One part of the criticism regarding a democratic deficit in the EU is towards a considered tecnocratic bureacracy - especially in the Committé of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER). However, if the argumentation stands on research that compare the EU with theoretical constructs, how valid can that criticsm be? By relating the formal discretion of the bureacrats in Coreper to the formal discretion of the bureacrats in Swedish ministries this study contributes to the discussion on an empirical level. The research design is thus a qualitative comparison of procedure-manuals from both units. The method is text analyzing: through the lens of the policy cycle (first and second phase) and through the defined concepts `discretion ́ and `control ́. These concepts stem from theoretical contributions by Herman Finer regarding discretion and democratic legitimacy. The main findings show that the permanent representatives hold more opportunities of discretion than the Swedish bureacrats. However, these are well specified and more so compared to the Swedish case. According to the theoretical framework the specification is of most relevance - why democratic legitimacy can be derived. I therefore argue that this specific criticism towards the EU might not be as valid if Sweden is still to be considered an accepted democratic system.