar o efeito moderador da reputação corporativa sobre a relação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e a qualidade da informação contábil. Assim, o principal pressuposto é que os CEOs com traços altos da Tétrade Sombria envolvem mais em gerenciamento de resultados e fraude, no entanto, em empresas com forte reputação, o gerenciamento de resultados e fraude seriam menores devido aos valores, estruturas e regras formais ou informais construídas em empresas com forte reputação. Isso implica que as empresas com forte reputação tendem a suprimir as ações oportunistas do CEO, permitindo uma melhor qualidade da informação contábil. O método de pesquisa foi dividido em duas partes: primeira parte, um método documental; e segunda parte, um método experimental. Para o método documental, foram analisadas 434 empresas (2.645 observações) com sede nos Estados Unidos para o período entre 2010 e 2017, utilizando accruals anormais, gerenciamento de resultados por atividades e mudança de classificação para gerenciamento de resultados, a pontuação geral das empresas mais admiradas da Fortune World para reputação, e o discurso do CEO e a literatura de personalidade sombria para mensurara Tétrade Sombria da personalidade. Para, foram executadas regressões para testar as hipóteses de pesquisa e verificou-se que a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade possui uma relação positiva com todos os tipos de gerenciamento de resultados; em relação à reputação, apenas os accruals anormais mostram relação negativa com a reputação corporativa; por sua vez, a interação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e a reputação corporativa está negativamente relacionada a todos os tipos de gerenciamento de resultados. Para o método experimental, foi utilizado o desenho de experimento 2x2 entre sujeitos com 101 alunos de MBA do Brasil e dos Estados Unidos da América que, em geral, tiveram experiência em gestão. Para medir a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade, foi usado The Short-Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014) e Assessment of Sadistic Personality (Plouffe et al., 2017). Para a reputação, foi adaptado os cenários de Goldberg e Hartwick, (1990) e Lafferty (2007). Já para a fraude, foi empregada duas variáveis, a primeira tem cinco situações baseadas em literatura abordando questões contábeis e a outra baseia-se em D\'Souza e Lima (2015).Para testar as hipóteses, aplicou-se regressão por Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários e regressão Poisson, e observou-se que a psicopatia, o sadismo, o maquiavelismo e a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade mostraram uma relação positiva com a fraude contábil e a falsa representação; sobre a reputação, a reputação de todos os modelos não apresentou relação com fraude; Por outro lado, em relação à interação entre a Tétrade Sombria da personalidade e reputação corporativa, apenas os CEOs altamente maquiavélicos estão desencorajados a cometer fraude devido a uma forte reputação. Portanto, este estudo demonstrou que a personalidade do CEO pode afetar a qualidade da informação contábil, no entanto, a reputação corporativa é um recurso intangível que influencia a tomada de decisão do CEO, então a reputação ajuda a aumentar a qualidade da informação contábil.