王睿智. / 論文(哲學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院歷史學部, 1997. / 參考文獻: leaves [213-218]. / Wang Ruizhi. / Chapter 第一章： --- 「三角政治」的締造者及六九年中蘇衝突 帶來的契機 / Chapter 第二章： --- 六十年代蘇聯開始在冷戰取得優勢 / Chapter 第三章： --- 七三至七六年：中美關係停滯不前及蘇聯 加緊擴張 / Chapter 第四章： --- 「三個世界」理論：七十年代中國的新 「世界觀」及毛澤東逝世後的中蘇關係 / Chapter 第五章： --- 七七年至七九年：中美走向建交及其合作 的局限 / Chapter 第六章： --- 蘇聯入侵阿富汗帶來地緣政治衝擊，成 爲「三角關係」的轉捩點 / Chapter 第七章： --- 七九年至八二年：蘇聯入侵阿富汗推動中 美合作以及中美關係的新危機 / Chapter 第八章： --- 中國採取新外交姿態以及對美國、蘇聯關 係的變化 / 餘論 / 參考書目

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University

Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University

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This dissertation examines three enduring questions for the study of conflict. First, I consider how domestic institutions affect threat credibility, arguing that audiences can either help or hinder a leader during bargaining. Second, I show that the success of third party guarantees of civil war treaties is conditional on the guarantor's credibility. Finally, I argue that the willingness of a leader to nurture a reputation depends on their time horizons, and that long time horizons can allow a leader to deter conflict. The first essay considers how leaders communicate in a crisis. Scholars frequently use audience costs to explain how accountable leaders communicate, but these have received mixed empirical support. I argue this apparent disconnect between theory and evidence is due to simplistic assumptions about how audiences use their sanctioning power. I contend that supporters balance concerns over consistency and policy outcomes. As such, accountable leaders' ability to credibly communicate depends on their supporters' policy preferences. I apply this insight using casualty sensitivity as a conditioning policy preference. I expect, and find, that audiences only help a leader commit to fight when fighting is low cost, and actually prevent commitment when fighting is high cost. Audiences have countervailing effects on credibility due to their preferences for leaders who are both consistent and avoid costly conflict. The second essay addresses a puzzle regarding outside enforcement of civil war peace agreements. Instead of fighting, domestic belligerents could have agreed to outside support for a peaceful resolution to their underlying dispute, avoiding war and its costs. Existing theory cannot explain why third parties can end but not prevent conflict. I argue that war breaks out if third parties cannot credibly promise to enforce a peacefully negotiated agreement. Subsequent military intervention serves as a sunk cost signal of the third party's resolve to enforce an agreement, facilitating peace. I test this theory using a new dataset of treaty terms and duration for civil wars that began between 1944 and 1997. Consistent with the theory, guarantees only prolong the post-war peace when the guarantor intervened in the conflict. Guarantees that were not associated with an intervention do not improve the prospects for peace. In the final essay I argue that reputation formation is a type of investment. Leaders pay the costs of fighting in the present, in return for future gains in the form of deterrence. The investment decision depends on whether leaders survive in office to reap the future benefits of their reputation. I formally show that, while long time horizons increase a leader's willingness to fight, this alone does not make reputation formation more likely. As reputations form through the strategic decision to go to war, the chance to form a reputation is determined by the opponent's bargaining strategy. Opponents can "pay'' a leader to forgo the chance to earn a reputation through fighting by making greater concessions. However, an opponent might instead offer small concessions that risk war to learn a leader's resolve. Knowing a leader's resolve gives the opponent an advantage should they bargain in the future. As a result, when both a leader and their opponent have long time horizons, they forgo bargaining concessions that would be acceptable without reputation concerns, leading to war. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester 2018. / July 13, 2018. / Includes bibliographical references. / Mark A. Souva, Professor Directing Dissertation; Jonathan Grant, University Representative; William D. Berry, Committee Member; Robert J. Carroll, Committee Member.

Chung, Lok Wai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 254-271). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract / --- p.i / Acknowledgments/ --- p.iii / Table of Content / --- p.iv / List of Tables / --- p.ix / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- Theoretical background --- p.2 / Chapter 2. --- Research questions --- p.6 / Chapter 3. --- Explanatory Variables and Hypothesis: --- p.7 / Chapter 4. --- Main Findings --- p.9 / Chapter 5. --- Research methodology --- p.10 / Chapter 6. --- Research significance --- p.11 / Chapter 7. --- Structure of the thesis --- p.12 / Chapter Chapter One: --- Literature Review --- p.15 / Chapter 1. --- Debate between ideas and interests in International Relations --- p.16 / Chapter 1.1. --- Conceptualization --- p.17 / Chapter 1.2. --- How idea affects policy: three pathways? --- p.19 / Chapter 1.3. --- Interest matter? --- p.20 / Chapter 1.4. --- How is it formed? --- p.22 / Chapter 1.5. --- End of idealism and rationalism debate? --- p.23 / Chapter 2. --- Debate between epistemic community with other communities --- p.28 / Chapter 2.1. --- How expert group works --- p.31 / Chapter 2.1.1. --- Uncertainty --- p.31 / Chapter 2.1.2. --- Cause and effect relationships --- p.32 / Chapter 2.1.3. --- Define self-interests --- p.33 / Chapter 2.1.4. --- Formulate policy --- p.33 / Chapter 2.2. --- Difference between epistemic community with other groups --- p.33 / Chapter 2.3. --- How to affect policy --- p.35 / Chapter 2.4. --- Transnational Advocacy Network --- p.38 / Chapter 2.4.1. --- What is network --- p.38 / Chapter 2.4.2. --- What is transnationalism --- p.40 / Chapter 2.4.3. --- What is transnational advocacy network? --- p.42 / Chapter 2.4.4. --- How Transnational Advocacy Network works? --- p.44 / Chapter 2.4.5. --- What conditions do advocacy networks have influence? --- p.46 / Chapter 3. --- Application to the North Korea case --- p.47 / Chapter Chapter Two: --- North Korea Economy: General Review and Trend Development --- p.50 / Chapter 1. --- History of North Korea --- p.50 / Chapter 2. --- Overview: From 50s to 2002 --- p.52 / Chapter 1.1. --- Economic Philosophy: Juche --- p.53 / Chapter 1.2. --- 70-80s --- p.55 / Chapter 1.3. --- After the Cold War --- p.56 / Chapter 1.4. --- Famine: 1995 --- p.58 / Chapter 1.5. --- 2002 Reform --- p.58 / Chapter 1.5.1. --- Prices rising and increase in wages based on performance --- p.60 / Chapter 1.5.2. --- Enhancement of self-management of enterprises --- p.61 / Chapter 1.5.3. --- Devaluation of exchange rate --- p.62 / Chapter 1.5.4. --- Farm reform --- p.62 / Chapter 1.5.5. --- Attracting foreign direct investment --- p.63 / Chapter 3. --- North Korean Economy in 2005-2007 --- p.63 / Chapter 3.1 --- Lack of substantial changes --- p.64 / Chapter 3.1.1. --- Slow down the rapid change --- p.64 / Chapter 3.1.2. --- Focus on security/nuclear issue --- p.65 / Chapter 3.1.3. --- Adverse feedback from the July Reform --- p.67 / Chapter 3.2. --- Detrimental Economic Situation --- p.70 / Chapter 4. --- Conclusion --- p.71 / Chapter Chapter Three: --- EU-DPRK Relations: From Governmental to Non-Governmental … --- p.73 / Chapter 1. --- EU-Asia Relations: In general --- p.73 / Chapter 2. --- EU-DPRK: Historical review --- p.76 / Chapter 2.1. --- Cold War Era --- p.76 / Chapter 2.2. --- Post Cold War era --- p.78 / Chapter 2.3. --- After 9-11 --- p.80 / Chapter 3. --- EU-DPRK Relations: Governmental Level --- p.82 / Chapter 3.1. --- EU Perspective --- p.82 / Chapter 3.1.1. --- Motives --- p.82 / Chapter 3.1.2. --- Strategy: Quiet and Engagement diplomacy --- p.83 / Chapter 3.1.3. --- Political perspective --- p.85 / Chapter 3.1.3.1. --- Political dialogue --- p.85 / Chapter 3.1.3.2. --- Diplomatic recognition --- p.87 / Chapter 3.1.3.3. --- Nuclear and security problem --- p.88 / Chapter 3.1.4. --- Economic perspective --- p.89 / Chapter 3.1.4.1. --- Trade --- p.89 / Chapter 3.1.4.2. --- Economic Assistance --- p.91 / Chapter 3.1.4.3. --- Food aid --- p.91 / Chapter 3.1.4.4. --- Technological Transfer --- p.93 / Chapter 3.2. --- DPRK Perspective --- p.96 / Chapter 3.2.1. --- Motives --- p.96 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- Strategy: Pragmatic but gradually open --- p.98 / Chapter 3.2.2.1. --- Pragmatic policy --- p.98 / Chapter 3.2.2.2. --- Open Policy --- p.100 / Chapter 4. --- EU-DPRK relations: Non-Governmental Level --- p.103 / Chapter 4.1. --- NGOs and North Korea --- p.104 / Chapter 4.2. --- Humanitarian NGOs in North Korea --- p.105 / Chapter 4.2.1. --- Period: 1995-1998 --- p.106 / Chapter 4.2.2. --- Period: 1998 -1999 --- p.108 / Chapter 4.2.3. --- Period: 1998 to present --- p.110 / Chapter 4.3. --- Debate among European NGOs: Hard-landing vs. Change through Rapproachment? --- p.111 / Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.114 / Chapter Chapter Four: --- Pushing the envelope: new forms of political advocacy generated by NGOs: analysis on the two EU-DPRK Workshops organized by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation --- p.116 / Chapter 1. --- FNF and the expert group generated by it --- p.117 / Chapter 1.1. --- Shared Normative and Principled Belief --- p.119 / Chapter 1.2. --- Shared Causal Belief --- p.122 / Chapter 1.3. --- Shared Notions of Validity --- p.125 / Chapter 1.4. --- A Common Policy Enterprise --- p.126 / Chapter 2. --- "Experts groups in FNF matters: How did the ideas developed, transferred and influenced the policymakers in North Korea" --- p.128 / Chapter 2.1. --- Transnational actor characteristics --- p.131 / Chapter 2.1.1. --- Participants of the expert group --- p.131 / Chapter 2.1.1.1. --- Workshop in 2004 --- p.132 / Chapter 2.1.2. --- Consensus among community members --- p.134 / Chapter 2.1.3. --- Density among members --- p.136 / Chapter 2.1.4. --- Resources of FNF --- p.137 / Chapter 2.2. --- The specific need of policy suggestion from North Korea --- p.140 / Chapter 2.2.1. --- The existence of uncertainty --- p.141 / Chapter 2.3. --- Communication Process --- p.145 / Chapter 2.3.1. --- Networking Building --- p.145 / Chapter 2.3.1.1. --- Seminar --- p.145 / Chapter 2.3.1.2. --- Study Tour/ Training seminar --- p.147 / Chapter 2.3.2. --- Channels --- p.149 / Chapter 2.3.2.1. --- Conference --- p.149 / Chapter 2.3.2.2 --- Presentation --- p.151 / Chapter 2.3.2.3. --- General Discussion and working groups --- p.152 / Chapter 2.3.2.4. --- Field Visit --- p.154 / Chapter 2.3.2.5. --- Lunch/Coffee Break and Dinner --- p.155 / Chapter 2.4. --- Institutionalization of advice --- p.155 / Chapter 2.5. --- Communication strategies --- p.158 / Chapter 2.6. --- Policies recommendation and ideas shared during the two conferences --- p.160 / Chapter 2.6.1. --- Workshop on Economic Reforms and the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK (31 August to 4 September 2004) --- p.160 / Chapter 2.6.2. --- Second Workshop on Economic Reform and the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK (12-14 October 2005) --- p.171 / Chapter 3. --- Conclusion --- p.188 / Chapter Chapter Five: --- The Distinctive Path of North Korean Reform and the Policy Impacts of the Expert Group --- p.190 / Chapter 1. --- Similarities between North Korea and Central and Eastern Europe --- p.190 / Chapter 2. --- From ideas to policy: What are policy impacts from the expert group to the North Korea economic reform? --- p.195 / Chapter 2.1 --- IT and software development --- p.195 / Chapter 2.1.1. --- Case one: Nosotek --- p.196 / Chapter 2.1.2. --- Case two: Pyongyang International Technology and Infrastructure Exhibition (PITIE) 2006 --- p.198 / Chapter 2.2. --- The strengthening of the small and medium enterprises (SMEs)in mining industry --- p.200 / Chapter 2.3. --- Policies to attract FDI --- p.204 / Chapter 2.4. --- Legal development --- p.205 / Chapter 2.4.1. --- Case one: Pyongyang Law Office --- p.206 / Chapter 2.4.2. --- Case two: Birindelli & Associati --- p.207 / Chapter 2.4.3. --- "Law on the Assessment of Environmental Effects in North Korea (Mar. 10, 2006)" --- p.208 / Chapter 2.5. --- Trade fairs --- p.210 / Chapter 2.5.1. --- The Pyongyang Autumn International Trade Fair (PAITT) 2006-2008 --- p.211 / Chapter 3. --- Conclusion --- p.212 / Conclusion: --- p.214 / Chapter 1. --- Research Implications --- p.215 / Chapter 1.1. --- Revisit the debate between scholarship and policy-making in Political Science --- p.215 / Chapter 1.1.1. --- Bridge-Building Perspective --- p.216 / Chapter 1.1.2. --- Independence Perspective --- p.218 / Chapter 1.2. --- Revisit of the theory of epistemic community and transnational advocacy network --- p.221 / Chapter 1.3. --- Re-examine the debate between shock therapy and gradualism --- p.223 / Chapter 1.4. --- Re-evaluate the importance of EU on North Korea --- p.225 / Chapter 2. --- Conclusion --- p.227 / Appendix 1: Participants of the two EU-DPRK Workshops --- p.229 / Appendix 2: Debate between shock therapy and gradualism approach in economic transformation --- p.240 / Chapter 1. --- Shock therapy --- p.241 / Chapter 1.1. --- Agent analysis --- p.242 / Chapter 1.2. --- Programs analysis --- p.243 / Chapter 1.2.1. --- Price liberalization --- p.243 / Chapter 1.2.2. --- Privatization --- p.243 / Chapter 1.2.3. --- Institutional design --- p.244 / Chapter 1.2.4. --- Monetary policy --- p.245 / Chapter 1.2.5. --- Fiscal Policy --- p.245 / Chapter 1.2.6. --- International trade --- p.246 / Chapter 1.3. --- Ideas analysis --- p.247 / Chapter 2. --- Gradualism --- p.249 / Chapter 2.1. --- Agent analysis --- p.250 / Chapter 2.2. --- Progress analysis --- p.251 / Bibliography --- p.254

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